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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

ALGERIA, MOROCCO
(French and Spanish),
TANGIER
(International Zone)
AND TUNISIA

PART 5

January to December 1956

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter I.—ALGERIA

No. and Name	Date	Subject	Page
General Correspondence			
1 Sir Gladwyn Jebb ... **No. 48**	1956 Feb. 4	French policy in Algeria: M. Mollet's investiture speech ... Statement of Government intentions and of Socialist policy on Algeria.	1
2 Sir Gladwyn Jebb ... **No. 80**	Mar. 10	The Algerian problem ... ... Report by Mr. R. S. Faber, Second Secretary, British Embassy, Paris, on his visit to Algeria from February 21 to March 2, 1956.	4
3	—	The military situation in French North Africa	19
4 Sir Michael Wright... **No. 126**	May 15	The Iraqi attitude to events in Algeria	22
5	—	A general report on the Algerian situation, June 25, 1956, by Brigadier A. C. F. Jackson, C.B.E., Military Attaché, British Embassy, Paris	25
6 Mr. Sarell ... ... **No. 93**	Aug. 7	Monthly political report—July 1956	33
7 Mr. Sarell ... ... **No. 94**	Aug. 8	Record of interview with M. Robert Lacoste	43
8 Mr. Sarell ... ... **No. 99**	Sept. 6	Monthly political report—August 1956	46
9 Mr. Sarell ... ... **No. 103**	Oct. 2	Monthly political report—September 1956	49
10 Mr. Sarell ... ... **No. 105**	Oct. 3	Report by Her Majesty's Consul-General, Algiers, on his visit to the Department of Bône, September 24–26, 1956 ...	53
11	—	Record of conversation between the Secretary of State and M. Pineau on October 14, 1956, in New York	57
12 Mr. Sarell ... ... **No. 106**	Oct. 25	Visit of British Parliamentary Delegation to Algeria, October 15–22, 1956	58
13 Mr. Sarell ... ... **No. 107**	Oct. 26	The arrest of the Algerian Nationalist leaders	60
14 Mr. Sarell ... ... **No. 108**	Oct. 31	Monthly political report—October 1956	62
15 Mr. Sarell ... ... **No. 113**	Nov. 30	Monthly political report—November 1956	65
16 Mr. Sarell ... ... **No. 112**	Nov. 29	Local Government reforms in Algeria	68
Appendix—Biographical Notes			
17 Mr. Sarell ... ... **No. 104**	1956 Oct. 3	Report on leading personalities in Algeria	71

TABLE OF CONTINUED

Chapter II.—FRENCH MOROCCO

No. and Name	Date	Subject	Page
General Correspondence			
18 Mr. Freese-Pennefather **No. 1**	1956 Jan. 3	Quarterly political report—October–December 1955	78
19 Mr. Freese-Pennefather **No. 13**	Jan. 27	Morocco: El Glaoui ... ... After being Pasha of Marrakesh for nearly half a century, El Glaoui passes away in his palace on January 23; an outstanding part played by El Glaoui in the shaping of the destinies of his country.	89
20 Mr. Reilly ... ... **No. 95**	Mar. 26	Report on a visit to Morocco made by Brigadier Jackson, the Military Attaché in Paris, February 20–March 2, 1956 ...	91
21 Mr. Freese-Pennefather **No. 41**	April 13	Quarterly political report—January–March 1956	103
22 Mr. Freese-Pennefather **No. 59 E.**	June 18	Mineral resources and mining in Morocco	112
23 Sir Gladwyn Jebb ... **No. 189**	June 20	" The Grandval Experiment " in retrospect	118
24 Mr. Pyman... ... **No. 73**	Aug. 14	The internal situation in Morocco	120
25 Mr. Pyman... ... **No. 84**	Sept. 10	Moroccan foreign policy	122
26 Mr. Freese-Pennefather **No. 98**	Oct. 29	Moroccan reactions to the arrest of the five Algerian Nationalist leaders	124
27 Mr. Freese-Pennefather **No. 104**	Nov. 7	The prospects for Franco-Moroccan co-operation	128
28 Mr. Freese-Pennefather **No. 111**	Nov. 16	The inaugural meeting of the Moroccan Consulative Assembly Ceremony held in the Mamounia Palace in Rabat on the 12th November, 1956.	133
Chapter III.—SPANISH MOROCCO			
General Correspondence			
29 Sir Ivo Mallet ... **No. 21**	1956 Jan. 20	Evolution of Spanish views on the future of Morocco ... ... Government determined to maintain the unity of the empire and the independence of Morocco; Spanish policy to seek to promote the " self-government of the Spanish Zone by its natural authorities ".	135
30 Sir Ivo Mallet ... **No. 69**	April 12	The Hispano-Moroccan Agreement—April 7, 1956	138
31 Mr. Selwyn Lloyd ... **No. 77**	Sept. 25	British capitulatory rights and privileges in the former Spanish Zone of Morocco	145

18995—14 5/60 52049 B 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter III.—(*continued*)

No. and Name	Date	Subject	Page
Appendix—Biographical Notes			
32 Mr. Pyman ... ... **No. 38**	1956 June 1	Leading personalities in the Northern Zone of Morocco ...	[1
Chapter IV.—TANGIER (International Zone)			
General Correspondence			
33 Mr. Scott ... ... **No. 2**	1956 Jan. 5	Quarterly report—October–December 1955	147
34 Mr. Scott ... ... **No. 3**	Jan. 5	Tangier: Annual review for 1955	150
35 Mr. Scott ... ... **No. 33**	April 12	Quarterly political report—January–March 1956	154
36 Her Majesty's Consul-General, Tangier	—	Quarterly political report—April–June 1956	156
37 Mr. Meade ... **No. 88**	Oct. 8	Quarterly political report—July–September 1956	158
Appendix—Biographical Notes			
38 Mr. Meade ... **No. 65**	1956 July 30	Tangier: Heads of foreign missions	(1)
39 Mr. Meade ... **No. 102**	Dec. 8	Tangier: Leading personalities	161
Chapter V.—TUNISIA			
General Correspondence			
40 Mr. Williams ... **No. 14**	1956 Jan. 25	Political review for the three months ending January 25, 1956	165
41 Mr. Pell ... ... **No. 37**	May 3	Political review—January 26–April 30, 1956	168
42 Mr. Malcolm ... **No. 58**	July 10	Interview with M. Bourguiba	171
43 Mr. Selwyn Lloyd ... **No. 541**	July 17	Conversation between the Secretary of State and the French Ambassador on July 17, 1956 ... ... Views of the French Government on the breakdown in negotiations between the French and the Tunisian Governments for a mutual defence agreement.	172

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter V.—(*continued*)

No. and Name	Date	Subject	Page
44 Mr. Malcolm ... **No. 64**	1956 July 21	The breakdown of the Franco-Tunisian "Inter-dependence" negotiations	174
45 Mr. Malcolm ... **No. 69**	July 31	The Tunisian Constitution—first chapter	176
46 Mr. Malcolm ... **No. 72**	Aug. 5	Support for the French position in Tunisia	178
47 Mr. Malcolm ... **No. 75**	Aug. 5	Political review—May 1 to July 31, 1956	180
48 Mr. Malcolm ... **No. 90**	Sept. 11	French Ambassador to Tunis ... ... Comte Pierre de Leusse appointed in place of M. Roger Seydoux.	183
49 Mr. Malcolm ... **No. 98**	Oct. 15	The present state of Franco-Tunisian relations and the policy of M. Bourguiba's Government	184
50 Mr. Malcolm ... **No. 105**	Oct. 26	State visit of the Sultan of Morocco to Tunisia	187
51 Mr. Malcolm ... **No. 109**	Oct. 31	Political review for the period August 1–October 31, 1956 ...	191

SUBJECT INDEX

[The figures denote the serial numbers of the documents]

ALGERIA

Annual report on leading personalities—17.

Algerian Nationalist leaders, arrest of—13.

Algerian problem, the—2.

Algerian question in the General Assembly, conversation between the Secretary of State and M. Pineau on October 14, 1956, in New York—11.

Algerian situation—
General report by Brigadier Jackson, Military Attaché, British Embassy, Paris—5.

Events in Algeria, Iraqi attitude to—4.

French policy in Algeria—1.

Military situation in French North Africa—3.

Political review, monthly—
July 1956—6.
August 1956—8.
September 1956—9.
October 1956—14.
November 1956—15.

Reforms in Algeria, Local Government—16.

M. Robert Lacoste, record of interview with—7.

Visit of British Parliamentary Delegation to Algeria—12.

Visit to the Department of Bône by Her Majesty's Consul-General—
Algiers, September 24–26, 1956—10.

FRENCH MOROCCO

Arrest of five Algerian Nationalist leaders, Moroccan reactions to—26.

El Glaoui, Pasha of Marrakesh, death of—19.

Franco-Moroccan co-operation, the prospects for—27.

" Grandval Experiment " in retrospect—23.

Internal situation in Morocco—24.

Mineral resources and mining in Morocco—22.

Moroccan Consultative Assembly, Inaugural Meeting of the—28.

Moroccan foreign policy—25.

Political reports—
Quarter, October–December 1955—18.
Quarter, January–March 1956.—21.

Visit to Morocco by Brigadier Jackson, Military Attache, British Embassy, Paris—20.

SPANISH MOROCCO

Annual report on the leading personalities—
British Capitulatory Rights and Privileges in the former Spanish Zone of Morocco—31.

Hispano-Moroccan Agreement, April 7, 1956—30.

Spanish views on the future of Morocco, evolution of—29.

TANGIER (International Zone)

Annual report on the heads of foreign missions—38.

Annual report on the leading personalities—39.

Annual review for 1955—34.

Political reports—
Quarter, October–December 1955—33.
Quarter, January–March 1956—35.
Quarter, April–June 1956—36.
Quarter, July–September 1956—37.

TUNISIA

M. Bourguiba, interview with—42.

Defence Agreement between the French and Tunisian Governments—
Conversation between the Secretary of State and the French Ambassador on July 17, 1956—43.

Franco-Tunisian " Interdependence " negotiations, the breakdown of the—44.

Franco-Tunisian relations and the policy of M. Bourguiba's Government—49.

French Ambassador to Tunis—48.

French position in Tunisia, support for—46.

Political review—
November 1955–January 1956—40.
January 26–April 30, 1956—41.
May 1–July 31—47.
August 1–October 31—51.

Tunisian Constitition—
First Chapter—45.

Visit of the Sultan of Morocco to Tunisia—50.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING ALGERIA, MOROCCO (FRENCH AND SPANISH), TANGIER (INTERNATIONAL ZONE) AND TUNISIA—PART 5

CHAPTER I.—ALGERIA

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

JF 1019/41 No. 1

FRENCH POLICY IN ALGERIA: M. MOLLET'S INVESTITURE SPEECH

Sir Gladwyn Jebb to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received February 7*)

(No. 48. Secret) *Paris,*
Sir, *February 4, 1956.*

In his investiture speech M. Guy Mollet stated that the most pressing and most difficult problem facing his Government was that of Algeria. I have had the honour in recent despatches, of which the last was my despatch No. 429 of the 15th of November, to describe the development of opinion in France on the Algerian problem and the impact on Government policy of the continuing emergency in that country. The purpose of the present despatch is not so much to forecast how the new French Government will cope with this problem—M. Mollet was studiously vague about this—as to summarise briefly the position which he and his Cabinet have inherited.

2. *M. Mollet's investiture speech and Socialist policy on Algeria.*—M. Mollet's statement on Algeria contained the following principal points:—

(i) The despatch of a Minister Resident proved the Government's intention to act firmly;

(ii) The Government refused to argue about terminology, *i.e.*, the Soustelle analysis of the four different policies open to France;

(iii) The Government would press forward with the re-establishment of peaceful conditions providing for the co-existence of the two elements in the population and the maintenance of the " indissoluble union " between Algeria and France;

(iv) The earliest possible free elections to a single college would be held, which would require electoral reform;

(v) More troops would be sent if necessary;

(vi) Apart from administrative reforms, political prisoners would be freed if not subject to ordinary criminal law.

I enclose the full text.(1)

3. There is nothing new in this programme, except perhaps point (vi) which together with (iv) has already caused criticism. In my despatch of the 15th of November I said that it was doubtful whether the Socialists would disagree with M. Faure's outline of his Government's policy on Algeria at that time, which consisted of a number of political, administrative and economic measures for improving the lot of the Algerian Moslems leading eventually to free elections. Certainly the Civil Servants in the Ministry of the Interior have not thought beyond this policy of steady and gradual improvements; moreover the official in charge of Algerian affairs recently claimed to a member of my staff that M. Mollet had inspected his Department's plans for Algeria and approved them. Nevertheless there have been a number of suggestions in the Press to the effect that the Socialists favour a federal policy, *i.e.*, the grant of home rule within the framework of the

(1) Not printed.

French Union. It may well be that a federal solution is the one which would most obviously appeal to the Socialist Party but it is questionable whether, even if it received political backing in the French Assembly in the near future, it could be carried out in practice owing to the lack of what is always called an " interlocuteur valable ".

4. Meanwhile M. Mollet has appointed the venerable General Catroux to be Minister Resident in Algeria and both he and General Catroux will shortly pay their first visit to look at the problem on the spot. General Catroux will have a Secretary of State, M. Champeix, who will answer to him and deal with his business within the Ministry of the Interior. The latter may well have some difficulty in serving two masters, the Minister of the Interior in Paris and the Minister Resident in Algiers. Moreover the War Minister, M. Lejeune, is to have a special responsibility for Algeria. He is reported to have had already a quarrel with M. Bourgès Maunoury, Minister of Defence. This proliferation of authority does not auger well for the liaison between the civil and military power in Algeria, which according to Her Majesty's Consul-General is at present inadequate.

5. General Catroux, who holds liberal views and was chosen to go to Antsirabé to prepare the return of the Sultan of Morocco, will have a difficult job and it is doubtful whether he will himself see the " free elections " which M. Mollet has promised will be carried out. Even the restrained tinge of liberalism which he brings to the scene has already caused great dissatisfaction amongst French interests in Algeria and it is reported that the admirable Mayor of Algiers, M. Jacques Chevallier (himself a liberal) will not go to welcome the Minister Resident when he arrives. It is difficult to be optimistic about the General's ability to grapple with the situation. He may not be old for his age, but he is old (79 years).

6. *The security situation in Algeria.*—According to reports in the Press and from Her Majesty's Consul-General at Algiers, the security situation in more than one area continues to deteriorate. In his despatch No. 8 of the 26th of January, Mr. Mill Irving describes the ineffective nature of the measures taken in the Bône-Constantine-Philippeville area to protect the civil population outside the towns against terrorism. On the other hand the most recent reports collated by the Military Attaché suggest that the general military situation in Algeria is no worse, if not better, than it has been for some time. Activity on both sides has been intense and the rebels' casualties have been growing much more severe. The French Army's tactics appear to have improved and they have been recovering more weapons and military stores. Nevertheless French Army casualties are not light and there is still a tendency to drive into ambushes. It is of course virtually impossible for the French Army to afford complete protection to outlying farms in Algeria. This can only be done by rounding up all the rebels—an almost impossible task—or by the political pacification of the country.

7. A curious sidelight on the failure of French security measures is thrown by a report I recently received through secret sources here to the effect that a large number of Algerian voters during the recent metropolitan elections in France were forced to destroy their ballots and leave the polls without voting by the threats of Nationalist Algerian gangs determined to boycott the elections. This illustrates the purely Moslem fanaticism of the Algerian rebel leaders, for if the latter had been more politically minded they would surely not have prevented their fellow countrymen from voting Communist (which most of them would have done), *i.e.*, for a party committed to end French " colonialism ". It is indeed questionable how far the " free elections " of which M. Mollet speaks will be possible in Algeria if such pressure can be applied to voters in France itself. How many candidates will stand if the rebels continue to boycott elections and assassinate candidates?

8. *M. Soustelle's legacy.*—M. Soustelle's resignation as Governor-General had been in the hands of the Government for some little time. Towards the end of his term of office he came down firmly in favour of a policy of integration carried to its logical conclusion. M. Soustelle's analysis of the policies open to France was described in some detail in my despatch No. 254 of the 7th of July and I then expressed the opinion that neither M. Soustelle nor the French Government had seriously considered accepting the full implication of integration, *i.e.*, full social and economic equality for Algerian Moslems with the inhabitants of metropolitan France. It seemed then that M. Soustelle had launched the idea of integration mainly in order to educate opinion at home and show what massive efforts would be required of France if she wished to keep her " Algerian extension ".

In fact the maintenance of the French position in Algeria was inevitably the main, indeed the only, consideration for M. Soustelle who for all his Left-wing views is a Gaullist and therefore an ultra-nationalist. It was this aspect of his character which after a shaky start endeared him to the *colons*. But unlike most of them he had the imagination to see that the policy of integration must, to achieve its purpose, not be a mere screen for " immobilisme ", but that it must be carried out to the full. It is a policy which will entail changes every bit as revolutionary as those entailed by a federal solution. It was presumably because the *colons* supposed that the policy of integration would never, for material reasons, be carried to its logical conclusion that they accepted it from M. Soustelle; they saw in it the way to reduce concessions to a minimum. It seems however from Mr. Lawson's note enclosed in Algiers letter to African Department on the 28th of January that some French business men with important interests in Algeria regard the grant of some degree of autonomy as inevitable and are prepared to take the risk of an eventual secession. They may well be right in thinking that a federal policy will affect their material interests less than a policy of complete Integration.

9. We are thus faced with a fluid situation in which everything will no doubt depend upon events in Algeria itself and the fate of M. Mollet's Government in France. The following elements however seem to stand out from the confusion:—

(*a*) There is as yet no " interlocuteur valable " for the French in Algeria. It is I suppose possible that a newly elected Algerian, single college Assembly might serve this purpose but it is most doubtful whether such a body can be created and, if so, whether it would have any influence over the rebels. It has been suggested that the Sultan of Morocco might eventually be called upon to mediate: but this possibility has been vigorously repudiated by General Catroux. The situation would have to be desperate indeed before French thoughts turned in the direction of Colonel Nasser!

(*b*) M. Mollet's position is ill-defined. On the one hand he has caused criticism by sending a liberal to Algeria; on the other hand, unless he is prepared to accept dependence on the Communists, he will remain dependent on M.R.P. and Right-wing support for a majority in the Chamber. He is unlikely to shake the Ministry of the Interior in their policy of " gradualness "; it would need M. Mendès-France to do that. In any case, for the reasons stated under (*a*) above, the elements of a purely political solution are not yet present.

(*c*) It is doubtful whether the French Army can find many more troops for North Africa without increasing the length of military service or calling up reservists. The military situation in Algeria does not yet show signs of improvement, but the increased activity and rebel casualties may presage a weakening on the part of the latter (though they may equally well mean that the rebels are feeling more confident in their strength).

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Algiers, Rabat, Tunis and Tangier and to POMEF.

I have, &c.

GLADWYN JEBB.

JF 1019/97 No. 2

THE ALGERIAN PROBLEM

Sir Gladwyn Jebb to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received March 13*)

(No. 80. Confidential) *Paris,*
Sir, *March 10, 1956.*

Much has happened since I addressed you in my despatch No. 48 of February 4 on the subject of the new French Government's policy towards Algeria. A day or two after that despatch was signed M. Mollet was greeted in Algeria by hostile demonstrations on the part of the European populace and decided to jettison his candidate for the post of Minister Resident, General Catroux. Since then M. Mollet has been forced, in spite of his natural abhorrence of violent methods, to seek powers enabling the Government to take more drastic action to establish law and order, while issuing an ultimatum without a deadline to the rebels. His Minister Resident, M. Lacoste, has asked for 200,000 more troops but is at present being given only 30,000, which will simply restore the Army's strength to what it was a month ago.

2. In these circumstances you were recently good enough to authorise me to send Mr. Faber, a Second Secretary at this Embassy, on a short visit to Algeria for the purpose of liaison with Her Majesty's Consul-General at Algiers. Mr. Faber left Paris with a questionnaire framed by members of my staff and this has served as the basis for his valuable report, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy. Naturally Mr. Faber's first source of information has been Her Majesty's Consulate-General and he has discussed his conclusions with Mr. Mill Irving. I think he is to be congratulated on his able and valuable analysis of the situation.

3. I suggested in my despatch under reference that the elements of a purely political situation in Algeria were not yet present. The main factors in the situation have always been the size of the European colony and the absence of an indigenous dynasty or ruling class. Nevertheless, since Algeria has for some time played a central role in French politics, the temptation has been to think in terms of a political solution. M. Soustelle's analysis of the four possible types of an Algerian settlement was typical of the French tendency to treat the problem as a lesson in philosophical definition. Another slogan of the Soustelle era was that political reforms should not wait upon the restoration of law and order but that the two should go hand in hand. This sounded well but I think it has become sufficiently clear that it is impossible to carry out far-reaching reforms in an atmosphere of civil war.

4. I suggest that the reasons why successive French Governments have been slow to get a grip on the military situation in Algeria emerge from Mr. Faber's paper, if they were not already clear to the political observer. The failure of the French to bestow on the Algerian Moslems any noticeable advance in the political and administrative field and the non-fulfilment of the 1947 Statute had caused a sense of grievance amongst the Moslems and a sense of guilt amongst the Left-wing parties in France. Therefore when the moment came eighteen months ago to restore law and order with a firm hand, at a time when public opinion was already prepared to grant almost complete independence to Tunisia and Morocco, few French Governments would have been ready to take the necessary measures. Throughout the French Press " repression " is now, I regret to say, virtually a synonym for the restoration of law and order.

5. The fog of words is clearing, as usual, at a time when it is probably too late to control the situation. The only hope of preserving the French position in Algeria—and probably in the whole of North Africa—is for the Government to master the rebellion. Mr. Faber's terms of reference were restricted and he was specifically instructed in accordance with your wish not to go near the troubled areas or to appear to be seeking military intelligence. It was not therefore to be expected that he could throw any light on the military situation, for information about which we are almost entirely dependent on the Press. But it is my impression that the French have not yet gained as much experience as we have of dealing with guerillas. In any case, rightly or wrongly, M. Lacoste thinks that a large number of additional troops should be imported in order to protect the Europeans and loyal

Moslems wherever they may be. This emphasis on static defence in outlying farms and villages does not mean, in the French view, that the attempt to seek out and defeat the rebels is to be abandoned but only that the first priority is at present held to be the protection of the civil population.

6. Meanwhile responsible members of Left Centre opinion in France still claim that M. Mollet must hold to what seemed to be his original intention, viz., to track down a responsible representative of the Algerian Moslems (the " interlocuteur valable ") and strive for a political settlement. This opinion was vehemently expressed to me by a well-known journalist of the Mendès-France circle. I can see little future for France in this policy in present circumstances. The French Government would be negotiating from weakness so long as the rebels are being so successful and they would therefore have very little hope of safeguarding the interests of the European inhabitants of Algeria. Of course they should offer to introduce reforms (particularly in the administration), and certainly they must be prepared to spend a great deal of money on economic development; but basically I cannot see any alternative for the French but to attempt to restore the security situation and I cannot be hopeful, for the reasons expressed above, that they will have the strength and the will to do this successfully. The operation should, however, be technically possible provided the Government has the will to apply its special powers, and so far as we are concerned, I can only hope that we shall give them all possible support and encouragement in their efforts.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Algiers and copies of the despatch only to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Rabat, Tunis, Tangier and to POMEF.

I have, &c.

GLADWYN JEBB.

Enclosure 1

REPORT ON A VISIT TO ALGERIA, FEBRUARY 21 TO MARCH 2, 1956

February 21: Arrival in Algiers by air.
February 24: By air to Bône.
February 26: By train to Constantine.
February 27: By air to Algiers.
February 29: By train to Oran.
March 1: By air to Algiers.
March 2: Departure to Paris by air.

Her Majesty's Consul-General at Algiers, and his staff, were throughout extremely helpful. By their offices, and those of the Vice-Consul at Bône, I met a number of French officials, journalists and business men. I was also able to have private conversations with four educated Muslims (two at Algiers and two at Bône) who were more or less in sympathy with the nationalist movement. I talked casually with Europeans and Muslims whom I met by chance in trains, taxis and hotels. I attended two sessions of the Algerian Assembly. Finally I learned a great deal from talks with the Consul-General himself, with members of his staff and with the Vice-Consul at Bône.

2. Her Majesty's Consul-General impressed on me that, with its present staff, the Consulate-General cannot report fully on present events in Algeria. Neither he nor his staff have the time to travel round the country; and the duties and contacts of the Consulate-General in the past have necessarily been mainly consular. A further difficulty is the importance of avoiding contacts that might embarrass the French authorities. In the present situation the Consul-General needs the assistance of a Consul capable of doing political work. It would also greatly help him if the Lloyd's agent at Oran (who is a British subject and already regarded locally as a British consular officer) could be officially retained as a consular agent.

3. The Algerian problem is extremely complex, and reactions to it seem infinite. People are ready to talk but their accounts frequently disagree. The conclusions reached in a short visit must therefore be very tentative. Most of the

information I obtained is set out in the form of answers to the Questionnaire, prepared in the Embassy, which I took with me. I went through this Questionnaire orally with Her Majesty's Consul-General; but he may not agree with all the views I have expressed. For what they are worth I attach some general remarks by way of introduction. These are entirely personal, much over-simplified, and should probably be taken with a good deal of salt.

R. S. FABER,

March 5, 1956.

Enclosure 2

THE ALGERIAN PROBLEM

On first arriving in Algiers the visitor wonders what all the fuss has been about. Streets, shops, hotels, cinemas and faces have a normal appearance; except for the emptiness of the streets at night there are few outward signs of tension. Oran seems if anything even more normal than Algiers; and a tourist can still travel in a comfortable and punctual train, through a pleasant landscape, between them.

2. At Bône and Constantine, with their soldiers and curfews, the illusion of normality disappears. Ordinary activities continue without panic, but in an atmosphere of evident disquiet. I travelled in a train crowded with soldiers past deserted farms and sabotaged telegraph lines.

3. Only a part of the country is seriously affected by the revolt. But few areas are safe from incidents, and fear seems to be spreading generally throughout the countryside. In Algiers and Oran Europeans are in no danger. Even there, however, it does not take long to penetrate to the disquiet under the surface. Most of the colons are worried by the future, even if they have no immediate fear for the lives and property of themselves and their friends. At Oran the Préfet and the Maire spoke to me complacently about the situation; but there too the private persons I questioned were, to say the least, disturbed.

4. There is in fact a great deal that is genuinely tragic in the Algerian situation, since it involves a real clash between real people and ideas. Both the Right-wing editor of the *Echo d'Alger* (who said he lived in fear of assassination), and the Muslim Consulate messenger, described Algeria to me as " malheureuse ". A French Algerian journalist began his conversation with me by saying that the Algerian problem was insoluble.

5. On the one side there is the *Oeuvre Francaise*. It is impossible to visit Algeria, after living a little in the Middle East, without admiring what the French have done. One can understand the intense local patriotism of the colons. " How are we to leave all this "? said one of them to me, pointing at the impressive modern silhouette of Algiers through the window.

6. On the other hand what the French have *not* done is also striking. It is difficult to resist the impression that, apart from some paternalist measures, some schools and hospitals, the *Oeuvre Francaise,* with all its roads, railways and fine buildings, has been the work of Europeans for Europeans. The Moslem population seems backward even by Middle Eastern standards. Emancipation of women has barely begun. There is little real social intercourse between the two communities. Only a small number of Moslems are employed in the administration or in skilled jobs; in 1954 there were only 557 Moslems, as compared with 4,548 Europeans, in the University of Algiers. As far as I could judge even those Moslems who wished to retain the French connexion felt some bitterness at the extent to which the *élite* of the country was European.

7. Behind everything is the population problem. The rapid increase has no doubt been due, as it was in India, to the measures taken by the authorities to preserve order and public health. But it now poses a problem that increased emigration to France, and measures of economic development, can palliate but not solve. Even if all goes well it must take decades before education, and a higher standard of living, can persuade the people to control the size of their families. The Préfet at Oran said seriously to me that he thought forced abortion (if it were not for public opinion) the only solution. Moslem nationalists say glibly that the

problem would soon be solved by industrialisation and the distribution of the big estates; but it is clear that even, if they were practicable, such measures could not provide a quick solution.

8. The immediate importance of the population problem is not only that unemployment provides recruits for the revolt, but that it increases the colons' fears of Algerian independence. Moslem nationalists may say that Europeans would be welcome citizens or guests of an independent Algeria. But I heard two uneducated Moslems blame unemployment on the presence of the colons. If Algeria were independent there must be an increasing demand for jobs of all kinds for the Moslem boys.

9. I think that this helps to explain the alarm with which the majority of the colons view any solution that would involve a real transference of power to Moslem hands. They have to face not only a reduction of privileges, and a deterioration of their achievements, but the danger of a distinct fall in their standard of living.

10. The French Government seems to have a number of valid motives for not abandoning the colons to their fate:—

(*a*) the real consequences to the colons;

(*b*) the scandal of deserting them;

(*c*) the economic loss to the Metropole. (Algeria is France's best customer);

(*d*) the effect on France's world position. (The Directeur de Cabinet du Gouverneur Général told me that, without Algeria, France would be crushed between the American and Soviet *blocs*.)

11. At the same time the extent of the revolt, events in Tunisia and Morocco, the trend of world opinion, and the weakness of the French political system, suggest that the effort of indefinitely maintaining the present régime—with or without modification—will probably be too great.

12. Integration is perhaps the most satisfactory theoretical solution. But there are great difficulties in the way, and it will be very surprising if they are ever overcome. A policy of integration could certainly only be applied by a strong Government in firm control both in Paris and Algiers.

13. In the long run it looks as if the French will have to accept some kind of federal solution on the best terms they can. But every federal solution must contain the possibility of secession; and the bulk of the colons will (not unreasonably) resist such a solution as long as they can.

14. Even such a compromise presupposes that the French can master, or at least check, the revolt. At present the rebel leaders seem determined to fight until they have the upper hand and can impose their own terms of complete, or virtually complete, independence. An attempt to negotiate with the rebel chiefs at present would madden the colons and ruin French prestige with the loyal Moslems; nor could it be expected to succeed.

15. It seems unlikely that economic and political reforms, though desirable, will have much immediate effect on the revolt. Their " psychological shock " (a favourite expression of French officials in Algeria) must be limited, partly because the atmosphere is too strained and partly because politically-conscious Moslems are profoundly distrustful of French intentions after the " trickery " of the Statute of 1947.

16. Unless she is to abandon Algeria France must first get the upper hand in the revolt. But it seems doubtful whether she will be able to do so unless

(*a*) she resorts to severe repression (hardly the best background to a peaceful compromise); or

(*b*) she can throw many more men and arms into the scale.

17. Many of the people to whom I spoke seemed anxious for British support. One Moslem mentioned the possibilities of trade with an Algeria released from French coat-strings. Another, who was afraid of Communism, wanted close cultural ties with Great Britain. Frenchmen stressed passionately the need for a combined Western effort to prevent North Africa falling into Communist hands. The editor of the *Echo d'Alger* baited his appeal with a reference to the possibilities awaiting European capital in the economic development of Algeria.

18. Both sides referred appreciatively to our example in solving colonial problems. But, whereas the nationalists spoke of India or Nigeria, the colons preferred to mention Kenya.

19. The Algerian problem has in fact no close parallel, and there is no ready-made solution for it. The French Government are faced by a choice of evils, and it is only if they can make a great effort that they will be in any position to choose.

JF 1019/97 Enclosure 3

VISIT OF MR. R. S. FABER TO ALGERIA—FEBRUARY 21 TO MARCH 2. QUESTIONNAIRE PREPARED BY THE STAFF OF HER MAJESTY'S EMBASSY IN PARIS WITH MR. FABER'S ANSWERS SHOWN AFTER EACH QUESTION.

I.—Framework

Only two solutions have been seriously envisaged:

(*a*) INTEGRATION

This would mean that the Algerian Assembly and the Government general would be abolished and that the Algerian departments would be represented in the National Assembly on exactly the same proportional basis as French departments. *Ultimately* this would mean at least 100 Algerian deputies. *All* Algerians would have the same rights and duties as Frenchmen (equal pay, family allowances, &c.). It might be possible to make certain provisions for Algerian cultural differences (cf. the religious régime in Alsace-Lorraine), but these differences could not be discriminatory against the Algerians.

Question (*1*)

Would the Moslems be satisfied with this as an outlet for their aspirations?

Answer (*1*)

My impression is that the idea of *total* integration (allowing of course for religious safeguards) still has some appeal for French-educated Moslems, but they do not regard it as a practical possibility. Thus one Moslem with whom I spoke, who otherwise expressed strong nationalist views, said that he would support integration if M. Soustelle (and he alone) could be given full powers to put it into effect. Another seemed only to reject the idea of integration, because he thought that it might never be honestly applied.

At the same time there is growing opposition even to the principle of integration. A third Moslem whom I questioned, although devoted to French culture, told me that the idea was offensive to his national and religious dignity. There is certainly no important public support from Moslems for integration. The rebels seem to want complete independence. Ferhat Abbas, the leader of the U.D.M.A., once supported assimilation but has now returned to federalism. The "61" group, at their inaugural meeting on September 26, 1955, declared: ". . . . la politique dite de l'intégration, qui n'a jamais été sincèrement appliquée est actuellement dépassée. L'immense majorité des populations est présentement acquise à l'idée nationale algérienne."

The short answer to this question is therefore "No". But *if* France mastered the revolt and proceeded swiftly, efficiently and justly to embark on a real policy of integration (it is almost impossible to imagine her doing so) I think she could still rally the sympathies of numbers of educated Moslems.

Question (*2*)

Would the Europeans be prepared to accept it? (for example, it would raise their wages bill many times over).

Answer (*2*)

I believe that few Europeans in Algeria have ever thought seriously about integration. The vast mass of the colons seem either to misunderstand it or regard it as an academic proposition. M. Chevallier has publicly said that it cannot be

applied in practice; his Directeur du Cabinet told me that it was impossible to envisage 100 Algerian Deputies in Paris. I got the impression from M. Sérigny of the *Echo d'Alger* (who admitted that his respect for M. Soustelle did not imply entire agreement with his view) that he and his friends consider integration too improbable to be worth opposiing.

It is clear that, in view of the difficulties both in France and in Algeria, only an unusually strong and determined Government could carry out a policy of integration. Economically it could only proceed by degrees (wage increases would of course have to be gradual, if only to avoid inflation). It is possible that this necessary combination of strength and caution might impose integration on a European population still under the shock of the revolt. But at present the Europeans do not take integration seriously, and they would certainly not be enthusiastic about its implications if they did.

(*b*) FEDERATION

This would mean that the Algerian Assembly would be given greater powers leading to the emergence of a responsible, semi-sovereign Government. Algerian representation in the Paris Parliament would remain as small as at present or could even be reduced. But any move towards self-rule for Algeria raises the question, who is to rule? It would seem that this solution is only satisfactory if both races agree to work together, for otherwise one is bound to tryannise the other.

Question (*1*)

Which European elements are in favour of a federal solution? Do they favour it because they want to set up a Malan-style government? Why do some Liberals like M. Chevallier favour it (if only in the long run)? Is it because they still hope that the two races can work together?

Answer (*1*)

Most Europeans are not now thinking in terms of any long-term solution. Their energies are absorbed by the revolt, and "integration", "federalism", &c., have become rather meaningless terms for them. As far as I know no serious European element favours a federal solution in the hopes of setting up a Malan-style government. There is certainly a great deal of criticism of the "Métropole" and of its allegedly inadequate support for Algeria. This leads to wild talk about a complete rupture with France. (A taxi driver in Oran, who told me that the metropolitans were "des brébis" and that the Oranais would know how to defend themselves if given arms, was rather of this school.) But most European Algerians realise the extent to which they depend, militarily and economically, on France. Responsible colons are all for maintaining and strengthening the links that bind France to Algeria; and "federalism" is precisely suspect to them because it implies "secession".

M. Chevallier is apparently still, fundamentally, a federalist. It is of course the whole basis of his doctrine that the two races can be brought to work and live together in equality. He said last October that he thought a federal structure "inévitable dans une évolution politique rationelle". But he immediately added that it would take years to bring about—"la fédéralisme n'est réalisable qu'à échéance lointaine. . . . ." Even therefore the most prominent French liberal in Algeria has only held out a very tentative hand to federalism. M. Chevallier is anyway a *rara avis*. The mass of the colons can be expected to oppose any system that might develop an effective Moslem majority capable of breaking the French connexion.

Question (*2*)

Do the politically conscious Moslems favour federalism? If so, is it because they think that *they*, not the colons, will exercise the self-rule? Would federalism provide a dependable policy for those Moslem elements who do not want to sever their connexion with France but who are afraid of being outbid by the extremists?

Answer (*2*)

The rebels apparently demand complete independence. A spokesman of the F.L.N. said last September (since when the attitude of the rebels has if anything hardened) that they would refuse even a "Tunisian" solution. On the other hand a federal solution, assuring a local Moslem majority and the recognition of Algerian

" personality ", should satisfy the needs of the more moderate nationalists. For that matter there are some moderate Moslems who would even accept the *status quo,* provided political and economic inequalities between the two communities were removed; but they are not organised and seem unlikely ever to control events.

Federalism could take so many forms that it is difficult to estimate the extent of its potential appeal. But it seems safe to say that a federal solution would only be agreeable to a substantial number of the colons if it assured " la présence française "; similarly it would only be agreeable to a substantial number of politically-conscious Moslems if it assured " l'idée nationale algérienne ". It would be difficult (at present perhaps impossible) to find a formula that would guarantee both demands. Meanwhile the attitude of the rebel leaders tends to make all discussion about federalism academic.

II.—Voting

M. Mollet still says that he wants to abolish the double college. At the same time, however, he wants to retain " double representation ", *i.e.,* a fixed ratio of European to Moslem representatives. If this is done within the framework of multi-member constituencies it will inevitably lead to the election of European representatives who make demagogic promises to the (much larger) Moslem part of the electorate, *i.e.,* to the election of Communists. Therefore the only possibility is single-member constituencies (scrutin d'arrondissement). The boundaries will have to be so drawn as to provide a number of almost purely " European " constituencies.

Question (1)

Would it be easy to draw satisfactory constituency boundaries? Would it not look like trickery?

Answer (1)

The fact that Europeans predominate in the big towns would ensure a certain number of seats where " bienpensant " Europeans would normally be elected. At present, for instance, Algiers, Oran, Constantine and Bône and their suburbs provide about 25 Deputies of the First College between them. I do not think it would look like trickery to retain these " safe " seats. But it might be difficult to add substantially to their number, since one of the hopes of the moderate Moslems is that the necessity of appealing to predominantly Moslem electorates would provide for the election of some " reasonable " Europeans to the Assembly. After talking to an official at the Algerian Assembly I got the impression that about 30 predominantly European constituencies could be arranged satisfactorily; but this is only a rough estimate. M. Mollet was said to have talked of 13 possible solutions to the electoral problem; but I could not discover what they were.

Question (2)

Would the Europeans be prepared to concede a larger representation for the Moslems than for themselves?

Answer (2)

The majority of the Europeans still demand parity in representation between the two communities. They justify this by French economic predominance and by the backwardness of most of the Moslem population. Some moderate Moslems would accept parity, within the framework of the Single College. But I understand that the " 61 " group require a Moslem majority in, *e.g.,* the ratio of 70 : 50 or 65 : 55.

Question (3)

More generally are the Europeans now prepared to accept the Single College *in any form?*

Answer (3)

There is widespread European opposition to the Single College in any form. Opposition to the Single College is one of the chief cries of the extremists; it symbolises for the colons their submersion in the native population. I did, however, meet one French Algerian politician, the Maire of Oran, who was not frightened by the prospect. I suppose others could be brought to swallow it if given suitable guarantees.

III.—The Europeans

The impression is that having tasted blood (General Catroux's) they are out for more. On the other hand the excesses of M. Biaggi and others may be alienating the moderate elements. The Liberals like M. Chevallier seem to be biding their time.

Question (1)

Is the atmosphere such that further violence is inevitable—probable—possible —unlikely?

Answer (1)

Probable on a small scale; possible on a large. There is continued excitement and increasing strain. But the more responsible elements want to give the new Governor-General a chance to tackle the military situation, and seem likely to hold their hands.

Question (2)

Do the Liberals see a hope of gaining control of the situation?

Answer (2)

The Liberals are lying low and one wonders whether, apart from M. Chevallier, they really exist. M. Chevallier's Directeur du Cabinet told me that there was a large body of Liberal European opinion, and that only a noisy minority made the trouble; I thought, however, that he was being rather obviously loyal to his chief. The Consulate-General have noticed an increase in Liberal views over the last year, but believe that recent events have set this tendency back. I found people who said they were ready to co-operate with the Moslems (even M. de Sérigny said they should get more administrative posts): and there is at least general lip-service to the need for some economic and social reforms. But I found very little tendency to make political concessions.

The present atmosphere in Algeria is tinged with crisis and war and liberalism cannot thrive in it. But when I left Algiers M. Chevallier had just launched a series of articles in the *Journal d'Alger.* These will perhaps outline a new Liberal programme, and may do something to improve M. Chevallier's stock.

Question (3)

What role is being played in stirring up agitation by—

(i) the reactionary colons like Senator Borgeaud?

(ii) the Poujadists?

(iii) the hotheads among the Federation of Mayors?

Answer (3)

(i) I do not know. He was barely mentioned to me.

(ii) Probably important but not fundamental. Two Poujadist Deputies came out from Paris, and Poujadist posters were on view. There was some whitewashing of the movement in the *Echo d'Alger.* Government officials profess to regard the influence of Poujadism in Algeria as real but superficial.

(iii) Mayors are usually well to the fore whenever there is any trouble.

Question (4)

What does the Comité d'Entente amount to?

Answer (4)

The " Comité d'Entente des anciens combattants et cadres de réserve " is an extreme organisation that professes to be apolitical and to be constituted " pour la seule défense de l'Algérie française ". A " Comité de coordination pour la défense de l'Algérie française dans la fraternité franco-musulmane " has now been formed, which seems likely to be the most representative and important organisation of its kind. (M. de Sérigny told me it had been set up to disprove Parisian notions that patriotism in Algeria was the result of plots.) This new body has already demanded general mobilisation in Algeria.

Question (5)

Is there any suggestion that high Government officials are lending a hand in creating disorders?

Answer (5)

I heard none. The Préfet at Bône clearly believed that some of the senior permanent officials were obscurantist or reactionary—as indeed one would expect. M. Lacoste's speech on February 21 contained a clear warning that " les fonctionnaires sont au service de l'intérêt général et non de coalitions d'intérêts particuliers "; though he also said that he had decided to judge by acts and not by reputations. But so far none of the senior officials, outside the police, have been dismissed.

Question (6)

How reliable are the police in use against the Europeans? Do the local police require to be stiffened by C.R.S.?

Answer (6)

The local police are already heavily laced with metropolitan C.R.S. who seem to be used against Europeans whenever possible. The police involved in the recent riots in Constantine, when 20 of them were wounded, had arrived from France two days before. Eye-witnesses of the Algiers riot told me that the C.R.S. themselves were incompetent with the mob. But this does not reflect on their reliability; they seem to have tried.

Question (7)

What is the attitude of the Army? Is there a marked difference in outlook between local troops (*e.g.*, the Foreign Legion) and the conscripts? Do officers and men see things the same?

Answer (7)

Morale in the Army appears adequate. I saw no signs of panic or excessive drunkenness. I was told there was occasional talk of desertion, but no more than talk, that there were no abnormal difficulties between officers and men, and that there was little difference between local troops and conscripts when they were mixed in the same units. On the other hand I gathered that there was a good deal of discontent among the troops that the war was not being prosecuted more vigorously. An N.C.O. in the *gendarmerie mobile*, whom I met in the train from Bône to Constantine, said that the situation had got worse rapidly in the last three months. The rebels were clever, well-directed and everywhere. The only way to get at them was to hit back hard, without being too tender or scrupulous about the rural population. " Il faut des représailles, Monsieur." This was also the burden of most of the civilians I met.

Question (8)

What is the prevailing outlook among senior officials at the Government-General and in the Prefectures? Are they prepared to persuade/coerce the Europeans to accept some reforms?

Answer (8)

I think that the answer is, on the whole, " Yes ". The Director of the Government's Information Services followed faithfully M. Mollet's line in his conversation with me and spoke, for instance, of the need to increase Moslem parliamentary representation. The Préfet at Bône clearly had progressive views. The *Directeur du Cabinet Civil et Militaire du Gouverneur Général* admitted that the Government had to fight the colons as well as the rebels.

Question (9)

Is M. Soustelle's stock still high? Is his popularity based on the misapprehension that he had been won over to the colons' point of view? Or does it indicate that he had genuinely persuaded the Europeans of the need for reforms?

Answer (9)

M. Soustelle is still respected, though his successor has also made a good impression. M. Soustelle's popularity seems chiefly due to his determination to

maintain the French connexion. It is not due to any success he may have had (and he probably had some) in persuading the Europeans of the need for reforms.

Question (10)

Are any differences in outlook between Europeans in relation to social position? Would it be true to say that the most reactionary elements are those whose economic position is least sure?

Answer (10)

I think it true to say that the mass of the colons, of all classes, think substantially alike. I found a tendency among Government officials (shared by one of the Moslems I met) to blame excesses on a handful of big colons. But I suspect this to be wishful Socialist thinking. As far as I could judge, the majority of all classes approved the spirit, if not the form, of the demonstrations against M. Mollet. These represented a genuine popular movement among the Europeans. On the other hand I doubt whether the smaller colons are necessarily more extreme than the big men. After all the big colons, if they have less reason to fear a compromise, have also less reason to fear the results of refusing one. An exception should probably be made in the case of big colons with purely commercial interests. Such men seem to be looking wistfully at our example in India and may be thinking already of trade with an independent Algeria.

Question (11)

Are there any signs of purely racial or religious hatred?

Answer (11)

There is undoubtedly some " racism " in the attitude of some Europeans toward the Moslems, but it is not normally fanatical. For their part the rebel chiefs have certainly been able to exploit, though they do not seem themselves inspired by, religious hatred. Moslem " Oulemas " are said to have joined the rebels in some places.

IV.—The Moslems

The impression is that less than 5 per cent. of the Moslems genuinely favour the revolt which is itself the work of a few thousands, and that the majority would rally to the French cause if

(*a*) they were given some kind of hope economically and politically;

(*b*) they were convinced that the French could protect them against rebel vengeance;

(*c*) they were sure that the French would win.

Question (1)

Is this impression really correct? Or is there any reason to think that a substantial proportion of the Moslems favour the revolt: and if so, roughly what proportion?

Answer (1)

It is impossible to assess the degree of Moslem support for the rebels. One Muslim I saw said that the vast majority of the rural population, even when suffering exactions, sympathised with the rebels. Another said that since M. Mollet's reception (which had been a great psychological shock to the ordinary people) they *all* did—apart from a handful of " traitors ". A third said that 95 per cent. of the population were, if not pro-rebel, at least anti-French. At Oran the British Lloyd's agent told me that the dockers were nationalist to a man.

On the other hand large areas of the country are still barely affected by the revolt. The French continue to claim that popular support for the rebels is small; and the rebels find it necessary to kill quite a number of their compatriots. Moslems in the streets of the towns are seldom openly surly; I walked twice through the Arab quarter of Algiers without any obvious curses or black looks.

On the whole, however, I reached the conclusion that a larger proportion of the population actively favours the rebels than the French, and that this proportion is rapidly increasing. Perhaps the majority (particularly outside the warlike Kabylian areas) want above all to be left in peace; but I suspect that even their sympathies are more often against than with the " forces of order ". Resentment

against the exactions of the rebels is outweighed by pride in their achievements. It cannot be difficult for the peasants to learn to view the French as alien oppressors.

But it is important to add that the rural peoples of Algeria are extremely primitive and that their political consciousness is slight. In the last resort they respect force, and most of them will rally to the winning side.

Question (2)

Does the conception of an " Algerian personality " (whatever that means exactly) have any appeal to the Moslems?

Answer (2)

It might appeal to some of them if suitably defined.

Question (3)

Is it still really true that there is no *Algerian* national feeling, national " idea ", nationalism? If it is, is it likely to remain true much longer?

Answer (3)

No, it is not true. The proof is in the revolt itself. The French Administrator at Tebessa told the Vice-Consul at Bône last summer that he had himself seen signs of a new Algerian national feeling.

Question (4)

If the view set out above is correct, how far are (*b*) and (*c*) true *without* (*a*)?

Answer (4)

(*c*) Would probably count most with the Moslem majority; but (*a*) would have some effect on the Moslem intelligentsia and conceivably on some of the more moderate followers of the rebels.

Question (5)

By refusing to let themselves be outbid by the extremists have the " moderate " Moslems (*e.g.*, the " 61 ") succeeded in gaining the esteem of their compatriots?

Answer (5)

Not really, I think. Their action has been approved, but is attributed to fear. The F.L.N. have put out tracts suggesting they have not made up for their " néfaste passé ".

Question (6)

Has fear of rebel vengeance spread generally to the Moslems of Algiers itself? What is the atmosphere in, for example, the mixed housing estates? Is there a difference in outlook between Moslems living in purely Moslem communities and those living intermingled with Europeans?

Answer (6)

On the whole not; though there have been one or two attacks in the Arab quarter attributed to the judgments of the secret tribunals. But two moderate Moslems I saw in Bône were clearly afraid. I was told in M. Chevallier's office, but could not verify, that social relations in the mixed housing estates were still happy.

Question (7)

How strong is Pan-Arab or Pan-Islamic feeling? Has the conception of a united Moslem North African state, or federation, from Tunis to Morocco, any appeal?

Answer (7)

Pan-Arab feeling plays its part: but my informant suggested that simple Algerian nationalism was more important. The most extreme Nationalist I met said that a North African federation was " on the programme " of the rebels. But he said that they did not mean to be absorbed by Egypt, although they regarded her " as a sister ". After all, he said, " nous sommes des occidentaux ".

V.—The Rebels

Questions

Estimates vary as to their numbers: the latest is 18,000, but that is very much higher than any previous estimate. They seem to be perpetually warring not only with the Nationalist political parties but also among themselves.

We require to know the aims and composition and the relations to each other of the following:—

(1) The Armee de Liberation Nationale.
(2) The Federation Nationale de Liberation.
(3) The Union Democratique du Manifeste Algérien (Ferhat Abbas).
(4) The Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Democratiques (Messali Hadj).

(3) and (4) are political parties (banned) which seem to have been overtaken by events though they are running hard to catch up. Are they having any success? (2) should be the political side of (1) which is purely military. In fact however they fight each other. Does that mean that (2) is in Cairo's bad books? Has (1) a political programme? If so is it dictated by Cairo?

Where do the " 61 " (who were originally of course " beni-oui-oui ") come into all this? Have they contacts with (1), (2), (3) or (4)?

It is true that the Communists have lost all touch with the Algerian Nationalists? Even with the " 61 "?

Answers

Everybody I spoke to seemed agreed that the revolt was, to all intents and purposes, centrally planned and directed, though some small rebel chiefs might be at loggerheads with each other. Nobody recognised any difference in aims between the F.L.N. (Front de Liberation Nationale) and the A.L.N., its military organisation. Some people told me, however, that there were supporters of Messali Hadj (the M.N.A.—or Mouvement National Algérien) conducting their own rebellion in various regions. " Messalistes " are regarded as disruptive by the F.L.N. which claims to express the whole of the revolutionary movement. Their activities seem anyway to be of secondary importance; Messali Hadj is himself under surveillance in France, where his following among Algerian immigrants is still said to be considerable.

A French journalist of the *Journal d'Alger* divided the rebels into the following classes for me:—

(*a*) a few idealists and inteilectuals;
(*b*) ex-soldiers of the French Army, disgruntled when they returned to their villages after the war and found that little was done for them;
(*c*) simple bandits;
(*d*) traditionally warlike Kabylian mountaineers, attracted by promises of more food, women, &c.
(*e*) young men kidnapped by force and later indoctrinated by simple nationalist ideas.

The M.T.L.D., which had already split into " centralists " and " messalistes ", was banned at the end of 1954. One hears no more of it.

The U.D.M.A., to which four of the Second College delegates belong, is still a legal political party. Its leader, Ferhat Abbas, moves between Algeria and France. His party (which began in 1945) stands for a programme of moderate nationalism, which would not involve a complete break with France. But, like most moderates, it regards itself as " dépassé " by events. Ferhat Abbas, though his past may entitle him to some nationalist respect, has had close relations attacked by the rebels.

The " 61 " seem now to stand more or less with the U.D.M.A., though their past has been very different. M. Bendjelloul is one of their leaders, and they have a Secretary-General, M. Oulda-Ouida. But they form a loose group of Algerian Assembly Delegates, National Assembly Deputies and Counsellors of the Republic and of the Union Française, rather than a disciplined party. They first came together in September 1955, when they condemned the policy of integration after a meeting in an Algiers café. Their resignations have not been accepted by the

Government; they do not perform their representative functions but continue to draw salaries. A number of Second College delegates have never joined them, and continue to attend the Algerian Assembly.

The Algerian Communist Party was banned in September 1955. Since then it may have made some progress with the Algerian Nationalists. But it seems still to be regarded as a European organisation (in the past it followed the French party line and was supported by European workers) and has a long way to catch up.

At this point might be mentioned the new " Union Syndicale des Travailleurs Algériens ", which has applied for affiliation to C.I.S.L. and expressed concern for " the national aspirations of the Algerian people ". The Government-General is disquieted by this development and is considering whether it would be legally possible, and desirable, to suppress the movement.

VI.—The Military Situation

Questions

Can you provide an estimate of rebel strengths in the various regions, of the tactics employed (*a*) by the rebels, (*b*) by the military, and of the relative importance of the various rebel bands and leaders?

The French units with heavy equipment are said to be wasted: What are they doing with them?

The present Government talks of a system of reliefs for the troops in Algeria: does this mean that morale is bad?

Is there any attempt at an overall strategy, *i.e.*, concerted drives in one area after another, or are the soldiers tied down on guard duties?

What is the relationship between the administration and the army? Why no Supreme Command of the Gendarmerie and C.R.S. (still answering to Préfets) and the troops?

Answers

I have little information. 15,000 is the figure for total rebel strength most often quoted in Algeria; but there are probably a large number of part-time rebels on top. Most of the rebels are in the mountains in the east of the country. The other area of the revolt is of course round Tlemcen round the Moroccan border. The Préfet at Oran estimated rebel strength here at about 600 in all. Near Bône some of the rebel bands are said to be commanded by German deserters of the Foreign Legion.

The rebels use guerilla tactics—operations chiefly, but not entirely, at night, sabotage of telephone lines and railways, attacks on convoys and farms, and so on. (I saw from the train between Bône and Constantine that many of the telegraph poles had been cut; and most of the lines were down.) The role of the French military seems at present mainly defensive. In the worst areas detachments of soldiers are necessarily tied to guarding farms, which would otherwise be abandoned.

Among civilians there is general criticism that the army is too rigid, that their orders are too inhibiting, that there is too much red tape and too much dependence on the civil power. A lot of these rumours seem to be unfounded. But the fact remains that the military situation is getting worse rather than better. Constantine, where there is a curfew from 9 o'clock, is almost like a town in a state of siege, and the inhabitants of Bône do not like to leave the built-up area.

The Directeur du Cabinet Civil et Militaire du Gouverneur-Général admitted to me that the Government would not master the revolt with its present resources. He said however that the Government would not resort to savage measures of repression. These were immoral, would have to be on a vast scale, and would widen the gulf between the two populations. The only alternative was to have many more men, who could guard the whole country properly and eventually take the initiative. He did not say how they were to be armed. Stories I heard in Algeria suggested that the existing troops were ill-equipped.

As regards alleged atrocities by French troops there is no doubt that official policy is " pacification " rather than repression. As I have already said there is some discontent both among soldiers and civilians that more severe measures are not taken. (The fierce repression of the 1945 rising in the Selif area is cited to

explain the comparative tranquillity of that area to-day.) On the other hand Moslems continue to talk of the brutality of the French troops, which they pretend drives recruits into the arms of the rebels. There have probably been some breaches of discipline which have been exaggerated by nationalist propaganda. I did hear of two occasions (notably at Philippeville) where French troops were said to have seen red. But these were mentioned as exceptional cases.

I asked the Préfet at Oran about the desertion of native soldiers at Port Say. He confirmed that native troops (I understand that some are still being recruited) would as far as possible be sent to Europe in future.

Bône and particularly Constantine were full of soldiers. Algiers and Oran less so. I noticed some Colonial Infantry troops, and a number of Senegalese. I noted the following regimental numbers:—

Algiers: 10, 3, 27, 411.
Bône: 3, 52, 152, 153.
Constantine: 10, 14, 19, 24, 411.

VII.—Economic

Questions

It seems that, of the Algerian population, the French one million have a standard of living comparable to that of France, 10 per cent. of the Arab population have a standard of living within reach of that of the French, the remaining eight million Arabs are at a subsistence level, with one million of them lacking employment of any sort. Is this correct? Is the position worse now than it was a few years ago? Is it expected to get worse in the future (given that Algeria has one of the highest birth-rates in the world)? The French Government at present subsidises Algeria to the tune of some 80 milliard francs a year, partly to balance the budget, and partly for investment. Is this investment expenditure showing any noteworthy return?

In recent weeks large figures have been quoted regarding the amount of money which France should spend to put Algerian economy on its feet. M. Mollet is reported (without confirmation) to have spoken of a 200 milliard francs loan, while a report by M. Pellenc talks airily of the need to spend 400 milliard francs a year for a considerable number of years. An article in last week's *Vie Française* says that these figures are nonsense and that, because of the lack of technicians and of prepared plans in Algeria, it would not be possible to increase productive expenditure there by more than 15 milliard francs a year above the present 80 milliard francs (excluding, of course, a long-term " handout " programme of food and clothing to all and sundry). Is it known whether the Administration has prepared any large-scale plan for the economic development of Algeria and, if so, what is the plan worth?

To what extent has economic activity in Algeria over the last year been slowed down, or stopped, by the reported repatriation of capital to France?

Answers

The analysis in the Questionnaire of the standard of living of the European and Moslem populations is I think roughly correct, except that the Europeans probably enjoy a *higher* standard of living than they would normally in France. M. Lacoste has himself spoken publicly of nearly a million permanent unemployed in Algeria. A larger number of course have only part-time employment. The position is constantly getting worse because of the high birth-rate, and must continue to do so. The native population increased from 2,125,000 in 1872 to 8,301,000 in 1954. At the present rate there will be 15 million inhabitants in Algeria in twenty years' time. This frightening increase virtually condemns any economic and social measures by the Government, except on the vastest scale, as inadequate in advance. It (together with the economic progress of the colons) help to explain the bitterness and strain in Algerian life, which were not felt a generation ago.

The French Government will this year subsidise the Algerian budget to the tune of 80 milliard francs. This is an advance of about 33 milliards on last year. Under the Maspettiol Plan this metropolitan contribution will increase annually by 15 milliards until it reaches 150 milliards. The corollary is some increase in local taxation, which the delegates to the Algerian Assembly are showing no anxiety to shoulder.

The new Algerian budget provides for increases in expediture on education, agricultural credits, &c. (Education absorbs something like one sixth of the budget. But the provision of education for the whole of the present Moslem child population would cost a sum equal to the total budget expenditure.) Any large-scale programme of " petits travaux ", however, capable of making a real impression on the population problem, would need considerable extra sums. It is very likely that, even if these sums were forthcoming, they could not be properly used for lack of suitable experts and planning; though at least a start could be made. But in any case the Algerian Director-General of Finance announced a few days ago to the Algerian Assembly that he knew no more of a 200 milliard francs loan than what he had read in the Press.

Algeria is apparently already under its second economic plan. Some attempts have been made at industrialisation, but without any spectacular success; costs and metropolitan competition are both too high. I was told in the Government-General at Algiers that M. Lacoste would probably launch a new economic plan; but till then he had only given rather vague indications of his intentions in his inaugural speech. Presumably much depends on what financial support is forthcoming, privately or publicly, from France.

Companies have been prospecting for oil in various parts of the country, with the encouragement of the Government, for some time. There are indications that oil exists; but it could only be exploited economically if found in considerable quantities. If it was found in such quantities the resultant revenues, and possibilities of employment, could make a real difference to the economy of the country.

Economic activity seemed to continue in Algeria more or less unabated thoughout 1955. It is undoubtedly now affected by the general uncertainty. In the worst areas it has necessarily slowed right down. At Constantine a waiter spoke to me of " complete misery " in a few months' time. The ports at Bône and, to a less extent, Oran are relatively idle. The Lloyd's agent at Oran told me that trade had deteriorated over the last 18 months and was now doing so rapidly. A French tractor merchant in Algiers said that his own turnover (which was not exclusively from agricultural business) had dropped by two-thirds since January. His agent at Oran said that business was almost at a standstill.

This economic stagnation is still by no means complete. There seems quite a lot of building activity in the districts unaffected by the revolt; and the shops are everywhere still full. Agriculture is only seriously affected in the areas dominated by the rebels, where many colons have abandoned their farms.

I do not know how far repatriation of capital may have affected the situation. Certainly one hears frequent stories of people who have provided, or are providing, retreats for themselves in France or elsewhere. But Algeria is normally an attractive country, and people will probably hold on there as long as they can. There are still no signs of a general stampede.

JF 1015/15 No. 3

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

In November 1954 rebellion broke out in Algeria on a small and controllable scale. To-day, with the exception of the southern desert and the area between Oran and Algiers, the whole of North Africa from Fez over into western Tunisia is at war. The Government's policy of " too little and too late " has allowed the rebel movement to gather momentum like a snowball. It has lacked the strength and courage to take firm but unpopular action. On the contrary the old Government released the reservists, called up in August 1955, just before the election and the new Government is accelerating the release of conscripts retained with the colours. Decisive measures are forecast now; whether a weak Government can survive them is problematical.

The Rebels

2. When rebel activity is so widespread and so successful, it is academic to discuss the differences that undoubtedly exist between their various political groups or whether Islam, Berber nationalism or Communism are their main motives. The results are the same. It may even be that competition for the fruits of victory between these groups is helping to quicken the pace.

It does, however, seem that the main driving force and source of arms and money is the Arab League. But Russia is obviously making what capital she can out of the situation. Some Communists are reported in rebel bands. Ex-prisoners from Dien Bien Phu lead some of them and are among the deserters. The flow of Algerians back and forth across the Mediterranean may play its part. The new Soviet Embassy in Tripoli undoubtedly will.

3. Active rebels are estimated to number between 10,000 and 20,000. A rough distribution might be:—

Rif and Eastern Morocco	3,000
Western Oran	1,000
East of Algiers	1,000
Grande Kabylie	2,000
North and West Constantine	3,000
East Constantine and Bone	3,000
Aures	1,000
Nementchas	2,000
Tunisia	1,000

4. Formerly they operated in small bands of ten to twenty men and dealt in murder, arson and sabotage. Now, despite considerable casualties, they often work in bands of 100 or more. Murder and arson continue on an increased scale. Sabotage has been extended to railways, main roads and telegraph poles. Above all action against the army or in areas where the army is strong has become much bolder. Villages near Constantine have been attacked recently. Posts of company size are assaulted. Ambushes continue to be plentiful and successful.

5. Whether they come in through Spanish Morocco or Southern Tunisia or are loot from battle, arms are improving in quality. Rifles are more modern, machine guns and mortars more numerous. Explosives are better.

6. Geographically north-west, north and east Constantine and east to the Tunisian frontier have been and remain the worst affected areas. The Grande Kabylie is also in a bad state. The Nementchas, important for the Libyan supply route, continues most disturbed.

The most serious development of the last few months is the outbreak in western Oran, which was formerly quiet. It links up through the Beni Snassen in Eastern Morocco with the Rif, where the Sultan has done nothing to discourage the rebels. Their threat to Taza and to a revival of war in the Middle Atlas remains.

In Tunisia action is more scattered and spasmodic, but Ben Youssef's supporters are able to hold down many troops.

The French Army

7. Apart from some 60,000 in the Colonies, the French Army is equally split between Europe and North Africa. From the 330,000 in Europe it can still find for N.A.T.O. two and a half armoured divisions and one light mechanised division. No infantry divisions are left intact. The vast bulk of its strength is tied up in training and other static establishments. At the moment it could not raise much more than a division's worth of infantry to reinforce North Africa. Nor could its training organisation properly handle an accelerated call up, if this were decided on. As recruit training takes four months, its effect would in any case be delayed.

8. The 330,000 in North Africa comprise nine infantry divisions and many independent regiments. A large proportion are engaged in administration and the manning of small posts.

The burden of administration increases when road movement is restricted, convoys have to be used in ideal ambush country and trains must be guarded.

Where so much of the battle zone is inhabited the scattering of the army, in small posts, is essential to give protection and confidence if the whole population is not to go over to the rebels. (Evacuations of population as in the north-west corner of Oran cannot often be carried out.) But the area is vast and local protection is inadequate, as are the forces immediately available as mobile reserves.

9. The army lacks a clear policy and firm support from Paris. It is handicapped by slow civil processes (some rebels have just been brought to trial for deeds committed on 1st November, 1954). Only in two areas has the army been given control—the Aures, where much progress has been made with the *Officiers des affaires indigènes*, and more recently in Grande Kabylie. But the O.A.I. are still far too few.

The political division of North Africa into three territories handicaps the army in operations on the frontiers and deprives it of flexibility in moving its forces. There is no single Commander-in-Chief.

10. The army was slow to adapt itself to guerrilla warfare; but now it has shed most of its heavy N.A.T.O. equipment and, despite its difficulties, is acquitting itself well though there is still room for improvement. With little or no intelligence of the rebels, its sweeps for suspects and pitched battles after some local disaster have achieved good results. It inflicts higher casualties than it receives; but of course it never has the initiative.

Reservists will always grumble, but generally morale amongst French troops seems high. It will usually be so when men have plenty to do, even if they are uncomfortable.

Desertions

11. There has always been a trickle of desertions by local musulman troops. In the last few months two regiments of Moroccan Tirailleurs have been sent to Europe. For a month or two past it has been necessary to withdraw local musulmans from small isolated posts. But the recent defection of fifty out of eighty Algerian Tirailleurs in a post of 130 makes the problem much more serious.

It is all the more unfortunate as the policy had been to increase the number of local units, better suited for guerrilla warfare, in order to relieve the strain on the Metropolitan Army. In fact, many new local units have come to notice, especially in Algeria. It may be that this expansion has allowed unreliable elements to creep in.

12. It is difficult to see a solution, as the problem is one of great magnitude. Nearly a quarter of the troops in Algeria are musulmans. Accelerated promotion of musulman officers, increasing the proportion of Europeans, posting units as far from their homes as possible and exchanging complete units with French ones in Europe have all been suggested. It has been shown above how little in Europe there is to exchange with. As the rebel power grows and more troops' families can be terrorised, it seems likely that desertions and mutinies may increase and the army be further weakened.

The Future

13. In Morocco and Tunisia rebel activity will take its tone from Algeria. It seems probable that the Middle Atlas may flare up again.

14. In Algeria the boldness and scope of rebel action in the present wintry conditions are most serious. One can only foresee a further increase in tempo in the spring, followed, if the rebels can patch up their political differences, by an unacceptable offer to negotiate.

To speak of another Dien Bien Phu is going too far. The French Army in North Africa cannot be defeated by the rebels. But it has the initiative nowhere and little control over vast areas. Unless its methods and means are improved urgently, the situation will continue to deteriorate.

15. No political, social or economic solution is possible without a military one. And that means the recall of reservists; 200,000 is the figure mentioned.

Moderate and co-operative governments in Morocco and Tunisia cannot survive if Algeria crumbles. It is difficult to see any other end to the rebellion unless the French Government acts with realism, vigour and speed.

27th February, 1956.

JF 1023/40 No. 4

THE IRAQI ATTITUDE TO EVENTS IN ALGERIA

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received May 22*)

(No. 126. Confidential) *Bagdad,*
Sir, *May 15, 1956.*

With reference to my telegram No. 426 of the 5th of April, I have the honour to report that the Iraqi public and press have been following with increasing concern the course of events in Algeria. During the present sitting of the Iraqi Parliament, which began on December 1, there have been debates on this subject on no less than three occasions. The first was on the 12th of December when the Minister of Finance introduced a Bill seeking Parliamentary approval for Ordinance No. 2 of August, 1955, which appropriated a quarter of a million dinars for the " Arab victims in Morocco to be spent through the Iraqi Red Crescent Society." This sum, as will be seen from my telegram No. 715 of the 25th of August, was allotted by the Iraq Government to relieve Arab sufferers after the disturbances which took place in Morocco and Algeria in August, 1955, but was declined by the French Government. The Parliamentary debate on this occasion was centred more on Morocco than Algeria and the Government were able to avoid any major statement of policy since the Bill was a financial one and it fell, therefore, to the Minister of Finance to wind up. He contented himself with stating that the money was voted for humanitarian purposes and as an expression of the traditional policy of Iraq towards other Arab peoples; he still hoped that the French Government would accept it.

2. When the next debate took place on the 20th of March, the independence of Tunis and Morocco had already been assured and the attack shifted to French policy in Algeria. Eleven of the leading Deputies spoke. An economic boycott of France was called for and the nationalisation of French petroleum companies' shares in the Iraq Petroleum Company was advocated. On this occasion the Minister of Foreign Affairs replied to the debate. He condemned the " massacres " by the French authorities in Algeria and said that the Government were consulting with the other States who had participated in the Bandung Conference to enlist support for the Algerian Nationalists. He said that a boycott of France could only be an effective weapon if the States where the French had really substantial interests could combine to enforce it. Unilateral action by a single State would be well-nigh meaningless. Sayid Burhanuddin Bashayan added that the Iraq Government would gladly join in a combined boycott. It was as a result of this debate that on the 24th of March the Chamber addressed telegrams protesting against French action in Algeria to the Presidents of Assemblies and Parliaments of the free nations (see Mr. Beaumont's letter to Mr. Rose of March 28). The debate also led to the official *démarche* by the Minister of Foreign Affairs reported in my telegram under reference.

3. The sentiments expressed on this occasion must also have influenced the attitude which the Minister of Foreign Affairs adopted at the meeting of the Political Committee of the Arab League early in April. For when he returned to Iraq on the 11th of April he told the press that he had expressed Iraq's readiness to join in a boycott of France and had advocated that it should be declared immediately, but that " other Arab States " had preferred to refer the matter to a committee. Not only did this statement conform with his previous declarations in Parliament but, as reported in my telegram No. 458 of the 13th of April, it had the added virtue in the eyes of the Iraq Government of having enabled the Minister of Foreign Affairs to drive a wedge between the Syrian Government, which favoured an immediate boycott, and their Egyptian and Saudi allies who were hesitant.

4. In the Parliamentary debate which took place on the 26th of April the Minister took this line once more and various of the Deputies criticised the Arab League's decision to refer the matter to a committee, which, they said, was the equivalent of pigeon-holing it, but they also criticised the Government for having submitted to such a decision instead of proceeding to a unilateral boycott of France. Hostile reference was made to the use of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation forces

by France in Algeria and there was some talk of " Western imperialism." France was criticised for supplying arms to Israel—another act of hostility to the Arabs. The Foreign Minister spoke three times in the course of this debate. He referred to the official protests he had made to my American and French colleagues and to myself, to his consultations with the Bandung powers and his action in Cairo. However, he found some difficulty in defending his thesis that a boycott could be effective only if unanimous and by the end of the debate had gone so far as to promise that the Government woud not hesitate to declare a boycott of France, unilaterally if necessary, if it could be shown to be useful. A motion recommending a boycott of France to the Government was put to the vote and carried.

5. During the whole of this period the press and Government-controlled Bagdad Broadcasting Station had continued their attacks on France. Algeria has, in fact, become a subject charged with emotional overtones only second to the Palestine issue and a committee of the " Save Palestine " Society has been set up to " save Algeria." The younger generation of politicians, civil servants and lawyers will corner one at receptions and harangue one with no little earnestness and heat. Groups of politicians, professional bodies (doctors, engineers and lawyers), Chambers of Commerce and students have all showered manifestos on the Government condemning French policy and calling for a political and economic boycott. In all this it is assumed that the French are the only party guilty of atrocities in Algeria and that the rebels are inspired by the pure flame of Arab nationalism. Attempts to show that this is not the case fall on deaf ears.

6. The position of the Iraq Government in this situation is not an easy one. Fundamentally, the policy of Nuri Pasha is based on collaboration with the West and therefore on the strengthening of the Bagdad Pact and of N.A.T.O. against Communism and the forces of disruption. Internally, he is the apostle of the strict maintenance of public order, and the idea of allowing the outcry against the French in Algeria to assume the proportions of popular demonstration, such as have occurred in Syria, is utterly repugnant. On the other hand, the spark of Arab nationalism still burns in Nuri Pasha—though perhaps not so brightly as in some other Iraqi politicians—and tempered by a realism which others do not have. The Iraqis as a whole regard the French contention that Algeria is part of France as, to say the least, academic and artificial. Moreover, both the Prime Minister and his Government are acutely conscious that their policy of supporting the West has led to the accusation both abroad and at home that they have isolated themselves from the rest of the Arab world. Therefore, to take any other than a Nationalist line over the Algerian issue would provide a further weapon to those who, like the Egyptian Government, accuse the Iraq Government of having sold out their country to " Western imperialism." The Iraq Government have thus taken in public and will, I believe, continue to take a strongly anti-French line over the Algerian issue. At the same time, they hope that they will not be called upon to take active measures against France in support of that line. I suspect that they will seize on every instance they find to avoid doing so. They were certainly most relieved that at the Arab League meeting it was the Egyptian Government who applied the brake to Syrian enthusiasm for a boycott, thus allowing the Iraqi delegate to side with the Syrians without fear of being called upon to translate his words into action. Indeed, they have in private and in the latest debate in Parliament taken for themselves a little discreet credit for their Nationalist intransigence at the expense of the Egyptian Government. I expect they will continue to do this also.

7. The French Government will thus probably have little to fear save harsh words from the Iraqis. They do not, however, have themselves to thank for this restraint. The Iraqis believe that the preoccupation of successive French Governments and the Quai d'Orsay with the " special position " of France in Syria has led them to cold-shoulder the Iraq Government because Iraq desires the Fertile Crescent which French policy believes to be detrimental to France. Also because of Syria, the French Government have continually attacked the Bagdad Pact, which is the cornerstone of Iraqi policy. At the same time they have systematically failed to insure the enormous economic stake they have in Iraq—(*e.g.*, 23¾ per cent. of the Iraq Petroleum Company, the large French dependence on Iraqi oil, substantial contracts in the Iraq Development Programme and various commercial enterprises)—by paying a premium of political goodwill. The action of the Syrian Government in taking the initiative to propose the boycott of France would

appear from here to demonstrate the illusory nature of the French position in Syria and the lack of realism of French Middle Eastern policy as a whole, when contrasted with the tangible French interests in Iraq. Indeed, one cannot resist the temptation to think that, if things were to go badly with the French in Iraq, they will have brought it upon themselves and, conversely, if they do not, that it will be largely due to the moderating influence exercised by Nuri's rule, by Iraq's allies in the Bagdad Pact and by the Pact itself which is increasingly providing a safety-valve for Iraqi energies.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Paris, Washington, Cairo, Algiers, Amman, Ankara, Damascus, Jedda, Beirut, Rabat and Tunis and to the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL WRIGHT.

JF 1019/180 No. 5

A GENERAL REPORT ON THE ALGERIAN SITUATION, 25th JUNE, 1956, BY BRIGADIER A. C. F. JACKSON, C.B.E., MILITARY ATTACHE, BRITISH EMBASSY, PARIS

Introduction

1. The rebellion in Algeria broke out in November, 1954, and was confined, at first, to the restricted area of the Aures Mountains. As this was the least settled part of Algeria and had never really been completely pacified, the French Government did not take the rising very seriously. It came at an extremely bad moment, however, as the settlement in Indo-China was only just completed and the run-down of the garrison there had hardly started. As a result, there were few troops in Algeria and certainly not enough to deal with the outbreak in the Aures Mountains. It was possible to collect a few regiments of the Foreign Legion, rush some more back from Indo-China and send the 25 Aéroportée Division from France. These steps were considered adequate and it was confidently predicted by the French General Staff that all trouble would be over as soon as the spring weather made campaigning in this very hilly country reasonably easy.

2. These steps, however, were not adequate at all and the rebellion spread during the spring across the Mountains of Hodna into the Grande Kabylie and also eastwards into the Nementcha area along the Tunis border. Again, these were areas which were frequently disturbed and, though more reinforcements were sent, the danger signals were not read correctly and the rebellion was still considered to be a number of local risings.

3. On the 20th August, 1955, the whole position changed overnight when the rebels spilled over from the Aures-Nementcha area and Grande Kabylie into the settled parts of the Department of Constantine. Bands of armed and organised rebels, supported by locals, impressed or volunteering, massacred some hundreds of French and did considerable material damage. These massacres were also the signal for the paying off of old scores between Muslims and many were murdered and much of their property destroyed. Even these events did not have much effect on opinion within France, though more reinforcements were sent. These, however, were not very numerous and hardly replaced the normal conscript wastage of French forces in Algeria.

4. In October, the rebellion spread to the Department of Oran and a number of massacres took place. It was now beginning to be quite clear to anyone who seriously considered the problem that Algeria was in the throes of a major nationalistic revolt and not a series of local risings which happened to be more or less simultaneous. The winter weather of the mountains of Algeria, in which the rebels were living, gave the French a short breathing space, but advantage was not taken of this and in February the security situation had further degenerated and become very serious. French and friendly Muslims were being murdered daily in increasing numbers, farms were being burnt, communications being interrupted, and the troops, constantly ambushed, were not having the best of the subsequent encounters. The situation had become so bad that urgent steps could not longer be delayed.

5. It is not within the scope of this report to cover political events in France but there were several definite political decisions taken by M. Mollet's new Government as soon as it was formed:—

(*a*) After an abortive attempt to make General Catroux Resident-General in Algeria—an attempt which was fortunately prevented by the colons—the energetic and forceful M. Lacoste was appointed Minister-Resident to direct the civilian and military pacification of Algeria in accordance with the policy of the Government of which he formed a part.

(*b*) It was finally decided to cease trying to pay any heed to the NATO obligations of the French Army and to withdraw entirely all combatant units from Germany. This decision has not been publicised as such, but it has been made.

(*c*) It was decided to recall the "disponible" categories of the reserve to meet M. Lacoste's large demands for reinforcements.

After a delay, therefore, of approximately 18 months, measures were taken to put right a situation which had got out of hand because it had not been taken seriously when it started.

6. The object of this report, written mainly as a result of a short tour of the disturbed areas, is to describe the situation as it is at present and to make an attempt to assess the result of these measures.

The Rebel Organisation and Strength

7. It is normal to divide the rebels into those belonging to the Mouvement National Algérien (MNA), who are really supporters of Messali Haj, now exiled in Bellisle, and the Forces Libérations Nationales (FLN) who are more or less affiliated to the exiles in Cairo. This division, however, is extremely fluid and very many of the rank and file neither know nor care to which party their leaders owe allegiance. Muslims recruited in France by Messali Haj's organisation serve happily in FLN bands.

In this connection, the information given to the world press by the French journalist, Mlle. Gerard, as to the importance of the MNA is probably much exaggerated. This prominent ex-member of the French resistance, now being prosecuted for her contact with the rebels, was probably misled by wishful thinking into minimising foreign influence in the rebellion. It is, however, interesting to note that her views about the genuine nationalistic aspirations of the whole Muslim population correspond with those given to me by M. Chevallier, the Mayor of Algiers.

A division of the rebels into MNA and FLN is not particularly important as it is unlikely that the French will ever negotiate with the leaders of either organisation, as such. There is some interest in the fact that there are two bodies at certain levels, as inter-gang battles are not infrequent. I could not, nevertheless, find any real evidence that these fights were due to ideological differences between the two parties, though rumour often attributes them to this cause, and I found it much easier to agree with the view of most officers that these inter-gang battles are caused by normal Arab quarrels, paying off old scores, and similar reasons. Even though some rebel bands are theoretically MNA or FLN, they are all loosely knit into one organisation centrally directed.

8. The French military authorities are fairly well informed of rebel organisation, though they do not yet know all the details. The centre of operational control is not thought to be in Cairo. Cairo is considered to be assisting solely in arms, ammunition and moral support. The moral support of the other Arab nations is also very important. Every Muslim radio in Algeria is tuned to Arab stations from which they get guidance and encouragement. Radio sets have been found among gangs which have been broken up, but it is not thought that orders are passed this way. It is almost certain that the operational organisation centres in Algiers. Its links with the outside world for arms, &c., are through NADOR in Spanish Morocco and with Tunis, and information and directives come by many normal channels direct from Cairo and from Bellisle. This theory of the central operational control in Algiers is reinforced by the capture of more leaders leaving or coming into the city than the importance of the local terrorist operations would warrant. The recent arrest of Fetail Mustapha Ben Mohammed, Chef des Groupes Armés des FLN, at a police barrier leaving Algiers, is a typical example. Algiers is also probably responsible for arranging the allocation and distribution of arms received from overseas. Under this central operational authority are zones, sectors, groups of bands and bands. At each level will be a commander with some assistants who act as his staff. It is thought that the rebels have adopted the Communist cell idea with only leaders knowing the leader above and this has made interrogation of prisoners difficult. There are now indications that the monolithic structure is gradually breaking down as a result of numerous contacts over a period, so that more rebels know those above and the French are finding interrogation produces more fruitful results. It will be realised that French methods of interrogation are such that prisoners, who have information, invariably disclose it. Real ignorance is therefore the only rebel safeguard.

9. At group of bands and band level, there is close touch with the local inhabitants. The contacts, who are ordinarily non-uniformed local civilians, pass on information, collect taxes and recruits, and spy on and report any Algerian Muslims friendly to the French. In the Grande Kabylie, I was told that there were one or two such individuals in every village, but there are fewer in the more settled areas of Constantine where friendly villages may have no rebel contacts at all, and there are fewer still in the comparatively peaceful parts towards Algiers and Oran. The whole organisation is widespread over Algeria, except possibly in the Saharan districts. The French have considerable detailed knowledge of the local bands. In areas where the bands have been in existence for some time and where they are small, *i.e.*, North Constantine and the Grande Kabylie, the names of every member of the band and details of his weapons are known. I was shown maps at all levels giving this information and they reflected a remarkable military intelligence achievement. In areas where the bands are bigger or more newly formed, *i.e.*, Aures-Nementcha or Oran, the names of the leaders, the size of the band and most of the details of the armament only are known. The French, however, are quite able to assess very exactly the strength of the permanent opposition.

10. Rebel forces may be assessed as follows:—

North Constantine: 10,000–11,000.
Grande Kabylie: 1,500–2,000.
Aures-Nementcha: 3,000–4,000.
Oran: 2,000–3,000 (inclined to fluctuate owing to reinforcements from Morocco).

I was not always given the same figures at all levels and I found a curious tendency to exaggerate in the bigger headquarters. This may have been merely an attempt to make the problem facing the French more formidable to a foreigner. Checking, however, was very simple and the above figures are the hard core. These figures are for armed men, normally wearing uniform, and, except in winter, living in the maquis. They may be taken as virtually correct at the moment, whatever other figures may be issued by soldiers or politicians to the contrary.

11. In addition to the hard core professionals, there is a further large number of men at call. Many of these live in the villages and have normal day-to-day contacts with the French in the guise of farmers, shepherds, lorry drivers, &c. At night, or when an operation is planned, they may slip away from the village, change into uniform, if they have it, and arm themselves with modern weapons, if these are available. If modern weapons are not available, anything lethal is carried and it is this type of individual who was seen in such large numbers in the Philippeville-Constantine area on 20th August, 1955, and succeeding days, and who carried out so many bestial murders with knives, scythes and so many other primitive weapons. These "reservists" are naturally much more unpredictable in numbers and are comparatively more numerous in the settled areas than in the Aures Mountains. General Noiret estimated that there were some 25,000–30,000 in the Military District of Constantine, so it would be fair to estimate that there are probably not less than 60,000 in Algeria.

It is by means of these "reservists" that the strength of the permanent rebel bands is kept up. General Beaufre and General de Labarthe both told me that, in spite of their divisions having inflicted heavy casualties on the rebels in the last few weeks, the numbers had hardly varied. The strength of the rebel bands appears to depend on the arms in the area and also on the local logistic support available to the maquis from surrounding villages. It must be a most significant factor in assessing rebel morale and the future, to appreciate, for example, that 2 DIM have killed about 500 rebels in the last three months in north-east Constantine, but that the strength of the rebel bands during that period has slightly risen.

12. There are two factors connected with the rebel forces which are important:—

(*a*) The Algerian Communist Party has tried to make contact with the rebels and has, to all intents and purposes, failed. The rebels are prepared to take advantage of assistance given, as they did when the young French-Algerian aspirant, Maillot, gave them arms, but generally speaking there is no interest in any closer ideological relationship. The Communist Party is banned by the French in Algeria and some of its leaders have been deported, but this again has not in any way affected the rebel operations. On the other hand the rebels have kept many of the features of a Communist organisation and some of their tactics. It is, however, wrong to attribute the troubles in Algeria to Communist influence. This was the official view given to me by the 2ème Bureau in Algiers. I am aware that a contrary opinion is often expressed, particularly in Metropolitan France, but it is not true.

(*b*) It seems as if Tunis has lost its influence to some extent in Algeria,

owing to the Bourguiba-Yussef quarrels, while the influence of Morocco, thanks to the activities of the Moroccan Army of Liberation, has grown. The present threat of the Moroccan Army of Liberation is very serious, and it may well be more so in the future. There is no doubt that it is working in close co-operation with the rebels in the Oran area. As the Governor appointed by the Sultan to Oudja is currently reported to be the active leader of the Moroccan Army of Liberation, its activities across the border will hardly be restrained by any diplomatic pressure in Rabat by the French Ambassador on the Sultan.

The French appear to be fully aware of this new danger and the main weight of the latest reinforcements are in Western Algeria. The decision, reported to me by a member of M. Lacoste's staff, that the French Government intends to build a wire obstacle along the Algerian-Moroccan border, from the sea to Figuig, will ease the military situation. It may engender ill-feeling between the Moroccans and French. It will certainly put an economic screw on the Moroccan Government as many thousands of Moroccans are accustomed to cross the border into Algeria every year to help in the harvests, and the French will now be able to control this movement and cause unemployment in Morocco should they wish to do so. This wire will also limit the activities of the rebels who cross the border and play Tom Tiddler's ground with the French forces.

Rebel Aims and Tactics

13. It is not at all easy to see the original cause of this rebellion. It is, for instance, very hard to understand why there is any revolt at all in the Grande Kabylie. In this area, at least one member of each family works in France to support his relations in Algeria, so Algerian independence would bring instant economic disaster to the Kabyles. To a lesser extent, the same sort of thing applies elsewhere in Algeria.

In spite of many Frenchmen in authority saying that the rebellion is caused by 20 per cent. terrorising 80 per cent., there is no evidence that this is anything but wishful thinking. It is certain that 20 per cent. are the active spirits and consider that one of their tasks is to keep the less militant 80 per cent. up to the mark, but the desire now of every Muslim is for more self-government. This hunger for autonomy is the only possible real basis for rebellion. While the militants demand a republic and complete separation from France, the majority of Algerian Muslims are far more vague in their aspirations and would be satisfied with much less. On the other hand it cannot be repeated too often that the sole aim of the rebellion is now some degree of racial autonomy and, in this aim, has the support of every Muslim in the country. Unfortunately, many French are not clear on these two vital points.

14. To achieve their object, the rebels are not really doing anything new or original. Similar tactics were used in Ireland, Palestine, by the French Maquis against the Germans, and they are now being used in Malaya and Cyprus. It is perhaps worth noting that the rebel tactics in Algeria largely differ from the later military operations of the rebels in Indo-China, and this may well have been one of the reasons why the French military authorities were inclined to under-estimate the serious threat of the constant minor guerilla operations which opposed them at the early stages.

Briefly listed, the rebels are—

(*a*) Interfering with the normal life of the country by interrupting communications. The railway has its rails lifted, the telegraph and telephone lines and poles are cut, the roads and bridges are cratered or destroyed.

(*b*) Attacking the French civilian and anything French in the country districts. The attacks on colons are well known but this form of rebel activity extends also to French agricultural and forestry installations, while scores of schools have been closed because teachers have been intimidated or the schools burnt.

(*c*) Terrorising any pro-French or wavering Muslim. This is a very serious aspect of the rebel tactics as there are now practically no Muslims who dare to come out into the open against rebel action. It is also the reason why information about the rebels is so lacking. To protect such people must be one of the main tasks of the French Army.

(*d*) Playing tip and run with the French Army. It is possible that a few of the rebels consider that a complete defeat of the French Army in the field may take place. Certain propaganda to this effect has been issued to delude the fanatics or the ignorant. It will never happen now that the French Army in Algeria has reached its present size, and tip-and-run tactics are the rebels' only answer. What may happen is that such action by the rebels against the French Army will produce casualties that French public opinion will not be prepared to support for more than a short period or cause such a financial drain on the French economy, by forcing them to keep so large an army in Algeria, that the French will give up. This is really what happened to us in Ireland and Palestine.

French Counter-Measures

15. French plans at the moment are of two kinds, military and civil, and the accent is now on the first. In the interview M. Lacoste gave me he made it quite clear that the primary aim was to suppress the rebellion. While he was doing so, and after the rebellion, political reforms would take place, but these must be considered as secondary while the rebellion was in progress. M. Lacoste also said that there was no one suitable with whom he could negotiate in order to stop the rebel action. If this continues to be French policy, it is clear that the rebellion is going to be primarily ended by force. This is a tremendous undertaking in so big and so densely populated a country, but the French are trying to reduce the military action necessary in three ways:—

(*a*) The French always have believed, and still believe, that they have many supporters among the Muslims. They consider it their duty to protect these supporters from rebel terrorism so that they will come out openly on the side of the French. These Muslims will give information which will lead to the destruction of the rebel bands and they will also stop supporting them with money, supplies, &c. It is, therefore, the policy now to protect the villages in areas not too disturbed. This is happening in a large number of places already, particularly North Constantine and around Algiers. Whilst this policy is based on a false premiss, it cannot fail to have good results. The non-militant Muslims are undoubtedly tired or tiring of the rebellion, particularly of terrorism and extortion, and some areas have already started to react favourably to the new treatment. It may be a most important cause of stopping the active fighting in the country districts, as, if it works well, some districts will become impossible to the rebels who will then be forced to move into areas where the French Army can concentrate to destroy them.

(*b*) A number of reforms have been or are being started immediately and these may go some way towards the aspirations of the less extreme Muslims. Such measures as increasing the number of Muslims in the civil service, giving a minor form of local self-government, particularly in the Grande Kabylie, are also all to the good. The reporting of the political measures in progress is a matter naturally for the Consul-General in Algiers, and so they are not commented on further. It is worth noting, however, that M. Chevallier, in an interview he gave me, was very sceptical of the value and wisdom of the reforms proposed. He said that M. Lacoste was imposing measures on the colons and on the Muslims without any consultation. As a result of this, and of his complete ignorance of the real feelings of the colons and Arabs, there was a serious danger that he would please no one.

(*c*) A third measure, which will be of importance if it is successful, is that of trying to circulate information to the Muslims. Up to the present, French propaganda, external and internal, has been lamentable. A Bureau of Psychological Warfare was started by the French Army about last July, but, as its sole duties up to now appear to have been censorship and the concealment of information under cover of puerile press handouts, it has done more harm than good. M. Chevallier told me that his many Muslim friends beg for news to pass on in their own towns and villages but he could never get anything to give them. There are indications that this may be about to change. There are rumours that the

recent conference of préfets and generals in Algiers under M. Lacoste's chairmanship decided to issue a psychological directive to the troops telling them that they were the real ambassadors of France, and guide their behaviour. It was also apparently decided to appoint a "psychological" officer in each unit whose duty it was to keep the troops informed of the customs, &c., of the local inhabitants. I had heard about these officers a few days earlier, so I do not think it is as new an idea as the press has suggested. These measures, which one would have thought would have been automatic in any good unit, are, however, a step in the right direction and may be the early stages of trying to get at the mind of the Muslim, a measure long over-due.

16. The French forces in Algeria have nearly reached the intended strength and the end of June will see something like 400,000 men of the services in position. According to M. Lacoste, and most of the senior officers with whom I spoke, the numbers are now considered adequate for the envisaged task and I have no reason to doubt this expert opinion. I do not think that full credit has yet been given to the French military machine for a magnificent achievement in mobilising some 200,000 men in about three months and moving them overseas to Algeria without dislocating the normal day-to-day life of France. This is something of which the French Staff have every reason to be very proud. In a speech given a few days ago to the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre, General Piatte, Chief of the French Staff, said that the movement had gone remarkably well in his opinion. I am sure he is right. We are often inclined to criticise the French for rigidity and lack of organisational powers militarily, but this movement shows they are as capable as any other modern army.

17. In addition to the political measures referred to in paragraph 15 above, military action is to be as follows:—

(*a*) Priority is to be given to the less difficult areas. As a result, in the Aures Mountains area, the troops will be thinner comparatively on the ground than they will be in the rich, flat, coastal plains in North Constantine, around Algiers and in the Oran Area. The Grande Kabylie, being a special case, some of it will come into either category.

This may be a sensible measure if the area does not become a nest of rebels who prey on the pacified parts of Algeria. The Aures-Nementcha area never has been really pacified and the present crisis is hardly a moment to complete such a very difficult operation, if it can be avoided.

(*b*) The method of pacification to be adopted is that known as "quadrillage," which merely means the placing of small garrisons, normally one company but sometimes larger or smaller, at every key point in the area. These key points may be villages, centres of cultivation, prominent cross-roads or tracks, or commanding features. Groups of these posts form a sector under a colonel or lieut.-colonel and groups of these sectors form a zone normally under the command of a general commanding a division.

In the areas settled by the French colons, the French Army is able to save men because of the territorial system which has just come into force. This system makes it compulsory for all male colons up to the age of 48 to devote 1/14th of their time to local guard duties. Territorials are armed and equipped so they are available at call in emergency in addition to their guard duties. In the settled areas it is not therefore necessary to have regular troops normally as thickly on the ground as in the past and it is estimated that this territorial system has released something like two divisions' worth of regular troops for more active duties. It also produces the satisfactory results of disciplining and controlling the colons and this, in itself, is not a bad thing. Regular officers do the organising of the territorials and they may be either the commander of the local subdivision or a special officer appointed for the purpose.

The routine tactics employed by the French Army are constant patrolling so as to show the flag, to get to know the people and to give them confidence and the knowledge that if they defy the rebels they will be well supported. There are few

central reserves, a division may keep one battalion concentrated for special operations. Normally, however, an operation is carried out by temporarily thinning out adjacent posts to provide the force. This system has the advantage that troops are usually operating over ground they know. The distance between posts varies according to the country. Three to five kilometres is normal and except in the Kabylie, where villages are close together, this means one per major village.

(*c*) It is the policy to attack the rebels whenever they are seen or whenever information comes in of their presence. In the past large sweeps were carried out as well as minor operations but I was told that the former method was becoming unpopular as the effort seldom was justified by results. It is quite possible that big operations will take place in the future—they will certainly be necessary in due course in the Aures as bands are up to 200 in strength—but the normal operation is a small one using the three or four companies whose posts surround the objective. Such operations take place daily all over Algeria. They are run by the local commanders and a senior echelon is only involved to co-ordinate an operation involving two subsidiary ones. These are the sort of operations in which light aircraft and helicopters are constantly being used and they are very much in demand. Information about the use of helicopters and light aircraft will be submitted in a separate report.

It will be realised that probably more than half of these operations produce no visible result in the way of rebels killed or captured, but they are by no means valueless. The rebels are kept on the run, the local inhabitants are given confidence and supported and the "présence Française" appears frequently in areas in which it has been sadly lacking in the past.

(*d*) Check posts on all the roads, including those within towns and at intervals on all major tracks, control the movement of the population. Papers are examined and individuals searched. These posts certainly hinder rebel movements and quite a number of wanted individuals and suspects are rounded up. The check posts in towns are specially important, and will become more so if terrorism spreads, as they make the work of the town terrorist very difficult since he may always be found with weapons on him. In Algiers alone, there seem to be patrols everywhere and they constantly change their location. One sees them also at intervals of every few miles on the main roads in the country.

General Conclusion

18. It has been stated on a number of occasions by the highest authorities that France has no intention of relinquishing her sovereignty over Algeria. It has also been generally stated by M. Mollet, and more specifically by M. Lacoste, that there is no intention of negotiating with the rebel leaders and that there is little intention of negotiating at all until a considerable measure of pacification has been reached. These two statements can only lead to the conclusion that the French aim is the suppression of those actively operating against them, while at the same time attempting to gain the allegiance—or at worst acquiescence—of the non-militant part of the Muslim population.

19. To deal with the first problem. The active rebel strength is something under 20,000 and these men are so fanatically involved in the rebellion that it seems hard to believe that they will submit to anything except force. It should also be remembered that the majority have carried out terrorism against other Muslims, so they cannot return to a peaceful existence except as part of a victorious army and future leaders of Algeria. If they returned to normal life under French rule, they would certainly be murdered by people whom they have injured. This looks like being a hard core of men who have nothing to gain and everything to lose by submission. Their suppression is the first task of the French Army and it is one they are carrying out systematically. The various engagements that are reported in the papers indicate that the French are killing or capturing something like fifty rebels a day. These figures will get higher with the increase in the French Army and then should start to decline if the rebels get thin on the ground. For the moment the casualties are quite immaterial, as the number of rebels remains almost constant and

there seems to be an immediate volunteer waiting to step into a vacant place. The volunteers come from the semi-professional group of part-time rebels whose numbers are estimated at something like 60,000. One is sometimes therefore inclined to wonder if the hard core resistance is not much higher than one would believe and only limited by a lack of arms and logistic support. If this is the case, the task of the French Army is a bigger one than at first appears. It seems that some such calculations are in the minds of the more senior French officers. It was most noticeable that the spirit of optimism was highest among the troops themselves. This is as it should be in any army, but I found the more senior officers inclined to discount the casualties and to say that they hoped the position would be much improved " by the end of the year " and this is very different from the " Home by Xmas " attitude of the units.

20. In my appreciation of the possible duration of the operations in Algeria, I gave my opinion that the earliest the military situation could be cleared up would be the end of 1957. My visit to Algeria has not led me to modify this view very greatly, but the following factors might cause slight variations:—

(*a*) Political measures, including the granting of some form of municipal independence, are being pressed on rather faster than one would have expected. There are some bold experiments in hand, which may, if they succeed, turn many waverers towards the French, including some of the semi-professional rebels. This would lessen the flow of recruits to the hard core bands and so make the French Army's task easier.

(*b*) The French Minister-Resident has decided that the Aures-Nementcha and the Grande Kabylie are special problems which can be dealt with separately from the main rebellion. It is therefore intended to do little more than hold the position in these areas while concentrating on the rest of Algeria. It is possible therefore that we may get to the position rather earlier that part of Algeria is pacified while the two worst areas are nearly as bad as ever. This would permit a reduction in the total French effort but I am a little sceptical of this idea as it is reverting only to pre-August 1955, and not pre-November 1954, and what happened on 20th August, 1955, might happen again if the French efforts were relaxed.

(*c*) The Minister-Resident might waver in his somewhat dogmatic view of no negotiations without pacification. I am quite sure that M. Chevallier, the Mayor of Algiers, is right when he says there is plenty of moderate opinion among the Muslim population who are tired of the troubles and would be prepared to accept a lot less than the militant rebels. If these were used skilfully, the rebels would find their support fading away and they might start to withdraw from the more peaceful areas where existence was becoming difficult. This would lead to a concentration and facilitate the tasks of the French Army.

JF 1013/8 No. 6

MONTHLY POLITICAL REPORT—JULY 1956

Mr. Sarell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received August 13*)

(No. 93. Restricted) *Algiers,*
Sir, *August 7, 1956.*

I have the honour to enclose herewith my report of events in Algeria during the month of July.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosures to Her Majesty's Representatives at Paris, and (without appendices) Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli, Benghazi and to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, Malta.

I have, &c.

R. F. G. SARELL.

Enclosure

MONTHLY REPORT—ALGERIA, JULY 1956

The month has seen a continuation of terrorism in the towns, which yielded the rebels one of their most striking successes in the widespread observance of the F.L.N.-inspired general strike of July 5. In the countryside, the military *quadrillage* or grid zoning is now officially stated to be complete. In spite of local setbacks due to the inexperience of newly-recalled reservists, there has been a marked improvement in such hard-core rebel areas as Kabylia, where the first of the new Departments created under the recent reforms is due to be inaugurated during the second half of August. At the same time, the realisation that complete pacification is not likely to be achieved until well on into next year is gradually being borne in upon local opinion, and the maintenance of considerable French forces in Algeria for some time after pacification has now been officially confirmed. The news of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, at the end of the month, was on the whole greeted with relief by the European population, in the belief that Colonel Nasser had at last over-reached himself, and Western reaction to the move was awaited with some anxiety and impatience.

2. July opened with an important test of strength, when the Front de la Libération National called upon all Moslems throughout the country to observe an " insurrectionary strike ", timed to coincide with the anniversary of the French landing in Algiers in 1830. In the event, and despite warnings by the authorities that strikers would be liable to disciplinary measures, the strike was a signal success for the rebels in Algiers, where it was observed by practically 100 per cent. of the Moslems; while many of the strikers no doubt sympathised on religious and racial grounds with the aims of the rebel organisers, it was clear that the majority stayed away from work through sheer terror of the consequences of any non-compliance with the instructions of the F.L.N., who thus demonstrated that their writ, in the native quarters of the capital, ran as strongly as that of the legal authorities. In other towns however—and notably in Oran, where Europeans greatly outnumber the Moslem population—abstentions from work among the Moslems were considerably less numerous. French reports of the strike emphasised the fact that public order had everywhere been maintained, and that the " insurrectionary " element was conspicuous by its absence. The undoubted success of the strike has however been followed by continued acts of individual terrorism in the towns and, while Moslems are still the principal object of attack, European policemen are now being marked down by the bolder terrorist elements. Several hundred gendarmes have been brought over from Metropolitan France, with the task of evaluating and following up the information which is now beginning to flow in. As a result, a certain number of F.L.N. networks have been rounded up, although the attacks still continue on a disturbing scale. An increasing flow of rumours has been current of F.L.N. plans for a renewed wave of violence on or before August 20, the first anniversary of the outbreak of full-scale rebellion in Algeria. While the authorities are taking precautionary measures they

are well aware that the terrorists, with the power to choose their own time and place for their *attentats*, can cause a great deal of disturbance, with a series of well co-ordinated attacks, if they put their minds to it.

3. At the same time, the possibilities of extremist *colon* counter-terrorism continue to preoccupy the Administration, and in particular M. Lacoste. The *ultra* " Comité de Co-ordination ", which had been dormant for some weeks, protested vigorously against the final communiqué issued by the Socialist Party Congress in France, with its reference to a " fight on two fronts in Algeria "—against the terrorists and against the reactionaries. Finally, on the eve of the general strike, M. Lacoste dissolved the extremist Union Française Nord Africaine (U.F.N.A.), two of whose leaders he had already expelled from Algeria. Meanwhile, despite sporadic local cases of mob violence by exasperated *colons*, there has as yet been no general counter-terrorism, although M. Lacoste still considers the danger to be acute.

4. The deep mistrust felt by local European trades unionists of the I.C.F.T.U. has not been allayed by the latter's acceptance during July of the Union Général des Travailleurs Algériens (U.G.T.A.) as the representative body of Algerian workers, since pamphlets issued by the U.G.T.A., and urging all Moslems to observe the strike, were found by police at the U.G.T.A. headquarters a few days before the general strike was called. The letter addressed by M. Meany, the United States trades union leader, to M. Mollet, over the head of M. Lacoste, was also deeply resented, and general local support was given to the protest by Force Ouvrière to the I.C.F.T.U. over the U.G.T.A. affiliation.

4. In the field, the completion of the military *quadrillage* has now been officially announced. A further official statement claimed that 2,000 *fellaghas* had been killed during June, while the amount of arms recovered had doubled during the past three months. During July, as expected, the number of pitched battles against large-scale rebel forces dropped sharply, though daily actions continued in Eastern and Northern Constantine, Kabylia and West Oran. A cleaning-up operation was launched with 9,000 men in the mountains south of Algiers. It was found that in some of the villages, only 40 miles from the capital, no French administrator had ever been seen before. One advantage of the present emergency has thus been to open up the country with new roads, schools and medical posts, while the new communal reforms provide for the care of regions which have long been under-administered in every respect. Meanwhile, it is announced that the first of the new Departments to be created under the reforms, Tizi-Ouzou in Kabylia and Batna to the south of Constantine, will be inaugurated during the second half of August or the first half of September. Press reports have spoken of hopes that M. Guy Mollet may himself visit Algeria to be present at the first inauguration. The Prefect of Tizi-Ouzou is to be a career official from France, but one of Algerian birth, from Constantine. It is perhaps significant that the first Prefect of Batna, which includes the Aurès-Nementcha zone, will be General Parlange, commander of the region since 1955, who will also retain his military command.

5. Meanwhile, attempts are being made to press on with the remainder of the social reforms already authorised by the Government. While the agrarian reform remains in an extremely nebulous state, a first token distribution of 200 hectares of land took place in Oran during the month, when lots taken from a large estate were handed over to Moslem employees of the owners. This has not hitherto been followed by any further distributions, and it is admitted in private conversation by French leaders in Algiers that these reforms are long-term in effect and of little relevance in the solution of the immediate troubles. In Algiers, the post has been created of Secretary-General of Social Services at the Government General, with the duties of co-ordinating public health, labour legislation and social security services.

6. The situation in Morocco and Tunisia, and the aid and comfort which these two countries are believed to be giving to the Algerian rebels, still continue to cause much disquiet here. M. Fouques-Duparc, the redoubtable Mayor of Oran, chose July 14 as the occasion for a remarkable speech, in which he roundly declared that Algeria's " natural frontier " was on the Oued Moulouya. This river, to the west of Oujda, rises well to the south-west, and a shift in the border as demanded by the Mayor would result in a loss of anything up to 100 km. of land for Morocco. A more practical step in the normalisation of Algero-Moroccan

relations was taken when, following a visit by General Cogny to Algiers, the 4th Motorised Infantry Division was moved from Morocco to Western Oran and placed under the orders of General Lorillot, where it will help to cushion the extreme western territory of Algeria against rebel infiltration from across the present border.

7. Renewed criticisms of MM. Pineau and Savary—the favourite targets for French Algerians disgruntled at the alleged failure of France's Moroccan and Tunisian policy—were linked with further appeals for support from France's allies for her Algerian policy. The Ambassador's statement in Paris, on the occasion of July 14, was thus extremely well received. The speech of the United States Ambassador, Mr. Dillon, a week later was less widely publicised.

8. Anglo-French solidarity was also the keynote of the first reactions to the news, at the end of the month, of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. It was widely felt that Colonel Nasser had now over-played his hand, and it was not only the more nationalistically-minded *colons* who hoped that a show-down would at last be possible with the man who is believed to be the animating spirit behind the Algerian rebels. To this extent Mr. Dulles has been criticised for what was taken to be his moderating and delaying influence. The majority of European Algerians undoubtedly feel that, if Nasser is forced to retreat before firm Western action, the rebels will lose one of the mainsprings of their resistance. M. Chaussade, the Secretary-General, went so far as to say to me that it would be much easier to fight Nasser through his regular army than through the guerrilla bands in Algeria. If Nasser were defeated he thought a settlement in Algeria could be reached in a month. If on the other hand the Egyptian dictator can be made to appear as the victorious defender and leader of the Arab world, and of a pan-Arabic crusade, the whole rebel movement in Algeria will receive a fresh and vigorous impetus, which may gravely hamper future talks for a settlement. Quite apart from its wider implications, therefore, developments in the Suez Canal seem bound to have an important effect on the local situation.

Appendix 1

Political Events—Algeria, July 1956

2 Following an explosion in the U.D.M.A. Club premises in Algiers, the police have discovered the organisers of next Thursday's intended strike. Some 25 people have so far been arrested, and large quantities of documents seized in the Club are being examined.

M. Froger, President of the extremist Interfederation of Mayors of Algeria, appeals to local Mayors to organise help for French reservists, and complains of " cold reception " frequently accorded by Algerians to Metropolitan troops.

3 Right-wing circles in Algeria are annoyed at the final communiqué of the S.F.I.G. Congress in Lille, which urges the Government to fight " on two fronts " in Algeria—against the rebels and against reactionary Colonial elements. The Right-wing Comité de Co-ordination has issued a protest.

Appeals by the Union Général des Travailleurs Algériens (U.G.T.A.) to observe the forthcoming " insurrectionary strike " were found in the U.D.M.A. Club raid. The Press are already mentioning the Union's connexion with the I.C.F.T.U., Irving Brown, &c.

The French Union of Students (U.N.E.F.) has split over the question of breaking off relations with the Moslem students (U.G.E.M.A.). Some French students from the Ecole Polytechnique on a visit to Algeria have met Moslem students near Sétif to exchange ideas on Algerian policy, at Lacoste's suggestion.

Much publicity is given to a lecture by M. Naegelen, former Governor-General, defending French policy in Algeria, at the Paris Academy of Moral and Political Sciences.

4 The authorities have announced that military and police forces will be strengthened tomorrow, in order to guarantee the freedom of all to travel to work if they wish. Anybody attempting to interfere with the liberty of others will be arrested, and disciplinary sanctions will be taken against any shopkeepers

or civil servants who strike. The F.L.N., in clandestine tracts, have for their part announced that the " Army of National Liberation " have received instructions to fire upon any vehicles circulating in the streets.

Echo d'Alger publishes what it states is a clandestine communiqué issued by the Communist Combattants de la Libération, announcing the dissolution of C.L. groups and their incorporation in the F.L.N.

A meeting of 102 members of various elected bodies in Algeria—mostly of the Right wing headed by Senators Borgeaud, Schiaffino, Froger, Laquière, &c.—held in Algiers yesterday, passed a motion condemning the principle of the " collège unique ", protesting once more against the Socialist " fight on two fronts " resolution and affirming that they are " ready to study " reforms when order has been re-established. The Algerian Senators have requested an audience in Paris with M. Mollet in order to express their " reserve " on various propositions put forward at the Socialist congress, including " anti-democratic reforms ".

220 Algerian Moslems left to perform the Hadj. They were addressed by M. Paye of the Gouvernement Général, who spoke of French support for Islam, &c.

5 The Government has announced that there will to-day be 330 patrols in the streets of Algiers, instead of the normal 130, in order to preserve order in face of to-day's strike.

Lacoste has dissolved the extremist Union Française Nord Africaine (U.F.N.A.), which he accused of " manoeuvres tending to set the army against the civil power and to compromise its actions ". The Union's headquarters was searched by the police, and four members have been detained for questioning. (Professor Bosquet and M. Boyer-Banse, two prominent Algerians connected with the Union, were expelled by Lacoste from the country following the May 8 demonstrations.)

6 Yesterday's strike was almost 100 per cent. effective in Algiers, and also in Sétif and Mila. In Constantine and Bône the situation was quite normal, with all the cafés (European and native) open, and only very few absences among officials. In Oran, the strike was effective in the port, but only about one-third of the stalls in the market were closed, and shops were open and public transport normal. In Tlemcen the strike had no effect. The Prefecture of Algiers has announced that shops which failed to open yesterday (including some European shops) will be closed for a month; native cafés will be closed until further notice, and some licences will be withdrawn altogether. Civil servants who struck will be subject to disciplinary action.

Raymond Hannon, a Communist originating from Paris who had joined the P.C.A., has been arrested for treasonable relations with the F.L.N.

7 The authorities have ordered the closure of 180 shops—including 50 owned by Europeans—which failed to open on July 5.

Agreement has been reached between French and Moroccans about Foum-el-Hassan, on the borders of Morocco and the Spanish enclave of Rio de Oro, where a mixed Franco-Moroccan garrison will be installed.

In Tunis, French personnel of Tunis Radio state that they will resign if broadcasts from Tunis to Algerian rebels do not cease.

George Meany, President of the American A.F.L./C.I.O., has addressed a letter to Mollet, urging him to adopt an " anti-imperialist " policy in Algeria, and to dissociate himself from Lacoste; the letter has caused considerable resentment in Algeria.

8 The I.C.F.T.U. in Brussels has recognised the U.G.T.A. as the representative Free Trades Union in Algeria, and has invited them to join the international organisation. The Messalist U.S.T.A. was rejected as unrepresentative (which it is, in fact). The I.C.F.T.U. are to inform M. Mollet of their determination to send a delegation of enquiry to Algeria, which would include Irving Brown, despite the latter's rejection by Lacoste. The British representative, it is reported, will be Mr. Geddes. Finally, the I.C.F.T.U. has called upon the French Government to " open negotiations with the authentic representatives of the Algerian people, and to put an end to the fighting in Algeria ". Local reaction shows keen resentment.

At the M.R.P. Congress in Paris M. Pflimlin, the President, has urged a federal solution for Algeria.

9 M. Lacoste laid the foundation stone of the new thermo-electric plant at Béchar-Djedid, just outside Colomb-Béchar, which is to provide 200 million kWh. of power per year.

In an interview with a Bordeaux paper, Lacoste said that there had been a slight retrogression in the situation in Algeria. On the other hand, there had been an improvement in the traditionally restive south-west of Oran Department, and an extension of submissions to the French in the valley of the Soummam, south of Bougie, despite brutal rebel reprisals. The rebels were no longer independent, he added, being subjugated to Cairo, and only with France could Algeria be really free.

The Parliamentary Question in London, referring to Mr. Mill-Irving's speech on the Queen's Birthday, and the Foreign Secretary's declaration of support for France in Algeria, are published with some prominence in Algerian papers. " Force Ouvrière " has protested against the admission of U.G.T.A. to I.C.F.T.U. Bothereau, Secretary-General of Force Ouvrière, explained that he had himself opposed the motion, pending an enquiry, but had been voted down.

10 Lacoste's speech at the opening of the Béchar-Djedid power station is published to-day. After speaking of the reforms in Algeria, the Resident Minister attacked both Pan-Arabism, with its Russian backing, and " some Western nationalism which is ready to take possession of the strategic positions and riches of French North Africa ", referring to the fate of American negroes, the natives in Kenya and the Cypriots. He ended up by repeating that Algeria would always remain French.

The Algerian Students' Federation, at a meeting in Paris, has announced its decision to break with the French Students (U.N.E.F.), following the latter's support of the Moslem U.G.E.M.A.

11 In a speech at Constantine, Lacoste repeated that a reformed Algeria would never be separated from France, and that the Algerian problem would be solved by France alone, without interference of any sort from outside. He strongly criticised the partisans of " negotiations at all costs ", saying that this was not by any means necessarily the answer.

A delegation of French Socialist Deputies is visiting Algeria, to see things for themselves.

12 Lacoste, continuing his inspection in Eastern Constantine Department, visited the Algero-Tunisian frontier and Guelma. In a speech he said that France was moving " slowly but surely towards a more equitable and liberal solution of the Algerian problem ".

All Algerian papers have reported Pineau's statement that the French Ambassador in London protests " every week " against the Arabic-language broadcasts from Cyprus, " which are as disagreeable for us as Radio Cairo ". The Swiss police have searched the houses of several Algerians residing in Switzerland, following discovery of a plot to attack the French Embassy and Consulates there. Among residents in Switzerland are Ferhat Abbas and Moulay Merbach, Secretary-General of Union of North African Workers in France.

14 Sir Gladwyn Jebb's statement on Algeria is reproduced with some prominence in nearly all the local papers.

The *Journal Officiel* has published a decree on agrarian reform in Algeria. It provides for the expropriation of lands, of over 1,000 hectares, which were originally granted to French settlers (mostly during the Second Empire). The reversion of these lands to the State for reallotment is justified on the ground that the original grants favoured the few and did not achieve their object of encouraging French settlement as successfully as was the case with the smaller concessions which were also made at the same time. Only agricultural lands are involved; industrial property is not affected.

During the July 14 ceremonies in Oran M. Fouques-Duparc, the Mayor, said that Eastern Morocco should be incorporated in Algeria, adding: " Our frontier is on the Moulouya ".

The participation of natives throughout Kabylia in the July 14 ceremonies is stressed in all local papers. Much is made of the rallying to the French side of 400 to 500 native families at El Ksar (in the Commune Mixte of Maillot) at a ceremony presided over by General Olié.

17 Mr. Nehru's visit to Paris is given prominence in all local papers. Comment is reserved, but on the whole friendly.

500 French students are to be invited to spend a fortnight in Algeria as guests of the Algerian Students' Association (A.G.E.A.), to find out for themselves what is happening here.

At Algiers the printing press and offices of the suppressed Communist paper, *Alger Républicain*, were damaged by bombs. Some people attribute this action to counter-terrorists and disparage it as " unintelligent ".

18 Mr. Nehru's remarks on leaving Paris are interpreted as admitting that Algeria is a purely French problem. Ferhat Abbas, Dr. Francis, Debaghine and Mohammed Yadid have arrived in Yugoslavia, where they hope to state their case to Tito, Nasser and Nehru. The local papers declare roundly that the three leaders would do better to mind their own business.

In a message to Moslems to mark Aid-el-Kebir, Lacoste appealed for pardon and reconciliation to build a new Algeria.

300 internees are to be liberated under a July 14 amnesty.

19 Lacoste held an important conference, attended by Bourgès-Manoury, Max Lejeune and Champeix, as well as the principal generals, naval officers and prefects. They are believed to have discussed measures to stop arms traffic from Morocco and Tunisia, and by sea; a transport plan to increase military effectives in the Sahara and especially Tindouf area; the organisation of work for Moslems in newly-pacified areas; and the construction of new schools, roads and other public works.

20 The passage dealing with Algeria, in the communiqué issued after the Tito-Nasser-Nehru talks at Brioni, is bitterly criticised in all Algerian papers. Lacoste has commented that the anti-colonial spirit of the meeting was only to be expected from the personal history of the three participants.

In Paris Mollet, in a reply to the Algerian Senators (of the Premier Collège), stated that the Government had not engaged in any negotiations with the rebels, either directly or indirectly.

Lacoste, in a Press interview, has stated that the first reservists will be released in October. It is reported that conscripts may in future do their military service in Algeria, thus maintaining local strength.

22 In a speech at Royan in France, Ambassador Dillon has reaffirmed the " total support " of the United States to France in her efforts to bring about a just solution in Algeria.

Bourgès-Manoury and Lejeune, in a joint statement on their return to France after their inspection visit to Algeria, state that 400,000 men are now in position. This figure would probably be maintained for some time after pacification has been completed.

23 Mollet, in a wireless interview from Paris, said that reservists and conscripts now serving in Algeria would have priority, over those serving in France and Germany, when the time came for their release. He declined however to fix any term for the completion of their service. In an interview with a French newspaper widely reproduced here, he said that the quadrillage, or zoning, of Algeria was now completed. The situation in Kabylia, and in other zones previously particularly exposed to rebel infiltration, was showing signs of a " notable détente ". Mollet repeated that the future statute of Algeria would be decided only after talks with " the qualified representatives " of the country, to be elected by a collège unique. Finally, he said that Algeria would be resolved only by France without any outside interference, " even if animated by friendly intentions ", but he appealed for the " moral support " of France's allies.

25 Lacoste, in his exposé of the Algerian situation before the Council of Ministers in Paris, said that the geographical limits of the new " communes de plein exercice ", to be created out of the former " communes mixtes ", would be

published by September 15, and the first municipal elections would be held in the pacified areas at the end of September. The appointment of 800 Moslems to senior posts in the Administration would be announced soon, and Moslem cadets would also be entering the officers' training schools. In a Press interview Champeix, speaking of elections for the " conseils généraux ", which advise the Prefect in each Department, said that elections on the Departmental level in Algeria were " neither possible nor desirable " in the near future. Budgetary matters, in which the councils are particularly concerned, would continue to be dealt with on the basis of the present Algerian Departments.

27 General Cogny has visited Algiers to discuss with General Lorillot Algero-Moroccan border problems. It is now announced that the 4th Motorised Infantry Division is being moved from Oudjda into Algeria.

The Suez Canal nationalisation has prompted the almost unanimous reaction of the Algerian Press that Britain and the United States, who have consistently failed to support France sufficiently against the Arab world, should at last learn their lesson and react vigorously. While Britain's " refusal to march " during the Rhineland crisis of 1936 is recalled, America comse in for the most severe criticism and, at the end of the month, the theme was in general Anglo-French firmness against American weakness, due to the anti-colonial tradition in the States, this year's elections, &c.

30 A " Direction Générale de l'Action Sociale " has been set up at the Government-General in Algiers, to co-ordinate public health, labour legislation and social security services. Newspaper comment points out that the new organisation is necessitated by the demographic problem among Algerian Moslems—55 per cent. of whom are under 19 years of age—and the attendant problems of unemployment and under-employment.

Appendix 2

Principal Military Events and Anti-terrorist Measures—Algeria, July 1956

2 10 solders killed, six missing and two civilians murdered in attack on convoy near El-Abiod, Oran.

13 rebels killed SE. of Clairefontaine (Constantine Department), and 17 others killed in rest of Constantine Department.

Two women and a child killed, 32 wounded in bomb-throwing at Constantine café. Moslem doctor blown up when his car was mined near Bou-Abderamane, Kabylia.

Two arms caravans intercepted near Ras-el-Euch, and between Tebessa and Tunisian frontier. 10 rebels killed, rifles, cartridges and equipment captured. Rebel attack on Birmandreis police station, in Algiers suburb, repulsed.

European murdered at Guelma. 20,000 vines cut down at St. Pierre-St. Paul, Algiers Department.

3 22 rebels killed in Ouadhia region, Kabylia. Rebels overran a military post at Chellala, near Ain-Sefra (Oran); one goumier killed, European sergeant and 27 Moslem soldiers disappeared.

Two Moslem-French farmers and their wives kidnapped near Bordjbou-Arréridj, Kabylia.

Condemned terrorist guillotined at Oran. 10 members of F.L.N. cell at Blida (south of Algiers) arrested.

4 1,500 reservists arrived in Algiers, from Third Military Region.

A terrorist who attacked an officer in the centre of Algiers was shot down by a military patrol.

One car burnt at a garage in the centre of Algiers in the evening, by terrorists who bound the watchman. Two bombs at a Moslem-owned factory (Tamzali) near the port did some damage.

16 rebels shot in various operations in Constantine Department; seven killed in Kabylia. 31,000 vines cut at St. Pierre-St. Paul. Fairly quiet in other sectors.

5 General strike (see Appendix 1). In spite of large-scale abstentions from work, the " insurrectionary " element of which the F.L.N. had spoken entirely failed to materialise.

10 rebels killed at Douar Kouriet (Kabylia); 20 others captured and stocks of weapons seized. 5,000 persons checked at Sidi-bel-Abbès.

6 Four rebels killed at Birkadem, on the outskirts of Algiers. Four rebels killed in public gardens at Tlemcen. 10 rebels killed in Garem region (Constantine Department), after being discovered dug-in in trenches.

8 At Boufarik, near Algiers, a rebel band penetrated into the town and instigated a series of attacks with grenades and machine-gun fire. The authorities reacted quickly, and seven rebels were killed. The only civilian victim was a Frenchwoman killed by a stray shot while watching the fun from her balcony. In Algiers itself, a bomb destroyed a bus, while another set light to a kiosk near the Casbah; seven people slightly wounded.

24 rebels killed in different actions in Constantine Department, where 18 Moslems were murdered by terrorists over the week-end. At Taouirt-Moussa, near Tizi-Ouzou (Kabylia), 30 rebels were killed and three taken prisoner.

9 23 rebels killed in engagements in Bône and Sédrata. 16 rebels captured at Ain-Beida, near Constantine. 15 rebels killed in Petite Kabylie. In an action in the Mechtras region of Kabylia, near Dra-el-Mazan, 12 rebels were killed over the week-end.

Seven soldiers killed, 10 others wounded in an ambush between Palestro and Bou-Zegza, east of Algiers.

Another arms caravan intercepted by French forces in south Tunisia.

10 9,000 men are at present engaged in a large operation to clear the area Tablat-La Chiffa-Loverdo-Champlain, in the mountains directly to the south of Algiers.

90-year-old French farmer and his 50-year-old maid murdered by terrorists at Corso, near Algiers.

41 rebels killed in various actions in Constantine Department. 1,500 quintals of grain burnt by rebels at St. Charles, near Philippeville. In the Grande Kabylie, 46 rebels in uniform have been killed and 28 captured during quadrillage operations of the past 10 days.

11 In a series of terrorist attacks in Algiers in the evening, a bomb was thrown in a café and another in the street, while other rebels fired from a car on a military post in the residential suburb of El Biar. One terrorist was killed and another four captured, while four civilians were slightly wounded.

Rebels attacked two farms near St. Pierre-St. Paul, but were beaten off by police and military.

16 rebels killed in Béni-Ouarsous mountains, 40 miles south of Tlemcen. 15 rebels killed in various engagements in Constantine Department. 57 suspects arrested in Tizi-Ouzou area.

12 European driver, a French gendarme and two Moslem passengers murdered when a bus was stopped by rebels between Affreville and Letourneux (Oran Department).

10 rebels killed in different sectors of Constantine Department; 36 rebels arrested near Béni-Saf (Oran); 56 suspects detained at Fort-National (Kabylia).

15 44 rebels killed, 27 captured and 500 suspects rounded up in eastern Constantine, near the Tunisian border, during operations which lasted from July 4 to 12. 17 rebels killed near Nedromah (Oran).

12 soldiers killed in ambush at Chefka (Djidjelli); five rebels killed in the same affray. Train derailed by terrorists near Biskra, with unspecified loss of life.

16 The large-scale operation in the mountainous area between Chrea, Loverdo and Tablat, south of Algiers, is said to have been successful in wiping out an important rebel stronghold. 9,000 troops under the orders of General Manceaux-Demiau killed 25 rebels and rounded up 1,300 suspects. New roads are being planned to open up this hitherto inaccessible area.

17 A " zone interdite " has been created around the commune mixte of Tablat. New measures are also being taken for the protection of the Oran–Colomb-Béchar railway. In Bône, the French assistant to the Mayor was shot dead. The bodies of three French postal engineers captured by rebels near Laghouat on July 12 have been found.

18 Enquiries into the recent shootings at the Algiers suburb of El Biar have revealed that the leader of the F.L.N. murder squad in the Casbah is Yacef Saadi. He himself has fled, but a number of his followers have been arrested. A Moslem was shot through the head in the Casbah to-day. Military convoy ambushed near Lamoricière (Oran); casualty figures as yet unrevealed. 12 rebels killed near Guenzet (Constantine Department). European schoolmaster at Ain Témouchent (Oran) arrested with 24 others for alleged complicity with rebels. French farmer shot dead at l'Arba (Algiers Department).

19 In an engagement in the Tessala mountains, 20 miles south-east of Oran, French forces suffered 24 killed, including two officers and 10 wounded; 35 rebels killed in counter-action. French café proprietor murdered near Dellys by five rebels.

20 28 rebels claimed killed in local actions in Constantine Department. Pilot farm 3 miles from Tizi-Ouzou burnt, causing 14 million francs of damage.

22 60 rebels killed in new operation in Tlemcen mountains (Oran); 24 rebels killed in various actions in Constantine Department; eight rebels killed, five prisoners in operations in Palestro-Bou Zegza area, Kabylia.

18 members of the F.L.N. in Algiers, alleged to be responsible for 23 attacks since February, arrested. Former agha of Dra-el-Mizan shot dead in Algiers in broad daylight; he was uncle and personal enemy of Krim Belkacem, the rebel leader. 1,400 air force men landed in Algiers.

23 Two soldiers killed, and two wounded, when rebels fired on a military truck near the centre of Algiers. Police post near suburb of Hussein Dey attacked at lunchtime; two police injured. 23 rebels killed in different operations in Constantine Department. Officer and 15 Moslems wounded by bomb at Ain Mlila. An entire Moslem family of 22 kidnapped by rebels near Kouif (Constantine Department). Tobacco plants attacked in Bône region, 24,000 vines cut down near Duzerville.

24 Military patrol attacked in broad daylight near the centre of Algiers; one soldier killed, and his machine-gun snatched by the terrorists, without any reaction from other members of the patrol. Soon after mid-day another group of terrorists fired on a patrol near the same spot, wounding two men; this time 20 suspects were arrested. Two French soldiers killed in ambush near Dra-el-Mizan, Kabylia. Five rebels killed in attempted attack on convoy near Maillot, Kabylia. Nine rebels killed near Ain-Boucif. 15 rebels killed in Constantine Department. A total of 63 rebels have been killed in Kabylia between July 1 and 20.

25 Three farms burnt by terrorists near Maréchal-Foch (Algiers Department); Frenchman stabbed to death by a rebel at l'Alma, not far away; army doctor and two goumiers of the S.A.S. killed in ambush between Philippeville and Bône; 21 rebels killed in Constantine Department actions, nine killed near Montagnac (Oran).

26 Three farms attacked and partly burnt at El-Affroun, south-west of Algiers; no Europeans were there, but three native guards were kidnapped. Three small fires started in the evening by rebels on Algiers-Airport road, and some damage done.

In Kabylia, seven rebels killed and 20 captured in a series of actions. In Constantine Department, 16 rebels killed. In Oran, eight terrorists condemned to death, five others to prison sentences.

323 Metropolitan police, the first of 1,700 reinforcements, arrived in Algiers.

27 Following Algiers discussions between General Cogny and Lorillot, the 4th Motorised Infantry Division is being moved from Oudjda to Oran Department in Algeria, in order to cushion the Algero-Moroccan frontier.

Terrorists set fire at mid-day to a garage in a new block of flats at the Algiers residential suburb of El Biar; four cars and five motor-cycles were burnt. In Constantine Department, 13 rebels killed in local actions. Six rebels were killed in the first engagement which has so far taken place near Saida, south of Oran, where rebels had not previously appeared.

28 In a series of four rapid raids near the centre of Algiers in the afternoon, terrorists burnt a stationary bus and a petrol station, and damaged two cars. French farm burnt by a band of rebels numbering about a dozen, at Fondouk (Algiers Department); Foreign Legionaries went in pursuit, killing two rebels. A total of 119 rebels are claimed to have been killed during the past 48 hours in Constantine Department. In the most important of these actions, helicopter troops followed up Piper Cub reconnaissance reports near Lafayette (West Constantine) and killed 66 rebels.

30 Three European farmers arrested near Philippeville for complicity with the rebels. 20 rebels killed in Bougie and El-Arrouch (North Constantine) districts, were 32,000 tobacco plants belonging to Moslem cultivators were destroyed by rebels. In Algiers Department, 10 rebels killed at Bellefontaine. In Oran Department, 60 suspects arrested at Béni-Saf. Three rebels, including a political commissar, killed and four captured in Ouadhia mountains, Kabylia.

31 General Robert Loth has been appointed operation assistant to the Commander of the Xth Military Region, Algiers.

33 rebels killed, 12 captured in the Némentcha range east of Constantine. 29 rebels killed near Palestro, Kabylia. 18 rebels killed near Rivet, just south of Algiers. 65-year-old Frenchman shot dead by terrorist at Bougie.

JF 1019/192 No. 7

RECORD OF INTERVIEW WITH M. ROBERT LACOSTE

Mr. Sarell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received August 13*)

British Consulate-General,
(No. 94. Confidential) *Algiers,*
Sir, *August 8, 1956.*

I paid my first official call on M. Lacoste, Minister Resident and Governor-General of Algeria, on the 7th of August. I was fortunate to catch him during an unusually long and uninterrupted stay in Algeria of more than eight days. The Minister received me with great cordiality and was good enough to give me his ideas on the future course of Algerian affairs.

2. M. Lacoste began by saying that France had not the slightest intention of severing her ties with Algeria, and it could be readily understood that she had not sent 400,000 men here with any such purpose in view. First and foremost, France considered Bizerta, Mers-el-Kébir and Dakar vital to French national existence and to the safety of Western Europe. To create a power vacuum such as would result from French withdrawal could well precipitate a third world war. It was unthinkable that the area could remain a strategic void, or that in the absence of French control the Russians would tolerate American domination of the area or that the Americans would accept Russian infiltration there.

3. The present situation was heavily dominated by Nasser. If Nasser's present policy, particularly his action over the Suez Canal, could be checked by the action of the Western Powers, and his prestige receive a consequent set-back, this would be of considerable help to the French in Algeria. The more his prestige grew, the more difficult became the task of solving the Algerian problem. I suggested to the Minister that the prestige of Nasser might in fact be a two-edged weapon, since the Algerian Nationalists, who were no doubt inspired in part by personal ambition, might fear—or be discreetly led to fear—the effect on their status of the unchecked growth of an Egyptian hegemony. M. Lacoste replied that this was only in part true, since there were two broad streams within the Moslem population. The broad mass of the Islamic population had become fired with a pan-Arabic, pan-Islamic ideal, the distinction between pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism being blurred in the popular mind. These simple people were less motivated by the concept of an Algerian nation than by the idea of Islamic resurgence freed from European domination. The second stream was composed of the more liberal professional and middle classes to whom belonged those who aspired to preferment in the new order of things. Among such people there was already some doubt about the role of Nasser and it might be possible to play upon it.

4. The Minister went on to say that his main immediate task was one of pacification. It was not always understood, however, to what extent in the implementation of this policy he was walking a knife-edge between the containment of the rebels and the avoidance of a rising of the French settlers and a resultant civil war in Algeria. The French settlers were tough and they had their rights. There was danger that if they were driven too hard and came to believe that they were being abandoned by France they would take the law into their own hands and turn upon the Moslem population. That this was no idle fear is demonstrated by the sporadic outbursts of anger amongst the French *colons*, on the occasion usually of the funeral of some esteemed settler, where on more than one occasion Moslem shops have been sacked and Moslems killed. In any policy he pursued therefore he must safeguard the basic minimum rights of the French settlers. This said, however, he was in favour of the most liberal and generous possible solution.

5. When asked whether he could give any outline of his thinking on such a solution, M. Lacoste said that he had in mind a broad measure of autonomy for Algeria with its own Parliament in Algiers but linked to a Ministry of Algerian Affairs in Paris; that the autonomous Algeria would elect its own President who would have a chair in the Ministry in Paris. Algeria would also be represented in the French Council of Ministers. He explained that his thinking had not crystallised and that he and his colleagues were poring over the constitutions of Sicily, Switzerland, Puerto Rico—

and anywhere that might offer a suitable prototype. They were all rapidly becoming experts in constitutional law. His aim, he said, was some sort of Federal relationship or Dominion status although evidently of a vintage well anterior to the Statute of Westminster.

6. I asked M. Lacoste whether he had in mind any time-table. He answered, reminding me that all he was saying was in the strictest confidence, that he thought it essential to make "some positive political gesture" within the next two or three weeks but that he could not yet say such things publicly. This gesture would consist in outlining the concessions which the French Government was prepared to grant and he again repeated that he intended that these should be as generous as possible. I asked whether it was his idea that this gesture should be made by means of a public announcement or whether he had in mind to initiate discussions with the Nationalist leaders in Cairo. He said that he had not yet made up his mind, but it was probable that it would be by both channels. They were already in touch with the Nationalists. He admitted that the French Government had in fact no time to delay such a gesture because it must be assumed that the Algerian question would be debated at the forthcoming General Assembly of the United Nations, and it was essential that the French position should be known before then. I did not feel able to ask for details of the French Government's recent dealings with the Nationalists but, in passing, I enquired whether the Minister was working on the lines of the Socialist resolution of Lille concerning Algeria. He laughed and replied that I no doubt knew about party congresses and their resolutions as we had them in England.

7. I then asked M. Lacoste what importance he considered Algeria to have to the French economy. France was, I understood, essential to the economic life of Algeria and I should be most grateful for his views on the reverse of the medal. The Minister, again emphasising that he spoke confidentially, said that, while France considered the problem as one of politics and strategy and not primarily one of economic interest, the fact of the matter was that Algeria itself, from a purely economic view, was nothing but a liability to France. It cost France substantial sums each year (I have been given the figures of 100–150 milliards of francs of budgetary subsidy) to maintain the country and, although the Algerian *colons* liked to think that they were important to the French economy, this was not in fact the case.

8. We discussed the possibility of bringing the Nationalist leaders to a realisation of the economic dependence of Algeria. M. Lacoste remarked that one must realise that the Algerian nationalist movement was a revolutionary one. Revolutionaries were fired by ideals and would not be trammelled by hindering facts. For this reason alone the current administrative and economic reforms, although valuable and necessary, were not an immediate contribution to solving the Algerian problem. Nothing but a generous political gesture could help in this. The Minister then went on to admit that Algeria had an importance for France in the wider economic sphere as the gateway to the riches of the African continent and in particular to the Sahara. M. Lacoste said that once the present crisis was over he was convinced that the wealth of the Sahara would correct the present imbalance of the Algerian economy. This would require substantial capital investment not only from France but from foreign countries. It was crucial that there was available a source of power. As a former Minister of Mines for four and a half years he was in a position to appreciate the value of this. The main source was a large deposit of natural gas which it was planned to pipe into Algiers. In addition, there were useful petroleum deposits which, although not on the scale of those of the Arabian fields, would be of great value to the Algerian economy. Plans for such developments were in being, but, quite apart from the present troubles, there loomed on all economic questions the pressing need to solve the demographic problem. (It will be recalled that the Moslem population numbers over 8 millions, growing by ½ million a year, is 50 per cent. under 20 years of age, and is suffering from unemployment and low wages.) Nothing could be done about the problem of the birthrate at the moment but in due course he hoped that feminine emancipation might help towards bringing this problem under some sort of control.

9. In conclusion, M. Lacoste reiterated that the area was vital to France and added that there was also involved a question of morale as well as of strategy. Fate had in the last few years dealt France severe blows. The French people considered the Algerian

crisis as a test to prove to the world that they were not finished. They had slid far down the slope in world affairs but intended to slide no further. They were determined to demonstrate by their solution of this problem that a national revival was taking place.

10. The thinking of M. Lacoste, and, I believe, of the French in Algeria generally, is developing fast in the direction of liberal concessions to Nationalist opinion. It is difficult to avoid the feeling, however, that their ideas still lag dangerously behind events, and that their plans which could have solved the problem a year or so ago may prove inadequate to bring peace to this country. It is to be hoped that they will in the event find it possible to give more of the outward show of independence than they at present seem inclined to do, and so preserve the substance of their ties and of their position in Algeria, which seem as essential to the future prosperity of this country as they no doubt are to the strategic and political well-being of France and of Western Europe.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Paris, Cairo, Rabat and Tunis and to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

I have, &c.

R. F. G. SARELL.

JF 1013/9 No. 8

MONTHLY POLITICAL REPORT—AUGUST 1956

Mr. Sarell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received September 11*)

(No. 99. Confidential) *Algiers,*
Sir, *September 6, 1956.*

I have the honour to enclose herewith my report of events in Algeria during the month of August.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosures to Her Majesty's Representatives at Paris and (without Appendices) to Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli, Benghazi and to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, Malta.

I have, &c.

R. F. G. SARELL.

Enclosure

Monthly Report—Algeria

August 1956

After a political lull of several weeks, during which both the French authorities and the Nationalists were evidently waiting for the outcome of the Suez Canal dispute, news became public at the end of the month of a move by the French Government to break through the deadlock by offering a new draft Political Statute to Algeria.

2. The official French programme had hitherto been governed by the insistence on the necessity for pacification of Algeria as a preliminary to " free elections ", from which were to emerge the representatives of the Algerian people with whom in turn discussions on a new political order would be begun. A slight advance on this rigid programme was conceded some two months ago by M. Lacoste, the Resident Minister, when he stated that local elections would be held in each district as the area was " pacified ", without waiting for the total pacification of the whole country. The principle was however retained that the new statute could only be evolved in discussion with the elected representatives of Algeria herself. The impracticability of holding any kind of free elections, even on a local and limited scale, has however become increasingly obvious in recent weeks. Despite local successes against the rebels by the French forces now in this country, the rebellion itself drags on. Terrorism in the towns, while combated with some vigour by the authorities, continues to take its toll among Moslems and Europeans alike. Moslem opinion shows few signs of being satisfied with the French programme of internal reforms which, however useful and well-intentioned in themselves, are not sufficient to persuade Moslem Algerian rebels to relax their insurrectionary pressure. And all the time, with each week that passes, the continuing operations inevitably widen the gulf between the European and Moslem sections of the population.

3. Faced with this situation, the French Government appears to have resolved to break the deadlock by a complete reversal of its policy, and to be preparing to submit to Algeria a new draft political Statute. Although nothing official has as yet been published, all observers are agreed that the Statute will envisage a form of federal association between Algeria and Metropolitan France, granting a measure of local autonomy but reserving foreign affairs, defence and some aspects of economic affairs to the federal authority. This solution has already been urged in recent weeks by the Radical Party and by the National President of the M.R.P., M. Pflimlin, and it accords in principle with the motion on Algeria passed at the recent congress of the S.F.I.O. The same idea has now been put forward in a public speech by Marshal Juin, whose views naturally command a good deal of attention among European Algerians in the land of his birth. It is realised that formal federation must await a revision of the French Constitution. But some

interim arrangement is expected which will give to Algeria the *de facto* status in advance of the formal constitutional framework.

4. The new draft Statute is expected to be discussed here by M. Guy Mollet when he pays a brief visit on September 7 to M. Lacoste, who is at present convalescing after an operation. The French Government's move has been cautiously welcomed by Europeans here, although Right-wing circles have lost no time in affirming that federation must not be allowed to become the first step towards complete secession. There is indeed the danger, which has been pointed out by M. Lacoste himself, that a draft giving the extreme limits of French concessions may be taken by the Nationalists as the point of departure for further demands. Such a reform will probably be welcomed by the majority of Moslem opinion if they can be satisfied of French good faith. Whether the Nationalist rebels will accept it will depend much on presentation and the prospect which is offered to them of future political development.

5. Meanwhile the shadow of Suez has hung heavily over Algeria during the month. The local Press, which in the main inevitably reflects the Right-wing opinion which finances it, has been sharply critical of the Western reaction to the nationalisation of the Canal. The main weight of these attacks has fallen on the United States, accused of damping Anglo-French determination in the interests of American internal politics during the Presidential elections, while the American " anti-colonial " tradition has been recalled with some bitterness. It is keenly felt among European circles here that, if Nasser gets away with it, his increased prestige as leader of the Moslem world will inevitably have the effect of strengthening Pan-Islamism and its projection, through the rebels, in Algeria. Whatever compromise is arrived at in Cairo it is certain that the local Moslems, subjected as they are to the full flow of Egyptian propaganda through Radio Cairo and other means, will be persuaded that the Egyptian Big Brother has succeeded in humiliating the Western Powers, and rebel intransigence is likely to be increased accordingly. It is perhaps rather more than an amusing commentary on this local feeling that, whereas in the first 14 days of July only 10 Moslem babies in Algiers were given the name of " Nasser " or its feminine form " Nassera ", not previously a name current here, no less than 55 started off life with this distinction during the first 25 days of August.

6. The programme of reforms has continued during the month on its by now somewhat limping way. It seems clear that pressure has been applied by the F.L.N. to dissuade intending applicants for posts under the scheme for the progressive increase of Moslem staff in public service. A total of 1,800 applications have been received for the latest advertised vacancies and, while this is satisfactory enough in itself, we have been told in confidence that the authorities expected keener competition among those eligible. In the same way it has been made clear by the Nationalists to Moslem peasants in some areas that they would be ill-advised to take possession of land which might be offered to them under the agrarian reform. The reform itself is still slow in getting under way on any scale, although the authorities continue to proclaim that the necessary machinery will be set up " soon ". The Prefect-designate of the newly-created Department of Tizi-Ouzou has now arrived in Algeria, and is expected to take up his post about the middle of September. Meanwhile he has been attending, with General Ollié, the military commander in Kabylia, a series of widely-publicised ceremonies at which mass rallies of anything up to 6,000 Kabyle tribesmen have publicly proclaimed their loyalty to France. While great progress has undoubtedly been made in the pacification of this perennially-difficult area, the time is still far off when a purely civil administration will be able to take over again.

7. Terrorist attacks have continued in the large centres, supplemented by a series of forest fires at the beginning of August, in which the rebels adroitly turned to their advantage a particularly hot and dry spell in the environs of Algiers itself. The rhythm of attacks however showed a certain slackening in the middle of the month; this was possibly due in part to a policy of wait-and-see while the London talks on Suez were being held, while at the same time constant checks on persons and vehicles by the 130 military and police patrols in Algiers have no doubt made the smuggling of arms and explosives into the town a risky business. The general strike called on August 24 in support of Egypt's action on the Suez Canal was scarcely observed at all in Algeria, where only a small proportion of the Moslem employees in the P.T.T. and some of the dockers absented themselves from work.

August 20, the anniversary of last year's bloody massacres of European settlers, which had been awaited as a dangerous date, in the event also passed off without any special disturbances.

8. Operations in the field continued to be centred for the most part in the Aurès-Némentcha range, northern Constantine Department in the mountainous area south of Djidjelli, and along the Algero-Moroccan border. Terrorists have however now begun to make their appearance around Orléansville and in the Plain of the Chéliff, between Algiers and Oran, which had hitherto been relatively free of rebels. Meanwhile the rebels, who have of course an interest in food supplies, have done little to hinder the gathering-in of the harvest, which this year has been extremely good; it is estimated at 24 million quintals of cereals, compared with 20,600,000 quintals in 1954–55. The quality is excellent, and is said to be especially outstanding among hard wheats. The vine harvest, which is now being gathered, is a source of rather more anxiety. Special precautions are being taken to protect the casual labour who come down from the hills for the work, and to safeguard their houses and families. So far all has gone well in the Oran area and only one attack on grape harvesters is reported. The yield is estimated to be up to the same figure as last year, despite some damage caused by the same sirocco which at the beginning of August offered such convenient encouragement to the rebels' forest fires.

JF 1013/10 No. 9

MONTHLY POLITICAL REPORT—SEPTEMBER 1956

Mr. Sarell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received October 8*)

(No. 103. Confidential) *Algiers,*
Sir, *October 2, 1956.*

I have the honour to enclose herewith my report of events in Algeria during the month of September.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosures to Her Majesty's Representatives at Paris and (without Appendices) to Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli, Benghazi and to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, Malta.

I have, &c.

R. F. G. SARELL.

Enclosure

Monthly Report—Algeria

September 1956

The Constitutional Problem

September has been dominated in political circles in Algeria by the prospect of the launching of a new Statute, with which it was hoped to cut through the present deadlock. Every fresh alleged scoop of the terms to be offered, which have been published in some profusion in the French Metropolitan Press, has been widely reproduced in the local newspapers. These expectations were however abruptly cut short at the end of the month, when it was announced in Paris that at its meeting on September 26 the Council of Ministers had taken no decision in the matter, and further discussion was reported to have been put off until mid-October. Once more the month, having opened with great expectations of a forthcoming decision, ended in the anti-climax of renewed postponement.

2. M. Robert Lacoste, now back at work after his recent serious operation, has stated that at least six different texts of the future statute have been under discussion at one time or another. He told a Press conference that he was personally in favour of the single college electoral system, although he agreed that " counter-balances " should be provided to protect the legitimate interests of the French settlers. He added that, in any future Algerian Assembly, a second chamber dealing primarily with economic matters might be envisaged, sitting side by side with a first chamber whose main responsibility would be political. The consent of both chambers would be required for all important decisions. It seems probable that present plans also envisage an Algerian Executive, to be chosen from both the Moslem and European communities. The former President of the French Republic, M. Auriol, has written that according to his information there would in addition be two Ministers of State (presumably one Moslem and one European), to represent Algeria in the Council of Ministers in Paris.

Internal: Political

3. At the Cabinet meeting of September 26 M. Lacoste is reported to have been one of the most urgent advocates of a postponement of any pronouncement at this time, adducing once more the Suez Canal situation as the main obstacle to the calm consideration which such a crucial decision required. The Resident Minister is known to hold strong views on the responsibility of the Egyptian Government for support and encouragement of the Algerian rebels. Conversations with Frenchmen of all classes and political opinions in Algeria make it clear that, in the present Suez crisis, they are less concerned with the genuine maintenance of the Canal as an international waterway than with the administration of a public rebuff to Nasser. At the same time, M. Lacoste has several times during the course of the month referred to the many reports—supported by the written evidence of documents captured from the *fellagha*—which testify to the increasing war-weariness among the Moslem population, and to the resulting dissension among

the rebel leaders. This is perhaps at present merely the cloud no bigger than a man's hand, but it may be significant, and it is possible that M. Lacoste is stalling in the hopes of a still further decline in rebel determination. If this policy were capitalised by the large *colons* to stiffen their hostility to any reforms, the result would of course be disastrous. Since however the French Government are evidently anxious to be able to show the United Nations, at their meeting in November, that something in the way of a political solution for Algeria is already under way, a decision on the Statute may not be postponed much after the middle of October.

4. A further impulse to the urgency of finding a political solution in Algeria was given at the end of the month by an interview accorded to *Le Monde* by M. Abderrahmane Farès, the former President of the Algerian Assembly. Farès is widely respected throughout the country, and his consistent friendship and admiration for France has led him to be an ardent and genuine advocate of full integration. When at the end of last year the 61 Moslem elected representatives proclaimed their hostility to this solution, Farès declared his opposition to the group in a broadcast over Radio Algiers. During recent months however his faith in the policy now being pursued in Algeria has been steadily declining. In August Farès addressed two letters to M. Lacoste, telling of his distress at the reports which he had heard of French excesses in the pacification campaign. He has now followed this up, in his Press interview, with a declaration that in his view direct negotiations must be undertaken with the National Liberation Front, as the only representatives of the Algerian people. The defection of Farès, who as a respected moderate might have been looked upon as a possible negotiator himself, must be a severe blow to the French authorities here, and comparisons are already being drawn between his gesture and that, at a similar critical period in Morocco, of El Glaoui.

The Lacoste Policy of Pacification

5. Meanwhile M. Lacoste celebrated his return to work by the issue of a second General Directive, addressed to all civil and military authorities in Algeria. After paying tribute to the Army for their work in the administrative, educational and medical services of Algeria, the Minister said that 75 young Moslems were already attending officers' courses in Metropolitan France, while 2,300 senior posts had been offered to Moslems in the Administration, and 752 had already been filled. On the economic side, credits had been advanced to the Prefects for public works to absorb unemployment. The increase in agricultural wages was already in force, while the commission charged with the agrarian reform had started its work. The most striking passage in the Directive came however in the final paragraph, in which M. Lacoste enjoined all civilian and military personnel to do all in their power to foster individual contacts with Moslems, " even with those elements who may have doubted France in a difficult moment ". This appeal to bridge the gap between the Moslem and European communities, which has itself inevitably been deepened by the long-drawn-out campaign of " pacification ", is welcome. It is only to be hoped that it will be heard before it is too late.

The Settlers

6. Right-wing opposition among the settlers to any loosening of Algeria's ties with France continues to show itself in sporadic meetings of such bodies as the Ex-Servicemen's *Comité d'Entente*. This committee, which was founded in February of this year at the time of the disturbances which attended M. Soustelle's departure, has once more declared its opposition to the grant of any Statute until peace and order are completely restored in Algeria. The most powerful business and agricultural interests here are not backing this campaign to any great extent however, and it is perhaps significant that an appeal by a retired General, from an old *colon* family, to raise funds for launching a newspaper to represent the settler point of view in Paris, has met with little success. The menace of counter-terrorism, still present among a section of the *colons*, has probably become more acute as tempers rise following the ever greater concentration of rebel terrorism on the towns—and in particular on Algeria itself. The placing during the month of two bombs, which exploded with only material damage in the flats occupied by two liberally-minded town Councillors, is known to be the work of counter-terrorists, and is widely interpreted as a warning to the liberal Mayor of Algiers himself. But these are isolated incidents and it still seems that unless the situation takes a

drastic turn, no organised campaign of reprisals by civilian settlers is probable. In the light of his experiences under a barrage of tomatoes in February, extensive police precautions were taken for M. Mollet's flying visit to Algiers in the middle of the month. In the event however the visit passed off without incident; the Prime Minister, after brief consultations with M. Lacoste and the latter's principal advisers, returned to France the next day.

Communism

7. What is described as an important Communist network, centred in Oran, was broken up during the course of the month, when over 30 people were arrested. Half of these were European, and they included the Chief Surgeon at the Orléansville Hospital. The arrests followed the capture of Lucien Guerrab, a Communist who, when called up as a reservist, deserted to the rebels. Guerrab, who has since been condemned to death, evidently gave his colleagues away under the " expert interrogation " to which he was subjected. François Mauriac in the Mendès-France weekly *L'Express* bitterly accuses the French authorities in Oran of using the Gestapo's water and electrical tortures on these prisoners and there is reason to believe the charge may be justified. It was revealed that offers by the Algerian Communist Party to assist the Nationalists had been turned down by the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.); individual Communists were then instructed to take to the *maquis* and infiltrate into the F.L.N. ranks, with a view to taking over control of the local rebel bands. In this they are believed to have had little success.

The Rebellion

8. While military operations continued sporadically throughout the month, the shift to rebel concentration on terrorism in the towns—and particularly in Algiers itself—was intensified. After the temporary and comparative lull in mid-August, the number of incidents in Algiers rose to a new high level, and the strain is beginning to be increasingly felt by Europeans and Moslems alike. Considerable play has been made in the local (French-controlled) Press with the surrender to the authorities of one or two minor rebel leaders in Kabylia and in Constantine Department, who brought with them documentary evidence of the tiredness which is now beginning to make itself felt among the rebel bands and particularly among the local Moslem population. That the rebels are still operating in bands of considerable strength was however proved by the large-scale action at the end of the month near MacMahon, on the western fringes of the Aurès Massif, in which the rebels lost 105 uniformed men. M. Lacoste has himself pointed out that rebel forces in the field are limited purely by the availability of arms, and bands up to 100 strong have been operating as close to Algiers as Mouzaiaville, some 30 miles to the south-west, near Blida. Other groups, although suffering considerable losses from French troops, have kept up the pressure in the newly-infested Plain of the Chéliff, between Orléansville and Oran. In the extreme west of Oran Department, near the Moroccan border, things have been quieter, though it is recognised that this may be only a temporary respite. It was notable that in spite of this military activity the vine harvest was gathered virtually without incident in spite of F.L.N. directives to the contrary. The yield in wine is expected to be higher than in 1955.

Neighbours

9. Relations with Algeria's immediate neighbours have indeed generally been much improved during the month. In particular, the Sultan of Morocco's speech at Oujda, in which he appealed for the re-establishment of peace in Algeria, and for the granting of the country's national aspirations, but at the same time emphasised that legitimate French interests must be respected, has been generally welcomed, and even the Right-wing Press has had to accord its grudging approval, while at the same time repeating yet once again that the Algerian problem can only be resolved by France herself.

The F.L.N.

10. The month closed with another important trial of strength by the F.L.N., which issued orders that a strict boycott of the schools should be observed by all Moslems. Obedience to this instruction was nearly 100 per cent. in Algiers, while large numbers of children also stayed away in Oran, Sétif, Tizi-Ouzou and some other large centres. However in much of Constantine Department, Oran Department (outside Oran itself) and the whole of Bône Department attendance

was practically normal and, with the exception of Algiers, pupils have been drifting back even in the centres where the order had been heeded. It is as yet too early to judge the success or failure of this latest move. Many factors are involved: parents' fear for their own and their children's safety on the one hand, and on the other the genuine thirst for knowledge as a means to advancement, coupled with the sheer inconvenience of having the children around all day. But the results hitherto achieved do emphasise once more the concentration of F.L.N. terrorism on Algiers itself, as the administrative capital and the town upon which most attention from the outside world is centred. Meanwhile it is interesting to note that, among the assiduous pupils duly attending school in Batna, in the heart of the Aurès-Nementcha country, figure the three sons of Mustapha Ben Boulaid, the F.L.N. leader in the area, whose death in action some weeks ago has still not been confirmed.

JF 1019/212 No. 10

REPORT BY HER MAJESTY'S CONSUL-GENERAL, ALGIERS, ON HIS VISIT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF BONE, SEPTEMBER 24–26, 1956

Mr. Sarell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received October 9*)

(No. 105. Confidential) *Algiers,*
Sir, *October 3, 1956.*

With reference to my telegram No. 3 Saving of the 18th of September I have the honour to report that I paid a short visit to Bône on Monday, the 24th of September, returning to Algiers on Wednesday, the 26th. Mr. Bowker, the British Vice-Consul in Bône for the past thirty-six years, arranged an excellent programme as a result of which I was able to call on the Prefect of Bône, M. Ellia, the Acting Mayor, M. Hélie, General Redon, commanding the Second Mechanised Infantry Division, the General Officer Commanding the Eastern Operational Zone, and his deputy, General Balmitgère, commanding the northern sector of it. I subsequently entertained these gentlemen to dinner, together with Mr. Bowker and Mr. Gwynne Jones, the Pro-Consul, before returning to Algiers.

2. Bône, now a full department since its separation from Constantine last year, is of peculiar interest in the present state of Algeria as the first area to be affected by the rebellion, and the pilot scheme of M. Lacoste's policy of pacification.

3. Broadly speaking it can be said that the improved situation noted by Mr. Alexander during his visit at the end of May last, and reported by my predecessor in his letter 500/2/56C of the 8th of June, has been maintained. The Prefect informed me that five-eighths of the department was now pacified, an area corresponding to the settled area of the plain of Bône. This has been achieved by the system known as "quadrillage," consisting of a dense military screen to contain rebel activity followed up by a programme of relief works organised by officers of the *Service d'Administration Spécialisée* (SAS), who are in fact native affairs officers. It is their prime function to tackle the severe unemployment among the Moslem population with a programme of low-cost housing and public works. This programme, entailing the payment to all those taken on at the agricultural minimum wage of 525 francs per day, has the incidental effect of forcing up the wage levels of the large estates where the big landowners have apparently evaded even this very modest minimum.

4. It is said in Bône that many former rebels are now back on the land, and that the population are co-operating well. It is probable that this success is due to a large extent to the presence in the area until recently of an outstanding officer, General Beaufre, who was only lately transferred to take command of the French "Force A" held in readiness for any possible action against Egypt.

5. The success hitherto achieved in the Bône plain is undeniable. I was shown rows of low-cost housing built on the outskirts of Bône by the SAS with the help of unemployed trained on the site. The farms are reoccupied, and so many refugees have come down from the hills to escape—on the admission of French officers themselves—from military punitive action as much as from the rebels that they constitute a considerable problem. The morale of the whole population also reflects the improved security. Mr. Bowker, who has resided in Bône since 1920, told me of the experience during successive visits of M. Seytre, a director of the *Société des Fermes Françaises et Tunisiennes,* who own property in the Department of Bône. In January his Moslem friends were in hiding, in March they sent messages saying they were sorry they could not see him, in May they were again in evidence, but greeted him shyly and discreetly from across the road, but on his last visit they seemed anxious to be seen talking to him. Certainly there seemed less racial segregation in Bône than in Algiers and the café in front of my hotel was frequently patronised by Moslem dignitaries, some of whom were identified for me as large landowners and notables from the surrounding countryside.

6. In spite of the very encouraging features of this pacification policy few people in Bône underrate the continuing threat of the *Front de la Libération Nationale* (F.L.N.). The present calm depends, in their view, on the maintenance

of the existing military occupation and of the expenditure on public works and administration. No attempt at a return to normal seems possible until such a system of pacification becomes countrywide, if, indeed, that is feasible with the manpower available, or until an arrangement is reached with the Nationalists. In the meantime, any military withdrawal would, it is thought, entail a shift in the allegiance of the Moslem population from the French to the Nationalists. My informants all commented that for the Algerian Moslems he who had the last word was always right. To be fair it must be added that where one of the disputants is the F.L.N., with their ruthless reprisals for any disobedience, the Moslems cannot be criticised for a certain supineness.

7. The cost of the experiment seems high. The Prefect told me that the troops on static defence in the pacification "quadrillage" area were on a scale of one man per square kilometre, and that two divisions were so employed. On the civil side, the programme of relief works in the department, which seems to cover little more than one in ten of the known unemployed, is costing 100 million francs out of a departmental budget of 2,000 to 3,000. This may not be much in itself, but when applied to the whole of Algeria the military and civil burden seems likely to add up to a formidable total, most of which would have to be borne by the Metropolitan French taxpayer.

8. The Department of Bône still has far to go. I was taken out to see a model SAS village at Mondovi. Here the captain in charge has already built forty-five out of the fifty two-roomed huts of concrete blocks in which the shanty dwellers are being re-housed. He told me that refugees were coming in from the hills and an important part of his task had been to make a census of the adult population, giving identity cards to all residents and temporary permits to seasonal labour and refugees from the hills. But I was struck, as often before, by the extent to which the French Administration in Algeria have lost contact with the Arabic-speaking population. The SAS officers spoke no Arabic and were recent arrivals, and in the course of my visit I met only one Arabic-speaking official. He was a middle-aged man who admitted to me that in recent years people had not been interested in learning Arabic. It is symptomatic of this under-administration that the census at Mondovi had revealed a population of adult males over four times as great as the official estimates given to the SAS officer on arrival, which suggests that in the vital matter of unemployment the French Administration has little accurate idea of the problem to be tackled.

9. Mondovi is a "*commune de plein exercice,*" which means that it has an elected municipal council in which the Europeans have a statutory majority. It is one of the functions of the SAS officer, who is a member of the mayor's staff, to see that the Moslem interest is not overlooked and to draw the Moslem population into active participation in local administration. The officer at Mondovi told me that he was having some success in stimulating useful suggestions for small local public works from the Moslem townsfolk. It is symptomatic of the state of the country that the Moslem municipal councillors, who should lead this movement, have all taken refuge in France for fear of F.L.N. reprisals for "collaboration." No less revealing was the captain's reply to my questions about the relations between Moslems and French. As soon as a Moslem youth can save the money he goes to France because he finds relations with Metropolitan French more agreeable than with the *colons*. However, the SAS in the Bône plain seem to be working on the right lines to restore good relations between the communities and can contribute much if given the necessary security and finance.

10. Certain features of the Bône situation are ambiguous. The Moslem response to the call-up is higher than in normal times and is over 75 per cent. The French authorities are uncertain how to interpret this phenomenon and are embarrassed since they fear it to be but a F.L.N. device to secure arms and military training at French expense. They cannot reject conscripts on racial grounds but they are said to be using every excuse, and particularly the medical examination, to reject as many as possible. In practice only some 25 per cent. are being taken.

11. Again, according to a French official, two F.L.N. bands were in being in the Bône area and he could only speculate whether they were lying low on instructions from their leaders or because of the strength of military precautions. They were in any case a reminder of the precariousness of peace in the Bône plain in the absence of a general settlement.

12. I was enabled by the hospitality of the leading Maltese British resident, Mr. Camillieri, to meet three leading Moslem landowners of the plain and to talk over the situation. They probably represent from age and material circumstance the most conservative and francophile section of the Moslem community. Their present desire is for a cessation of bloodshed at almost any price, and they have certainly no desire to see the French depart. They do, however, want reforms. First and foremost they want improved opportunities for the educated young men. They complained that their children were educated and then denied the opportunity to use their talents, so that they drifted into discontent and mischief. The ambitions of these Moslems seemed to turn mainly to Government employment and from this sprang one of their objections to the former system of two electoral colleges. They believed, and I cannot say if they are mistaken, that the European members of the Assembly had had the greater influence in securing the favour of the Administration in the matter of appointments which naturally went to their French and Jewish supporters. With the single college, the reform which all Moslems and most moderate Europeans support, the Moslems feel that favours will be more evenly distributed.

13. They stressed to me that the minor French official was a serious source of friction between the communities. Few residents in France can have escaped at one time or another the off-hand insolence of these people. To the Arab, already feeling somewhat outside the pale of the prosperous society about him, their arrogant and overbearing manner must be intolerable. This was particularly mentioned as the reason why the various agricultural co-operatives for cotton and tobacco, cereals and vegetables, were unpopular among the Moslems. Rather than have to deal with such people who kept them waiting about for hours and sometimes days for their payments they preferred to sell for a lower price for cash in the local market. It was a further grievance against the co-operatives that the Government fixed prices on the basis of the costs of the most efficient producer. The larger estates could thus make a profit but the small man, usually an Arab, was left in debt, clearly a difficult problem for the Government.

14. One of the most valuable of the Lacoste reforms may thus well be the recruitment of Moslems into the minor grades of the Administration to obviate this inter-racial friction. On his instructions seven out of ten places are to be filled with Moslems provided they can pass the examination. Recruitment is said to be satisfactory and a most interesting phenomenon in a country where Islam seems particularly reactionary and obscurantist is that girls are not only coming forward but are proving abler and more efficient than the Moslem boys. M. Lacoste's hopes of feminine emancipation mentioned in my despatch No. 94 may not therefore be vain. When I asked how this Moslem recruitment compared with the past, the French official concerned told me that Moslem recruitment had not in fact ever been encouraged and very few had been taken on. It was no doubt argued that Moslems were corrupt, but in this matter the European officials in Algeria seem to have picked up local customs with some facility.

15. Although the general direction of affairs at Bône seems promising, it is necessary to record that here, too, the French army do not seem to have been adequately controlled. After the attack in August last on Colonel Bigeard, commanding the paratroops, his troops are said by Mr. Bowker to have conducted a minor massacre in the Arab quarter, killing nineteen Moslems at random. He is also satisfied that it was the army who fired the cork forests to smoke out rebel dumps and camps. Such acts of ruthlessness are understandable in an exasperated unit but they bespeak a lack of vision and political guidance or a lack of adequate control by senior officers. General Massu, commanding the paratroops, certainly went out of his way to deny to me recently the reports of excesses by his troops in Bône, but I am inclined to believe Mr. Bowker's information.

16. In the course of my visit I asked about the progress of land reform and was told that it was "being studied." As the Moslems have been ordered by the F.L.N. not to accept land, and its redistribution is admittedly no adequate solution of the economic problem of the Moslem population, this reform may well remain in abeyance. I learnt incidentally that over twenty *colons* from the Aurès area, with medium holdings of 500–1,000 acres, had asked to exchange their farms for land in the Bône plain. This is hardly surprising after two years in the area most severely affected by the rebellion, where the rain failed last year.

17. I have described these impressions of Bône in some detail because the area seems representative of the more promising aspects of the Lacoste policy of pacification. It is not for all that a very encouraging picture, and it suggests that France has a long, hard haul in front of her if no accommodation can be reached with the Nationalists.

18. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I have, &c.

R. F. G. SARELL.

JF 1071/57 No. 11

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND M. PINEAU ON OCTOBER 14, 1956, IN NEW YORK

M. Pineau told me in the course of our talk yesterday that he was concerned about the trouble which would arise during the next session of the General Assembly in connexion with the Algeria question.

2. I drew his attention to the procedure we are adopting in connexion with the Cyprus item. By putting down an item of our own we calculated that the question would be more manageable from our point of view. There was always the chance that both items would be left until the end of the session or possibly not discussed at all. I pointed out that this course involved the abandonment of the stand we had taken in the past in opposing inscription. Personally, I was sure that with the expanded United Nations and so many more anti-Colonial votes it was a forlorn hope to attempt to oppose inscription.

3. *M. Pineau* thought that France might be well advised not to oppose the inscription of the Algeria item, but he said that he thought that his colleagues would insist.

4. We agreed that the issue of inscription was the worst to fight on, because so many countries believe as a matter of principle that any item should be inscribed.

JF 1053/1 No. 12

VISIT OF BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION TO ALGERIA

Mr. Sarell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received October 31*)

(No. 106. Confidential) *Algiers,*
Sir, *October 25, 1956.*

I have the honour to report that a British Parliamentary delegation visited Algeria as the guests of the French Government from the 15th to the 22nd of October. The delegation was led by the Right Hon. Walter Elliot, P.C., C.H., and consisted of the Earl of Listowel, Lord Birdwood, Viscount Hinchingbrooke, Sir Lynn Ungoed-Thomas and Messrs. Paul Bryan, John Cronin, G. M. Thomson, W. Fienburgh and Julian Amery.

2. The programme prepared for the delegation by the French Government, of which I attach a summary,(1) was a very full one and erred on the side of over-occupying every moment of the day. At the invitation of the French authorities I accompanied the party throughout their visit with the exception of their third day when they visited Blida in the vicinity of Algiers.

3. In the course of a comprehensive tour the party visited the iron ore mines at Ouenza in the east and the administrative centres of Constantine and Bône, and then flew back to the western department of Oran, ending the tour with an afternoon and morning of relaxation at the oasis of Ghardaia in the Southern (Saharan) Territories.

4. Throughout their visit the delegation was received with the greatest cordiality by all the French authorities—civil, military and commercial—and the banquets which formed a physically testing feature of the tour twice a day were invariably very happy celebrations of Anglo-French friendship. Mr. Walter Elliot particularly delighted his hosts when he found the courage after luncheon on the third day of his visit to launch out in the French language in a witty speech at the end of which he proposed the health of the President of the Republic. Equally appreciated by the French was Mr. Julian Amery's mastery of their language in a series of post-prandial speeches in support of Mr. Elliot and Sir Lynn Ungoed-Thomas in which he stressed the need for closer Anglo-French collaboration alike in the political and economic sphere.

5. It was clearly the French intention to bring home to the delegation the very wide scope of the French effort in all fields in Algeria. In this they were in the main successful even if the visit on the first day to the Algiers municipal housing schemes—in the company of MM. Lacoste and Chevallier—seemed at times designed to show the delegation to the populace of Algiers rather than for any other purpose. Throughout the tour the high quality of the senior French officials was notable. The lectures given in each centre on the situation there prevalent were admirably clear and gave a good picture of the military, political and economic measures which are being pressed ahead to deal with the Algerian crisis in its local aspects.

6. It was perhaps inevitable that the officials concerned should describe their plans and draw attention to their successes while passing over in silence the less promising implications of their policies. This was, I fear, an error of public relations for the delegation was composed of men of acute perception and wide experience in colonial matters and though without exception very friendly to France they were determined to arrive at an impartial and objective estimate of the state of affairs. It was impossible not to contrast the picture given to us of the advance of pacification with the very heavy military escort which accompanied the party on the journey in Kabylia where the military unit at Les Ouardhias, where we had lunch, was very much on a war footing and the normal escort of police was exchanged for armoured cars fore and aft and a scout aeroplane overhead. That these precautions were not exaggerated was suggested by the rows of eucalyptus trees freshly felled across the road by the rebels and which were being hastily cut up by the army with power saws to clear the way; and by the burnt-out bus and farm buildings, and cut telephone poles along the way.

(1) Not printed.

7. An even more serious mistake was the failure to provide any opportunity for the delegation to meet members of the Moslem population other than two or three venerable village head-men who were obviously judged politically safe. M. Langlais, of the Quai d'Orsay, who accompanied the party, realised that the delegation had some feeling of frustration on this point. Towards the end of the tour he took an opportunity to explain to me that it had unfortunately been judged unwise to select any prominent Moslems to meet the delegation for fear of investing the men so chosen with undue importance among their fellows.

8. The defects I have described in no way impaired the success of the visit in the context of Anglo-French relations nor did they in practice prevent the members from reaching what seemed to me at least a just estimate of the situation here. The delegation, while finding reasonable many of the aspirations of the Moslem population for an adequate share in political and administrative responsibility, were at the same time impressed by the indications brought to their notice of Egyptian and, probably, Communist-inspired support and guidance of the rebels; and they were unanimously convinced that it was of vital interest for the security of Europe as a whole that France should remain in control of the southern shore of the Mediterranean. Regarding the correct policy for France to pursue to attain this objective there was inevitably less agreement. Mr. Amery seemed rather inclined to believe that any move towards a liberal political solution should be postponed if possible until military measures internally had been carried further and the European position in the Middle East strengthened. The other members of the delegation were, I think, rather of the opinion that undue delay in reaching a political solution would be most dangerous in view of the enormous strain imposed on France by the military measures now undertaken and still more by the fact that we are in Algeria in the presence of a rising tide of Moslem population, increasing at the rate of 2½ per cent. per annum, which must make the success of any purely military and repressive measures a temporary phenomenon.

9. I enclose a note on the main points made by French officials in the course of the tour.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I have, &c.

R. F. G. SARELL.

JF 1019/227 No. 13

THE ARREST OF THE ALGERIAN NATIONALIST LEADERS

Mr. Sarell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received October 31*)

(No. 107. Confidential) *Algiers,*
Sir, *October 26, 1956.*

As already reported in the press the French authorities, on the night of the 22nd of October, successfully intercepted a French aircraft on charter to the Sultan of Morocco in which were travelling five of the leading members of the Algerian National Liberation Front, their bodyguard of four men, as well as two journalists, Mr. Brady of the *New York Times* and Mlle. Eve Deschamps, the " Eve Paret " of *France Observateur.*

2. The five Algerian leaders were: Mohamed Ben Bella, usually considered the military leader of the Nationalist rebellion; Mohamed Khider, the political leader; Mohamed Boudiaf, self-styled " Chief of the Internal Command of the Army of National Liberation "; Hocine Ait Ahmed, the F.L.N. (Front de Liberation Nationale) representative in New York—the only member said to be a Communist; and Mustapha Lacheraf, one of the intellectual leaders of the movement.

3. As to the importance of the five men and the extent to which they are in fact the leaders of the rebellion there seems to be sharp disagreement. As I have already reported, it has been said in Algiers for some time that the real leaders of the rebellion are in Algeria and not in Cairo. The well-informed Mayor of Algiers, M. Chevallier, told me that he was satisfied that the real leader of the Nationalists was in the mountains of Kabylia and was Abane Ramdane; next in importance came Krim Belkacem and Ouamrane, also in Kabylia. M. Farès, the last Moslem President of the Algerian Assembly, was also most emphatic that the leaders were not in Cairo, but he maintains that they are in Algiers itself and nowhere else although he gave me no names. Perhaps naturally Ben Bella and Mohamed Khider, who have in the past been regarded as the military and political leaders of the movement, when interrogated on this point after their capture, dismissed as mere executive agents the three leaders mentioned. Moreover I found at Oran that the staff of the Liberal *Oran Républicain*, who maintain some contact with the Moslem Nationalists, considered that the leadership was at Cairo and not Algiers. There is in fact probably rivalry and disagreement on this point in the F.L.N. itself. One thing however is certain. The Cairo Committee were the channel for Nasser's and the Arab League's influence and a support for the Algerian rebellion, and the channels for this have been damaged if not severed.

4. Whatever the position of these men in the Nationalist movement it seems probable that this blow to Cairo's influence on the Algerian rebellion represented by their capture must be valuable. Reports published daily since their capture of the aims and plans of the Cairo Committee have revealed from their own statements to their captors and in the many documents taken with them that Khider and his friends were in disagreement with the Algerian Nationalists not only about the leadership but about aims also. I have repeatedly been informed in recent weeks that the Nationalist leaders in Algeria no longer aspire to independence—at least not in the immediate future—but had indicated they would be satisfied with an intermediate stage of autonomy within the French Union. The Cairo Committee however, no doubt egged on by Colonel Nasser, seemed to remain intent on achieving complete independence at whatever cost.

5. These same reports also suggest that the French, by their capture, have avoided a most embarrassing development which M. Chevallier feared some months ago; for it appears that the Cairo Committee were planning to proclaim an Algerian Republic during the Tunis conference. As M. Chevallier explained to me in August last this would virtually preclude any possibility of discussion between the French Government and the Nationalist leaders since any such contact would imply both in French eyes and in those of the Nationalists a recognition of a " Government in exile."

6. The capture of this aeroplane should be of the utmost value in the military conduct of operations in Algeria. It has hitherto been one of the strengths of the F.L.N. organisation that it has adopted a cellular " secret society " structure making it extremely difficult to disrupt its network of intimidation. It seems likely that the large volume of general intelligence and the lists of names said to be included in the papers captured will enable this network to be disrupted. This might well come near to breaking the power of the F.L.N. in Algeria for the time being at least by cutting off the flow of " protection money " which it has been able to levy from the propertied class, both Moslem and European, on a wide scale in recent months, and by weakening its domination of the Moslem community. In addition, the French population both civil and military have received from this a powerful boost to their morale and according to French sources a considerable number of former Moslem friends have found the courage once again to come out in support of France and have written and telegraphed their congratulations.

7. On the other hand these very valuable immediate advantages seem accompanied by serious dangers in the future if the French Government does not take quick advantage of its present position of strength to reach a generous and statesmanlike solution. M. Farès, whose views I reported very briefly in my telegram No. 122 of the 24th of October and who, by a happy coincidence came to see me after the *coup* as the result of an appointment made some time previously, was much alarmed by the possible repercussions of the French action. He appeared to fear that his Moslem friends might be driven to desperate measures and that the French, puffed up with success, might become more intransigent. He believed that if the French Government did not now come forward at least with an outline of a political solution, we should, in his words, " vivre des jours tragiques."

8. While I hesitate to treat lightly the views of a man of M. Farès standing, with his wide sources of information in the Moslem community, I would myself estimate that the danger that arises from this French success arises more from the temptation offered to M. Lacoste and his friends to put off a political solution than from the threat of any sudden increase locally of Moslem violence in the face of the very large security forces at present in Algeria.

9. It is, I believe, quite true as claimed by the French officials that pacification is making progress in certain areas and that some districts and some villages have not only been armed successfully by the French authorities but have reached the point where they have been willing and able to repel rebel attacks. But such developments, welcome as they are, do nothing to alter the rising tide of Moslem population with at its head a dissatisfied and frustrated intellectual leadership. These men have learned much in recent months from the difficulties experienced in Tunis and Morocco and from the behaviour of Colonel Nasser. They still look to France and from all accounts are more willing now than a few months ago to reach a compromise settlement preserving French administration to a considerable extent provided it can be accompanied by a considerable measure of local autonomy.

10. If the French are able to draw from their twin spectacular successes of the ATHOS and the aircraft the strength to be generous they will I believe be well repaid. If, however, they are deluded into believing a few more such strokes will stamp out the rebellion they will find themselves opposed by an ever more embittered Moslem population who will I believe be able to maintain a rebellion as a running sore until the French public opinion wearies of the continued drain of pacification.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Washington, Cairo, Tunis and Rabat.

I have, &c.

R. F. G. SARELL.

IF 1013/11 No. 14

MONTHLY POLITICAL REPORT—OCTOBER 1956

Mr. Sarell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received November 5*)

(No. 108. Confidential) *Algiers,*
Sir, *October 31, 1956.*

I have the honour to enclose herewith my report of events in Algeria during the month of October.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosures to Her Majesty's Representatives at Paris and (without appendices) to Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli, Benghazi and to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, Malta.

I have &c.

R. F. G. SARELL.

Enclosure

MONTHLY REPORT—ALGERIA, OCTOBER 1956

The Arrest of the F.L.N. Leaders

The capture of five of the leading members of the *Front de Libération Nationale* (F.L.N.) brought a dramatic note to the Algerian situation during the month. After the aircraft in which they were travelling on their way to Tunis had been diverted to Algiers, the five leaders were arrested and have now been transferred to Paris, where they will in due course be tried before a military court.

2. It is as yet too early to assess the full effect of this incident on the future of the rebellion in Algeria. From the preliminary interrogations which have been carried out in Algiers, and the amount of documents seized at the time of the arrests, it seems however that the French authorities should now have enough information in their possession to deal a severe blow to the F.L.N. organisation itself. Opinions are divided as to where the real power in the F.L.N. lies; some usually well-informed circles in Algiers consider that the true leadership of the movement lies in Algeria itself, and particularly in the Kabylie. Ben Bella, the military leader of the Cairo group, has on the other hand consistently maintained that this group held the real power, and that Mohamed Khider, the political chief, was in fact the principal leader of the F.L.N. However this may be, the information now captured should enable the French authorities to disrupt the cellular network by which the F.L.N. has hitherto protected its security.

3. Meanwhile, dissensions and rivalries over the succession have already broken out. Tawfik el Madani, the Oulema representative in the Cairo group, has now taken over the leadership in the Egyptian capital. Ben Bella and Khider are reported as having criticised this nomination on the grounds that Tawfik has not the stuff of a military and political leader in him. Within Algeria itself things have come to a show-down among the chiefs in Kabylia where Mohammedi Said, second in command to Krim Belkacem, has been murdered by rebels working for his rival Ouamrane.

4. The result of this disarray—however temporary—in the ranks of the F.L.N. has been that, in contrast to the angry and violent disturbances in Morocco and Tunisia, the arrests have hitherto excited no particular overt reaction among the Algerian Moslem population. Military operations have so far not increased since the incident, while terrorism in the towns has, if anything, somewhat diminished. This is of course not to say that the F.L.N., once it has recovered its breath, may not launch a campaign of reprisals. Indeed, a general strike has been called for November 1. This is the anniversary of the outbreak of the rebellion in November 1954, and a general strike was also proclaimed last year on this date. The day is also All Saints' Day however, and thus in any case an official European holiday, so that the effects of the strike, except as regards public transport, will not normally be so visible. A strike called on Sunday, October 27, to coincide

with the strikes organised in all Arab countries in protest over the arrests, was observed hardly at all in Algiers. In the rest of the country obedience to the F.L.N. orders varied widely; in the towns of Constantine and—to a lesser extent—Oran, the stoppage was in general observed by Moslems, but in many smaller centres activity was normal.

The " Athos " Affair

5. The capture of the ship *Athos*, with on board a large consignment of arms which had been loaded in an Egyptian port under the orders of Egyptian officers, was cited as proof of Egyptian complicity in the Algerian rebellion, and the matter has been referred by the French to the United Nations. The Greek captain of the ship has admitted that he was bound for a small port just inside the Moroccan frontier, and this is also quoted as further evidence of the aid furnished to the rebels by the Governor of Oudjda, in Eastern Morocco. Ben Bella has himself declared, during his tnterrogation, that it had been intended during the Tunis conference to proclaim an Algerian Republic and, with the aid of the arms from the *Athos*, to set up an Algerian Republican flag in Tlemcen, the sacred city which lies in Oran Department not far from the Moroccan border.

New French Cease-Fire Appeal

6. Much local publicity has been given to the identical appeals broadcast at the end of the month, by M. Guy Mollet from Paris and M. Robert Lacoste from Algiers, for a cease-fire in Algeria. The French Government promise to guarantee the persons and possessions of all those responding to the appeal; the equality of all citizens under the law; free elections under a single college system; wide consultations to define the " fundamental law " of Algeria; and finally, a financial effort by the French for the future development of Algeria equal to the expenditure at present allotted to military pacification. This appeal is not expected—even in the most optimistic circles—to have any immediate effect; rather it is considered that it was given out with the object of striking at Moslem opinion at this time in order to take advantage of the twin successes of the F.L.N. arrests and the *Athos* seizure, while at the same time strengthening France's position when Algeria comes up for discussion in the United Nations, showing that some positive effort towards a peaceful settlement is being made.

Internal Reforms

7. Meanwhile, a start has at last been made during the month towards launching the long-awaited agrarian reforms. Two large estates, totalling 80,000 hectares in all, have been taken over by the State organisation set up for the purpose, and M. Lacoste has stated that 200,000 further hectares would be expropriated in the near future, while 20,000 hectares would be bought by mutual agreement from their present owners. These estates are to be split up into lots varying from 15 to 25 hectares for the rougher areas to 2–10 hectares in fertile zones. Some progress has also been made in municipal reform. Under a series of decrees by M. Lacoste the first 35 centres, lying mostly in the present *commune mixte* of Médea, some 40 miles south of Algiers, are to obtain the status of *communes de plein exercice*, with the right to elect their own Mayor and municipal council. Some 140,000 people are involved, extending over an area of 14,000 square kilometres. In Kabylia the Prefect has installed a new Kabyle municipality in the recently-pacified Mizrana region. Grouping 14 villages, the new *commune* contains 50,000 people, who have elected a Mayor and 42 councillors. In Oran it has been announced that 65 new *communes* are to be created in the Department.

The Rebellion

8. Military operations in the countryside against the rebels have shown a slight decrease during the month. Strong rebel bands are still in circulation however, and this was brought sharply home to the French at the end of the month when 27 soldiers were killed and 10 wounded in an ambush at Tablat, only 30 miles south of Algiers. The main problem is still that of the arms supply to the rebels and M. Max Lejeune, during a visit to Oran, declared that had it not been for the weapons which entered Algeria from Tunisia or Morocco, the rebellion would by now have been over. It is for this reason (quite apart from its diplomatic context) that the capture of the *Athos* was so important; the Commander of the intercepting vessel was personally decorated by Admiral Auboyneau on the day following his return to port.

9. The first reservists, due for release on October 18, have left for France, but the number of French troops in Algeria is being kept up to the same strength by new arrivals of recruits. The French Government have publicly stated that the force will have to be maintained at its present strength for an indefinite period to come, and local newspapers have published with some prominence M. Ramadier's forecast of 320 milliard francs as the figure which military operations in Algeria will cost the French tax-payer during 1957.

10. Terrorism in the towns—and notably in Algiers—has shown some falling off from the high figure reached during September. This has been helped by security measures in Algiers, where vehicles are now more strictly controlled, and where stringent safety precautions are in force in all public buildings and places of entertainment. A wide-scale check throughout the Sahel, the ridge of hills immediately behind Algiers, was carried out during the month, when the whole region was virtually sealed off for two days and a number of known members of the F.L.N. were captured. It is reported that General Lorillot, the French Supreme Commander in Algeria, about whose transfer rumours had been circulating for some weeks past, is to join the French group at NATO in Washington. His replacement in Algiers, according to newspaper reports, will be General Malagutti, at present Inspector-General of Infantry.

Communism

11. An explosion in a villa on the outskirts of Algiers led to the discovery of a " bomb factory ", and to the arrest of a band of European Communists who had been using their scientific knowledge to assist the local terrorists in the manufacture of explosives. Meanwhile, M. Lacoste has denied reports in *Le Monde* and *l'Express* to the effect that Communists arrested in Oran had been subjected to torture by the police. A Parliamentary commission is to be sent from Paris to investigate the charges.

British Parliamentary Visit

12. A British Parliamentary delegation, composed of 10 Members of both Houses and containing representatives of both Conservative and Labour Parties, spent a week in Algeria during the month as guests of the French authorities. The delegation were clearly impressed by the extent of the French achievement in this country, and had an opportunity of visiting outlying areas. Particular stress was laid by the French authorities on the work of the *Sections d'Administration Spécialisée* (S.A.S.) which is endeavouring to build up administration and community life from the lowest levels. It was a pity, though perhaps natural in the present circumstances, that the delegation were only able to meet a few isolated Moslems, carefully chosen for their pro-French sympathies. The majority of the delegation however appeared to be convinced at the end of their tour of the importance of maintaining Algeria in the Western zone of influence, while at the same time recognising the necessity for a rapid political settlement in the country.

JF 1013/11 No. 15

MONTHLY POLITICAL REPORT, NOVEMBER 1956

Mr. Sarell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received December 4*)

(No. 113. Confidential) *Algiers,*
Sir, *November 30, 1956.*

I have the honour to enclose herewith my report of events in Algeria during the month of November.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosures to Her Majesty's Representative at Paris and to the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations at New York and, without appendices, to Her Majesty's Representatives at Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli, Benghazi and to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, Malta.

I have, &c.

R. F. G. SARELL.

Enclosure

MONTHLY REPORT—ALGERIA, NOVEMBER 1956

General

The news of the Anglo-French action in Egypt was hailed with enthusiasm by the European population whose growing sense of hopelessness was replaced by a feeling that concrete and realistic action was at last being taken against what has always been considered the source and mainstay of the Algerian rebellion, and that this augured well for the settlement of the problem here.

2. The Moslem reaction was one of stunned dismay that the much-vaunted Egyptian power should have crumpled up without a fight. A somewhat similar attitude was apparent among the Moslems in 1940 at the time of the French collapse, but this time there was a deeper and more personal sense of shame.

3. While there has been some Moslem criticism of Nasser for making so much of his intentions and then being unable to back up his statements effectively, certain of the educated Moslems have evinced great bitterness against the British of whom they did not expect this. The man in the street however remains as friendly as ever.

4. The general feeling before the cease-fire in Egypt intervened was that the possibility of understanding being reached was no longer remote, and this was supported by the falling off in terrorism which marked that period. Since then this hope appears to have receded as both sides have once again stiffened their attitude and there was a sharp increase in rebel activity in the second half of the month. The reported lassitude however of both rebel and civilian Moslems remains an encouraging feature. In this connexion the rumour now current among the local Moslems that a cease-fire in Algeria will take place by the end of December is interesting.

5. French European opinion, as one would expect, has turned sharply against the United States attitude and indeed feelings sometimes verge on hatred.

Communism and the Rebellion

6. As already mentioned, events in Egypt in showing up the idol's feet of clay, coupled with the impact last month of Ben Bella's capture and the seizure of the *Athos*, had a discouraging effect on rebel morale. Subsequent events such as the voluntary surrender of the rebel leader of the Némentchas, Adjoul Adjoul, together with his tribesmen, on the 5th of November, followed by the capture at Affreville on the 13th of November of another leader, Bentaleb Mohamed, confirmed this. The latter made a broadcast statement in which he said the Algerian Moslem wants equality and feels he is now treated as a second class citizen, but if French promises were kept Moslems would be prepared to collaborate. He claimed that the Mollet-Lacoste appeal had influenced his own decision to collaborate.

7. General Vanuxen has also stated that four-fifths of the mountain population in the Némentchas have rallied to the French. In his opinion however it will require two years more of army presence to finally consolidate the gain.

8. It seems to have been at about this time, the beginning of November, when F.L.N. action was at a low ebb, that the Communists decided to act with the double objective of revivifying the rebellion and at the same time gaining control. Their current propaganda slogan is " The USSR saved Nasser. Communism will save Algerian independence ".

9. The explosion of a time bomb at Algiers in a bus packed with women and children was one of the typical incidents which inflamed public opinion and lost for the party many of its European sympathisers and shocked Moslem opinion. Since then the authorities have redoubled their efforts against the Communists with some success. A European Communist, who attempted to leave a time bomb at the gas works where he was employed, was arrested and shortly afterwards sentenced to death. The names and information obtained from him have led to a series of arrests, but although these have numbered over 150 this month, both European and Moslem, bomb outrages continue in the city of Algiers, causing indiscriminate casualties among the Moslem and European population.

Rebel Political Activity

10. Throughout the month rebel political activity has been expressed in the form of lightning strikes affecting mainly public transport and shopkeepers and markets. These have tended to snowball as disciplinary action taken by the authorities against the strikers provoke further strikes in protest. The strikes have never been fully country-wide, even when this has been an acknowledged objective as, for instance, the general strike on the 1st of November to mark the second anniversary of the rebellion. The most successful have been those occurring at Algiers, but even here the response has at times been somewhat ragged.

11. Another measure introduced last month, the order given to Moslem parents forbidding them to send their children to school, shows signs of petering out. This has been extremely unpopular with most parents (particularly with the Moslem women, who have found their large families underfoot all day a great trial!), but it was obeyed no doubt through fear. French pressure on the parents has not been effective but counter-orders seem to have been issued by the Nationalists who are apparently trying to explain the whole thing away as an order which emanated in the first place from Jewish sources.

Political and Administrative Reforms

12. Despite a flood of Press reports little new has transpired regarding the Government's plans. M. Lacoste, in speeches made during the month, has stoutly and consistently maintained his view is unchanged, to wit, that pacification is achieving its ends, in support of which he pointed to the increasing inflow of taxes in Moslem areas and the satisfactory response to Army recruitment, which he claims is equivalent to that which obtained in normal times.

13. News of the new Statute has once again been deferred. From Press sources it would seem that the proponents of an early and liberal settlement were out-voted in the French Cabinet. M. Lacoste, who maintains that the rebellion is at its last gasp and that such a policy would be interpreted as weakness, returned from Paris on the 22nd of November with a free hand to decide the timing of any political moves. The implementation of the Cabinet's decision to disband certain European municipal councils (in towns and villages of less than 30,000 inhabitants) and to replace them by special administrative units, a measure apparently intended to mollify the more liberal elements, is to remain subject to M. Lacoste's discretion. This proposal has of course been universally criticised by the Right-wing Europeans here.

14. M. Lacoste's policy received the support of the Independents and Peasants' Congress at Versailles (November 24) which passed a resolution calling for a strong policy, administrative and political de-centralisation and, virtue assuming, the emancipation of Moslem women.

15. A further step in the implementation of local reform was taken with the appointment of the Prefects who are to take over the new Departments brought into being by decree last July. At the same time, M. Collaveri, the Prefect of Algiers,

who has been appointed Prefect of Sarthe, has been replaced by M. Serge Baret, formerly Prefect of the Loire-Inférieure, who has also been promoted I.G.A.M.E.

Military Situation

16. Since October, the release and return to France of the reservists has been going on steadily. Port statistics suggest that the movement is now being balanced by a reverse flow of new conscripts. This is understood to have reduced the number of troops in Algiers. The deficiency appears to have been made up by the increased use of local territorial reservists on a part-time basis on patrol duties and similar work in the towns. The reservists proper and conscripts have the task of fighting the war itself.

17. The lull in military activity which marked last month has been followed by an increase in operations which are in part the corollary of greater rebel activity in the second half of the month. Attempts to seal off the Moroccan frontier continue. The Northern section for about 100 miles through the mountains and as far as the Southern edge of the Monts de Tlemcen is virtually sealed with wire, watch towers and mines. This would explain the infiltration from the South of rebels entering Algeria from Morocco. M. Lacoste has announced his intentions of similarly sealing the Tunisian frontier.

18. General Salan, now promoted Général d'Armée, replaces General Lorillot as Commandant Interarmes, and G.O.C. the 10th Region at Algiers. The latter has been appointed Chief of Staff of the Army.

JF 1019/247 No. 16

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORMS IN ALGERIA

Mr. Sarell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received December 4*)

(No. 112. Confidential) *Algiers,*
Sir, *November 29, 1956.*

The announcement in the press of the 15th of November of the appointment of Prefects to the eight new departments to be set up in Algeria, in pursuance of the administrative reform ordered by decree No. 56–641 of the 28th of June last, affords a suitable opportunity for reviewing this section of M. Lacoste's general policy directive of the 19th of May, which formed the subject of my predecessor's despatch No. 71 of the 9th of June, 1956. The new men are to take up their posts on the 1st of December.

2. As explained by M. Lacoste and in the preface to the decree, the administrative reforms are intended to mitigate the serious under-administration from which Algeria has suffered in the past. It is indeed a striking fact that the departmental structure of the Administration remained unchanged from 1848 until August 1955 when the number of departments was raised from three to four, with the elevation of Bône; and that the organisation of the *communes*, although modified to take account of the progress of European colonisation, was not adjusted to meet the problems presented by the very large native population. The existing administrative structure of Algeria seems in fact to have crystallised between 1890 and 1902 when the population—to take the figures for 1891—stood at 3,267,000 Algerian Moslems, 272,000 French, and 219,000 foreigners, mainly Spaniards, Maltese and Italians. A measure of the urgency of the present reforms is given by comparing these figures with those of the 1954 census, of some 8½ million Moslems and 1 million French and European settlers. It was further brought home to everyone when troops operating in the mountains less than 30 miles from Algiers itself found themselves in villages where no Europeans had been seen within living memory—if ever.

3. The shortcomings of the French administrative framework in Algeria can hardly fail to strike any observer of the Algerian crisis. As a result of the policy of assimilation, departmental officials have always been freely interchangeable with those in France and it has been assumed in the past that French culture and the French educational system would enable the country to be administered with French as the sole official language. Senior officials have in consequence not troubled to learn the local dialects of either the Arab or the Berber languages; and their subordinates, in the absence of compulsion or encouragement, have followed suit. But the tidal wave of population has submerged the educational system so that a considerable section of the population has not received the schooling to acquire a ready familiarity with French; and for a vast majority of the Moslem population the first language remains the native Arab or Berber dialect. The failure of French officials to be able to converse in these languages has placed a screen between the two races which must have been an important cause of French miscalculation of the temper of the native population in the early days of the rebellion.

4. Like the language problem, the inadequacy of the local government structure at *commune* level was due to failure to move with the times. The original idea was logical enough. The areas of European settlement were formed into *communes* in 1870. These were called *communes de plein exercice* in which the normal elected communal council operated as in France, except that the proportion of European to Moslem representation was fixed at three to two. The rest of the country was covered by areas of indirect rule, called *communes mixtes*, in which the native village and tribal assemblies were organised in *douars* (" circles " originally of tribal tents) under native Caïds and supervised by a French Administrator. This was an organisation evolved by the military administrators in the '60's and taken over by the civil Administration as more and more territory was transferred to it from 1870 onwards. In areas of sparse population, with tribal, village and family discipline still strong, this organisation seems to have worked well, particularly since the administrators of those days appear to have been familiar with the local language and, having no motor-car, travelled their districts on horseback and on foot. During the sixty or seventy years in which this administrative organisation in the purely Moslem areas has been left almost unchanged, the population has trebled while the family and tribal organisation has grown weak. A *commune mixte*, which initially might have had, say, 80,000 inhabitants, had, in the case of Michelet in the Grande Kabylie on the eve of the reforms, over 200,000. At the same time, roads have been built, and the Administrator has become chair- and car-borne and, like administrators in other spheres, has become immersed in paper and out of touch with the public. Only in areas of European colonisation was the system modified by the setting up from 1937 onwards of *centres municipaux*, where village self-government was granted under the continued control and supervision of the Administrator.

5. The reforms attack the problem from two directions. Administrative areas are to be made smaller and more homogeneous racially and geographically, and the barrier between the administrator and administered is to be mitigated by the increased recruitment of Moslems, and by the development of the *Sections Administratives Spécialisées*, or native affairs officers, to specialise in establishing contact with the native Moslem population and seeing to their welfare.

6. At the departmental level, the new administrative districts reduce the size of the departments to more manageable proportions and to some extent divide the country according to its geographical and climatic regions. For the first time the semi-arid highland steppe, with its pasture land and esparto grass, is separated, in the Departments of Tiaret, Médéa and Batna, from the coastal and frontier areas covered by the nine other prefectures. The breakdown of administrative areas is followed out at the lower level by decree 56–642 of the 28th of June in the conversion of the sub-divisions of the *communes mixtes*, the *douars*, formerly administered by Caïds under a French Administrator, into *communes de plein exercice*. These old *communes* yield five or six—and in some cases as many as ten or eleven—*communes de plein exercice*, some being former *douars*, others groups of *centres municipaux* now raised to full local self-government. The size of this undertaking is well illustrated by the figures given to me by M. Lucien Paye, M. Lacoste's special adviser on constitutional and organisational questions, who told me that in all they expected to establish between 1,200 and 1,400 new *communes* and that so far 200 had been set up. Since then a further sixty have been created in the new Department of Tizi Ouzou in the Grande Kabylie. Over all, the former three large Departments of Oran, Algiers and Constantine become " Inspectorates General " with, at their head, Super-Prefects, who have the title *Inspecteur Général en Mission Extraordinaire* (I.G.A.M.E.), and the function of decentralising the overgrown and cumbersome Government General Secretariat—with what success, in the face of the French tendency to centralise, remains to be seen.

7. The abolition of the *communes mixtes* has been long planned and is now decreed for the second time. The 1947 Statute provided that the Algerian Assembly should proceed to the gradual replacement of all *communes mixtes* by *communes de plein exercice*, but this—like so much else in the Statute—remained a dead letter. The decree of June last has again announced the same reorganisation but I understand from M. Paye that such a sweeping reform would be misconceived. Algeria is a country with many peoples, some of whom still have strong traditions of local organisation. Among the Berber peoples particularly, such as the Kabyles and the Mozabites of the Ghardaïa oases, there is a very strongly developed democratic organisation based on the family grouped in turn into fractions and village councils or *djemaâ*, with an elected headman. I understand that the *communes de plein exercice* will in practice only be set up in the more advanced areas and that there is a plan to divide the country into perhaps as many as eighteen regions, each with its own local government organisation designed to take account of local peculiarities and the natural economy of the area. These would be so divided as to produce areas of European, Arab or Kabylie predominance as well as areas of predominantly agricultural, pastoral or urban and industrial interest.

8. The reforms in the matter of staffing are to be effected under the terms of decree No. 56–273 of the 17th of March, 1956, whereby special facilities were given for the recruitment of French Moslems to the public service, both by raising the age limit by five years and by permitting recruitment

by contract instead of competition to fill up to one-half of the vacancies. To this was added a provision for the filling of two-thirds of the subordinate posts, the *auxiliaires de l'administration*, by Moslems, with priority given to ex-servicemen. The former provision has run into some difficulty owing to the strike of Moslem students at the University of Algiers and to a general hesitancy to come forward in the face of Nationalist opposition. It is known that candidates coming forward have not been as numerous as had been hoped. On the other hand the recruitment of junior staff is apparently going well and on my recent visit to Bône the French officials spoke highly of the Moslems who had been taken on, particularly the Moslem girls. It is admitted that in the past the Moslems were not encouraged to join the Administration and this was of course the cause of double resentment. They complained that they were given an education and then debarred from using it, and at the same time they resented the frequently overbearing manner of minor French officials and the blatant favouritism with which these habitually, in my experience, treat any European in comparison with any Moslem. It is to be hoped that the new arrangements will in time alleviate such complaints.

9. It is an integral part of this administrative modernisation that elections should take place, first at the communal and then at the departmental level. At the present, few Moslem members of existing communal councils dare to appear, and many are in France or lying low. There seems little prospect therefore of elections in advance of some settlement of the rebellion. Communal elections should perhaps be possible in the more fully pacified areas in advance of a general settlement. But even these, let alone departmental or general elections, seem very remote.

10. These reforms are designed in fact to overtake the neglect of some forty years in the course of which the male population of Algeria have fought for France in two world wars. They returned to their native land to find themselves treated with contempt by people who had frequently made a good thing out of the war; and the French Administration physically remote and psychologically out of touch. It is not an accident but symbolic that Ben Bella, a sergeant in the French army with an outstanding war record and numerous decorations for gallantry, should have taken the lead in armed rebellion against France after being refused the post of Caïd in his native district for which he had applied. It is not to be expected that this great administrative reorganisation will produce any rapid results. It is however an impressive effort by France to regain the vital contact which she had lost with the Algerian Moslem population. It should provide the means of consolidating such progress towards pacification as may be achieved by the army in the coming months.

11. I enclose copies of the three relevant decrees for ease of reference.(1)

12. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris and to the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations at New York.

I have, &c.

R. F. G. SARELL.

(1) Not printed.

JF 1012/3

No. 17

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN ALGERIA

Mr Sarell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received October 8*)

(No. 104. Confidential) *Algiers, October 3, 1956.*

Sir,

With reference to my predecessor's despatch No. 33 of the 12th of July, 1955, I have the honour to transmit herewith the brief biographies of certain leading personalities in Algeria revised up to date.

I have, &c.,

R. F. G. SARELL.

Enclosure

INDEX

1. Abbas, Ferhat.
2. Alazard, Professor Jean.
3. Auboyneau, Vice-Admiral Philippe.
4. Aumeran, General Adolphe.
5. Beaufre, General André.
6. Ben Bella, Mohammed.
7. Ben Boulaid, Mustapha.
8. Bendjelloul, Dr. Mohammed.
9. Blachette, Georges.
10. Borgeaud, Henri.
11. Bouakouir, Ahmed.
12. Bouhali, Larbi.
13. Boumendjel, Ahmed.
14. Caballero, Paul.
15. Charles-Vallin, Mme. Henriette.
16. Chatoney, The Rev. A.
17. Chaussade, Pierre.
18. Chevallier, Jacques.
19. Collaveri, François.
20. de Novion, Vicomte G.
21. de Sérigny, Vicomte Alain.
22. Ducournau, Colonel.
23. Duroux, Jean.
24. Duval, Mgr.
25. Eisenbeth, Maurice.
26. Ellia, Michel.
27. Fares, Abderrahmane.
28. Fouques-Duparc.
29. Francis, Dr. Ahmed.
30. Frandon, General René.
31. Frappart, Charles.
32. Froger, Amédée.
33. Geli, Rear-Admiral.
34. Germain, Henry.
35. Guellati, Ali.
36. Guiauchain, Jacques.
37. Guiauchain, Pierre.
38. Hosteing, Pierre.
39. Imbert, Dr. Marc.
40. Justrabo, René.
41. Kiouane, Maître.
42. Lacoste, Robert.
43. Lafont de Sentenac, Max.
44. Lambert, Pierre.
45. Laquière, Raymond.
46. Lavaysse, Paul.
47. Lefevre-Paul, Maître Jules.
48. Lorillot, General Henri.
49. Lung, Mlle. Henriette.
50. Maisonneuve, Pierre.
51. Massu, General.
52. Manceau-Demiau, General.
53. Maricourt, General Dumesnil de.
54. Mathiot, André.
55. Mesbah, Maître Salah.
56. Messali, Hadj.
57. Meynier, General O.
58. Mezerna, Ahmed.
59. Nabal, Colonel Albert.
60. Papon, Maurice.
61. Parlange, General Gaston.
62. Paternot, Marcel.
63. Paye, Lucien.
64. Pernet, Jacques.
65. Perrier, Raoul.
66. Quénard, General.
67. Racim, Mohammed.
68. Ribère, Marcel.
69. Rigollet, Léon.
70. Saiah, Abdelkader.
71. Schiaffino, Laurent.
72. Seiberras, Georges.
73. Sportisse, Mme. Alice.
74. Tamzali, Mustapha.
75. Urbani, Henri.
76. Vignon, Robert.

1. Abbas, Ferhat

Born 1899 at Tahert (Constantine). Chemist by profession. Formerly a member of the Assembly in Paris, and Secretary-General of the moderate U.D.M.A. (*Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien*). Advocated a Federal solution for Algeria. In April 1956 joined the F.L.N. (*Front de la Libération Nationale*) in Cario. Probably still a moderate and might be one of the Nationalist negotiators.

2. Alazard, Professor Jean

Born about 1897. Dean of the Faculty of Letters and director of the National Art Gallery at Algiers. Is president of L'Alliance Française. Has visited the United Kingdom as a guest of the British Council and proved helpful in arranging lectures by British Council representatives visiting Algiers. Is married.

3. Auboyneau, Vice-Admiral

Commander-in-Chief, French Naval Forces in the Mediterranean and Commander, Western Area, N.A.T.O., since August 1955.

Entered French Naval College 1917. Served in Indo-China from 1923. Promoted *Lieutenant de Vaisseau* two years later and appointed instructor on *Jeanne d'Arc*. Commanded *Orage* 1937 to 1939. Promoted *Capitaine de Frégate* and appointed liaison officer to the British Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. Joined de Gaulle's forces in 1940 and in 1942 on promotion to Rear-Admiral was appointed *Commissaire National de la Libération* and Commander-in-Chief of the Free French Naval Forces. Took part in the landings in the south of France where he led the Third Cruiser Division. Promoted Vice-Admiral in 1945 in command of French Naval Forces in the Far East, and from 1949 to 1951 commanded French Naval Forces in the Indian Ocean. 1951 to 1952 Inspector-General of French Naval and Naval Air Forces.

Admiral Auboyneau has a young and attractive wife and speaks English well. He has many friends in the Royal Navy and is consistently friendly and helpful.

4. Aumeran, General Adolphe
A retired General, who until the recent dissolution represented a constituency of the Department of Algiers in the French National Assembly. Comes of an old Algerian settler family which has for long run a small printing press and published a local weekly, *L'Africain*. Recently appealed for funds to launch a new Paris daily to support the maintenance of the French presence in Algeria. A Right-wing *colon* of secondary importance.

5. Beaufre, General André
In August 1956 was appointed to command French Force A for any operation necessitated by the Suez Canal crisis.
Specialist in Algerian affairs, he took an active part in preparing for the Allied landings in North Africa in 1942. Has served with many units in Africa and led the 4th Moroccan Mountain Division in Italy and France. Served as deputy to Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery at N.A.T.O. Is reputed as able as an administrator as he is as a soldier. Speaks perfect English. Promoted *Général de Division* October 1956.

6. Ben Bella, Mohammed
Former sergeant in the French Army. Condemned to death following a raid on a military post in Oran, but fled to Cairo where he is one of the leaders of the *Front de la Libération Nationale*, and is believed to have a large hand in the military direction of the rebellion inside Algeria.

7. Ben Boulaid, Mustapha
Rebel leader. Condemned to death following massacres in Constantine Department in August 1954, but escaped last December from Constantine Prison and took command of F.L.N. bands in Eastern Algeria. Reported killed in summer 1956, but identification of his body has never been confirmed.

8. Bendjelloul, Dr. Mohammed
Born 1893. Comes from a good middle-class family. After qualifying as a doctor in Algiers, joined the Administration, but was dismissed in 1931 and has since maintained a lucrative private practice. Volunteered for the Army 1939–40, but then became a supporter of Vichy. In 1947 came into open conflict with Ferhat Abbas (*q.v.*); elected to the National Assembly in Paris, became a fervent advocate of integration for Algeria. But in November 1955 he violently reversed his position, organising the vote of the "61" Moslem representatives who rejected integration and urged a form of federal tie. Though able, Bendjelloul has throughout his career trimmed his sails; he has also been involved in two notorious financial scandals.

9. Blachette, Georges
Born about 1897. Served in the Great War. The "esparto grass king" of Algeria and, as President of the Federation of Algerian Producers' and Exporters' Association, the most powerful representative of agricultural interests in the country. Owns the *Journal d'Alger*, one of the three Algiers daily papers, and is seeking to gain control of the *Echo d'Alger*. Represented a constituency of the Department of Algiers in the French National Assembly until the dissolution in January 1956. One of the more liberal of the wealthy settler leaders.

10. Borgeaud, Henri
Senator for the Department of Algiers and President of the Rassemblement de la Gauche Républicaine. Is a landowner, wine-grower and business man of considerable means. Presented Algiers with its first blood plasma laboratory. In politics represents the Right wing of *colon* opinion.

11. Bouakouir, Salah
Directeur du Commerce, de l'Energie et de l'Industrie, Algerian Government General. Highest ranking Moslem on Governor-General's staff. He seems conscious of this exceptional position and to be inhibited from any critical comment on affairs as a result.

12. Bouhali, Larbi
Secretary of the Algerian Communist Party. Was sentenced in July 1952 to six months' imprisonment and a fine of 600,000 francs for plotting against the internal security of the State. Sentenced on similar grounds since.

13. Boumendjel, Ahmed
Born about 1902. Moslem barrister. Member of the U.D.M.A. Wrote occasional articles for the nationalist *La République Algérienne* before the paper's suppression.

14. Caballero, Paul
A secretary of the Algerian Communist Party. Although Bouhali, Larbi (*q.v.*) is nominally general secretary of the party, Caballero is said to be really in control. He was sentenced to two months' imprisonment in June 1955, for "resisting arrest" when he was taken into custody earlier in the month in connexion with a prison sentence passed on him in May 1954 against which he had not appealed within the due time.

15. Charles-Vallin, Mme. Henriette
Was a delegate to the Algerian Assembly until its dissolution in April 1956 and plays an important part in Algiers social life. She is president and animator of the *Cité Universitaire*, and also president of the Cancer Research Institute. She has a friendly interest in the United Kingdom. She is a widow. Her late husband was a leading figure in Algiers before the war.

16. Chatoney, The Reverend A.
President of the Reformed Church of France in Algeria.

17. Chaussade, Pierre
Born in 1913. Appointed Secretary-General of the Government-General of Algeria in May 1956. After studying law entered the Administration in 1935. In the army 1939–40. As Sub-Prefect of Brive (Central France) negotiated the surrender of the local German garrison in 1944 and received honorary citizenship of the town. Served successively as Director of Cabinet to the President of the Council (1948); on the legal staff of the Council of State; Director of Personnel and Political Affairs at the Ministry of the Interior; and Prefect of the Marne (1951). Promoted Super-Prefect, 1955. Medal of the Resistance, Croix de Guerre, Officer of the Legion of Honour. A quiet and efficient administrator.

18. Chevallier, Jacques
Born about 1912. Belongs to an old French family established in Algeria for the past 80 years. Holds a degree in law from Algiers University. Mayor of El Biar, a suburb of Algiers, April 1941, at the age of 29. Was held in high esteem by General Weygand and appointed a member of the old Financial Assembly of Algeria. Volunteered for service with the French Army in Italy but was recalled and appointed principal liaison officer to the French counter-espionage services in the United States and Canada. He has been a Deputy to the National Assembly since January 1952 and was for some time prior to that a Delegate to the Algerian Assembly. He was elected Mayor of Algiers in May 1953, and appointed Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces (War) in M. Mendès-France's Government in June 1954.
M. Chevallier's political career has been very varied. Though a firm believer in the French presence in Algeria is very liberal in his attitude to the Nationalists. Has consistently urged the necessity of opening direct discussions with the Nationalist leaders in order to achieve a settlement. Hostile to Lacoste, whom he considers an ambitious opportunist. A spontaneous open and likeable character. He is very friendly and speaks excellent English. His mother is a member of an old French family long resident in Louisiana.

19. Collaveri, François
Appointed Prefect of Algiers in June 1955. Born 1900. Entered the Administration in 1944 and has served as Director of the Cabinets of the Minister of the Interior and of the Minister of National Defence. Was Prefect of Ain 1951–55. Holds the *Croix de Guerre*.

20. de Novion, Vicomte G.
Born about 1902. Local manager of the Swedish Match Corporation. Was appointed Austrian Vice-Consul in Algiers in April 1954. Active and frequently away on business in various countries. Does not indulge in politics. Speaks fluent English. His wife, who is Swedish, is prominent in local society. They are a wealthy couple and very friendly.

21. de Sérigny, Vicomte Alain
Born about 1907. Delegate to the Algerian Assembly of which he was elected Third Vice-President in May 1953, and editor of *L'Echo d'Alger*. Combines with his journalistic profession considerable political activities in which he is extreme Right-wing. He is the brother-in-law of Jean Duroux (*q.v.*) owner of the paper, through his marriage to a daughter of the former Honorary Consul-General for Norway. Both M. and Mme. de Sérigny speak English.

22. Ducournau, Colonel
Born 1912. Appointed Director of Military Cabinet of the Resident Minister in March 1956. After the French campaign of 1939–40, commanded the 1st Commando in Algeria, and fought with distinction in Italy, Southern France, Madagascar and Indo-China, where he commanded a Parachute Regiment. Transferred to the Aurès region of Algeria in 1954.

23. Duroux, Jean
Born about 1907. Son of the late Senator Jacques Duroux. While not himself engaged in active politics, is energetic in pulling strings behind the scenes. Owner of the Right-wing *Echo d'Alger*, the daily paper with the biggest circulation in Algiers, which is edited by his brother-in-law, Alain de Sérigny (*q.v.*). Also owns the shipping line "Cargos Algériens," flour mills and large estates.

24. Duval, Mgr.
Archbishop of Algiers. Enthroned March 25, 1954. Has liberal views on the future of Algeria and is in close touch with M. Chevallier, the Mayor, whose disapproval of the Lacoste policy he shares.

25. Eisenbeth, Maurice
Grand Rabbi of Algiers. Is an Officer of the Legion of Honour.

26. Ellia, Michel
Born 1908. Appointed Prefect of the newly-created Department of Bône in June 1955. Previous appointments have included those of Sub-Prefect of Briey, Administrator at the Ministries of the Interior and Public Works, and Secretary-General of Guadeloupe. Friendly, though outwardly not a very forceful personality.

27. Fares, Abderrahmane
Born 1911 at Constantine, Algeria. Was first Moslem admitted to practise as Notary in Algeria. Was president of the Algerian Assembly for the year May 1953–April 1954. Is a firm believer in Moslem co-operation with the French and in the possibility of a synthesis of the two cultures. He was an able president and commanded the respect of delegates to both colleges. In September 1956, dissatisfied with French policy in Algeria, advocated direct talks with F.L.N. leaders in order to bring about a settlement. Is married and lives as a European. Is a Chevalier of the Legion of Honour.

28. Fouques-Duparc
Mayor of Oran since 1953, and elected President of the General Council for Oran Department in September 1956. Born in Lyon. Has been Minister for Air, and still visits the Farnborough Display each year. An overpowering personality, with Right-wing views, he has displayed energy and efficiency during his term as Mayor.

29. Francis, Dr. Ahmed
Member of the inner committee of six members of the F.L.N. organisation in Cairo.

30. Frandon, General René
Officer Commanding 5th Air Region since July 1955. Born at Briançon on January 13, 1904. Left Saint-Cyr in 1924 and was first posted to the French Foreign Legion in the Far East. Returned to France in 1930, when he transferred to the French Air Force. Promoted Captain, December 1932. Attended the *Ecole Supérieure de Guerre* in 1935 and appointed staff officer in 1937. In 1939 at the beginning of the war appointed head of the *1er Bureau* G.H.Q., Air. Transferred in 1941 to the 1/23 Bomber Group. In November 1942, appointed head of the Air Section of the French delegation attached to the American Command in Morocco. Returned as Commanding Officer to 1/23 Bomber Group in February 1943. Promoted Lieutenant-Colonel in March 1944. Transferred to the headquarters of the Committee of National Defence at Algiers in May 1944. Promoted Colonel in March 1945 and *Général de Brigade* in July 1949. Appointed assistant to the Major-General, Air Force, in charge of plans at Paris from August 1949 to November 1951, when he was appointed Air Officer Commanding in Morocco. Promoted *Général de Division*, he was appointed Air Officer Commanding the 2nd Air Region at Paris. Promoted *Général de Corps Aérien* in March 1956.
General Frandon's wife belongs to a leading local family. He is a Commander of the Legion of Honour.

31. Frappart, Charles
Born 1920. Appointed Director of the Resident Minister's Civil Cabinet in February 1956. Entered the *Cour des Comptes* in 1944. Subsequently served in the Cabinets of the Ministers of Finance and National Economy, and of the Commissioner-General for German and Austrian Affairs. In 1953 appointed Director-General of the currency issuing institute of the Associated States.

32. Froger, Amédée
Born about 1894. Comes of an old Algerian settler family and owns large estates near Boufarik, of which he has been Mayor for some years. Uses his considerable influence as President of the Confederation of Mayors of Algeria to pursue an extreme right-wing policy in defence of *colon* interests.

33. Geli, Rear-Admiral
Assumed command of the Maritime Department of Oran in April 1952. Pro-British, and has been very helpful in fostering the re-establishment of friendly relations between the Royal Navy and the French Navy, whose memories of Mers-el-Kébir in 1940 have been hard to die.

34. Germain, Henry
Senior member of a family of important landowners and wine producers. Creator of the first regular air line in North Africa, now part of Air France.

35. Guellati, Ali
A Moslem. Member of the Algerian Assembly until the recent dissolution. President of the Commission de l'Economie de l'Union Française. Vice-President Union Algérienne des Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance. Conseiller du Commerce Extérieure de la France. Administrateur de la Banque de l'Algérie et de Tunisie at Paris. Has considerable influence at Paris as advocate for the small Moslem agriculturalist.

36. Guiauchain, Jacques
One of the owners of the Hôtel St. George, of which he obtained control in 1952. Is an architect by profession, and was designer of the Government-General building.

37. Guiauchain, Pierre
Owner, together with his younger brother Jacques (*q.v.*) and his sister, of the Hôtel St. George. Was also actively engaged in various business interests and was chairman of the Algiers Employers' Association until his health broke down early in 1952. The two Guiauchains had a British mother and are very pro-British.

38. Hosteing, Pierre
Born 1915. Appointed Assistant Director of the Resident Minister's Civil Cabinet in February 1956. After studying law, he served in the Army from 1937–40, and entered the Ministry of the Interior in 1942. Two years later he became Secretary-General of the Vosges and, in 1948, Sub-Prefect of Saint-Dié. In 1952 he was transferred to Algeria as Sub-Prefect of Mostaganem (Oran Department).

39. Imbert, Dr. Marc
Very pro-British. Invariably arranges hockey matches when Her Majesty's ships visit Algiers. Has flown his hockey team to Malta and Gibraltar for return matches.

40. Justrabo, René
Born about 1917 at Mascara (Algeria). Communist delegate for a constituency of Oran to the Algerian Assembly. Was Mayor of Sidi-bel-Abbès until March 1953, when he and the town councillors were removed from office for corrupt administration. Expelled from Algeria by Government order in spring of 1956.

41. Kiouane, Maître
Prominent young Moslem lawyer and former member of the M.T.L.D. When the party split in 1954, he was one of the leaders of the anti-Messali faction which later grew into the F.L.N. Arrested in December 1954 but released on bail. Later fled to join the other F.L.N. leaders in Cairo.

42. Lacoste, Robert
Appointed Resident Minister in Algeria in February 1956. Born 1898 in the Dordogne. A Socialist. Specialised in economic and labour problems, and by 1939 was a member of the Executive Committee of the C.G.T. Opposed Munich, urging a Franco-Russian military pact. Played an active part in the Resistance, and was a member of the Clandestine Directing Committee of the Movement of National Liberation. In 1944 de Gaulle appointed him Minister of Industrial Production (later called "Industry and Commerce"), and he held this post under successive governments until the resignation of all Socialist Ministers from the Bidault Cabinet in 1950. Next year was appointed President of the Higher Council for Gas and Electricity. Re-elected in 1951 and in January 1956 to the National Assembly, of which he was at one time Vice-President. Arriving in Algiers after the clamorous rejection of Catroux, Lacoste demanded and obtained reinforcements from France, and proclaimed a policy of military pacification, accompanied by large-scale reforms. This programme has had to be modified under the pressure of events. Widely supported by the Algerian settlers, he is by now sharply opposed by liberal circles, who accuse him of being a careerist and of permitting brutal and indiscriminate military repression in the name of pacification.

43. Lafont de Sentenac, Max
Appointed Secretary-General for Social Affairs in the Government-General in August 1956. Born in 1908, he entered the prefectoral service in 1934 as Chief of Cabinet to the Prefect of Basses-Pyrénées. Has held posts at Jonzac, Chôlet, Montbard, Rennes and Aube. Served as Prefect of Yonne until his transfer in 1955 to Algiers as Deputy Secretary-General of the Government-General.

44. Lambert, Pierre
Prefect of Oran (November 1953). Born Paris, February 2, 1901. Last post Prefect Saône et Loire (September 6, 1946). Played an active part in Resistance. Is a Chevalier of the Legion of Honour and Companion of the Liberation.

45. Laquière, Raymond
Born in 1881 at Saint Eugène, suburb of Algiers. Belongs to an old Algerian family with a distinguished military record. Studied law at Algiers University. Admitted to Algiers Bar. Entered politics about 1920, when he was elected Counsellor of the Department of Algiers and Mayor of Saint Eugène. Was Deputy for Algiers, 1928–32. Elected delegate to the Algerian Assembly when it was formed in 1948 and became its first President. Holds the Croix de Guerre for distinguished service in the Great War, and is an Officer of the Legion of Honour. Was again President of the Algerian Assembly for the year 1952–53 and was re-elected

Mayor of St. Eugène in May 1953. Is liked and respected by most delegates. He is a shrewd politician, an able orator and a firm partisan of the French position in Algeria, but always ready to fight the central authorities in the interests of Algeria. Elected president of the Algerian Assembly for the third time in May 1954.

46. Lavaysse, Paul
Secretary-General of the Prefecture, Algiers.
Born about 1897, of an old Algerian settler family. Served in the Great War, after which he entered Prefectoral Service. Deputy Chef de Cabinet to the Governor-General in 1940. Is now in charge of Administration at the Prefecture. Is a Chevalier of the Legion of Honour. Married.

47. Lefevre-Paul, Maître Jules
A leading member of the Algiers Bar and former *Bâtonnier*. Was some time legal adviser to Her Majesty's Consulate-General. Now old and seldom gets about.

48. Lorillot, General Henri
Supreme Commander of all arms in Algeria. Born August 18, 1901. In 1943 was liaison officer with British First Army and in April 1944 was military delegate on the French Committee of Liberation. July 1945, commanded the 110th Infantry Regiment. Served in the Far East until 1951 when he assumed command of the Oran Division. Attached to S.H.A.P.E. from October 1953. Is a Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour. Promoted *Général de Corps d'Armée* October 1956. Friendly but not wholly convinced of our inability to help more in putting down the arms traffic through Libya.

49. Lung, Mlle. Henriette
President of the Red Cross Committee of Algiers. Comes from a wealthy wine-growing family. Is quite friendly towards us and put facilities of Red Cross at our disposal at time of *Empire Windrush* disaster in 1954. Is a Chevalier of the Legion of Honour.

50. Maisonneuve, Pierre
Appointed in February 1956 by M. Lacoste to co-ordinate his Civil and Military Cabinets. Born in Paris 1912. Studied at the School of Industry and Commerce, and entered the Administration in 1938. After the Liberation, appointed Chief of Cabinet to the Minister of the Interior. Then served successively as Prefect of Tarn and Garonne and Director of General Affairs at the Ministry of the Interior. Since 1949 he had been detached for service in Algiers as President of the Council of Administration of the Algerian Gas and Electricity Authority. In his present post is reputed to be one of M. Lacoste's closest advisers.

51. Massu, General
Commander of the 10th Parachute Division. Has spent most of his career in Africa, including some years in French Togoland. A keen and energetic officer.

52. Manceau-Demiau, General
Appointed in June 1956 to command the Algiers Division. Previously commanded the 1st Armoured Division in Germany.

53. Maricourt, General Dumesnil de
Air Commander in Algeria since November 1955. Born in Paris in 1909. Served 1934–38 in Morocco, then in French West Africa until 1941. In 1944–45 commanded a bomber squadron in Germany and next year became Commander of the important Air School at Salon. After service in Indo-China he resumed command of the Air School in 1951. In 1954 transferred to command tactical air group at Constantine. Is married with seven children. Holds the Legion of Honour, *Croix de Guerre* and American Silver Star and Air Medal.

54. Mathiot, André
Born about 1907. Wealthy and prominent in Algiers society; mainly interested in horses and racing. Is president of the Société des Concours Hippiques d'Alger.

55. Mesbah Salah, Maître
First Vice-President of Algerian Assembly (1952–53). Born 1913 at Gueuzet (Algeria) of an old Moslem family of magistrates in the district of Sétif. Studied at Algiers and at the University of Toulouse. Was Second Vice-President of the Assembly in 1949–50, and rapporteur of the Committee on the Moslem Cult. Is *Bâtonnier* of the Sétif Bar.

56. Messali, Hadj
Born about 1898 at Tlemcen (Algeria). Served in the army during the Great War, after which he remained in France, working and studying at the Paris School for Oriental Languages and at the Sorbonne. Later frequented revolutionary circles, and after working for a short time with the Communist Party, decided to leave it and concentrate on the "liberation" of Moslem nationals in Algeria. From 1929–34 his subversive activities led several times to his arrest and imprisonment by the French authorities. In March 1937 a group of Algerian Moslems in France founded the Parti du Peuple Algérien (P.P.A.), of which Messali was elected president. The party's work took him back to Algeria, for which he demanded dominion status and a freely elected Parliament. He was arrested in August 1937 at Algiers and sentenced to two years' imprisonment. In August 1939 Messali was released from prison but was again arrested and detained until March 1941, when a military court sentenced him to 16 years' hard labour. He was subsequently pardoned in 1943 by General Giraud. Since then the continual agitation for Algerian independence by Messali and his party have proved a source of anxiety to the French Government. The P.P.A. gradually became the M.T.L.D. (Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques) with Messali as its recognised leader. On May 14, 1952, there were serious disturbances at Orléansville, when four demonstrators were killed. Messali was subsequently expelled from Algeria and taken under escort to Niort in the Deux Sèvres Department and subsequently to the Sables-d'Olonne. In the summer of 1954 a rift occurred between him and the local leadership of the party which split the party in two. Both factions were outlawed after the outbreak of terrorism in November 1954, but have continued their activity underground. Is at present a prisoner on an island off the coast of Brittany. He is considered to have little personal following left to him in Algeria.

57. Meynier, General O.
Retired. A leading personality in Algiers. President of the association known as Les Amis du Sahara, and of the Comité d'Organisation du Rallye Méditerranée Le Cap.

58. Mezerna, Ahmed
Chairman of the now outlawed M.T.L.D. Nationalist Party and editor of *L'Algérie Libre*.

59. Nabal, Colonel Albert
Secretary of the association Les Amis du Sahara. Is very pro-British and always willing to help British trans-Sahara travellers.

60. Papon, Maurice
Born 1910. Appointed Prefect of Constantine in April 1956. After studying law, entered the Office of the Minister for Air. Then served successively in the Offices of the Prime Minister and of the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Acting Prefect of the Landes in 1944, then served at Bordeaux and in Corsica. Transferred in 1949 as Prefect to Constantine, where he remained for two years. Then went as Secretary-General of the Prefecture of Police in Paris. Next year he returned to Africa as Secretary-General of the Moroccan Prefecture, before becoming Counsellor in the Office of the Secretary of State for the Interior.

61. Parlange, General Gaston
Born August 24, 1897. In April 1955, was appointed General Officer Commanding in charge of civil and military operations in the Aurès and Constantine areas. Commissioned in 1918. Posted to Morocco after the war where he served as a Native Affairs officer. Served in Italy in 1943 as General Officer Commanding 5th Tabors. Wounded and returned to Morocco where he reformed the 17th Tabors, later returning with this regiment to Italy. Promoted Colonel in June 1948, and appointed assistant head of the Political Section at Rabat. Appointed Officer Commanding Tafilalet Region and, in June 1953, Officer Commanding Agadir sub-division and frontier areas of the south. In August 1956 appointed first Prefect of the newly-created Department of Batna, while at the same time retaining his military command.

62. Paternot, Marcel
Born in Algeria in 1912. Wealthy landowner who has come into politics since the war. Represents a constituency of the Department of Algiers in the French National Assembly. A Right-wing politician who has frequently condemned the Government's weak policy in Algeria. Keeps in close touch with de Sérigny (*q.v.*) and the *Echo d'Alger*.

63. Paye, Lucien
Born 1907. Appointed Director of Political Affairs at the Government-General of Algeria in June 1956. A Socialist, he was the principal collaborator in 1945 of Yves Chataigneau, the Liberal Governor-General of Algeria. Resigned when Chataigneau was succeeded by Naegelen, and worked in the Administration in Tunisia. Recalled personally by Lacoste, in his present post he has been principally responsible for drafting reforms and the future statute of Algeria. Many Liberal hopes are pinned on him.

64. Pernet, Jacques
Born about 1914. Appointed Director of National Security in Algeria in June 1956. Previously served in the Prefecture of Côtes du Nord and as Sub-Prefect of Savoy before his nomination as Director of Cabinet to the Prefect of Algiers. Fought with the Free French in Gabon, Eritrea, Libya and Italy; Companion of Liberation and Officer of the Legion of Honour. Friendly and helpful.

65. Perrier, Raoul
Born about 1907. Managing director of *La Dépêche Quotidienne* of Algiers. A supporter of Vichy during the War. An opportunist.

66. Quénard, General
Commander, Southern Territories of Algeria. Knows the Sahara well, and has spent seven years in Colomb-Béchar. Also served in Tunisia. A good type of officer, he is benevolent but Right wing and paternalistic in his outlook towards the Moslems.

67. Racim, Mohammed
Born Algiers on 24th June, 1896. Moslem miniaturist. Cross of the Legion of Honour (1947). Has exhibited in Paris, London, Rome, Vienna, Bucharest, Oslo, Cairo, Stockholm, Copenhagen and Tunis. Married. Wife is Scandinavian. Very friendly. Is inclined to be given the cold shoulder by French officialdom as he represents the antithesis of the policy of latinisation.

68. Ribère, Marcel
Educated at Constantine and Algiers University. Doctor of Pharmacy. Represented a constituency of the Department of Algiers in the French National Assembly until the dissolution in January 1956.

69. Rigollet, Léon
Vice-President of the Algiers Chamber of Commerce. A member of various committees dealing with maritime and land transport. Formerly Honorary Polish Consul at Algiers. Croix de Guerre. Officer of the Legion of Honour (1952).

70. Saiah Abdelkader
Born 1889 at Orléansville (Algeria). Member of an old Algerian (Moslem) family established in the Orléansville district for the past five centuries. His grandfather, Saiah Si Henni, was supporter of the French occupation from the beginning, and co-operated with Marshal Bugeaud. Saiah Abdelkader played a leading part in municipal and departmental administration, and was financial delegate to the Government-General. Officer of the Legion of Honour, 1920. Counsellor of the Republic, 1946. Delegate to the Algerian Assembly since 1948, when he was elected Vice-President. President of the Assembly, 1949–50, 1951–52 and again in 1955–56, when he resigned early in the year, stating that the Moslems had lost confidence in the Assembly. Was regarded as pro-French and held in high esteem by the French authorities, and for that reason looked upon by extremists as a French puppet. Married in May, 1954 at Versailles to Mme. Dalin, a French-woman, previously private secretary to the former Governor-General.

71. Schiaffino, Laurent
Born about 1907. Wealthiest shipowner in Algeria. Owner of the Schiaffino Line with many other interests centred around the port of Algiers. President of the Chamber of Commerce of Algiers and of the Région Economique (federation of the Chambers of Commerce of Algeria). Elected Senator for Department of Algiers in June 1955. The most powerful representative of commercial interests in the country, as is Blachette (*q.v.*) of agricultural interests.

72. Seiberras, Georges
Owner of the largest cinema circuit in French North Africa. Pro-British and very helpful.

73. Sportisse, Mme. Alice
Former Communist Deputy for the Department of Oran to the French National Assembly, until the dissolution in January 1956. Expelled in summer of 1956 from Oran by the local authorities.

74. Tamzali, Mustapha
Born at Bougie (Algeria), July 1885. One of the wealthiest Moslem industrialists, exporters (chiefly olive oil) and property owners in Algiers. Has long-standing business connections with the United Kingdom. Is Honorary Treasurer of the Algiers Chamber of Commerce. Loyal to régime but

professes dissatisfaction at slow pace of Moslemisation of public services. A former member of the Senate in Paris, he joined the "61" Moslem representatives in December 1955.

75. Urbani, Henri
Deputy Secretary-General for Economic Affairs.
Born 1902. A former barrister at the Court of Appeal, after which he entered Government Service. Discharges his heavy duties with tact and ability, and is generally liked. Chevalier of the Legion of Honour. Married.

76. Vignon, Robert
Appointed first Prefect of the new Department of Tizi-Ouzou (Kabylia) in September 1956. Born and educated in Algeria, he entered the Prefectoral Service and fought in the Army 1939–40. Active in the Resistance, working with the British. After the war he went as Prefect to French Guiana, distinguishing himself in the reorganisation necessitated by the abolition of the penal colony there. Transferred as Prefect of l'Allier Department in 1955.

CHAPTER II.—FRENCH MOROCCO

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

JM 1013/1 No. 18

QUARTERLY POLITICAL REPORT, OCTOBER–DECEMBER 1955

Mr. Freese-Pennefather to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received January 9*)

(No. 1. Confidential) *Rabat.*
Sir, *January 3, 1956.*

With reference to my despatch No. 75 of the 21st of October last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith my political report on the French Zone of Morocco for the quarter ending on the 31st of December.

2. I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors in Paris, Washington, Madrid and Cairo, to His Excellency the Governor and to the Staff Officer (Intelligence), Gibraltar, to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet, and the Board of Admiralty, to Her Majesty's Consuls-General in Tangier, Tetuan, Tunis and Algiers, to Her Majesty's Consuls in Casablanca and Fez, to the British Middle East Office in Beirut, and to the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations, New York.

I have, &c.

H. W. A. FREESE-PENNEFATHER.

Enclosure

General

1. With the departure of the Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Arafa the negotiations of the previous quarter were directed towards reaching generally acceptable conditions for the establishment of a Council of the Throne and a representative Moroccan Government, as provided for in the Aix-les-Bains agreements: and these were based on the assumption that the ex-Sultan would not return to the Throne. The Glaoui's rallying to his cause and the latter's return to France at the end of the month precipitated a series of events in Morocco's emancipation, the rapidity of which bewildered the principally interested parties including Spain. Few observers would have forecast, as recently as last summer, that in the space of less than two months Morocco would have taken strides towards independence which might normally have been expected to require several years to achieve, nor that they could have been made with so little apparent friction, as yet, in responsible quarters, either French or Moroccan. The French Government may have preferred not to see the writing on the wall, when they felt obliged last August to secure the ex-Sultan's prior approval of their Moroccan policy, but on his return to France from Madagascar the momentum of Moroccan national sentiment carried all before it and the French Govenment, much preoccupied with internal poblems, were powerless to do otherwise than acquiesce in the " faits accomplis " with which they were successively confronted. The only effective brakes on Moroccan nationalist extremism were the responsible sentiments expressed by the Sultan and the realisation by political leaders here that the country would require financial and technical assistance from France for some years to come besides the experience of her administrators. At the end of the quarter an established Moroccan Government were awaiting the formation of one in France with whom to negotiate the country's future status.

2. Fighting broke out in the Riff mountains at the beginning of October and this, with the ever present danger of dissidence spreading among other mountain tribes, was a major preoccupation both of the French and of the Moroccans throughout the quarter. Terrorism, however, in the towns showed a marked decline.

Political

3. When the Sultan left Rabat on the 1st of October he had signed a declaration delegating to his cousin the management of the affairs of the Crown but he did not relinquish his claim to the Throne. The President of the French Republic took note of this, in a message which was read to His Majesty by the Resident-General at the airport, and observed that his conditions for leaving the French Zone made the restoration of the ex-Sultan juridically impossible. On the same day the Minister of Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs told the French Press that France intended to make Morocco a sovereign democratic State with which she would maintain permanent links based on the free consent of both parties. The Government's policy was based on four principles:—

(1) respect for treaties concerning Morocco and for the rights of powers benefiting from them;

(2) respect for Moroccan sovereignty and for the integrity of the Shereefian Empire;

(3) recognition that France should remain permanently in Morocco in the common interest of the two countries and of the free world; and

(4) recognition of the position and rights of the French community in Morocco.

M. July said that more responsibility could be given to the new Moroccan élite and that discussions could be held with a representative Moroccan Government for the gradual lifting of French controls. Any solution of the Throne problem would be acceptable. The new Moroccan Government which must be representative of different shades of opinion, would administer the country within the framework of the Treaty of Fez, would agree with the French Government about putting into effect democratic institutions, would find a way of guaranteeing the interests of France and of the French in Morocco, and would in conjunction with the French Government endeavour to define the permanent link between the two countries for the future. France would retain responsibility for defence and for foreign affairs and common bodies would be set up to give effect to the association of the two countries whose community of interest would be marked chiefly by the recognition of certain reciprocal rights in economies, politics, administration and justice. The Government intended now to press ahead with the formation of a Council of the Throne. The ex-Sultan's position was that he had given undertakings not to engage in any political activity and, if he returned to France, not to leave it without the consent of the French Government. On the 8th of October the French National Assembly approved the Goernment's policy by an overwhelming vote of 477 to 140, four out of five of the Gaullist Ministers having resigned two days previously.

4. In Rabat there were two main problems to be faced, firstly the complication of the Sultan's delegation of his powers to his cousin and secondly the revolts which had broken out in the Riff mountains and the Middle Atlas (see paragraphs 15 and 16 below). The Resident-General who had the Riff operations on his hands and was susceptible to the increasing pressure of the " Union pour le Présence Française ", was in no mood to tackle the dynastic issue and the French Government, without consulting the Resident-General, entrusted this task to the Délégué, M. de Panafiou, who had incurred the intense hatred of the French extremists by his effective role in the Sultan's removal. He flew from Paris to Tangier where the Sultan told him that his cousin's responsibilities related merely to the private affairs of the Crown and this incensed the French extremists yet further in that their ruse for preventing the appointment of a Council of the Throne was thereby defeated. From then onwards General Boyer de Latour no longer recognised M. de Panafiou as his " Délégué " and when the latter, perhaps unnecessarily, returned to Morocco on a very brief visit, he spent his time in Casablanca to avoid the mob which was staging demonstrations against him in Rabat. The way was now open, however, for constituting the Council of the Guardians of the Throne, and after some difficulty over the addition of a fourth member (on which the French extremists had insisted), it was constituted on the 15th of October as follows:—

His Excellency Si El Hadj Mohammed El Mokri, Grand-Vizier
His Excellency Si M'Barak Bekkai
His Excellency Si El Hadj Mhammod Sbihi, Pasha of Salé, and
His Excellency Si Tahar ben Ali ou Assou, Caid of the Ait Allam.

The Council, which was to take its decisions unanimously, was charged to exercise the prerogatives of the Crown and to appoint a Prime Minister who would form a fully representative Moroccan Government. Both the nationalist parties hastened to reserve their position in regard to the Council on the grounds that its formation was not in accordance with the Aix-les-Bains agreements. It was announced on the same date that the French Government had authorised the ex-Sultan and his family to return to France. The Council was formally installed by the Resident-General on the 18th of October and appealed to all their compatriots, both Moslem and Jewish, to give them their support. They proclaimed that Morocco was entering a new democratic era which would guarantee to all Moroccans, regardless of their religion, equality of rights and of obligations; the French population's rights and interests would be protected as those of other foreign communities. Si Bekkai announced that His Majesty Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef had approved the Council as constituted and referred appreciatively to the French Government's decision to authorise his return to France. Si El Hadj Fathmi ben Slimane, a former Pasha of Fez, was asked to form a Moroccan Government. Two days later the " Parti Démocrate de l'Indépendence " (P.D.I.) published a declaration approving the Council and this was followed by a declaration by the Istiqlal Party giving reasons for their non-acceptance of it in its present form; the relatively unimportant " Parti de l'Unité et de l'Indépendence " (P.U.I.) objected to it in principle and called for the immediate return of the ex-Sultan. Si Bekkai, thereupon, published a photostat copy of the ex-Sultan's message and issued an explanatory communiqué in the hope of inducing the Istiqlal Party to change their attitude. Si Fathmi ben Slimane agreed to form a Government and announced that His Majesty Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef would return to France at the end of the month. In Paris the Ministry of Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs was suppressed and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs resumed responsibility for the two North African Protectorates.

5. The President of the Council designate immediately embarked on a series of interviews with Moroccan leaders of all political complexions but his activities lost much of their importance on the 25th of October when the Glaoui arrived in Rabat and, after paying courtesy calls on Si Fathmi ben Slimane and the Council of the Throne, published a declaration asking for the prompt restoration of the ex-Sultan to the Throne. He desired independence for his country within the framework of interdependence with France and prayed for national unity. His spectacular and unexpected intervention, for which various motives were advanced, some more and some less obvious, removed the last obstacle among the Moroccans to the ex-Sultan's return, and the most important of the Pashas and Caids, who had likewise been opposed to it, rapidly followed the Glaoui's lead. The President of the Council designate continued his consultations with leading personalities, including representatives of the " Union Marocaine du Travail " (U.M.T.) and of the " Ulema " but he refused to receive members of the Moroccan Communist Party (P.C.M.); the " Union pour la Présence Française " published a statement accepting the situation resulting from the Glaoui's action. The Executive Committee of the Istiqlal Party announced in Paris that the Aix-les-Bains agreements were out of date and that the Council of the Throne was now meaningless. The Guardians of the Throne, the President of the Council designate and all personalities of consequence left for France to welcome the ex-Sultan on his return. The festival of the " Mouloud " (the Prophet's birthday) was celebrated with jubilation throughout the country and prayers were said in the name of Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef in all the mosques. The Glaoui received a tumultuous welcome in Marrakesh where the celebrations continued for several days. On the 29th of October the Sultan sent a letter to the President of the French Republic, renouncing all his rights and pledging his subjects, unreservedly, to His Majesty Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef.

6. On the 30th of October the ex-Sultan arrived by air at Nice and left next day for a residence which had been prepared for him at Saint Germain-en-Laye, where he had his first interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Pinay. Further discussions followed and on the 5th of November the French Cabinet consented to his resumption of sovereignty. On the following day His Majesty and M. Pinay issued a joint declaration at the château of Celle-Saint-Cloud containing the following points:—

(1) Pending his return to Rabat, the Sultan had commanded the Council of the Throne to expedite current business.

(2) The Sultan confirmed his intention to set up a representative Moroccan Government to administer the country and to negotiate with the French Government.

(3) The Moroccan Government would work out institutional reforms to turn Morocco into a democratic State with a constitutional monarchy.

(4) The Moroccan Government would negotiate with the French Government so as to make Morocco into an independent State, united to France by permanent bonds of interdependence freely consented and defined.

(5) M. Pinay and the Sultan were in agreement that France and Morocco must build up their future together without the intervention of any third party, with due regard to the rights of their respective subjects and to the situation created by the existence of treaties with foreign Powers.

On the following day the Sultan, who had now been accorded the full honours due to a foreign ruler, laid a wreath at the Arc de Triomphe and the Guardians of the Throne left for Rabat. For the remainder of his stay in Paris, His Majesty had a heavy programme giving audiences to official and other callers; these included the Glaoui, who effected his reconciliation in a somewhat medieval ceremony, and foreign visitors of note included representatives of the Arab countries and of Spain, but he declined to see Marshal Juin on his last evening, on the pretext that he could grant no further audiences. Hardly any Moroccan of standing was refused an audience with the exception of Abdelhai el Kettani.

7. On the 7th of November M. André-Louis Dubois, the Prefect of Police in Paris, was appointed to succeed General Boyer de Latour as Resident-General. The latter took the salute at the parade on Armistice Day and met his successor in Paris on the following day. M. Dubois arrived at Rabat by air on the 13th of November and held his official receptions in the course of the afternoon. He brought with him, as his principal officials, M. Roger Lalouette as " Ministre Délégué à la Résidence ", Count Ghislain Clauzel as " Ministre Délégué auprès du Sultan " and M. Gabriel van Laethem as Director-General of his Cabinet. M. Gabriel Eriau was confirmed in his appointment as Secretary-General of the Protectorate.

8. On the 16th of November the Sultan, after 27 months of exile, returned to his country amid the acclamations of his people. He was met at the airport by the Resident-General, the Guardians of the Throne, the President of the Council designate, the Mendoub of Tangier and by representatives of the Spanish Zone, of political parties, of trade union and veteran associations, by Caid Brahim el Glaoui (on behalf of his father who was ill) and by the Grand Rabbi. Members of the former " Maghzen " who had been summarily commanded to cease their functions by the 15th of November, were precluded from attending this and other connected ceremonies. The streets of Rabat were gaily beflagged for the occasion and crowds thronged the route along which His Majesty accompanied by his two sons, Their Imperial Highnesses Prince Moulay Hassan and Prince Moulay Abdullah, proceeded from the airport to the Imperial Palace. On his arrival at his Palace he gave a brief address to the multitudes who had assembled in the " Méchouar " and in the afternoon he held his official receptions. On the following day His Majesty, with his two sons, left Rabat well before dawn, driving his own motor car, to visit the tomb of his mother at Fez.

9. The 18th of November was the " Fête du trône ", being the 28th anniversary of the Sultan's accession. After his official receptions His Majesty went to a stand in the " Méchouar " from which he broadcast the Speech from the Throne. This important pronouncement was the keynote for responsible political spokesmen up to the end of the year and a simultaneous translation in French was given by Prince Moulay Hassan. He announced that negotiations would shortly be opened with the French to put an end to the Protectorate régime but this must not lead to any weakening of the bonds of friendship with France, whose help was needed for inaugurating a new era of interdependence. A representative Moroccan Government would be set up with three missions to fulfil (1) the conduct of public affairs, (2) the creation of democratic institutions, based on the separation of powers, in a constitutional monarchy and (3) negotiations with the French on the basis of independence within interdependence, founded on equality and mutual respect of their sovereignty. The French had played a noteworthy part in Morocco's evolution and their interests and rights would be fully protected. The speech was well received in both French and Moroccan circles. The " Union pour Présence

Française " issued a communiqué which showed a reasonable appreciation of realities and the P.D.I. expressed their entire agreement with the speech. The Istiqlal Party, whose leaders were more widely dispersed, took longer in coming round but proclaimed their full support of the Sultan himself from the outset. Their Executive Committee met in Madrid, with their leader Si Allal el Fassi, to thrash out their differences and announced their satisfaction at the political programme outlined by the Sultan.

10. On the 22nd of November the Sultan began a series of consultations with leading personalities and political parties to choose a new President of the Council. Si Fathmi ben Slimane who, with the Guardians of the Throne, had given his resignation on the Sultan's return, was the first to be received and he informed His Majesty of his earlier consultations. The Sultan then put four questions to the Istiqlal Party, the P.D.I. and the U.N.T.:—

(1) Name two persons who could form a Government representing the widest possible field of Moroccan opinion.
(2) What proportion of portfolios in the Government should be held by the various political parties or other elements.
(3) How many Ministers should the Government contain, and
(4) What should its programme be.

His Majesty then continued his consultations with other leaders, among whom he told M. Jacques Dahan, the secretary-general of the Council of Jewish Communities, that just as he intended the Jewish community to form an integral part of the Moroccan people so also he wished them to assume governmental responsibilities. The two major political parties and the U.M.T. all agreed to the presidency of the Council being offered to Si Bekkai, who accepted the office on the 30th of November, but there was disagreement over the proportion of seats to be allotted in the Government, the Istiqlal Party claiming 45 per cent. for themselves and the P.D.I. urging that they, the Istiqlal Party and the independents should each have one-third. At the request of the Sultan the P.D.I. modified their demands and within a week Si Bekkai announced the formation of a Government containing nine members from the Istiqlal Party, six from the P.D.I. and six independent (including one Jew).

11. In the meantime the Istiqlal Party held their first public congress from the 2nd to the 5th of December. It was staged in a spectacular fashion under the presidency of Si Ahmed Balafrej, secretary-general of the party, who made the opening speech and outlined a policy broadly similar to that in the Speech from the Throne. Maître Bousbid followed with a more detailed exposition of the party's aims, emphasising in particular that they would not subscribe to any alienation whatsoever of the country's sovereignty, and the later orators included a young Moroccan girl who appealed for equal rights and votes for women. There were indeed many women among the delegates—a feature which showed their determination to take a prominent part in the public life of the country. After two days of deliberations in committees a plenary session approved eight motions of which the most important related to the party's general political directives, to their insistence on reforming the " caidal " system, to the equality of rights for Moroccan Jews and to the political rights and responsibilities of women.

12. The first meeting of the Moroccan Cabinet took place on the 9th of December and on the 13th Si Bekkai broadcast their declaration of policy, which was in very general terms. Their first and foremost task was to negotiate with the French on the basis of the Celle-Saint-Cloud declaration (see paragraph 6 above), which implied the independence of Morocco; it was on the condition of this independence being conceded that he and his Ministers had accepted to form a Government. The country, however, required financial help to cope with its rapidly increasing population, 56 per cent. of which was less than 25 years of age. For this as also for defence the Government would need the continued co-operation of France, and it followed that one of their main preoccupations was to give to the French in this country, and to other foreign residents, the fullest guarantees for their rights and interests. Historically, ethnically and culturally Morocco belonged to the Arab-Moslem world, although by her geographical position and economic needs she belonged to the West. He hoped that it would form a meeting place between their two complementary civilisations. In the transition period the Government had urgent work to do especially for democratising the Moroccan

State, for reorganising the " caidal " system and for dealing with the remaining political prisoners. He appealed to all his listeners to give him their confidence and support.

13. The Government, considering that none of its members had held office before, moved with surprising rapidity. They appointed a Secretary-General of the Moroccan Government and on the 17th of December the nomination was announced of 15 provincial governors (two of whom would be responsible for the " autonomous cities " of Rabat and Casablanca), the new territorial divisions corresponding fairly closely with those contemplated in the programme submitted by M. Lacoste who had also recommended that Moroccan officials should take charge of them. The functions of the officials remained to be defined but the immediate object of creating these posts was to maintain order in the remoter country districts in many of which the situation remained threatening until the end of the year (apart from the Riff rebellion), and to supervise the activities of the Pashas and Caids on behalf of the Central Government. Finally on the 19th of December the Sultan signed a " dahir " granting a general amnesty to all persons who had been imprisoned since January 11, 1944 (when the manifesto of independence was issued by the Moroccan nationalists), for acts which had been motivated by patriotism, and providing that all outstanding proceedings on such charges should be dropped.

14. Immediately on the Sultan's return Moroccans began to flood into Rabat from all quarters of the countryside but on the first of the reception days the excited mob savagely murdered a " khalifa " of the Pasha of Fez, and his bodyguard, at the palace gates, and there had been some serious rioting at Meknes and elsewhere. The Sultan, therefore, stopped these pilgrimages and promised to tour the country himself instead. About a fortnight later, however, when initial passions had subsided, the pilgrimages were resumed again and throughout December Rabat saw a constant stream of buses, trucks, Cadillacs and Jeeps, all beflagged and filled to capacity with cheering and singing Moroccans, bent on seeing their sovereign. Some came only for the day and others set up their tents in the " Méchouar "; representative delegations were received by His Majesty, and he and Prince Moulay Hassan appeared frequently on the palace balcony to the delight of their loyal subjects. On many occasions the Sultan or his son addressed the throng, expressing appreciation of their coming to celebrate the new era of Morocco under his aegis and adding suitable admonitions to preserve the peace in their districts and to live in friendly relations with their French and other European neighbours. In all his utterances the Sultan went out of his way to preach unity and concord among all elements of the population, and to stress the continuing importance of the French in the life of the country. On the 31st of December he ordered these pilgrimages to cease since the well-being of the country required that his subjects should return to their work and occupations; this was, in fact, a timely injunction considering how far the holiday spirit was adversely affecting the economic life of the country. The scenes of happy jubilation in Rabat were repeated in many parts of the country and terrorism in the cities showed a marked decline, but behind all this lay the persistent spectre of the rebellion in the Riff and the threat of further dissidence in the mountain areas.

The Riff rebellion and public security elsewhere in the country

15. At about 1 a.m. on the 2nd of October a rebellion among the Berber tribes broke out almost simultaneously in the Riff country along the Spanish Zone frontier, and in the Middle Atlas near the Djebel Bou Iblane, about eighty miles south-east of Fez. It was officially stated that the initial attacks against the French Native Affairs posts were made by well armed Moorish commandos, wearing a type of irregular uniform, who had come from the Spanish Zone. They were joined later by the local tribesmen. In the Riff country, the French Native Affairs post of Boured was captured by the rebels and a large stock of arms and ammunition was seized. Two French customs officials and a Moorish guard were killed. Bou Zineb, a small French military outpost which is an enclave in the Spanish Zone, was also captured. In the Middle Atlas, the French post of Immouzer des Marmouchas was invested by the rebels and the French commander and ten Europeans were killed, including some two women and children. Troops were sent from Fez and, by the end of the day, both Boured and Immouzer were reoccupied and the posts disengaged. Military operations against the rebels

continued throughout October and substantial reinforcements of troops were drafted into the area from other parts of Morocco, Algeria and France. Air support was provided from the French Air Bases at Meknes, Rabat and Oujda. In the Middle Atlas the situation remained tense but there was no further fighting after the first day of the insurrection; by the end of October all the dissident tribesmen except for about one hundred who escaped into the Spanish Zone, had made their submission and four-fifths of the stolen arms and ammunition had been surrendered.

16. On the Riff front the French forces, operating in barren and mountainous country, and severely handicapped by the inclement weather, encountered stiff opposition and it was not until Bou Zineb was recaptured on the 3rd of November that the military operations as such were officially reported to have terminated. The whole of the region bordering upon the Spanish Zone was occupied by the French forces and the rebels, whose losses were estimated to have been about one hundred killed and two hundred wounded, retired into the Spanish Zone. Isolated attacks, however, against the French forces continued and by the middle of November the rebels were carrying on intensive guerilla warfare on a front of about one hundred and fifty miles between Ouezzane and Guercif. Operating in groups of from ten to fifty men from bases in the Spanish Zone, the guerilla bands infiltrated the French lines, attacking convoys, patrols and outposts. Their presence in the areas behind the front caused considerable agitation among the tribesmen, who were already highly excited by the return of the Sultan. Some twenty-five thousand dissident tribesmen and their families took refuge in the Spanish Zone. About fifteen thousand French and native troops were operating on the Riff front and a line of military posts was set up, as in 1925, close to the frontier. The Resident General who visited the front early in December promised further reinforcements without delay. French casualties up to the beginning of December were officially stated to have been just over a hundred killed and one hundred and seventy-three wounded. During the Riff insurrection attacks were intensified in the Beni Snassen and Berkane areas in an effort to persuade the Beni Snassen tribesmen to revolt; native villages were attacked, houses were pillaged and several local chiefs were killed. Over fifty-five Moors were murdered by these armed bands, who so terrorised the tribesmen that French Native Affairs Officers found political contact with them impossible. In the plain of Triffas, where there are two hundred European " colons ", farms were attacked and numerous acts of sabotage were committed, despite the strength of the French military forces, and the situation was further complicated by the failure of many of the Moorish chiefs to carry out their duties. When the Resident General visited the area it was decided that public works should be put in hand immediately to provide work for the tribesmen who, unable to exist on the produce of their land, were living in misery and were at the mercy of the rebels.

17. Political unrest, especially in the Fez " région ", increased considerably after the Sultan's return. The French authorities lost prestige and in many cases, since they did not know what their future powers would be nor how long they would remain in office, they were reluctant to take decisions of consequence. The traditional chiefs, some of whom were obliged to seek shelter elsewhere, began to shirk their obligations. Peasants refused to pay taxes and tribesmen squatted on the land of rich proprietors. Moors refused to appear before the local courts and judges were reluctant to officiate. Cars belonging to Europeans were attacked and stoned. Acts of sabotage were committed on farms belonging both to Europeans and to Moors. The situation was worse in the north and the numerous incidents in and around Meknes, Fez and Taza became so serious that in certain cases a curfew had to be imposed.

18. On the Casablanca terrorist chart the curve, which stood very high at the beginning of the quarter, rose once to a peak on the day of the ex-Sultan's return to France, but, towards the end of November, dropped suddenly in response to the appeals made by the Sultan and the Moroccan Government. In the past few weeks, although one or two attacks were recorded every day, there was a very marked improvement. The mass demonstrations on the day of the Sultan's return to Rabat, and again on the " Fête du Trône ", were peaceful. So too, though huge crowds attended, was the funeral on the 21st of November of three Moorish prisoners who died from the effects of tear-gas in a riot in the Civil Prison of Casablanca. The ordinary security forces were assisted on these occasions by

large numbers of volunteers belonging to the Istiqlal Party, the P.D.I. and the U.M.T. and they were successful in maintaining order among the crowds in the recent celebrations in all parts of the Protectorate.

Relations with Spain

19. The three principal considerations affecting relations with Spain have been her position with regard to the impending negotiations with the Moroccan Government, her criticism at the rapidity with which democratic reforms are to be introduced in this Zone and her attitude towards the Riff rebellion.

20. With regard to the negotiations, the views of the Spanish Government have not altered since they informed the French Government at the end of September that they expected to be consulted from the outset regarding any matters which might affect their zone or their treaty rights, and they naturally disliked the reaffirmation of the French position in the last paragraph of the joint declaration of Celle-Saint-Cloud (paragraph 6 above).

21. At the end of November General Franco gave an interview to the United States Press correspondents in Madrid and the paragraphs dealing with Morocco, which were by no means accurately reported here, received wide publicity. The Caudillo drew attention to the marked differences in outlook and advancement in the three sections of the Moroccan population—namely the *intelligentsia*, the urban proletariat and the tribesmen—and also to the religious foundations of their life. He did not think that the stages of their evolution could be rushed or that a Western democratic system could be transplanted here without dangerous consequences. His remarks did not elicit any vocal criticism and were regarded by many as being timely.

22. The most acrimonious issue of the quarter was unquestionably the allegations of Spanish complicity in allowing arms to pass through their zone to the rebels in the Riff mountains (and in the Middle Atlas) and in providing aid and comfort to the rebels themselves behind their frontiers. This formed the subject of a number of sharp exchanges, official and other and at the end of October a French senior military officer, by arrangement with the Spanish authorities visited the Spanish Zone frontier areas along which the fighting had been taking place. It was gradually appreciated that the wide stretches of mountainous country provide exceptional problems of control and, as time went on, complaints against the Spaniards became less frequent and virulent.

23. Relations with Spain showed signs of becoming considerably more reasonable towards the end of the year, with the growing realisation that there were common interests at stake, and it has been proposed that a meeting should take place shortly between the Resident-General and the Spanish High Commissioner.

Relations with Other Countries

24. On the Sultan's return, the Arab States hastened to send him their congratulations not only on political grounds but also doubtless out of respect for his being a spiritual chief as well as a monarch. He received invitations to visit them—to which he gave temporising replies—and Iraq, Egypt and the Yemen sent special emissaries to Rabat, all of whom were received with appropriate honours by His Majesty; they were also entertained by the Resident-General and by political leaders in Rabat, Casablanca and Fez. Special attentions were accorded to his Excellency Sheikh Ahmed Hassan Bakhouri, the Egyptian Minister of " Waqf ", who was accompanied by Si Ahmed Said, Director of the " Voice of the Arabs " (Cairo Radio) and Doctor Ibrahim Sallama, Dean of the Faculty of Letters at Cairo University. His Excellency was a guest of honour at the Istiqlal Party Congress and during his visit special importance was given to developing cultural relations between the two countries. Both he and his Excellency Abdel Majid Mahmoud, Minister of State in Iraq, had been attending the Neo-Destour Party Congress at Sfax; the Yemenese emissary was their Minister in London.

25. Relations between the Palace and the United States have been most cordial. At an audience on the Sultan's return Mr. Julius Holmes, the United States Diplomatic Agent, brought a personal message of congratulations from

President Eisenhower to His Majesty and the latter begged him to invite the President to convalesce in Morocco after his recent illness. The Nationalist leaders, however, have evinced considerable resentment owing to the Moroccans not having been consulted about the American Air Bases Agreement and the likelihood of the Moroccan Government asking for future negotiations regarding them has been the subject of frequent speculation.

26. In October the West German Government established a Commercial Mission in Casablanca under the charge of a senior Foreign Service Officer. The Mission, however, has not been accorded any consular attributes.

United Nations

27. On the 3rd of December the General Assembly of the United Nations, noting that negotiations between France and Morocco were to be initiated, decided to postpone further consideration of the question of Morocco. This confirmed a resolution which the First Committee had adopted by forty-nine votes in favour, none against and five abstentions, including the United Kingdom. The Minister of State, in explanation of his vote, said that apart from the question of competence there was nothing in the resolution with which he did not agree.

Labour

28. Moroccan trade union activities expanded considerably around its nucleus the " Union Marocaine du Travail " (U.M.T.). It is fast becoming a powerful moulder of opinion and a political force in the land second only to the Istiqlal Party, despite repeated protestations that it has no political interests other than the betterment of the worker's condition. It is in close sympathy with the Istiqlal Party and is already being publicly accused by the more moderate P.D.I. of coercing its members to join it. Attempts by the " Confédération Générale du Travail " (C.G.T.) trade unions to gain a measure of control by direct affiliation with the U.M.T. have so far been warded off, but individual members of these unions (both French and Moroccans) have since been applying for admission to the U.M.T. unions to exercise their influence from within. Public meetings have been held all over the country to instil trade unionism into the minds of the Moroccans and membership has grown rapidly. A preliminary training course for much-needed executives was held in Rabat and there are plans to establish a permanent training centre.

29. A two-day meeting, under the sponsorship of the Minister of Labour, of employers' and trade union representatives was held in December to discuss wage levels. The Minister opened the proceedings by stating that a rise in the minimum wage of industrial and commercial employees (agricultural wages were not discussed) was overdue; the trade unions had to remember, however, that any rise had to be reconciled with the country's economic ability to support it. He then left them to find common ground and report back. The trade unions wanted an increase of 150 per cent., the employers countered with 10 per cent., and a motion that a special committee should establish a cost of living budget for acceptance by the Government was put forward.

30. Over Christmas the U.M.T. held a Congress. Its somewhat Utopian hopes of economic expansion took little account of the average Moroccan's capabilities nor of the country's ability to pay for a modern social welfare state in the grand manner. The chief points in the final resolution, in the economic sphere, were the following; an immediate increase in industrial and agricultural wages, the extension of family benefits, social security legislation to cover all workers, better housing, increased exploitation of farming land, agricultural credits and modern machinery, support for and increase of industries, reduction of non-essential imports, public works to be for the benefit of the masses and not of the vested interests and increased educational opportunities. In the political sphere the chief points were: administration to pass to Moroccan hands, free elections at all levels, the establishment of a constitutional monarchy and a democratic State, reorganisation of the police (including its control by the Minister of the Interior), an eventual national army, an independent judiciary and machinery for the control of administrative abuses.

Communism

31. As stated in paragraph 5 above his Excellency Si Fathmi ben Slimane declined to receive representations of the P.C.M. when he was engaged in consultations about the formation of a Moroccan Government and the leader of the party, Si Ali Yata, who had been expelled from this country in 1952 and landed again at the Rabat–Salé airport towards the end of November, was promptly sent back to France by order of the Resident-General. The Sultan, however, received a delegation of the party which came to congratulate him early in December and they published a declaration approving his policy in the Speech from the Throne but calling for the evacuation of the American air bases and the immediate cessation of operations against the rebels in the Riff. The Sultan's action in receiving this delegation was much criticised by the Spaniards. While failing so far to make much impression in political circles, the Communists have not disregarded the possibility of infiltrating into trade unions (see paragraph 28 above).

Press

32. The Arabic local newspapers *Al-Alam* (Istiqlal—daily) and *Rai-el-Amm* (P.D.I.—weekly at present) both of which were suppressed after the Casablanca riots in December 1952, resumed publication directly after the Sultan's return. In the intervening period the only newspapers published in Arabic were *Es-Saada* and *Al-Widad*, both of which reflected official opinion since they were directed by Si Hadj Abderrahman el Hajaoui, the former Deputy Director of Protocol at the Palace; *Al-Widad* ceased publication in November. Although there was no censorship of the Press, all newspapers, whether published in Morocco or imported from abroad, were liable to be confiscated if they contained matter considered to be dangerous to the security of the territory.

Visitors

33. Mr. D. P. Reilly, Her Majesty's Minister in Paris, visited the French Zone of Morocco and Tangier from the 8th to the 18th of October.

34. In November Admiral Sir Michael Denny paid an official visit on Admiral Antoine at Casablanca on relinquishing his North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Command as Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic. He also called on the Resident-General in Rabat.

35. M. Emile Roche, the President of the " Conseil Economique ", visited this zone at the beginning of December to examine the economic situation. He was received by the Sultan and decorated with the " Grand Cordon " of the Order of the Ouissam Alaouite.

Appointments

36. Apart from the Protectorate officials mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the following were appointed and still held their posts at the end of the quarter:—

General Gabriel Bourgund, Commander-in-Chief.
M. de Mazières, " Chef de la Région ", Rabat (December).
General Agostini, " Chef de la Région ", Fez (November).
General Lecoq, " Chef de la Région ", Meknes (November).
General Brissot des Mallet, " Chef de la Région ", Agadir (December).
General Bazillon, " Chef de la Région ", Marrakesh (December).
M. Luccioni, Director of Shereefian Affairs (December).
General Méric, Director of Interior (December).
M. Roger Trintignac, Director of Agriculture (November).
Dr. Sanguy, Director of Health (November).
Colonel Costantine, Head of the " Cabinet Militaire " (December).

M. Jacques Bouchet relinquished his duties as Head of the " Cabinet Diplomatique " at the end of the year.

THE FIRST MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT

President of the Council	Si M'Barek el Bekkai (Ind.)
Vice-President	Si M'Hamed Zeghari (Ind.)
Ministers of State (responsible for the negotiations with France)	Me. Aberrahim Bouabid (Ist.)
	Me. Driss Mhammedi (Ist.)
	Me. Mohamed Cherkaoui (P.D.I.)
	Me. Ahmed Guedira (Ind.)
Minister of Justice	Me. Abdelkrim Benjelloun (Ist.)
Minister of Interior	Caid Lahcen (Ind.)
Minister of Finance	Me. Abdelkader Benjelloun (P.D.I.)
Minister of " Habous " (religious foundations) ...	Si Mokhtar Soussi (Ist.)
Minister of Education and Fine Arts	Si Mohammed el Fassi (Ist.)
Minister of Public Works	Si Mohammed Douiri (Ist.)
Minister of Agriculture and Forests	Si Ahmed ben Mansour Nejjai (Ist.)
Minister of Commerce, Arts and Crafts, Tourism and the Merchant Marine	Si Ahmed Lyazidi (Ist.)
Minister of Labour and Social Affairs	Si Abdelkhadi Boutaleb (P.D.I.)
Minister of Health	Dr. Faraj (Ind.)
Minister of Town Planning and Housing	Dr. Ben Bouchaib (P.D.I.)
Minister of P.T.T. (Postmaster-General)	Dr. Benzaquen (Jewish) (Ind.)*
Minister of Industrial Production and Mines ...	Me. Thami El Ouazzani (P.D.I.)
Secretary of State for Youth and Sports	Si Ahmed Bensouda (P.D.I.)
Secretary of State for Information (attached to the President of the Council's office)	Si Moulay Abdallal Ibrahim (Ist.)

Minister of the Imperial Household and of Protocol Si Mohammed Mammeri.

* Appointed on December 26, 1955.

JM 1851/2

No. 19

MOROCCO: EL GLAOUI

Mr. Freese-Pennefather to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received February 3*)

British Consulate-General,
Rabat,
January 27, 1956.

(No. 13. Unclassified)

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 6 of the 23rd of January, I have the honour to inform you that His Excellency Si Hadj Thami Mezzouari el Glaoui, who was born in 1869 and had been Pasha of Marrakesh for nearly half a century, died in his palace on the 23rd of January. I enclose a short account(1) of his life which was published in the *Vigie Marocaine*; for further particulars I can but refer you to the numerous books on Morocco which testify to the outstanding part which he played in framing his country's destinies. He was the last of the great feudal chiefs, with authority extending over a third of its surface and over an almost equal proportion of its population, and his influence had to be taken into account in all affairs of State. He was a great admirer of Britain, which he visited regularly, and a respected personal friend of Sir Winston Churchill.

2. It will be recalled that after his return from France the Glaoui went into hospital at Marrakesh for an operation early in December. A fortnight later he was moved to his palace, where his health was reported to be improving. On the 10th of January, feeling that his strength was leaving him, he wrote a personal letter to the Sultan announcing his intention to retire from political life for reasons of health and commending his family to His Majesty's gracious protection. Thereafter His Excellency got steadily weaker and his death was not unexpected.

3. As soon as the news reached Rabat, the Resident-General, Caid Lahcen Lioussi (Minister of the Interior) and General Méric (Director-General of the Interior) left by air for Marrakesh and proceeded direct to the Pasha's palace to pay a last tribute to his memory. M. Dubois then gave to the members of his family messages of condolence from the President of the French Republic, from M. Edgar Faure, President of the Council, and from the French in Morocco. Caid Lahcen presented the condolences of the Moroccan Government, but no word came from the Imperial Palace; the newspapers, however, recalled with appreciation that when the Sultan appointed governors (" oumal ") elsewhere in Morocco he made no appointment for Marrakesh during the Glaoui's lifetime.

4. The funeral took place on the following morning. At the Pasha's palace a guard of honour was mounted by the second regiment of the " Tirailleurs Marocains," colonial parachutist troops and the Spahis, with whom the Glaoui's son, Lieutenant Si Mehdi el Glaoui, was serving when he was killed in the fighting at Monte Cassino. The body lay in state in the palace gardens where the paths were lined with Moroccan boy scouts and with young militiamen of the " Parti Démocrate de l'Independence " (P.D.I.) and of the Istiqlal Party. Hundreds of Moroccans of all ages were chanting verses from the Koran, two secretaries passing among them from time to time to distribute bundles of 500 franc notes for their services, while a large crowd of Moroccans and Europeans attended in silence. The funeral procession then passed through the streets of the " Médina " which was lined with troops and filled with mourners. The bier was preceded by several hundreds of Moroccans, including blind members of the religious fraternities chanting prayers, and following it were the Glaoui's sons, the Resident-General, the Officers Commanding the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Director-General of the Interior, the " Chef de la Région," members of the Glaoui's household, delegations of the Istiqlal Party, of the P.D.I. and of the " Union Marocaine du Travail," civil and military notables and a large throng of the local population.

5. It took three-quarters of an hour for the procession to cover the 200 yards to the Place du Riad-el-Arous where, after the playing of the " Marseillaise " and of the Shereefian National Anthem, the Resident-General gave a short address (text enclosed(1)) extolling the eminent services which the Glaoui had rendered

(1) Not printed.

both to Morocco and to France. The procession then continued to the " Kouba " of Sidi ben Slimane in the " Médina," where the body was buried beside those of his three brothers, Si Madani, Si Hammou and Si Assi.

6. By a curious inversion of normal practice in other countries, the Glaoui's sons yesterday visited the Sultan to express their condolences to him on their father's death; this is reported to be an accepted custom on the death of a high officer of State. His Majesty said that, had their father not died, his acts would have proved the sincerity of his repentance and told them that they had plenty of time ahead to show proof of their patriotism and to join those who were working for their country's interests.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors in Paris, Washington, Madrid, to Her Majesty's Consuls-General in Tangier, Tetuan and to Her Majesty's Consuls in Casablanca and Fez.

I have, &c.

H. W. A. FREESE-PENNEFATHER.

JM 1016/23 No. 20

REPORT ON A VISIT TO MOROCCO MADE BY BRIGADIER JACKSON, THE BRITISH MILITARY ATTACHE IN PARIS

Mr. Reilly to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received March 27*)

(No. 95. Confidential) *Paris,*
Sir, *March 26, 1956.*

I have the honour to transmit herewith a valuable report by Brigadier Jackson, Military Attaché at this Embassy, on a visit which he made to Morocco between the 20th of February and the 2nd of March.

2. Brigadier Jackson's report gives a very interesting account of the military situation in Morocco. Its conclusion is that the French Army has been gradually losing the war against the rebels, essentially because it has no objective. As Brigadier Jackson himself points out, things change extremely rapidly in Morocco. Since his visit the prospect that the Sultan and the nationalist leaders may succeed in persuading the rebels to lay down their arms has a good deal improved. The Director-General of Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs at the Quai d'Orsay told me on the 22nd of March that he thought that it would probably be a little time before the contacts which are at present being made with the rebels produced concrete results. There was rivalry between the nationalist parties for the honour of being responsible for a cease-fire and the Parti Démocrate de l'Indépendance were as usual trying to outbid the Istiqlal. They had offered rewards for the rebels, including incorporation in the new Moroccan Army and so on. M. Basdevant thought, however, that within a few weeks at the most the majority of the rebels in the Riff would lay down their arms and seek to return to their homes. It would be too much to hope for complete pacification. Some of the rebels were ordinary bandits, and some, he said, were led by Communists and others by Algerians. These elements would probably refuse to surrender, but he had every hope that within a month or so there would be a major improvement in the situation.

3. It remains to be seen whether this optimistic forecast will be fulfilled. If it is, then the French Army in Morocco should have no grounds for complaining that it has no objective in its operations against the remaining rebels, since there should no longer exist the ambiguous situation in which the rebels have been able to claim the approval of the Moroccan nationalists or even of the Sultan himself. Unfortunately, as was shown by the war in Indo-China, it does not come easy to the French to put their hearts into operations of which the conclusion, like that of our own in Malaya, is a grant of independence for the country in question.

4. In the second half of his report Brigadier Jackson makes some pertinent observations on the general political situation in Morocco, on the prospects of the maintenance of the French position there and on the future value of Morocco to the Western Alliance. Her Majesty's Consul-General at Rabat will no doubt wish to comment on these points. Recent reports from Her Majesty's Consular Officers in French Morocco, and especially from Her Majesty's Consul at Fez, certainly do not give an encouraging impression of the situation. As seen from Paris it would appear that one cannot exclude the possibility that Morocco will slip back into something not very different from the anarchy from which the French rescued it. Brigadier Jackson's report confirms the view expressed in paragraph 6 of Sir Gladwyn Jebb's despatch No. 407 of the 26th of October, 1955, that Morocco is not ready for independence. Thanks to the disastrous errors of 1953 the country has been rushed in less than three years through stages of its road to independence which should have lasted at least 10 years. Nevertheless, after what had passed, the last French Government and that of M. Mollet have, I think, followed the only possible policy. One can only hope that both on the French and on the Moroccan side those responsible will have the patience and good sense to preserve for Morocco sufficient French backing, administrative, military and economic, to pull her through until she can hope to stand properly on her own legs.

5. Much will clearly depend upon the strength of the Sultan's position and upon the performance of Mohammed V himself and of his heir, Prince Moulay Hassan. Brigadier Jackson's report is pessimistic on both points. M. de Margerie

recently told me that he thought that the Sultan was fully aware that royalist feeling might quickly evaporate and that he might be ousted by a Nasser-type régime. M. de Margerie added that the Istiqlal were advising him to be in no hurry to complete the agreement with the French, because the deterioration of the situation in Algeria would strengthen his bargaining position. The Sultan, however, wanted an early agreement in order to strengthen his own position against the Istiqlal, and in this he was supported by Si Bekkai. Brigadier Jackson concludes that the most likely outcome is a republican dictatorship, which would presumably be based on the Istiqlal. It may be so. Mr. Freese-Pennefather is best qualified to comment on this point, but I would myself doubt whether the Sultan's present popularity is as illusory as Brigadier Jackson is inclined to suggest. I would guess that already in 1953 he had a good deal more support in the country than the French then believed. It seems to me quite intelligible that his period as an exile and a martyr should have caused a genuine wave of popular emotion in his favour and I do not believe that this was simply the result of artificial stimulation by the nationalist leaders.

6. There is reason to think that both the Sultan and his son learned much during their exile. It looks as if Prince Moulay Hassan, having sown his wild oats, may prove to be an heir of some real quality, although it is difficult to take him seriously in his latest role as Chief of Staff of the new Royal Moroccan Army. It is encouraging that Allal El Fassi should now have come out on the Sultan's side and in support of an agreement with the French. This is the second major development since Brigadier Jackson's visit to Morocco and I think that it gives grounds for hope that on the political side the prospects may be better, and perhaps a good deal better, than they seemed a few weeks ago. On the other hand the revolt in Algeria, if not quickly brought to an end, will continue to encourage the fanatical Moslem elements in Morocco, and make things very difficult for those who realise that Morocco needs the support of France if she is to develop into a responsible and well ordered State.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington and Madrid and to Her Majesty's Consuls-General at Rabat, Tangier and Tetuan.

I have, &c.

D. P. REILLY,

(Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires).

Enclosure

REPORT ON A VISIT TO MOROCCO, 20th FEBRUARY TO 2nd MARCH, 1956

A.—The Military Situation

The Enemy

1. There appear to be two main sorts of enemy in Morocco:—

(*a*) The Berber tribesmen in the Riff and also in the Middle Atlas.

(*b*) The terrorists in the centres of population and plains.

In the Riff, there is a minor war in progress. It stretches over the line of the hills from north of Oujda right across to the Atlantic, and is roughly the line of the border between the French and Spanish Zones. The degree of unrest varies, with the worst areas being to the east and north of Fez. To the west and north of Fez the area is still comparatively quiet. There are various estimates of the enemy in the Riff, the majority agree that there are something like 2,000 hard-core Berber tribesmen permanently under arms. The number varies daily as every tribesman is a potential enemy when there is a prospect of attacking the French, particularly if there is a chance of capturing arms. The Berbers work in bands varying in size from a few men to 200. The heaviest arms are the light machine-guns of which a number seem to be in use. The majority of the men are armed with modern rifles of some sort and there appears to be little shortage of rifles though ammunition is reported to be short at intervals. There were one or two

cases only when mortars have been used against the French. These are probably captured weapons with very limited ammunition.

The leaders of the Berber tribesmen are reputed to be youngish men who have forgotten the lessons that the French inflicted on the Berbers at the end of the Abdel Krim war. These young men do not seem very likely to take much notice of the views of the elder Moroccan statesmen. Their operations are really most loosely linked to nationalism and they are fighting because it is normal for a Berber to fight if he can get away with it and there is a chance of loot. The encouragement he is receiving from various nationalistic sources, including Cairo, is merely a fortunate incidental.

In the towns and villages are the terrorists and bandits and they are more or less everywhere to some extent, north of a line east and west of 50 miles south of Casablanca. These terrorists are normally Moorish tribesmen as opposed to Berbers and they work in small parties. It is among these that one finds the genuine supporters of the Moorish nationalists. They are armed as opportunity offers, but have ample arms to carry out terrorism.

2. The military organisation of Morocco to deal with the situation caused above, is given in the appendix to this report.

It will be seen that the Commander-in-Chief, General Bourgund, has under him four generals at Fez, Meknes, Marrakesh and Agadir, who are also civil commanders owing equal allegiance to the Resident-General. He also has under him three purely military commanders, General Renaudeau d'Arc, commanding 22 Moroccan Infantry Division, General Pedron, commanding 4 Division Infanterie Mécanique, and General Granger, commanding the Military District of Casablanca and Rabat. General Pedron and General Granger have no civil duties as the territories over which they have jurisdiction have civilian administrators. However, General Granger's opposite number is a French serving general, General Franchi, temporarily attached to the administration.

This organisation, half civil and half civil and military, appears to be cumbersome but it is working reasonably well and I did not hear any of the complaints that I heard last year, and one still hears, about the gap between the military and civil in Algeria. Nevertheless, until a general was appointed to be chief of the civil region in Casablanca there were constant complaints that liaison, particularly in the city of Casablanca, was bad. Since the appointment of General Franchi to this civil post, complaints of lack of liaison have ceased.

3. The 22 Moroccan Infantry Division is widely spread throughout Morocco and its units are not really under the operational command of General Renaudeau d'Arc. He has certain inspection and training duties in connexion with them but his main task is that of second-in-command to General Bourgund.

The Moroccan regiments of 22 Division used to be located at Marrakesh, Casablanca, Meknes and Taza but some of these locations have been changed owing to the influx of reinforcements and because of the number of Moroccan desertions.

The desertion problem is probably an even more serious one in Algeria, but in Morocco the number is high enough to have caused the withdrawal of the Moroccan units, as far as possible, from operational areas. Specific results are the return to 3 Division in Germany of 7 Regiment Tirailleurs Marocains, who only transferred to North Africa last July, and the move of 4 Regiment Tirrailleurs Marocains of 22 Division from Taza to the 15 Division in France. Further moves of this nature may take place.

22 Infantry Division units are part of the forces at the disposal of the military commanders of Fez, Meknes, Marrakesh, Agadir and Casablanca, and there are even some located in General Pedron's command. The remainder of the garrison in these places is made up of units returned from Indo-China, of reinforcements from France and of an increase in the colonial units from West and Central Africa. The duties performed naturally depend on the location.

In the Fez area a very high proportion are on actual operations in the Riff; at Meknes a number are also operational in the Riff, while in the other three regions the troops, not on internal security guard duties, train and rest. There is a system of replacement between non-operational and operational troops in force, so that approximately one-third of the units are fighting in the Riff while the remainder are back resting and training. The fact that only one-third are actually

engaged in operations may seem small but the internal security guard duties are heavy and all commanders are under constant pressure, often political, to provide guards for farms, &c., of influential colons and so on.

4. 4 Division Infanterie Mécanique under General Pedron is in the area Oujda, Taza and the eastern Riff. As stated above, there are also certain non-divisional units in this area as well, *i.e.*, there are battalions of 5 Regiment Tirailleurs Senegalese at Oujda and Taza, with the specific task of being responsible for the internal security of the towns, while 5 Regiment d'Infanterie from Coblenz is at Taza. All units in this area come under General Pedron for general operations but can be specifically allotted to the two military chiefs of the sub-divisions of Oujda and Taza for local duties. General Pedron appears to be operating on both sides of the frontier between Morocco and Algiers and he has definitely complete operational control, including that over the local sub-divisional commanders. Where exactly the civil controllers in these regions fit in is difficult to say. It is also difficult to understand why they have been retained at all as this is the most disturbed area in Morocco and, in less disturbed areas, the civilian control has already been eliminated completely. As the area is fairly concentrated, General Pedron is able to keep reserves under his own hand and the active use of these is probably one of the reasons why the war in his area seems to be going not too badly. He is a very active individual himself and his troops are expected to be so too. It is a very difficult campaign, however, and it is really doubtful if he is doing more—or as much—as holding his own.

5. General Agostini's command at Fez is a very large one territorially and he has something like a division and a half's worth of troops to look after the area. He has two main responsibilities. In the Riff, there are four contiguous regimental groups, each under a colonel. These groups are each about the size of a regiment, *i.e.*, three battalions, but they are composed of whatever sort of troops are available. General Renaudeau d'Arc told me that the ideal was a regimental group composed of one normal battalion, one motorised battalion, and one battalion of the Chasseurs Alpins type. Such a combat team could undertake all the sorts of fighting in the various types of terrain which an average colonel's command normally included. These combat teams, however, were often largely *ad hoc* formations and many service units were having to contribute. It is for this reason that recruit training in all units now contained 50 per cent. infantry work after the end of the basic training period.

Each regimental group has its own local reserves and Agostini told me that he had decentralised his reserves in the Riff area as he was too far away from it to be able to influence the situation.

General Agostini's other important task is the security of the permanently turbulent town of Fez and the main road and rail links towards the Algerian border. For the moment Fez is reasonably quiet, but the people are in an obviously unpleasant frame of mind and a serious outbreak of anti-French rioting might happen at any moment. When I went into the native part of Fez, the locals were not actively unpleasant but they clearly were filled with a very strong anti-foreign feeling. If our party had been French, rather than obviously British, I think we might well have been attacked.

The temper of Fez makes it extremely important that the Berber tribes of the Riff should be kept away from the vicinity of the town. At the same time it is equally important that they should not be allowed to infiltrate south across the road and link up with other Berber tribesmen in the Middle Atlas. Unfortunately it is becoming increasingly clear that General Agostini is really not succeeding in containing the tribesmen in their own areas. The main road is being continually crossed in the Taza area and it is definitely not safe to travel up and down by night, while there seems even some danger in doing so by day. It is thus clear that some junction has already been achieved between the Berber tribesmen of the Riff and those in the Middle Atlas. While I was in Fez there was at least one incident about 30 miles south of Fez on the main road to the south and others are now being reported.

I discussed the situation generally with General Agostini and he was most frank and forthcoming. He answered all my questions about the tactical handling of operations but I feel he was unduly sanguine about the results of these operations under his control. He said that he was satisfied with the situation, though this view was not at all confirmed by one or two other nearly as senior officers when I

discussed it with them. One regimental commander of great experience in Morocco told me that he considered the situation in the Fez District was more serious than it had been at the worst time of the Abdel Krim war. He anticipated that the French would lose complete control east of Fez within a few months unless something drastic was done.

I asked specifically on many occasions whether it was the opinion that the Sultan would be able to control the Berber tribes. In no case did I find any Frenchman who was of the opinion that the Sultan would now be able to do so. Though he might have been able to do so if he had said something immediately on his return to Morocco. It will be interesting to see whether his declaration of the 7th will have any effect. If it does not have any effect, one should be prepared for the fact that Morocco and Algeria may be completely separated except by air in a shortish time. What effect this will have on the country it is not possible to say, but it will obviously be serious, for it would mean that the Algerian situation would have spread as far West as Fez and be as equally out of control.

6. General Le Coq, Commanding at Meknes, roughly carries out the same duties in his area of the Riff as General Agostini at Fez. Meknes is further from the Riff than is Fez and is normally a much less turbulent town. At the same time Le Coq's troops have not yet been heavily engaged in fighting in the Riff, so the situation in his area is nothing like as serious. I did not see him, but his Chief of Staff, a soldier of 20 years' service in the Affaires Indigènes, was most pessimistic about the general situation and told me he was delighted he was being transferred to France before the trouble spread to the Meknes area.

7. General Granger at Casablanca, who also commands the Rabat Sub-Division, has a large number of non-divisional and static units under his command. He primarily carries out guard duties and training but he is responsible for the frontier North of Rabat between the Spanish frontier and the French Zone. This zone is held by six Company Posts on the general line Ouezzane to the west. There are other companies in the area available as reserves, but the principle is that everybody in this area should be mutually self-supporting. Very little actual operations are taking place, though a great deal of patrolling is being carried out to prevent illegal crossing of the frontier by men and arms.

8. In the South in the Military Regions of Marrakesh and Agadir the situation is calm and very few incidents have been reported, but the French are beginning to get nervous. Here, internal security duties are carried out by separating the regions into sub-districts in which the local senior military commander is responsible. Each sub-district has a Lieutenant-Colonel in command and about a Lieutenant-Colonel's worth of troops. As far as possible the sub-districts coincide with the areas now allotted to the newly appointed Moroccan Governors. General Bazillon explained that this was in order to make the new Moroccan Governors feel that they were responsible for internal security, but the Moroccan Governors as yet are not taking any part in maintaining order.

9. There are a number of criticisms of the French Army in North Africa. Many of these criticisms are obviously ill judged and without foundation but the two main ones are that the troops in North Africa are neither properly trained nor equipped for the tasks they have to undertake. To try to satisfy myself as to whether these criticisms were justified I asked a lot of questions and saw a number of units.

10. My impression is that generally speaking the troops in Morocco are as reasonably well trained as their opposite numbers in the British Army would be in similar circumstances and were, for instance, in the early days in Malaya or Kenya.

In an attempt to get the French soldier as mobile and tough as the Berber tribesman or bandit, the French Command in Morocco have started an anti-guerilla school at Marrakesh. This school is run by the 6 Battalion Colonial Parachutists. These Colonial Parachutists are always exceptionally good, with the majority of officers and N.C.Os. thoroughly battle trained in Indo-China. The course is six weeks and complete platoons are sent from units in Morocco to be trained as teams capable of living off the country, carrying out guerilla warfare and in general commando duties. I saw some of the training and it was most impressive. The course is extremely hard and a number of individuals cannot take it, but they are very few and I think that a man who has passed through this course will be an awkward customer to meet. It was interesting that French and Senegalese were being trained side by side, but there were no Moroccans. As the influence of this

school spreads throughout the units in Morocco I think we may find that the active operations against the enemy are more successful. It is a fair criticism that it might have been started earlier. However, from the other Units I saw, I gained the impression that the criticisms that the French junior leaders and soldiers were not up to the work, were not justified. This sort of warfare is always extremely difficult for regular soldiers to carry out. We have found the same difficulties ourselves in many parts of the world. On the other hand I am not sure that the more senior regimental officers are sufficiently flexibly minded to be able to do this form of warfare well. The regular French officer is inclined to be much older than his British opposite number and I think this is a weakness in Morocco. I also consider that the French commanders generally are far too old. This is a standard criticism of the French Army but it does apply particularly to guerilla warfare where push and go, combined with a flexible mind are essential.

11. The suggestions that the French Army in North Africa is incorrectly equipped is largely based on a desire to find excuses for lack of success. I could see no reason for these criticisms really. There is a certain need for heavy equipment and the French have correctly left much of it behind in France.

A limited amount of armour was being used on flat country and on roads as it did save men, because it allowed patrols to work fast where the going was good. As a rule, anywhere off the road, tracked vehicles were not of great value, because the country generally was so broken. Armoured cars could also get off the road sometimes and a new issue of E.B.Rs. with their alternative tracked wheels was being watched with interest, as it might solve quite a number of problems. Only one squadron was equipped with E.B.Rs. at the moment and these are the first that have appeared in Morocco. Some actually were on my boat.

Artillery was only of limited value, but it had been used most successfully on one or two occasions when definitely located enemy posts could be heavily shelled. This shelling had a very high moral effect. General Agostini told me that he had no intention of permitting the use of artillery for reprisals or indiscriminate shelling.

12. As regards co-operation between the Army and the Air, some interesting points appeared. Only two helicopters were available to General Agostini and none to General Le Coq. General Agostini told me that he felt it only right to reserve his helicopters for the evacuation of casualties. Te regretted having to make this decision because the helicopters would have been extremely valuable for reconnaissance purposes. This decision was not entirely based on humanitarian grounds but also on the fact that it allowed him to do away with practically every intermediate medical unit, with casualties being evacuated virtually from where they were hit back to the base hospitals at Fez and Meknes. As he was short of medical units, and also couldn't spare the troops to protect unarmed medical units spread all over the ground, the helicopters were invaluable. This seems a useful lesson of the campaign.

Where helicopters were not available for operations, light aircraft of the Piper Cub type were being used and they were very useful for reconnaissance, but not as good as helicopters and virtually useless for carrying troops. Jet aircraft were not of much value. On occasions where there was a definite target they could be got in by smoke or led in by other aircraft. The Air Attaché is visiting North Africa next week and, on his return, he and I intend to try to produce a paper on the air co-operation in these operations. In other parts of North Africa, quite a number of helicopters are in use and many more are on order. There will certainly be interesting lessons to be learnt.

13. All commanders with whom I spoke seemed to agree that the troops available in Morocco are not adequate for the job. It is rare to find a commander, resonsible for internal security, who thinks he has enough troops, because there are always so many calls upon them. In my opinion, everywhere but in Fez and the area to its east, the troops are adequate at the moment. But they will not be if the situation worsens and spreads beyond the Riff in the future.

Fez is a key area and here infiltration across the road to its east is taking place so it is gradually being surrounded and, in the areas north of Oujda and Taza, considerable battles, not always finishing in favour of the French, take place at intervals. More troops in the Riff might prevent the infiltration south and would definitely be of general value because the French are not able to profit by good enemy intelligence. If information was available, less troops would be required, but

for the moment information is very hard to come by and it is not getting any easier. The French appreciate the turning point can only be reached when information starts to come in and they admit they do not see that turning point in the near future.

14. There is an air of uneasy calm in the towns in Morocco at the present moment and the terrorists are clearly holding their hands while the negotiations are in progress. If these negotiations are satisfactory to these extremists—and this is not necessarily the same as being satisfactory to the Sultan and his party—terrorism may stop permanently. If the negotiations are not satisfactory, or if the terrorists decide to apply a little pressure, terrorism will break out again. The French would probably be able to prevent the situation really getting out of hand but it will be a thoroughly unpleasant period and many lives will be lost.

It is difficult, on the other hand, to escape the conclusion that the French are slowly being defeated in the war in the Riff and there is a very real danger of the districts of Fez and east of it falling into anarchy. The French are being defeated, not because they are badly trained, or because they are incorrectly equipped, but because they have no objective. In a war of this type, where every inhabitant is a potential enemy, there are only two ways of winning a war. The first is to kill so many of the inhabitants that the rest do not consider it worth while to fight, and the other way is to change the inhabitants' desire to fight by political means. The French Army are not obviously yet prepared to do the first of these alternatives and the second is a matter for politicians and not soldiers.

B.—Civil and Political Situation

1. Any report on Morocco is very likely to be out of date by the time it is made, as the situation is changing so fast. At the time of writing, the terms of the agreement between the Sultan and French have yet to be worked out though independence and interdependence are an announced and accepted policy. It is therefore not clear yet exactly how much independence has been granted to the Sultan nor whether what has been granted will be acceptable to the extremists behind him. There are, however, a number of points which arise from what is taking place that seem to be worth considering. Possibly the most curious fact is the air of unreality which must strike any visitor to Morocco almost immediately he arrives. One gets the impression that everybody is living in a dream of what they hope or want to happen. No one is realistic enough to see that all these things cannot happen.

2. There seem to be five main schools of thought in Morocco and each is quite certain that the future situation will be in accordance with their imagination. As a result of the many interviews I had with various people I have tried to record what this imagination is, at the same time giving my personal views as to its reality. By doing so, one seems to cover the main points now at issue before independence can come to Morocco.

The Sultan and his Supporters

3. The Sultan is supported directly by the more elderly and conservative of the educated Muslims and there is no doubt that these have taken the warmth of his reception and the size of the crowds on his return to Morocco as proof that he is the now wished-for leader of the Cherifian Empire. The Sultan's extortions before his departure are conveniently forgotten, as is also the fact that many of his present most respectable supporters were delighted when he was forced to abdicate by the French in 1953, even if, at the time, they did not themselves specifically ask the French to remove him.

The equal extortions of the heir to the Throne are also forgotten. This young man is now a hero to them and it is astonishing to remember that, in 1953, he was considered in Morocco to be everything the reverse of what he is considered to be now by his supporters.

The majority of the new Moroccan Ministers, local Governors and Caids are drawn from the class referred to above, though there are also a number of junior Moroccan army officers also included. My impression is that the majority suffer from the delusion that they are now ruling the country by their own efficiency when, in fact, they are ruling it because they are still completely supported by the existing French administration.

Moroccan Ministers dash about the country in large cars—a French car is never big enough, it is always a Cadillac or car of that type—and carry out

inspections of various projects, ordering buildings to be erected, roads and bridges to be built or improved, posts to be created and so on, without any reference to such mundane factors that money is not available or that suitable individuals to do the work are non-existent in Morocco. In their offices in Rabat, these new administrators also have a lot to learn. This is understandable, but the French officials with whom I talked said that the Moroccans would not take any decision which might offend any interested party and merely filed such papers or ordered a French subordinate to "carry on". The French say they are harder worked than ever as a result and there is still far more dependence than independence. This may be a temporary phase but it is what is happening at the moment.

The Moroccan Governors are in a curiously ineffectual position at the moment as they have not the means to enforce any decision as long as the judiciary and the forces of law and order remain with the French. They are probably doing quite a lot of good work in a quiet way but only minor problems can be settled by them. This does not appear to stop them already being filled with confidence at their ability to take over completely from the French administration the moment they are permitted to do so. S.E. Si Ahmed Bargach, the Governor of Casablanca, told me that he already considered General Franchi, the Chef de Région, and a serving officer in the French Army, as his technical adviser and he left me in no doubt that he intended shortly to be in a position to issue orders to General Franchi; orders which the general would be expected to obey without question. The fact that General Franchi might be unwilling to commit French troops or police to actions in support of Moorish policy never struck the Governor. This point is extremely important as it is not impossible that the first clash the Moorish Government will have will be with the colons and one can hardly see General Franchi taking action against them with French troops.

However, Bargach was nothing like so advanced in his confidence as S.E. Ben Slimane, Governor of Fez. Ben Slimane has made it quite clear that he intends to dispense with the services of a Chef de Région as soon as he can. In this case the Chef de Région (General Agostini) now combines military and civil duties and is the officer responsible for fighting a minor war against the Berber tribes in the Riff. Ben Slimane told me that he considered the Berber tribes in the Riff would quieten down immediately independence was granted to Morocco, so it would be possible to eliminate most of the French garrison at Fez and in the Riff. There is no evidence of this and, according to the French, there is every evidence that the young tribal leaders have got the bit firmly between their teeth and will take a great deal more stopping than a word or so from the Sultan. Of course Ben Slimane is extremely astute and he does intend to retain French advisers. Whether he is retaining them merely to carry out unpleasant tasks is naturally not apparent, but, if it is the case, they will not last long with the present temper of the Moroccans, particularly those in Fez and the Riff.

I have given these two examples of unreality, but probably the most important is that of the position of the Sultan himself. It is impossible to avoid getting the feeling that His Majesty's position is a most hollow façade which may collapse at any moment. It is a fact, though temporarily forgotten, that three years ago his departure caused little concern to anyone but himself and a great deal of relief to many. It is difficult to see the slightest reason to imagine that he has spontaneously re-won the hearts of his people. What has happened is surely that his regal and religious position has been used for propaganda purposes by the extreme nationalists. That the French were unable to see that this would happen was the greatest mistake they made and a mistake that halved the difficulties of the Moroccan nationalists. Under cover of the Sultan's return, the nationalists are getting their independence and one wonders how long they will need the Sultan. Much of his behaviour leads one to imagine that he realises the insecurity of his position. While he blackmails the French with the implicit threat of continuing terrorism, he is being similarly blackmailed by the terrorists. I was told on very reliable authority that there was the clearest evidence that the Sultan was in constant touch with Allal El Fasi, even while negotiations were in progress in Paris. There is no reason to doubt that this is typical of his present insecurity and of his doubtful authority.

The Various Extreme Nationalist Organisations

4. There is no doubt that there is a strong religious background to the real extremists. Men like Allal El Fasi appear to feel that there is much of the Jihad in their efforts to get rid of the French from Morocco, and, in this, they are unlike

their wealthy partners in the Istiqlal. These latter, with the example of the support given to Ghandi by the rich merchants of Calcutta and Bombay, probably base their actions on the benefits they expect from the future restriction of French commercial competition which will follow independence. There is every indication that these merchants are waiting to return to the good old pre-1912 days when they will be able to swindle their fellow Moroccans without French interference. They seem among the few realists at present in Morocco.

On the other hand, fanatical though they are, the real terrorist leaders include a number of educated and intelligent men whose sincerity it is difficult to question. Men like Allal El Fasi, who have shown such ability in organising terrorism cannot fail to realise that the stopping of French capital, with loss of French enterprise and technical skill will put back the development of Morocco for many years. One can only assume that they are prepared for this, though it is likely they underestimate the ultimate harm they will cause to Morocco. Perhaps some of this unconcern at self-mutilation can be ascribed to the mysticism of the Muslim who almost welcomes misery in a religious cause. And there is going to be misery. Unemployment is everywhere on the increase and will soon reach alarming figures. The economy of Morocco has always been largely artificial with the pump continually being primed by the French.

It is possible that the nationalist leaders imagine that they are going to get financial and technical assistance from other sources and there are already rumours of doctors from Egypt, technicians from Syria and financial assistance from the United States. It is unlikely that the Arab countries will be able to spare many qualified individuals to aid Morocco. If the qualified individuals do come, one cannot help feeling that it will be for what they can get out of it and not for altruistic reasons. United States business men have already started to try and do business direct with the Moroccan authorities and this is causing intense resentment among the French. The pros and cons of a Russian versus United States aid for an independent Morocco are outside the scope of this report, but it is difficult to see how any realistic Moroccan extremist can feel that he is leading his country to anything but economic disaster unless outside assistance is obtained for Moroccan economy when French financial assistance starts to decline.

As far as the ordinary supporter of the terrorists is concerned, and that now is virtually the man in the street in Morocco, the air of unreality has also started to creep in and it will require stern measures by any new Government, if chaos is not to be the result. For the not very intelligent Moroccan, *i.e.*, the vast majority, independence of the French conjures up prospects of a reversion to the happy state of being able to do whatever one likes. It is possible that a number of murders and beatings-up may already be due to this cause, and it is a fact that few, if any Moroccans have paid their taxes this year, nor do they intend to do so. The case is frequently quoted of the Moroccan who said, "As soon as we have independence, I shall ride my bicycle on the left side of the road". One can only hope that his obvious fate and Morocco's will not be the same.

The French Protectorate Authority

5. Owing to the constant changes of French Government and their repercussions on the Resident-General and his staff, many of the officials in the Protectorate Government are newcomers or comparative newcomers to Morocco. This is particularly noticeable among the senior ranks and is unfortunate because these are the individuals responsible largely for advising the French Government on the independence negotiations with the Sultan and his supporters. These negotiations, on which the whole future of Morocco depends are being conducted by a Sultan whose position is based on the most insecure foundations and Frenchmen who give the impression, at least outwardly, that they believe these foundations to be absolutely firm. It is difficult for the onlooker to forget that there has already been a statement by Abd El Krim in Cairo saying that he has no intention of abiding by the result of the decisions, that El Fasi and his supporters sit on the fence, while the Berber tribes continue to make trouble in the Riff. If a peaceful period is to come in Morocco, it must be because the Sultan has maintained control and it seems impossible to believe he can do this unless he can satisfy his most violent supporters that the reign of the French is over for ever. If that is the case, one wonders exactly what interdependence really means.

M. Eriau, the Secretary-General at Rabat, a most intelligent permanent member of the French Administrative Service, seemed quite happy, or at least resigned, to

the prospect of an almost complete disappearance of the French administration. He mentioned, with some amusement, the idea of the Moroccans suddenly finding they were responsible for local security particularly in the Riff. He gave the impression that the whole French administration, including the Army, were on the way out. I found this, however, to be a most unusual viewpoint and it is a question which I specifically asked of a number of individuals. As the viewpoint of M. Eriau, who is virtually No. 3 in the Moroccan Government, it is astonishing, as it presupposes the complete extinction of some 300,000 French colonists. A much more general view was that independence in some ways would be comparatively theoretical and the Army certainly did not imagine that their position is likely to be much affected.

Even Ben Slimane told me that he considered the " petit fonctionnaire " would only waste out gradually over a period of years, while the majority of French officials did not seem worried at the future. In this, possibly the most senior have least cause to worry as posts might be available for them in France and elsewhere. The future of the lower grade official, who is probably from a colon family, is indeed doubtful. With our experiences, of India, Burma, the Sudan, &c., we British may be more realistic and it is curious, too, that no one in Morocco remembers what has happened to Dutchmen in similar positions in Indonesia.

It was indeed sadly typical of the views of the majority and of the complete unreality of the situation, to find M. Dubois, Resident-General, is now using his position to move members of his family into nice positions in Rabat. I appreciate that this is a typical French story, but I have no doubt of its truth. One wonders how long M. Dubois' relatives will benefit from this nepotism. If the Sultan does not maintain control over his terrorist supporters, the departure of the French Government officials will be a civilian Dunkerque.

The French Army

6. The senior officers with whom I spoke blame Moscow for the majority of the troubles which face Morocco. Egypt, supported by the Soviet, is the actual villain with United States public opinion not far behind. The time may come when France will acknowledge a military defeat to be caused by her own actions or lack of them, but it has not yet come in Morocco. The truth is that the French forces in Morocco are in process of being defeated by a nationalist rising. This is primarily due to the fact that the Army has been given no clear instructions how it is to fight the war. It is therefore fighting it half-heartedly and is slowly losing. It is not losing because it lacks numbers, arms or courage, but because it has no military or political objectives. It does not even realise its own defeat, so the French Army has no thought or intention at present of leaving Morocco. This was the view expressed by General Bourgund, and a number of other senior officers, and one cannot help hoping, from the point of view of NATO strategy, that strong French forces will remain. It is difficult, however, to see how this possibly can be so, except for a short while, but there is no apparent change in the French military plans and the building programme continues. Work on the improvement of barracks and building of married quarters for French officers and men continues unabated on long-term programmes.

All the Moroccans I spoke to make it quite clear that a Moroccan Army for the Sultan is essential for internal security duties and for prestige, and it is now reported that there is to be an army of about 10,000 strong. French officers, from the most senior downwards, welcome this step but they do not seem to appreciate that it will alter their own position. The Sultan's Army is not going to be content to take second place to the French and it is most certainly not going to be under its command. General Si Kettani is already being spoken of by the Muslims as the first Commander-in-Chief. It is hardly conceivable that there are going to be two Commanders-in-Chief, two Staffs and a similar duplication in all parts of Morocco. What is likely is that there will be a first class muddle to start with, resulting in the inevitable squeezing out of the French. Fortunately for the French Army, the revenues of Morocco are totally incapable of paying for an Army even of the size now envisaged. This is the line which some of the officers with whom I spoke intend to take and they hope to be able to return with interest some of the Sultan's recent blackmailing efforts. It is clear that the Sultan will not be able to maintain order against the tribes and possibly some of his present supporters, without considerable assistance from the French Army for a number of years. But the assistance required will decrease rapidly and, whatever happens, there will be an inevitable decline in size and importance. If the French colon will stand it and the

French taxpayer pay, one can foresee that the short-term role of the French Army in Morocco may be that of controlling the Berber tribesmen while the Moroccans sit in the more comfortable garrisons. Any long-term role for a French Army in Morocco is difficult to foresee, whatever is written into the independence treaty.

The French Colons in Morocco

7. The colons are probably the only people in Morocco who are really viewing the future with dismay. But one wonders if even the colons realise how serious is their position, because, if they do, it seems incredible they are doing nothing about it. With Moroccan Governors and Caids, the Frenchmen are already finding that they cannot get justice and this will get worse. French courts or mixed ones are not the answer to this problem, unless there is an administrative machine to carry out the decisions of these courts. Whatever is written into any treaty, it is not realistic to imagine that any Moroccan official, in the foreseeable future, would execute a judgment given in favour of a Frenchman against a Moroccan. Even if such an action were not completely against his natural inclination, his fear of reprisals would prevent it. In any case, treaties can be denounced and it is fair to say that the Frenchman is not going to get justice in Morocco under independence any more than foreigners get it elsewhere in Arab or Eastern countries. Egypt is a typical example of this. Big foreign firms have means of dealing with this sort of situation and the big French firms may survive, but the days of the colon seem inevitably numbered. The lucky ones are the petty officials who may be able to find jobs in France or other French colonies. But the small business man will only be able to sell out at a great loss and it is doubtful if the small landowner will be able to sell at all.

It is difficult to know exactly what the colons of Morocco can do about their position. The alternatives appear to be the use of force, or faith in the promises of those who make the treaty. It is perhaps cynical to say that the former superficially appears the better of two bad choices. The use of force by a number of colons might produce a form of counter-terrorism which would have alarming results, particularly as one cannot see the French soldier taking real steps to prevent it. The few early efforts of the Presence Francaise caused a remarkable reaction at the time. One hopes the memory of this will not tempt hotheads to further action, but it is a possibility.

For the reasons given above, treaty positions in Morocco can only be temporary ones, but there is the possibility that they could be held long enough for the colon to sell his property at not too big a loss and return to France. This probably is the most realistic solution to a very difficult problem and one which gives some future for a class who are watching their approaching extinction with an equanimity which is most astonishing.

8. Any report on Morocco would be incomplete without consideration of the Spanish and International Zones.

The Moroccans consider that the Spanish Zone is an integral part of the Cherifian Empire and talk as if it will not be long before this also becomes an independent part of the Sultan's territory. One rather wonders whether this is going to be so quickly or easily achieved as they think. It is largely the vulnerability of the French colon that has made the French so influenced by terrorism but there are comparatively few Spanish settlers in Spanish Morocco so the Spaniards will not be so susceptible to terrorist pressure. In any case Spanish settlers are far less politically vocal than French ones. From the events of last week, it looks as though there is every likelihood of the Spanish authorities using repression to start with as an anti-terrorist measure. If the Spaniards do this without any concern at world opinion, there may be a lot of trouble before Spanish Morocco can be included in the Cherifian Empire. In any case, whatever line the Spaniards take, one cannot help feeling that it is likely to be a trouble spot for some time to come. It was Spain that helped the original advance of Islam; perhaps history will repeat itself.

The international zone of Tangiers is a detached part of the old Cherifian Empire, but with the curious factor that 50 per cent. of the inhabitants are now non-Moorish. As these non-Moorish 50 per cent. are the holders of all the wealth and would be inevitably ruined by the absorption of Tangiers in the Cherifian Empire, there is a good deal to be said for its keeping its Free Port position whatever its political future may be. The only certain result of including Tangiers within the customs, &c., area of Morocco would be its complete economic ruin.

Conclusions

9. At the present moment, speculation as to the future course of events in Morocco is not easy. So much must depend on the result of the future negotiations between the Moroccans and the French and whether the result of these negotiations are such as can be politically acceptable to the Frenchmen on the one side and satisfy the nationalism of the extremists on the other.

The earlier possibility that the French would repress nationalism and keep the situation more or less as it has been in the past has now receded so far as to be impossible. If for no other reason, with her other commitments in North Africa, France has not got the military resources. However, many reactionary Frenchmen and all the colons would like this to happen still as France gains a great deal economically from the present relationship.

There is no doubt that the real French hope is that the negotiations will result in the Sultan ruling with almost the same French methods as in the past, assisted by a larger staff of French advisers. This would probably be of considerably more benefit to the Moorish inhabitants than is the present system. One of the most frequent remarks that the French now make about Morocco is the amount of money, &c., that has been poured into Morocco for the benefit of Morocco. It is probably much truer to say that the money has been poured in primarily for the benefit of France and the French Empire generally. The French in Morocco have particularly benefited and Morocco has been a first class market for the French industrialists, but the extent to which Moroccans have benefited, except indirectly, is obviously limited.

This solution, which seems to be the French idea of interdependence, is not likely to be really acceptable to the Moroccans. The men in the street will now want to see that he and his family get the jobs which have been held in the past by junior Frenchmen and the good land which they have cultivated. It is obvious too, that the nationalists do not accept the need for any degree of French control, even if only given in the form of advice. However, this solution is quite likely to be a superficial result of the negotiations and in this state will pass through the French Parliament, but it can only be an initial phase and it would be unrealistic to think that it is a phase that can last.

From the start, there will be constant pressure to get rid of the French and they will be squeezed out. How long this will take will depend on a number of imponderables. But all experience in other parts of the world shows that it is a rapidly speeding-up process. One can foresee the complete elimination of French influence as quickly as it happened to the Dutch in Indonesia and as it happened to the French themselves in Indo-China. French money and big business may remain, but in competition with other money and business interests from other parts of the world.

Whether the Sultan will be able to hold his present secular and religious position in these circumstances is purely a matter of speculation at this stage. He has the advantage of his religious position and will probably continue to hold that, but he will have to play his cards extremely well if he is not going to lose his secular authority. If he is not very skilful he is going to fall into the same difficulties as did Bao Dai and has now King Hussein of Jordan.

It is not likely that the future of Morocco probably lies in some sort of a dictatorship by a nationalist leader who looks towards the Arab League for his support and not towards France. If this is the case the position of Algeria will be even more unreal than it is now. In addition as a NATO base Morocco will be useless.

APPENDIX A

PRESENT FRENCH CIVIL AND MILITARY ORGANISATION IN MOROCCO


Civil link in hierarchy.
Military link in hierarchy.
Resident-General (M. Dubois)
C.-in-C. Morocco (General Bourgund)
22 D.I. (General Renaudeau D'Arc) (a)
Comd. Casablanca Area (General Granger)
Chef de Region Casablanca (General Franchi)
Chef de Casablanca Base (Colonel Cadieu)
Chef Civil Region Rabat
Chef de S/Div. Rabat (General Lambilly)
4. D.I.M. (General Pedron) (b)
Comd. Civil and Military Regions
Fez (General Agostini)
Meknes (General Le Coq)
Marrakesh (General Bazillon)
Agadir (General Brissaud-Desmaillet)
Chef Civil Region Taza
Chef de S/Div. Taza (Colonel Hubert)
Chef Civil Region Oujda
Chef de S/Div. Oujda (General Berne)

(a) Also 2 i/c to General Bourgund.
(b) General Pedron's control of the Chefs de S/Div. of Taza and Oujda probably applies only to operations. Pedron himself seems to work across the frontier in Algeria, too.

JM 1013/5 No. 21

QUARTERLY POLITICAL REPORT—JANUARY–MARCH 1956

Mr. Freese-Pennefather to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received April 30*)

(No. 41. Confidential) *Rabat,*
Sir, *April 13, 1956.*

With reference to my despatch No. 1 of the 3rd of January last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith my political report on the French Zone of Morocco for the quarter ending on the 31st of March.

2. I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors in Paris, Washington, Madrid and Cairo, to His Excellency the Governor and to the Staff Officer (Intelligence) Gibraltar, to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet, and the Board of Admiralty, to Her Majesty's Consuls-General in Tangier, Tetuan, Tunis and Algiers, to Her Majesty's Consuls in Casablanca and Fez, and to the Regional Information Office in Beirut.

I have, &c.

H. W. A. FREESE-PENNEFATHER.

Enclosure

REPORT ON THE FRENCH ZONE OF MOROCCO FOR THE QUARTER ENDED MARCH 31, 1956

Introductory

The last quarter of 1955 saw the abdication of a Sultan, the reinstatement of a former one, the formation of a purely Moroccan Government and the recognition in principle by France of Morocco's right to sovereign independence. These events gave an impetus to political developments during the quarter under review: the formal recognition by France of Morocco's claim to independence and the opening in Paris of negotiations between the two countries on an equal status, the transfer of much of the administration of the country to Moroccan hands and, at the end of the quarter, an invitation from Madrid to discuss the Spanish side of the question. The Sultan and his Government thus made great progress towards the achievement of their political aims, but, on the debit side, public security and the economy of the country do not present such a promising picture.

Political—Negotiations with France

2. The year opened with a Moroccan Government ready to negotiate with France but with no French Government in Paris. The joint Declaration of Celle-Saint-Cloud (paragraph 6 of my last Quarterly Report) had established the agreed basis of future Franco-Moroccan relations and the Sultan's speech from the Throne (paragraph 9 of the same Report) had given the keynote for their fulfilment. There could be no going back on these pronouncements and in the intervening period until the Sultan's departure for Paris in February there was time and opportunity for the Moroccans, from the Sultan downwards, to give their own interpretations of the demands which they regarded as falling within the French commitments, with no comment from the French side as to their acceptance or otherwise of such statements. The Sultan, moreover, was under increasing pressure from ultra-nationalist elements to give nothing whatever away and there was the ever present threat of a revival of terrorism to remind the negotiators on both sides of the minimum terms acceptable to the Moroccans. The French rightly appreciated that in this amorphous country the Sultan was the only power with a chance of holding it together and of implementing any decisions reached; they knew also that his own interest and that of his Government lay in a policy of co-operation and of maintaining ties with the West, which were essential for the strategic and other interests of France and of Europe. It was, therefore, wise for them to acquiesce in the demands of the Moroccans to become a fully

independent and sovereign State, with complete freedom as regards the conduct of their foreign relations and the maintenance of a national army, knowing that in exchange the latter would, of necessity, be very largely dependent on them for their continuing assistance with regard to both, as also for their further help in the administration of the country and in meeting its financial and economic needs. The Sultan had stated, moreover, that he could not appeal effectively for a cessation of hostilities in the Riff unless his political requirements were satisfied.

3. Two of the Ministers of State, Maître Cherkaoui and Maître Bouabid, left for Paris early in January to make arrangements for the negotiations and it was decided that these should be opened by the President of the French Republic and the Sultan on February 15. His Majesty was accompanied by his son, Prince Moulay Hassan, and the Moroccan negotiators were Si Kekkai (President of the Council), Si Zeghari (Vice-President) and the four Ministers of State, Maîtres Bouabid, MôHammedi, Cherkaoui and Guedira. The principal French negotiators were M. Pineau (Minister for Foreign Affairs), M. Savary and M. Basdevant (Quai d'Orsay), M. Dubois (Resident-General) and M. Jacques Lucius (Conseiller d'Etat). At the opening ceremony President Coty said that the negotiations were to provide for the grant of independence to Morocco and to define the links of interdependence between the two countries; the future of the French settlers in Morocco must be assured. The Sultan replied that the task of the negotiators was to translate the independence which had already been granted into practical terms by the abrogation of the Treaty of Fez and its replacement by a new instrument providing for close co-operation between equal sovereign States: he stressed the importance of the territorial unity of Morocco which France and the other signatories of the Act of Algeciras had guaranteed. The Sultan's moderate language received favourable comment and it was decided that the negotiations should be resumed in a week's time. Progress was not easy but it was essential to reach agreement before the date planned for the Sultan's return both to counter allegations from the Arab League that he was an instrument of the Western Powers and to demonstrate the complete independence of his status, without which he could not appeal to the rebels in the Riff. On March 2 a Joint Declaration and Protocol was signed by M. Pineau and Si Bekkai on behalf of their respective Governments. The main points of the Declaration were as follows:—

(i) The Treaty of Fez could no longer govern Franco-Moroccan relations.
(ii) The French Government solemnly declared their recognition of Moroccan independence and acknowledged the Sultan's right to conduct his own external relations and to establish a national army.
(iii) Negotiations should continue as between equal and sovereign States to define the interdependence between the two countries in spheres of common interest.
(iv) In the transition period the new relations should be founded on the provisions of the annexed Protocol.

The provisions of the Protocol were as follows:—

(i) The Sultan should exercise full legislative power, informing the French representative of proposed new legislation. The latter might make observations on any affecting the interests of France, French citizens and foreigners (but would have no power of veto).
(ii) The Sultan would have a national army, which France would help him to form. The present status of the French Army in Morocco would remain unchanged during the transition period.
(iii) The " reserved " powers (see paragraph 6 below) would be transferred under arrangements to be agreed. The Moroccan Government would be represented with right of vote on the Franc Zone Committee. Existing guarantees for French officials serving in Morocco would be maintained.
(iv) The French representative in Morocco would bear the title of High Commissioner.

In explanation of the above Her Majesty's Ambassador in Paris was informed that the two Governments had reached agreement that the French would continue to conduct external relations until new arrangements had been evolved, that the Moroccans would not change their existing monetary and financial arrangements

until the principles of co-operation had been defined and the Franco-Moroccan Committees would be set up to deal with the transfer of the " reserved " powers and with the formation of the Moroccan national army.

4. The Sultan's return to Rabat on March 5 was the occasion for a triumphal welcome and the population turned out in their thousands to greet him. Two days later he broadcast a speech about what had been achieved in Paris and on the responsibilities devolving on the Moroccan Government as a result of independence. He paid a tribute to the understanding shown by the French people, spoke of the need for Moroccan unification and for peace throughout his realm, thus appealing indirectly to the Army of Liberation to cease hostilities. On the Friday which followed he made a similar appeal for peace as " Imam of the Faithful ". Allal el Fassi said, in Madrid, that his appeal would be heard in the Riff, and from then onwards organised hostilities diminished rapidly in this troubled area.

5. *Moroccan Army.*—The formation of a Moroccan Army was an urgent matter not only for reasons of prestige but also on account of the many desertions which had been taking place in operations against the Riff rebels. A small Moroccan Committee was set up under the chairmanship of General Kettani to study this matter and at the end of March their decisions were announced as follows:—

(i) The new Moroccan armed forces would be called the " Forces Armées Royales " and the Sultan would be the Commander-in-Chief.
(ii) The Army would start with a strength of 20,000 men.
(iii) The Sultan had appointed Prince Moulay Hassan to be Chief of the General Staff.
(iv) The Sultan had entrusted Si Ahmed Reda Guedira (Minister of State) with the duties of Minister of National Defence.
(v) Si Mohammed Laghzaoui would become Director of Public Security.
(vi) Si Guedira and General Kettani would hold discussions with the competent French authorities relating to the future army.

6. *Administration.*—Negotiations began in Rabat at the beginning of the year for the handing over of administrative powers and by February 11 a Protocol was agreed between the Residency and the Moroccan Government providing for the transfer to the latter of responsibility for public affairs in all spheres other than those reserved under the Treaty of Fez; the latter included the administration of the civil service, public security, prisons, exchange control and civil aviation. This Protocol was later to be amended by Article III of the Protocol of March 2, and before the end of the quarter the administration of prisons passed to Moroccan hands and sub-committees in Paris began their discussions over the other items.

7. *Political Prisoners.*—A matter which formed the subject of separate representations, both here and in Paris, was the release of the remaining political prisoners, sentenced at one time or another by Military Courts. Almost all of them have now been freed.

Internal

8. The rebellion in the Riff mountains was a major preoccupation both of the French and of the Moroccan authorities during the period under review. Subsidiary to this was the growing uneasiness of the French population, especially in the country districts, owing to the spread of lawlessness and the inability of the authorities to cope with it. In the political field, the outstanding events were the fusion of the Istiqlal and National Reform Parties and the rallying of Allal el Fassi to the Sultan's cause. The death of the Glaoui marked the end of a notable era of Moroccan history.

9. *Public Order.*—The use of organised terrorism as a national weapon abated once it was apparent that the Paris negotiations were proceeding favourably. Terrorism degenerated into general lawlessness and the police and provincial governors have shown themselves quite unable to cope with the disquieting wave in town and country of robberies, murders, blackmail, kidnapping and lesser crimes. Over several of the more glaring incidents the Government have promised a full enquiry and punishment of the wrongdoers but that, as far as the public is concerned, seems to be as far as the matter has gone. The armed rebellion in the

Riff spread to the Middle Atlas region during the quarter. Military operations to quell it were quite unsuccessful and desertions from native troops were frequent. The Army of Liberation consented to a cease fire after the Sultan's return from Paris and after it had become apparent that independence negotiations with Spain were assured. Thirty of its leaders, who chose to remain anonymous, came to Rabat on March 30 to pay allegiance to the Sultan. They declared that the Army of Liberation would remain in being ready to obey the Sultan until the complete independence and unity of the country had been effectively achieved. In the meantime the lives and properties of European farmers in the Meknes region and eastwards from there have grown so insecure that there have been many appeals for adequate protection and much talk of emigration.

10. *Political Parties.*—January 11 was the 12th anniversary of the Moroccan Independence Manifesto and monster demonstrations were held in Casablanca first by the Istiqlal Party and then by the " Parti Démocrate de l'Indépendence " (P.D.I.) in celebration of it. Smaller gatherings were held elsewhere in the country. Despite their common interest, however, in the nationalist cause, the rivalry between the two parties remained acute and shortly afterwards an ugly clash between them occurred at Souk-el-Arba du Rharb in which the casualties were four dead and 30 wounded. The Sultan and Government sternly reprimanded the offenders and promised a full enquiry.

11. Si Mekki Maciri and 15 members of the Executive Committee of the " Parti de l'Unité et de l'Indépendence " (P.U.I.) from Tangier visited the Sultan in the middle of January and had some talks with Si Bekkai to whom they promised their support. This was followed by a move initiated by Maître Said Ramadan, Secretary-General of the Islamic Congress, on a visit to this country, to get the parties together, and delegates of the Istiqlal Party, the P.D.I., the P.U.I. and the National Reform Party (Spanish Zone) signed a declaration in the Sultan's presence, affirming the policy in his speech from the Throne (paragraph 9 of my last Quarterly Report) and providing for arrangements to settle differences between their various organisations.

12. It was not, however, until March that the most significant developments took place with the fusion of the National Reform Party with the Istiqlal Party and Allal el Fassi's proclamation of his full support of the Sultan. The fusion of the two political parties, which was announced in Tangier on March 16, was the natural outcome of their close association over many years and a necessary preliminary to the reunification of Morocco. Si Abdelkhalek Torres, who was given a seat on the Executive Committee of the Istiqlal Party, arrived in Rabat and visited the Sultan on March 28. During his short stay he made a brief statement to the Press affirming the loyalty of all Moroccans to the Throne and explaining the significance of the fusion of the two parties.

13. Allal el Fassi, who had already made revealing statements in Madrid, delivered a major oration in Tangier on March 18 in which he declared the principles of his party as being based on attachment to God, Country and King, and founded on the will of the Moroccan masses. He discussed the objectives yet to be achieved, paid a tribute to " friendly countries and in particular France and Spain ", reassured foreigners that their legitimate interests would be respected and ended by saying that the Army of Liberation would respond to the Sultan's appeal but would remain vigilant and ready to do their duty if it was required of them. On March 25 he arrived, unexpected and incognito, on a short visit to Rabat where he had over an hour's conversation with the Sultan, and also a long talk with the High Commissioner. In an interview with the Press he announced that he would go back to Cairo to " complete his mission abroad " and then return to his own country. He said that the fighting in the Riff would not start up again unless Morocco's independence was violated and spoke of her role in the affairs of Arab North Africa, where there had always been a close relationship between the three countries.

14. *Death of the Glaoui.*—His Excellency Si Hadj Thami Mezzouari el Glaoui, the last of the great feudal chiefs, who was born in 1869 and had been Pasha of Marrakesh for nearly half a century died in his palace on January 23. Enormous crowds attended his funeral at which the principal French and Moroccan representatives were the Resident-General and Caid Lahcen (Minister of the Interior). The Sultan was not represented but afterwards told his sons that, had their father not died, his acts would have proved the sincerity of his repentance.

When appointing provincial governors elsewhere in Morocco (see paragraph 13 of my last Quarterly Report), the Sultan made no appointments for Marrakesh and its district during the Glaoui's lifetime. Three officials were subsequently installed for the provinces of Marrakesh and Ouarzazate and for the city of Marrakesh, but none were members of the Glaoui's family. His sons, Caid Brahim and Si Saddek el Glaoui have, however, retained their important offices.

Foreign Relations

15. *Spain.*—As stated in paragraph 23 of my last Quarterly Report French relations with Spain showed signs of improvement towards the end of the year. The Spanish Government were, however, still maintaining that negotiations with Morocco should be conducted on a tripartite basis but the French, with good reason, were not prepared to agree to this nor were the Moroccans in favour. The Spaniards regarded independence and interdependence with France to be mutually contradictory ideas and felt that interdependence with France would be equivalent of extending the influence of France over the Spanish Zone. The French had no wish to make the Spanish position more difficult and had offered to keep them informed about the negotiations but despite the protestations about helping Morocco towards independence and unity, the Spaniards had no constructive policy.

16. On January 10 the French Resident-General and the Spanish High Commissioner met at a villa near Larache, known as the "Palafito", and their conversations took place in a cordial atmosphere. M. Dubois made two requests, firstly that the native affairs officers of the two zones should co-operate along their common frontier and, secondly, that there should be liaison between the military authorities in the Riff area. General Garcia Valiño accepted the first request provided that the contacts were gradual and discreet, and also the second request in principle, though he asked that action be deferred till the spring. He assured M. Dubois that he was taking active measures against arms smuggling and that he would not tolerate the regrouping in the Spanish Zone of rebels who had been chased over the border by French military forces. M. Dubois had only been authorised to discuss matters of local administration but General Garcia Valiño had been instructed to inform M. Dubois of the Spanish Government's future policy which included *inter alia* the dissolution of the present Maghzen, the formation of a local government responsible to the Khalifa, and the establishment of elected municipal councils. The proposal for a separate government being formed for the Spanish Zone, which was announced in a communiqué three days later, was highly displeasing to the Sultan and since the Resident-General was his Foreign Minister, the French felt obliged to send a carefully-worded note indicating that His Majesty interpreted this intention in the light of the opening paragraph which had referred to the Spanish Government's determination to defend Moroccan unity. General Garcia Valiño had told M. Dubois that Nationalist activities in his zone had shown a marked increase since the arrival of refugees from the French Zone and since the recent resignations of Si Abdelkhalek Torres (Minister of Social Affairs) and Si Abdullah Gannun (Minister of Justice) from the Maghzen. The Khalifa's brother and Si Abdullah Cannun came to report to the Sultan on local conditions and friction increased between the Spanish Administration and the National Reform Party.

17. On the publication of the Franco-Moroccan Declaration of March 2 the National Reform Party called for a general holiday and both the Khalifa and Si Abdelkhalek Torres sent telegrams of congratulation to the Sultan, which referred to the theme of unity. Demonstrations took place involving some casualties for which the Spanish authorities were blamed, and several of the Spanish Consulates in the French Zone were attacked. Two more Ministers resigned from the Maghzen in Tetuan and the time had clearly come when nothing less than a spectacular *volte-face* could redress the Spanish position in relation to the concessions already granted by the French. The Spanish Consul-General in Rabat thereupon received instructions to invite the Sultan to visit Madrid where it was hoped to publish a Joint Declaration analogous to that of March 2. The French put no obstacles in the way of His Majesty taking a free decision in the matter and it was unofficially announced that he would probably leave on April 4 and return before Ramadan, which would begin on April 12. Negotiations ensued between the Spanish Consul-General and the Moroccan Government (without the intervention of the French) to arrange the programme and to ensure that the

political objectives of the journey would be achieved to the satisfaction of both parties and His Majesty conveyed his acceptance of General Franco's invitation at a formal ceremony at the Imperial Palace on March 31.

18. *The United States.*—On January 25 the Resident-General and the Moroccan Government were informed of the United States Government's intention to take the necessary constitutional measures to abolish their capitulatory rights in Morocco, which were first accorded in their Treaty of Peace and Friendship concluded with Morocco in 1787 and renewed in 1836. The State Department said that it would take some time to implement this declaration since the renunciation would involve both Congressional and Presidential action.

19. The question of the American air bases (paragraph 25 of my last Quarterly Report) has lain dormant. In the Paris negotiations regarding independence the Moroccans agreed to the bases being left outside the discussions on "interdependence" and to treat them in connexion with the general defence plans of the West.

20. Mr. Douglas Dillon, who had made a forceful speech in Paris affirming his Government's support of the French Government in respect of North Africa, visited Morocco with his wife in the last week of March: his speech had given much satisfaction to the French community but to the Moroccans less so. He had an audience with the Sultan, at which the latter took the occasion to express some sentiments with regard to Algeria. It was intended that the audience should be private but, owing to his Paris speech, the Press were admitted and the conversation which passed was given wide publicity. After his stay in Rabat the Ambassador went to Marrakesh for a short holiday. Shortly afterwards Mr. and Mrs. Winthrop Aldrich (United States Ambassador in London) came to Morocco on a private visit.

Economic

21. The financial year starts on January 1 and it is customary to publish the budget a few days before. Such a procedure was hardly possible in the fluid circumstances obtaining at the end of last year and resort was made to opening credits for the first quarter on the basis of the previous year's budget. Just before the end of the quarter the Minister of Finance announced similar measures for the months of April and May explaining that this expedient did not imply that a budget would not be published later in the year but that this could not be done until the take-over by the Moroccan Government had been completed.

22. An increase in minimum wage rates of 10 francs an hour for industrial and commercial workers, and from 230 to 300 francs a day for farm labourers was decreed to take effect on February 1. (See paragraph 25.)

23. An increase from one and two per cent. to three and five per cent. in the *taxe sur les transactions* is to come into effect on April 1 and this will certainly have a sharp effect on retail prices. This may well nullify any benefit derived from the increase in minimum wages. The proceeds of this tax have in the past gone to municipalities, not to the central Treasury, and will presumably continue to do so.

24. The national deficit expected at the end of the year is now referred to in terms of twenty milliards of francs, or more. Quite apart from the financing of the still unpublished schemes for the betterment of the worker, independence also entails the expense of some two dozen odd Ministers with their satellite secretaries and, now, an infant army of 20,000 men. It is difficult to see what revenue will pay for all these additional items. One unofficial estimate of the fall in the country's productivity during the last few months, owing to the political ferment, is 30 per cent. Moroccan Government financial experts, such as they are, appear to be placing their faith in protective import tariffs as a cure-all for any economic ills, and a demand for the revision of the restrictive treaties is to be expected.

25. *Labour.*—Early in the year the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, Si Abdelhadi Boutaleb, outlined his programme: the creation of a friendly climate between employer and worker, an increase in the minimum wage, safeguarding the worker's security of employment, the establishment of social services and medical facilities better adapted to his needs, and an improvement in apprenticeship conditions and in the service supplied by labour exchanges. The preparation of a Labour Code is being actively studied. It will consolidate what labour legislation is already in existence and augment it. There were no large-scale labour troubles during the quarter, though a demand for better wages and conditions by employees

at the American air bases grew steadily stronger. The " Union Marocaine du Travail " trade union organisation celebrated its first anniversary on March 20 soberly but enthusiastically, announcing that enrolled membership of the U.M.T. now reached 600,000 (120,000 in Casablanca) spread over 125 different unions. A few days later mine-workers (21 unions and 22,200 members) formed themselves into a nation-wide federation, the Fédération Nationale des Travailleurs du Sous-Sol.

Press and Radio

26. Two more newspapers of the Istiqlal Party, suppressed in 1952, reappeared during the quarter: *Maghreb* in Arabic (afternoon, daily) and *Al Istiklal* in French (weekly). In addition two more newspapers appeared for the first time: *Mitraka* (P.D.I., weekly) and *Al Maghrebi* (Istiqlal, weekly); the latter is published alternatively in Arabic and French (under the title *Le Jeune Maghrebien*), but its French edition is more or less a translation of the previous week's Arabic issue with very little, if any, fresh material in it.

27. Radio Maroc came under strong criticism by the P.D.I. for party discrimination. This organisation continues to be under French control but a delegate was appointed to it by the Public Relations Department of the Moroccan Government in order to convey the views and wishes of the Moroccan Government to the French Directors. The delegate being an Istiqlal Party man, is now being accused of party bias and of suppressing any news which is not favourable to his party.

Visitors

28. (i) Mr. Joseph D. Charles, Foreign Minister of Hayti, visited Morocco on his way back from Liberia. He arrived on January 13, accompanied by Mr. Jean Coradin, Haytian Ambassador in Monrovia, and both were received by the Resident-General and by the Sultan.

(ii) The Comte de Paris visited Rabat from January 30 to February 1. He stayed with the Resident-General and was received by the Sultan.

(iii) On January 22, Said Ramadan, an Egyptian, Secretary-General of the Islamic Congress and member of the Moslem Brotherhood Assembly, arrived in Morocco and stayed until February 13 when he left for the Sudan. He was received by the Sultan and met Istiqlal and P.D.I. leaders. During Friday's prayers on January 27, he preached the sermon in the Sultan's presence. His other activities are mentioned in paragraph 11.

(iv) M. Henri Laforest, Secretary of State for the Air Force, arrived in Rabat on February 20 and left again the next day.

(v) M. Max Lejeune, Secretary of State for War, arrived in Rabat on February 22 on a few days' visit to Morocco. He toured the north-eastern region and inspected army units in the fighting area.

(vi) Her Majesty's Military Attaché in Paris, Brigadier Jackson, visited Morocco between February 23 and March 2.

(vii) General Blanc, Inspector General of the French Army, and M. Charles Bauchard, Director of M. Pineau's Cabinet, arrived on March 1. They toured Morocco together until March 4, when M. Bauchard left for Algeria and General Blanc continued his tour alone until March 9. They told Press correspondents that their respective Ministers had sent them to Morocco to investigate the situation on the spot and sound French opinion here.

(viii) General Bailly, Chief of Staff of the French Air Force, visited Morocco towards the end of March. During his stay he decorated Major-General Glantzberg, Officer Commanding the United States Seventeenth Air Force stationed in Morocco, with the order of " Commandeur de la Legion d'Honneur ".

Appointments

29. The following appointments were made during the quarter:—

(i) M. François Charles-Roux took up his duties as " Conseiller Diplomatique " at the end of January. He succeeded M. Fouchet as Head of the Cabinet Diplomatique but with a higher rank, approximating to that which was previously held by M. Marchat for many years until the end of General Juin's appointment.

(ii) M. Vermeil, whose appointment as Chef de Region, Rabat, had been approved months ago, arrived from Tangier in the middle of February and took up his duties.

(iii) M. Georges Riou, who was Assistant Director of the Resident-General's " cabinet ", was appointed Director of the " Service de l'Information " in succession to Commandant Frois who resigned for reasons of health in February.

(iv) M. Adrien Massonaud was appointed " Chef de la Région " at Oujda in succession to M. Coricon in February.

(v) General Bourgund, Commander in Chief in Morocco, was promoted to the rank of Général de Corps d'Armée in January.

JM 1541/1 No. 22

MINERAL RESOURCES AND MINING IN MOROCCO

Mr. Freese-Pennefather to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received June 25*)

(No. 59 E. Confidential) *Rabat,*
Sir, *June 18, 1956.*

I have the honour to state that visiting economists and politicians have from time to time stressed the importance of Moroccan mineral resources as offering a field for economic development on a considerably larger scale than has been undertaken until now. Qualified observers have also suggested that the further exploitation of local petroleum and mineral deposits would, on a long term, provide a more stable basis for Moroccan economy than the creation of local industries which would be dependent on a tariff wall for their survival. This asset would of course be subsidiary to agriculture which must continue to be Morocco's most important source of prosperity for its rapidly growing population.

2. I therefore asked Mr. Lumsden, Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Casablanca, to prepare a memorandum on this subject, copies of which are enclosed, and I have discussed it with M. Eyssautier who was the Head of the Mines Section of the Department of Industrial Production and Mines before he assumed his present duties as Secretary-General of the new Moroccan Ministry. The report relates only to the Southern Zone of Morocco.

3. M. Eyssautier explained to me that at the time of the Korean war, when the price of raw materials rose in world markets, Morocco's mining industry enjoyed a temporary boom. Since the end of this war, however, a few of the smaller manganese mines near Ouarzazate had to close down and some prospection schemes were abandoned. The two main difficulties facing the industry were the general hardening of world markets and the high transportation costs, since many of the mineral deposits lay in isolated areas south of the Atlas mountains, where roads were unsuitable for heavy traffic and railways non-existent (except for the line from Colomb-Béchar to Nemurrs).

4. To assist the mining industry the Protectorate authorities had provided, under the Four-Year Plan for 1954–57 credits amounting to about 400 million francs per annum to assist the " Bureau de Recherches et Participation Minières " (B.R.P.M.), a State organisation, to promote and participate in mining prospection and development: but by far the largest investors were private companies, such as the Franco-Belgium Compagnie Asturienne des Mines (who were exploiting a lead mine near Azrou entirely on their own).

5. He said that after phosphates, of which Morocco was the world's second largest producing country (next to the United States), the principal mineral products were cobalt, manganese, lead and zinc in which Morocco ranked third, fifth, seventh and fourteenth respectively among the producing countries: her output of iron ore was small and coal and oil were not yet produced in sufficient quantities to be of more than local importance. The present position regarding her more important minerals was as follows:—

(i) Cobalt. The record output was reached in 1952 with over 9,000 tons of ore at 12 per cent. but by last year the figure had dropped to 7,000 tons. Sold in France and Belgium the ore was priced 30 per cent. higher than on the world market but by technical improvements it was expected that the price could be reduced and the output increased by a third by 1958.

(ii) Manganese. Owing to transportation difficulties the total output was likely to remain about 400–450,000 tons. If world prices fell some smaller mines might have to stop operating but the larger mines, at Imini and Bou Arfa, were expected to be able to make up for this by increased individual production.

(iii) Lead production reached 122,000 tons of concentrates in 1955 and zinc 78,000 tons. At present 86 per cent. of Morocco's lead came from the three main mines at Bou Beker (Zellidja) Touissit and Aouli-Mibladen but if new mines at Djebilett and in the Middle Atlas were brought into operation, the production of lead might be increased slightly.

(iv) Iron ore came mostly from the Ait Amar mine though there were numerous deposits elsewhere. Production was reduced last year at this mine owing to the atrocities perpetrated in August, but an increase is expected this year (up to 400,000). Most of its output is exported to the United Kingdom.

(v) Copper. A private company, with B.R.P.M. participation, would concentrate their prospecting on deposits discovered at Bou Skour in the Djebel Saghro.

(vi) Antimony. Before the war some 20 deposits were worked by primitive and unmechanic methods. Plans have been prepared for building a mining plant capable of treating 1,000 tons of ore per annum but no further action has been taken on this.

6. M. Eyssautier said that so far the whole surface of Morocco had been prospected and that the richer deposits were all being mined already. It remained now to prospect for deposits underground and to develop deposits which were low in quality but large in quantity by new methods which could now make this a profitable undertaking.

7. As regards foreign enterprise he said that a Dutch company was already prospecting with B.R.P.M. participation, and that German companies were showing an interest in the country without, however, reaching any decisions yet as to their intentions. The Compagnie Minière de Menizla, a Canadian undertaking (Kirk-Hudson Ltd.), have started prospecting in the Souss Valley. American companies appear to be less interested in prospecting for minerals than in selling mining equipment but there was little scope for the latter owing to the amount of capital available for the purchase of equipment in Europe as soon as the possibilities of a mine appeared promising: the bigger companies, moreover, such as the Compagnie Asturienne, produced their own equipment.

8. I then asked M. Eyssautier about the Tindouf deposits, in Algeria, the exploitation of which was important for Morocco since its production would probably be shipped from a port to be constructed in Morocco on the north-east of the mouth of the Draa. He said that the iron ore deposits, which were all on the surface and went down to a depth of 10 metres, were estimated to amount to at least 400 million tons of 55–56 per cent. iron and another 600 million tons of 53 per cent. iron. To develop these resources, however, it would be necessary to construct a railway line of 500 km. to the above-mentioned port which would have to be of a capacity to ship at least 5 million tons per annum: unless this amount could be shipped annually, and markets found for it, there would be no possibility of amortising the initial outlay on the port and railway construction.

9. This report has been written on the assumption that the security situation in the country may remain stable enough for mining operations to continue on their present scale. It remains to be seen how far they may be interrupted by local disturbances or by the closing of mines owing to the difficulty of guarding them. On the economic side, moreover, the constant demands for higher wages and the reluctance to do a proper day's work may make certain undertakings unprofitable. It is to be hoped, however, that in the course of time confidence may be sufficiently restored for the country's mineral resources to be developed as they should be.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Board of Trade, to the Export Credits Guarantee Department, to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and Madrid, to Her Majesty's Consuls-General at Tangier, Tetuan and Algiers, to Her Majesty's Consuls at Casablanca and Fez and to the Military Attaché at Paris (for J.I.B.).

I have, &c.

H. W. A. FREESE-PENNEFATHER.

Enclosure

MEMORANDUM ON MOROCCAN MINERAL PRODUCTION AND MINES, FEBRUARY 1956, BY ACTING CONSUL, CASABLANCA

General

1. Reference has often been made to the potentialities of Morocco's mineral resources as an important feature in her economy. With the exception, however, of phosphates, of which Morocco is the world's second largest producing country

(after the United States) her mineral resources are limited, although cobalt, manganese, lead and zinc, rank third, fifth, seventh and fourteenth respectively in output among world producers. Her production of iron is small and coal and petroleum are not yet produced in sufficient quantity to be of more than local importance.

Although mining is frequently spoken of as a preponderating interest in Morocco, the fact remains that its real vocation is agriculture, which provides a living for 80 per cent. of the population of 9 million, whilst the future of industry, employing only about 200,000 inhabitants, is uncertain and mining gives labour to only 30,000 workmen.

The value of minerals exported in 1955 was 40 milliard francs, which is more than one-third of the total export trade of the country (French Zone), a feature which it is considered worth while encouraging; and it is held that the more remote mineral deposits in Morocco would be made more accessible in export points if the French scheme to develop minerals in the Sahara were pushed forward. The French Bureau d'Organisation des Ensembles Industriels Africains (B.I.A.) is actively engaged in research work on this scheme. Four-fifths of the Sahara is considered to be devoid of any minerals, but a belt " a few hundred " kilometres wide stretching from Senegal through Mauretania, the Moroccan Southern Atlas, the Aurès in Algeria, Southern Tunisia and the Hoggar, is considered to be mineralised. The Shell Company is stated to have acquired rights over 240,000 sq. km. of the Sahara. Amongst other deposits prospected are the following:—

Iron: 1 milliard tons 50 per cent. pure at Gara Djebilet, 130 km. SE. of Tindouf and 100 million tons at Idjit in Mauretania.

Copper: at Akjoujt, in Mauretania, 20 million tons; and at Djebel Sarho, in Morocco.

Manganese: at Djebel Guettara in Morocco, 250 km. SE. of Colomb-Béchar, in Algeria.

The Conseil Economique de la Métropole sent a mission to study the transport needs of the Sahara mineral development scheme, especially that of manganese, in the Djebel Guettrra. A working committee was formed to consider extension to Adrar of the Méditerranée–Niger railway which at present runs as far as Abadla beyond Colomb-Béchar. This would cost 10 milliard francs, lengthen the line by 500 km. and would make Nemours on the Mediterranean coast the shipping point.

The mineral deposits in the Sahara involve difficulties to be overcome before the product can be exported. The chief obstacles are the geographical position and great distance, the aridity of the land, the sparsity and poverty of the population and the lack of water. Although the Kenadza coal mines have been working for years any appreciable extension would involve 20,000 metric tons of water per day from a long distance, at great cost. These conditions clearly suggest very heavy investment or else very slow development, unless the State were willing to finance the scheme for reasons other than ordinary investment.

Mining legislation in French Morocco is set out in a Sultan's Dahir of April 16, 1951.

Production and Export

2. *Phosphates,* a soundly established State-owned enterprise, leads the way with 5 million tons exported in 1955 for a value of some 20 milliard francs. A description of and brief notes on the different mining enterprises are given in the next chapter. There are about 10,000 labourers in the phosphate mines.

Iron deposits are found in many parts of Morocco. Distance and high cost of transport have put most enterprises out of work, and the only mine now worked is at Ait Amar, 180 km. from Casablanca by rail although even there production has fallen in 1954 and 1955. The content of iron is 45 per cent. but through lack of suitable coal no smelting is undertaken. The ore is shipped mainly to the United Kingdom and Germany. The quantity exported in 1955 was 300,000 tons or about half of the 1952 figure. The labour employed in iron mines is about 2,000 men.

Manganese is shipped mostly to France, but also to the United States. The tonnage per annum remains almost constant in the region of 400,000 tons. Labour employed is 4,000 men.

Lead deposits are estimated at 1½ million tons at least and

Zinc about 1 million tons. Of the present production of 125,000 tons of lead concentrates annually, some 40,000 tons is refined on the spot (at the Oued El Heimer foundry) and the rest is exported as ore. There are about 8,000 Moroccan workers employed in the different lead and zinc mines.

Cobalt.—Morocco was third in world production of cobalt in 1938 with 6,500 tons a year. Production by 1952 rose to 9,100 tons, but the yield dropped to 8,000 tons in 1955. Cobalt mines employ about 700 men.

Anthracite Coal.—The only mine of importance is at Djerrada, 50 km. south of Oujda. The coal deposit is estimated at 100 million tons. It is planned to step up production to a minimum of 600,000 tons annually. Morocco can absorb half the total output, the other half being exported to Algeria, France, Italy and Yugoslavia. There are some 5,000 workmen.

Petroleum boring has been carried out chiefly in the Gharb district; there is prospecting in other districts, viz., in the Middle Atlas, near Midelt, and in the south, near Agadir, but these prospects do not yield any volume. The annual output of about 100,000 tons is refined at Petitjean. Petroleum extraction amounted only to 117,000 tons after 20 years of prospecting and development in 1954 and to 102,000 tons in 1955.

Other Minerals

Gold-bearing quartz is now being mined at Tiouit, 180 km. from Marrakech. The gold content averaged 13 grammes per ton.

Asbestos is mined in the same property as the colbalt mines of Bou Azzer and there are unimportant amounts of copper, pyrite of copper, pyrite of iron and tin ore extracted from mines listed further down in this memorandum under their appropriate headings. The number of men employed is small.

On the other hand work has ceased or dwindled to negligible proportions in mines formerly extracting antinomy, graphite, mica and molybdenum.

The following table shows the comparative volume of extraction of the leading minerals and metals from 1951 to 1955 inclusive:—

	1955	*1954*	*1953*	*1952*	*1951*
Phosphates ...	5,320,000	5,020,000	4,156,000	3,960,000	4,717,000
Iron ore	310,000	335,000	517,000	650,000	532,000
Manganese ore ...	415,000	400,000	375,000	405,000	334,000
Lead	125,000	115,000	110,000	115,000	93,000
Zinc	77,000	63,000	64,000	52,000	36,000
Cobalt	8,000	7,356	7,200	9,100	4,400
Coal (anthracite) ...	465,000	486,000	565,000	440,000	381,000
Petroleum ...	103,000	118,000	102,000	98,000	75,000

Brief Notes on the Working of the Principal Deposits

3. *Phosphates.*—In 1916 the Protectorate Government, realising the extent of the phosphate deposits, decided to co-ordinate prospecting and development and called in engineers and geologists with previous experience in Tunisia. These development were actively pursued up to 1921 when, in view of the favourable results obtained, all workings of phosphate rock in Morocco were made a Government monopoly and centralised in the hands of the " Office Chérifien des Phosphates " (the O.C.P.). The O.C.P. is, in fact, the Moroccan golden egg, and the total phosphate reserves in Morocco have been estimated at 30 thousand million tons of high-grade rock, or 240 years' supply at present extraction rate. The most extensive deposits are those of the Ouled Abdoun plateau at Kouribga, and the deposits in the Gantour hills at Louis Gentil appears to be an extension to the south-west of the Ouled Abdoun beds, divided by the Oum-er-Rbia river. The larger of the two mines is at Khouribga, 125 km. south-east of Casablanca by rail, and the smaller is at Louis Gentil, 80 km. from Safi, also by rail. Both Casablanca and Safi ports are equipped with plant which can load ships at the rate of 1,000 tons per hour.

The United States have developed large reserves of high-grade phosphate which can compete with the Moroccan product.

New development on modern lines involved underground workings as well as the modernisation of the surface plant. So far modernisation has included:—

(1) Use of larger haulage units underground in the primary adits.

(2) The equipment of secondary and tertiary galleries with conveyor belts.

(3) The use of mechanical loaders.

(4) The working of part of the deposit by stripping methods.

(5) The handling of rock on surface by convenient units, especially in the sun-drying area.

Iron Ore.—The only mine capable of producing large quantities of iron ore is the Ait Amar (Oued Zem) mine, though there are numerous deposits elsewhere. Owing, however, to the restricted demand for low-grade ore, production is limited. The iron ore mined at Ait Amar is low in iron and high in silica and phosphorus—very similar, in fact, to the ores mined in Normandy—and is railed about 140 km. to the port of Casablanca for shipment. The mine belongs to the Société Marocaine de Mines et de Produits chimiques.

The other Moroccan iron mines are all small in size and of poorer quality than those of Algeria and Tunisia. They are mostly situated at some distance from the railway, and with long railway hauls to Casablanca or elsewhere are still marginal prospects. The better known of these are:—

Kettara, 25 km. north-west of Marrakech by road; 250 km. by rail to Casablanca, owned by Compagnie Minière et Métallurgique.

Khenifra, 110 km. south of Meknès by road, thence 250 km. by rail to Casablanca, owned by Société Anonyme Chérifienne d'Etudes Minières.

Metallurgic Manganese

The deposits of eastern Morocco at Bou Arfa, being close to railways, are being operated, and also two important deposits in south-western Morocco on the southern slopes of the High Atlas, Imini and Tiouine.

The Imini manganese mine is situated on the southern slopes of the High Atlas, 200 km. south-east of Marrakech by road, then 240 km. to Casablanca by rail. It is the property of the Société Anonyme Chérifienne d'Etudes Minières. This company is a Mokta-el-Hadid subsidiary.

The Tiouine manganese mine is near the Imini mine and is the property of the Compagnie Minière de Tifnout-Tiranimine—a subsidiary of Omnium Nord-Africain.

The Bou Arfa manganese mine is situated 300 km. south of Oujda on the Mediterranée–Niger railroad to the shipping port of Nemours. It is the property of the Société Anonyme des Mines de Bou Arfa.

In the Anti-Atlas the Compagnie Minière d'Agadir (Sliwinski) 198 Rue de l'Aviation Française, Casablanca, works a manganese deposit at Idikel.

Owing to the transportation difficulties the total output of manganese is likely to remain about 400–450,000 tons. If world prices fall some smaller mines may have to stop operating, but the larger mines (at Imini, Tiouine and Bou Arfa) are expected to be able to make up for this by increased individual production.

Lead—Zinc

The Zellidja and Touissit mines south of Oujda, and the Aouli and Mibladen mines, north-east of Midelt, are the only important producers of lead and zinc but smaller deposits of lead are worked beyond Ksar-es-Souk in the Tafilalet area and elsewhere as below.

The Zellidja (Bou Beker) mine, belonging to the Société des Mines de Zellidja, is situated 40 km. south-east of Oujda, very close to the Algerian frontier, and its lead and zinc is shipped from the port of Nemours. This mine formerly shipped all its lead in concentrates but now uses a lead smelter at Oued-el-Heimer, capacity, 30,000 tons of metal per annum.

The Touissit lead mine adjoins the Zellidja property, but is owned by the Compagnie Royale Asturienne des Mines.

The Aouli and Mibladen lead mines are situated at 30 km. and 20 km. respectively north-east of Midelt—200 km. to Meknès by road, then 250 km. to Casablanca by rail. They are the property of Mines d'Aouli (controlled by Penarroya).

The Goundafa lead and zinc mine is situated in the Atlas mountains, 100 km. south of Marrakech, then 240 km. to Casablanca by rail. It is the property of the Société Minière des Goundafa.

The Haut-Guir lead mine is in south-eastern Morocco near Bou Denib, 600 km. (450 by rail, 150 by road) to the port of Nemours where the lead is shipped. The mine is the property of the Société Minière du Haut Guir, a subsidiary of Penarroya, who also owns the lead mines de l'Adrar at Taouz, south of Ksar-es-Souk.

Another mine, owned by a subsidiary of Penarroya at Rehamna, in the plain between Safi and Marrakech, also produces lead and zinc.

Cobalt is extracted in the Bou Azzer mines situated 300 km. south-west of Marrakech by road over the High-Atlas, then 250 km. by rail to Casablanca. They belong to the Société Minière de Bou Azzer et du Graara, and their reserves are stated to be about 130,000 tons of ore.

Various antimony mines, little more than prospects, located about 80 km. south of Meknès were worked until last year irregularly on a small scale. The output in 1955 was less than 600 tons and will probably cease altogether.

A few other metals and minerals in addition to those mentioned above are worked in the mines listed below:—

Asbestos is found at the Bou Azzer mines, listed under cobalt above.

Pyrite of iron and *iron oxide* (ochre) are extracted at the Kettara mine, also described above, and at Rehamna, in the plain between Safi and Marrakech. The Mines de Rehamna belong to the Penarroya group.

Tin ore in insignificant quantity (last year 22 tons of ore) is worked at a mine near Oulmès, 150 km. by road south-east of Rabat and belonging to a Belgian named H. P. Manfroy, Rabat.

Barytine, used as a colour pigment, is mined near Safi (Djebel Irhoud) by the Compagnie Marocaine des Barytes, 26 Rue du Languedoc, Rabat, and produces 16,000 tons per year for export.

Copper ore and *pyrite of copper* are produced in small quantities at Azegour mine, 60 km. south of Marrakech, in the foothills of the High-Atlas. Société Le Molybdène is the owner of this mine.

4. For much of the information given above I am indebted to M. Thomas, the secretary of the Casablanca Chamber of Mining (Chambre Syndicale des Industries Minières, 1 Place Mirabeau, Casablanca). Political terrorism in various districts but especially at Khouriba and Ait Amar last August has created pessimism among mining and financial circles, which is likely to last for some time to come. Mining—like industrial enterprises—is therefore unlikely at present to attract outside capital and so progress will be impeded except in the case of well-established enterprises belonging to large financial groups like the phosphates of the Moroccan Government, or the lead of the Zellidja or Penarroya or Royal Asturienne companies. Even they are likely to find their working profits reduced by rising wages and unstable world prices and they all hesitate to put more money into their enterprises at this stage and I am informed that almost all re-equipment projects are suspended. The leading mines are, of course, well supplied with modern equipment. This dull outlook is reflected in the low Stock Exchange prices both here and in Paris for Moroccan mining shares. I understand that important Dutch and German financial groups were enquiring not very long ago into the possibility of opening mines in Morocco but before getting round to finding out who these firms were, I learned that they gave up the idea and that all potential investors have steered away from this area. United States firms are said to be more willing to sell supplies and machinery than to invest in the ventures themselves. United Kingdom firms, too, were able to supply equipment in recent years, and with the return of more settled conditions there should still be a share of this market for British manufacturers of mining equipment and accessories. Since the late war two or three British mining corporations of international reputation sent qualified surveyors to report on mineral deposits here which were available for development but they all found that these deposits were too small for them, or else were unprofitably inaccessible.

I learned from various reliable sources that the immediate future of Moroccan mining industry is not promising and I see no reason to disagree with those views.

JM 1016/64 No. 23

"THE GRANDVAL EXPERIMENT" IN RETROSPECT

Sir Gladwyn Jebb to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received June 27*)

(No. 189. Confidential) *Paris,*
Sir, *June 20, 1956.*

In his despatch No. 359 of the 2nd of September, 1955, Mr. Reilly gave an assessment of M. Gilbert Grandval's achievements as Resident General in the French zone of Morocco during the months of July and August 1955. M. Grandval has now given his own version of his story in a book published at the beginning of this month, of which I enclose a copy(1).

2. M. Grandval unfolds his tale with a vigorous brutality sparing none of the actors in this pitiful tragi-comedy. He exposes the shortsightedness, the devious subtlety, the unscrupulous intrigue which combined to wreck his bold inventions. It is reliably reported that General de Gaulle induced him to tone down the ferocity of some of his comments on individuals. If this is true, Saint-Simon himself must have been put to shame by the unamended version. The book has attracted rather less attention than might have been expected, though of course those who emerge the most severely battered from its pages have expressed their displeasure. But there has been a general disposition to describe the book as an interesting contribution to historical knowledge without any immediate relevance.

3. In so far as the situation in Morocco itself is concerned, this is perhaps true: the problems which preoccupied M. Grandval have now given way to others even less easily soluble. But M. Grandval's analysis shows up mercilessly the incapacity not only of the French political system but of the men who work it. If the French choose not to take these criticisms to themselves it shows, to my mind, that they are still not prepared to accept any but superficial criticisms and that any really fundamental judgment induces an ostrich attitude. I had already noted the same phenomenon in connexion with the even more penetrating analysis of Dr. Herbert Luthy.

4. M. Grandval's judgment on the failure of French policy in Morocco corresponds very closely with that which I have myself put forward from time to time and in particular with that contained in the despatch under reference. Indeed the book adds surprisingly little to our factual knowledge. On one vital point, however, M. Grandval provides confirmation of what we had previously only been able to guess at. The very first Moroccan contacts made by M. Grandval before even he had definitively accepted his mission were with supporters of the exiled Sultan ben Youssef. These contacts were facilitated by M. Edgar Faure himself. Before even he set foot in Morocco M. Grandval was a Youssefist in the sense that he believed that the restoration of the former Sultan was ultimately both inevitable and desirable. His instructions, however (and he confirms our view that these instructions had not been cleared with all the members of the Government) were to avoid the return of ben Youssef. He therefore elaborated an audacious plan which in his opinion—and in mine—would have at least deferred the restoration for many months. His analysis of the reasons for the failure of that plan corresponds exactly with that of this Embassy. But from the moment the plan began to miscarry, M. Grandval became convinced that since the restoration of ben Youssef was now inevitable, it was essential that the French Government should themselves take the initiative of replacing him on the Throne and not allow this result to be forced on them by events. Since at this stage the French Government had not even been brought to accept the necessity of bringing ben Youssef back to France nor even that of removing ben Arafa, there was obviously no chance whatever of getting them to accept this startling conclusion and it would be idle to criticise M. Grandval for failing to urge it on the Government.

5. These considerations cast some light on M. Grandval's attitude towards the Aix-les-Bains Conference. In the first place it emerges that the decision

(1) Not printed.

against his recommendation to hold this conference was not the prime motive in his resignation. A more important mistake in his view was the attempt to compel ben Arafa to form a representative government thereby showing up his impotence and creating that prolonged vacuum at the Throne which was fatal to the execution of M. Grandval's plan. His objection to the Aix-les-Bains Conference was partly that it derogated from his authority as Resident General. But there was another more potent objection: the conference was only too obviously designed not to produce an agreement between the French and the Moroccans, but to produce agreement between the members of the French Government. M. Grandval quite rightly regarded it as a disastrous mistake to display the divisions of the French Government so openly to their Moroccan partners. In M. Grandval's view the conference served only to convince the Moroccans that the French Government was so divided and irresolute that they were incapable of making their will prevail. Therefore the result of the conference could only be the restoration of ben Youssef against the will of the French Government.

6. There is one important question to which at the time of these events it was impossible to give an assured answer and which evidently puzzles M. Grandval himself: was M. Faure aiming from the outset at the restoration of ben Youssef? M. Grandval does not attempt a direct answer but by the end of the book the reader is left with the impression that in M. Grandval's view there was more than a possibility that this was in fact the President of the Council's underlying aim and that, whether or not this was so, M. Faure was prepared to sacrifice M. Grandval in order to further his unfathomable purpose.

7. M. Grandval's book is well worth reading for the light which it casts on the weakness of French Governments in grappling with any problem requiring bold decisions, on the failure of most French officials overseas to adapt their outlook to meet changed circumstances and on the readiness of all too many of these officials to exploit the hesitations of politicians in order to prevent the adaptation which they dreaded. He has some very hard things to say about many individuals, French politicians, certain high officials in Morocco and, in particular, the leaders of the French community in Morocco. These judgments should be valued in the light of M. Grandval's own character as it emerges with startling clarity from the pages of his book. More distinctively even than General de Gaulle himself, he is the liberal autocrat, the man who is determined to impose by brute force his own far-seeing solutions. There is no doubt that in the abstract M. Grandval was right: there is equally no doubt that his methods were not such as could be applied in a democracy and that he consistently failed to make proper allowance for the unpleasant necessities of democratic politics. But if the choice is between ungenerous solutions arrived at by proper democratic processes and generous solutions imposed by force, it is not so certain that M. Grandval was wrong in the perilous situation which confronted him and which still confronts France in her imperial problems.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Madrid, Algiers, Tunis, Tangier and Casablanca (without enclosure), and to Rabat (with enclosure).

I have, &c.

GLADWYN JEBB.

JM 1016/85 No. 24

THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN MOROCCO

Mr. Pyman to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received August 21*)

(No. 73. Confidential) *Rabat, August 14, 1956.*

Sir,

In the broadcast speech on the 3rd of August in which he informed his people that he had postponed his holiday abroad the Sultan explained his decision entirely in terms of the internal situation. In doing this the Sultan accurately reflected the main preoccupation of himself and his Government, which is the consolidation of the new Moroccan State.

2. This should not be taken to imply that the Sultan and his Government are indifferent to international affairs. On the contrary, the establishment of diplomatic relations with a number of countries following on the conclusion of the Diplomatic Convention with France, and the admission of Morocco to the United Nations Organisation have caused considerable satisfaction and have enabled the régime to demonstrate to public opinion that Morocco is genuinely independent. It remains true, however, that the main concern of the Moroccan Government is at present the internal situation, with which, from their point of view, are intimately bound up the various "interdependence" conventions under negotiation with France.

3. Two major steps towards the consolidation of the Moroccan State have recently been taken: the absorption of the Army of Liberation in the Royal Moroccan Army and the assumption of administrative control of the Northern Zone.

4. It is still too early to predict whether or not the Army of Liberation will eventually cease to be a separate power within the State but at least it can be said that the process of taking its men into the Moroccan forces has begun and that there are signs at last that disciplinary action may sometimes be taken to control its members. This is so much to the good. The experiment is now being tried of giving administrative responsibility to certain of the Army of Liberation chiefs, four of whom have been appointed as provincial Governors in the Northern Zone. These appointments may lead to trouble in the eastern part of the Zone, since some of the Rif population have shown signs of disliking the pretensions of the Army of Liberation. The Sultan is no doubt aware of this and may well have calculated that it might be better to sacrifice a little tranquillity and administrative efficiency, in order that the Rifs and the Army of Liberation should hold each other in check.

5. In the Northern Zone as a whole the transfer to the Moroccan Government of responsibility for the civil administration is now complete. Although the most difficult part of the absorption of the Northern Zone, the integration of its economy with that of the Southern Zone, has still to be tackled, what has already been achieved does constitute an important success for the Sultan and the Government. In particular it enables the Sultan, following his successful visits to Tetuan and Villa Nador, to present himself to his people as the unifier of Morocco, and enhances his great personal prestige which is one of the principal factors making for cohesion and stability in contemporary Morocco.

6. The difficulties which must be surmounted before the Moroccan State can be considered as having achieved a reasonable degree of stability remain, of course, enormous. The Moroccan Ministries, Army and Security Services are only in the process of formation and are seriously short of qualified Moroccan staff, the authority of the Government is not established throughout the country and the Cabinet itself is far from united. In the immediate future difficulties may arise out of the forthcoming Istiqlal Party Congress. The danger here is that the extreme wing of the party may bring about something of a Cabinet crisis by insisting on increased Istiqlal representation in the Government and may force through resolutions on a number of topics, including the proposed establishment of a National Consultative Assembly, which may prove embarrassing to the Sultan and the Government.

7. On the economic side danger is threatened by rising unemployment with all the possibilities of extremist activity which that involves and by the budgetary deficit. These economic and financial difficulties serve as a constant reminder to

the Sultan and his Government of their need for outside financial and economic help. At present large-scale governmental assistance is available only from France and the Moroccan Government has, therefore, no choice but to proceed with the negotiations of the proposed "interdependence" conventions with France. Conversely, France has no option but to provide Morocco with financial and economic help because, if she does not do so, her chances of maintaining any substantial political and economic influence in the new Morocco are very small. The interest of both parties is, in fact, to conclude the proposed "interdependence" conventions as rapidly as possible. Delay is, however, being caused by disagreement as to the terms of the military convention. While the Moroccan Government would probably be prepared, at present, to grant certain facilities to the French forces, it will be very reluctant to sign any military convention the terms of which might be considered as incompatible with Morocco's new position as a sovereign and independent State.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors in Paris, Washington, Madrid, to Her Majesty's Consul-General in Tangier, to Her Majesty's Acting Consul-General in Tetuan, to Her Majesty's Consul at Casablanca, and to the Governor and the Staff Officer (Intelligence) at Gibraltar.

I have, &c.

L. F. L. PYMAN.

JM 1026/3 No. 25

MOROCCAN FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. Pyman to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received September 18*)

(No. 84. Confidential) *Rabat,*
Sir, *September 10, 1956.*

So little time has elapsed since the conclusion of the Franco-Moroccan Diplomatic Convention gave to Morocco the conduct of her own foreign affairs, that it is perhaps somewhat premature to talk about a Moroccan foreign policy. Nevertheless, over the last few months there have been various declarations by Government spokesmen and by the Sultan himself, from which an outline of an emergent foreign policy can be discerned.

2. The acceptance of Morocco as a member of the United Nations at present takes pride of place. To the Moroccan leaders this symbolises international recognition of Morocco as a sovereign, independent State and guarantees that independence.

3. Next in importance is the sentiment of belonging, through ties of blood, language and faith, to the Arab-Islamic world. This feeling leads naturally to an instinctive attitude that, in any dispute between a fellow-member of this world and an outside interest, it is the Arab or Islamic country that is in the right.

4. The translation of this sentiment into action is, however, governed by a wary self-interest. Conscious of the heavy tasks before them at home the Sultan and his Government appear reluctant to undertake foreign engagements and commitments which are not strictly necessary in Morocco's own immediate interests. Their public declarations on Algeria and Suez have so far been cautious and restrained (this attitude to the Suez dispute, and much else besides, would, of course, alter for the worse if the Western Powers became involved in fighting with Egypt). They have not yet joined the Arab League, though it is expected that Morocco will do so. They have not yet opened an Embassy in Cairo (the result perhaps of the Crown Prince's unfavourable reaction to his reception there); and although they will no doubt do so eventually, and receive an Egyptian Ambassador here, their unhurried approach to the question shows a welcome readiness to think for themselves. That they are clearly aware of the danger represented by Colonel Nasser's friends, the Soviet Union, is demonstrated by their exclusion of the Soviet Government from the forthcoming conference about Tangier.

5. After Arab solidarity, strongly tempered by self-interest, comes the idea of Morocco as a link between the West and the Islamic Orient. This idea was given expression by M. Ahmed Balafrej, the Foreign Minister, in his speech to the Istiqlal Congress on the 19th of August, and more recently in an address delivered by the Sultan. While this sentiment is natural and laudable in Moroccans who have benefited from French education and culture, I suspect that the emphasis recently placed on this concept in public statements is due at least in part to a desire to find some high-sounding pretext with which to justify to public opinion the continued close relations with France and Spain which are rendered necessary by Morocco's contemporary situation.

6. Relations with the former protecting Powers, and especially with France, present the Moroccan Government with some of its most delicate problems. In these, as in other and easier fields, their attitude is governed by cautious self-interest. They accept financial help from France and Spain because they must, but they scrutinise all financial and economic proposals with great care to ensure that no undesirable conditions are attached. They will sign other non-military conventions because their practical needs make it necessary to do so. On the military side, not feeling themselves in danger of attack from outside, they will see little point in keeping foreign troops to defend their territory, but, despite the strong feeling against the continued presence of French forces, could probably be induced at present to grant certain limited facilities to France and Spain, if they find that they have no practical alternative but to do so.

7. While the Sultan and his present Government are more realistic and more moderate than the political parties and are liable to be driven off their course by extremist pressure, it remains encouraging that they are showing signs of evolving a comparatively sober and realistic approach to foreign affairs.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Washington, Madrid and Cairo, to Her Majesty's Consuls-General at Tangier and Algiers and the Acting Consul-General at Tetuan, and to the Governor and the Staff Officer (Intelligence), Gibraltar.

I have, &c.

L. F. L. PYMAN,
Chargé d'Affaires.

JM 1016/145 No. 26

MOROCCAN REACTIONS TO THE ARREST OF THE FIVE ALGERIAN NATIONALIST LEADERS

Mr. Freese-Pennefather to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received November 13*)

(No. 98. Unclassified) *Rabat,*
Sir, *October 29, 1956.*

I have the honour to report that the Sultan's visit to Tunis which was originally planned to last from the 22nd until the 28th of October was cut short on the day after his arrival by His Majesty's precipitate return to deal with the situation arising from the arrest of the five Algerian leaders of the National Liberation Front.

2. The Algerians Ahmed Ben Bella, Mohammed Khider, Mohammed Boudiaf, Husain Ait Ahmed and Mustafa Lashraf had met Prince Moulay Hassan, Chief of the Moroccan General Staff, in Tetuan on the 20th of October and were brought to Rabat by him in his private aircraft. Shortly after their arrival they were received by the Sultan with whom they remained in conference for three hours and there was another long meeting the next afternoon. At the end of the conversations the Sultan made a declaration to the Algerians in which he expressed his belief in the essential unity of the Maghreb, the need for awakening world opinion to end the Algerian conflict, the need for social emancipation, democracy and liberty as prerequisites for the development of the Maghreb as a link between East and West.

3. On the following morning the Sultan left Salé airport for Tunis accompanied by Prince Moulay Hassan, the President of the Council, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and other Ministers. I and my colleagues and the members of the Government who were not travelling in the Sultan's party were present to see him off. Algerian flags were much in evidence and the French policemen walked off on hearing that Ben Bella was also there. Shortly afterwards another aircraft belonging to the Shereefian Air Atlas Company and in the charge of a French crew, took off with the Algerian delegation for Tunis where they were to participate in the Moroccan-Tunisian talks: among the other passengers were correspondents of the *New York Times* and of the French Left-wing newspaper *France-Observateur*.

4. Meanwhile, considerable resentment had been caused in Morocco by the news from Paris that the French Government had decided to suspend negotiations on the Franco-Moroccan Conventions as a protest against the official character of the reception accorded to the Algerian leaders. Si Bekkai and M. Balafrej stated in Tunis that the Sultan as monarch of an independent State could receive any guests he pleased, and in Rabat the Moroccan authorities retorted that the visit had not been given any undue publicity at all.

5. News of the Sultan's arrival in Tunis was almost immediately thrust into the background by reports of the diversion of the rebel leaders' aircraft to Algiers and of their arrest by the French authorities. From Tunis the Sultan spoke by telephone to the President of the Republic in Paris, while in Rabat the Minister of the Interior, who was acting as President of the Council in the absence of Si Bekkai, delivered a strong protest to the French Chargé d'Affaires. He also summoned me and my United States and Spanish colleagues to inform us of the Moroccan Government's contention that the Sultan's efforts to find a solution for the Algerian problem were made with the approval of the French Government and to underline that the Algerian leaders were at the time of their arrest under His Majesty's protection: he asked that our respective Governments should intervene with the French in order to secure the immediate release of the aircraft with its occupants, failing which widespread disorders would break out across North Africa. I enclose a copy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs communiqué about the interviews. Forceful statements issued by the Moroccan political parties and the "Union Marocaine du Travail" left no doubt as to the profound impact on Moroccan opinion of the arrest of the Algerian leaders: and "Conscience Française" and other French groups protested to President Coty. The Minister of Public Works also put out a communiqué (copy enclosed) according to which he was kept informed of the instructions received from Paris by the crew of the Air-Atlas aircraft but his own instructions first that the aircraft should not leave Palma where it had

landed for refuelling and later that it should return to Palma were intercepted by the French-operated control tower at Casablanca. (It will be recalled that civil aviation was specifically excluded from the Protocol of the 11th of February which defined the functions and responsibilities of the Moroccan Government during the transition period, as reported in paragraph 2 of my despatch No. 17 of the 14th of February.)

6. The day of the 23rd of October was marked by a general strike throughout Morocco. In most towns there were demonstrations and meetings which passed with comparatively minor incidents only. In Rabat a crowd proceeding towards the French Embassy dispersed on the personal intervention of the Minister of the Interior. In Meknès, however, the situation got out of hand where the chief of the "assès", who was formerly a colonel in the Army of Liberation, was shot dead, probably accidentally with a bullet from his own gun, as he was trying to push back the demonstrators. Shop windows were smashed, the houses of Europeans attacked, cars stoned and set on fire, in some cases with their occupants who were burnt alive in them.

A brick works was set on fire and the European owner and his family were thrown into the flames. Two Europeans were attacked and killed by blows from an axe in front of their children. A French first aid worker had his skull smashed while tending the injured. On the farms around Meknès and near Fez, ricks of straw and agricultural machinery were set alight.

7. On the night of the 23rd–24th of October there were more murders and more properties were burnt. The French members of the Moroccan police in Meknès, after the action of Moghaznis in firing on the European population on the previous day, placed themselves at the disposal of the French "Délégation" and French Army patrols were sent out in the streets of the European town.

8. Si Bekkai and M. Balafrej, who had been sent by the Sultan to make protests in Paris, returned to Rabat on the afternoon of the 24th of October. In reply to journalists Si Bekkai said that the situation was serious: the French Government had refused his request for the release of the Algerian leaders, and the prestige of the Sultan and of the Moroccan Government was at stake. The Sultan himself landed the same evening in an Italian aircraft at the American base at Port Lyautey and was shortly followed by the Crown Prince who had travelled in a Spanish plane.

9. On the 25th of October there was a strike of French workers as a sign of mourning for the Meknès victims. It was almost complete in the Government services and only a few French police maintained an emergency security service. Around Meknès where the situation had appeared at one time to have been restored there were again incidents involving the deaths of several Europeans, together with more cases of incendiarism. General Cogny, Commander-in-Chief of the French forces in Morocco, visited Meknès in the afternoon and later asked for a "state of emergency" to be declared but the Governor declined to accept his request on the ground that it constituted an interference in Moroccan internal affairs. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs also protested against the French seizure of the Meknès police headquarters and the incorporation of the French police, who were in Moroccan Government service, into the French Army. The Moroccan Ambassador in Paris was recalled.

10. The Moroccans were not entirely deaf to French representations and agreed to the temporary appointment of Commandant Driss ben Omar, a member of the General Staff, to be civil and military Governor at Meknès. On his arrival he issued a businesslike statement proclaiming that he would tolerate no infringement of Moroccan rights and no disturbances of the peace. The same evening the Moroccan Government resigned and Si Bekkai was called upon by the Sultan to form a new Government which, it is hoped, may deal effectively with the new situation.

11. I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors in Paris, Madrid and Washington, to his Excellency the Governor and to the Staff Officer (Intelligence) Gibraltar, to Her Majesty's Consuls-General in Tangier and Tetuan, and to Her Majesty's Consuls at Casablanca and Fez.

I have, &c.

H. W. A. FREESE-PENNEFATHER.

Enclosure " A "

" Ayant appris par un message radio que l'avion transportant les cinq leaders algériens du Front de Libération Nationale parti de Rabat à midi à destination de Tunis via Les Baléares avait reçu l'ordre du gouvernement français de se diriger vers Alger, le Président du Conseil par intérim, M. M'Hammedi, a convoqué sur l'ordre de Sa Majesté les chargés d'affaires de France, des Etats-Unis et les ambassadeurs d'Espagne et de Grande-Bretagne à Rabat auxquels il a fait une communication importante en présence de M. Douiri, Ministre des Travaux Publics assurant l'intérim des Affaires Etrangères et de M. Guedira, Ministre chargé de la Défence Nationale.

Dans cette communication, le Gouvernement rappelle :—

(1) Que les démarches effectuées par Sa Majesté le Sultan en vue de trouver une solution du problème Algérien ont été entreprises en accord et avec l'encouragement du gouvernement français.

(2) Que les personnalités algériennes étaient les hôtes de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Le Président du Conseil par intérim a souligné que s'il se confirmait que l'avion avait effectivement reçu l'ordre de changer d'itinéraire, Sa Majesté considérerait cet acte comme un manquement à la parole donnée de la part de la France et ne pourrait rester passive en face d'un acte d'une telle gravité et qui porte atteinte à la souveraineté du pays. Elle envisagerait de prendre toutes mesures qu'imposerait la situation.

Dans l'immédiat Sa Majesté se verrait dans l'obligation d'interrompre son séjour en Tunisie.

Les représentants diplomatiques des Etats-Unis, d'Espagne et de Grande-Bretagne ont été invités par le Président du Conseil par intérim à porter cette communication à la connaissance de leur gouvernement respectif et à leur demander d'user de leur bons offices pour intervenir auprès du Gouvernement français afin qu'il permette à l'avion de poursuivre son voyage vers Tunis ".

Enclosure " B "

" L'avion transportant des personnalités du Front National de Libération Algérien est un DC 3 de la Compagnie Chérifienne des Transports aériens Société Marocaine contrôlée par l'Etat.

L'équipage est constitué de pilotes français civils au service de l'Etat Chérifien dont il relève exclusivement.

L'avion a décollé de l'aérodrome de Rabat-Salé à midi. Le carnet de bord spécifie la destination qui était " Tunis via les Baléares ", où l'avion devait se ravitailler en essence, étant donné sa capacité qui ne lui permet pas le trajet Rabat–Tunis d'un seul trait.

L'avion a effectivement atterri à Palma (Baléares) à 16 h. 55 G.M.T. Il venait de recevoir un message du Ministre français de la Défence lui intimant l'ordre de rejoindre Oran. Le ministre marocain des Travaux publics, ayant eu connaissance de cette information, ordonne à l'avion, à 16 h. 58 et à 17 h. 05, de ne pas quitter Palma jusqu'à nouvel ordre. A 17 h. 14, l'avion décolle en direction de Tunis, probablement dans l'ignorance des messages précédents qui avaient dû être interceptés.

A 17 h. 35, alors que l'avion était en vol, les pilotes reçoivent l'ordre impératif du gouvernement français de se diriger vers Alger. Ils transmettent ce message à Rabat où il est porté à la connaissance des autorités marocaines. A 17 h. 50, immédiatement, le ministre des Travaux publics donne l'ordre à l'équipage de retourner à Palma.

A partir de cette heure, Rabat ne reçoit plus aucun message de l'avion. C'est alors que la tour de contrôle de Casablanca fait savoir que tous les messages du gouvernement marocain ont été interceptés et stoppés sur l'ordre de la liaison de l'armée de l'air française (Contrôle militaire).

Vers 19 heures, M. M'Hammedi, président du Conseil par intérim, convoque, en présence du Ministre des Travaux publics, M. Lalouette, Ministre plénipotentiaire à l'Ambassade de France.

Le Ministre des Travaux publics demande à ce dernier d'intervenir auprès des services de la navigation aérienne pour lui permettre d'entrer en contact avec l'avion. Le Ministre français promet d'intervenir. C'est seulement à 21 h. 15 que la Cie. Chérifienne des Transports Aériens apprend que son avion a atterri à Alger à 20 h. 30. Ce qui a été confirmé par Palma à 21 h. 45. L'équipage de l'avion a été consigné par les autorités militaires.

Le Ministre souligne qu'il s'agit là d'un acte absolument contraire à toutes les règles admises dans les usages internationaux.

S'agissant d'un avion chérifien en dehors de toutes considérations politiques, il est impensable qu'un gouvernement étranger procède à son arraisonnement. Cet acte relève de la pure piraterie ".

JM 10317/37 No. 27

THE PROSPECTS FOR FRANCO-MOROCCAN CO-OPERATION

Mr. Freese-Pennefather to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received November 14)

(No. 104. Confidential) *Rabat, November 7, 1956.*

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that when I and my colleagues were returning from the airport on the 22nd of October after bidding farewell to the Sultan on his journey to Tunis, we looked forward with relief to an uneventful week in Rabat in which to have some respite after the Tangier Conference, and in anticipation of Morocco enjoying a period of well-earned tranquillity for concluding her negotiations with the French and embarking on her wider responsibilities in international affairs when elected to membership of the United Nations. Both the Moroccan and the French Governments were anxious to conclude conventions as quickly as possible for defining their continuing relations of interdependence on a formal basis and, after the uneasy period of lawlessness during the summer, the " colons " were looking to the future, if not with equanimity, at least with greater confidence. Little did we think that this orderly progress was to be checked so abruptly in the ensuing fortnight, in which the Sultan and his Ministers were confronted with the arrest of the Algerian leaders (and the disturbances which ensued), with a change of Government and with the Franco-British intervention in the conflict between Israel and Egypt. I venture to submit a provisional assessment of how far these strains have affected Franco-Moroccan relations to date and the respects in which they have set back the prospects of peaceful evolution in this country.

2. In considering this subject there are certain constant factors to be borne in mind. First there is the personal position of the Sultan. His claim on the loyalty of his subjects derives from his being not only the Head of State but also their religious leader, a factor which has always had special importance in the outlying areas. He has shown himself to be an astute politician in the national cause, with his prestige greatly enhanced by his exile. As a traditionalist he is the advocate of orderly political development and, as such, the rallying point of responsible politicians of differing views, who are fully alive to the dangers of this largely backward and gullible populace falling victims of Communist or other extremist propaganda.

3. Secondly, with independence coming overnight instead of after a period of internal autonomy, the government of the country depends on the strength and attitude of individual personalities, who are eager rivals for office although few of them are of Ministerial calibre by generally accepted standards. Despite the lip-service given to democratic principles the role of political parties is to rubber-stamp the policies of the various leaders without argument and not to contribute towards their formation: they are therefore the instruments rather than the dispensers of political power. This is not, however, to say that they are homogeneous bodies any more than their leaders themselves see eye to eye on individual political issues; and extremists such as Allal al Fassi often carry as much influence with the public as the politicians who bear responsibilities within the Government. In this field the importance must be stressed of the " Union Marocaine du Travail " which is most active politically without the responsibilities of office.

4. Thirdly there is the fact that Morocco is dependent on France for its economic survival and therefore also on its political viability as a country attempting to maintain its present standard of living and now desirous of making its voice heard in international and, more particularly, Arab affairs. The Sultan and the more experienced leaders must accept this politically unpalatable truth to achieve their objective of establishing in North Africa an Arab *bloc* which can cash in (fairly literally) on its vital importance to the West, instead of becoming a geographically remote and humble appendage of the Egyptian *bloc*, if this should still survive after our intervention in the Middle Eastern conflict The present leaders of the new Morocco have been most apprehensive of Colonel Nasser's antics and his relations with Communist countries—just as they have also been afraid of his seizure of power being admired by ambitious young army officers here. The danger of unrest in Morocco is, moreover, increased by the difficulties of

finding a solution to the Algerian problem. It was Algerians who appear to have taken the leading part in instigating the outrages at Meknes and the destruction of farms in the countryside reported in my despatch No. 98 of the 29th of October which, of all the upheavals of the past fortnight, may have the most lasting and detrimental effect on Franco-Moroccan relations and on Morocco itself.

5. The course of events has been easy enough to narrate—but for their rapid succession and detail—since it has been fully reported in the press with an ample accompaniment of official communiqués. Their significance, however, is a very different matter since the need for satisfying public opinion concealed many of the ingredients which were inevitably influencing Government policy.

6. The arrest of the five Algerian leaders, followed by the Sultan's precipitate return from Tunis, was understandably portrayed as a grave humiliation of His Majesty and an inexcusable affront to Arab traditions of hospitality and asylum, as also to Moroccan sovereign independence. Coming as it did when Franco-Moroccan relations were being progressively established on a durable footing by the negotiation of conventions, it was a most serious set-back to mutual confidence and, so far as the public were concerned, it was cited as yet another act of duplicity which showed how pernicious it was to expect fair play or sincerity from the French: it was a ruse of a colonialist Power, determined to retain its former strongholds. It was feared that the psychological impact of this action would be followed by immediate and widespread disorders endangering European lives and property—since on such occasions distinctions are not readily made between Frenchmen and others—but in the event there was no trouble in the major cities excepting Meknes, to be followed by the spread of incendiarism across the most important centres of French colonisation in Morocco. The " colons " in the affected areas have taken refuge in the towns at night, only visiting their properties for necessary supervision in the day time, and many of them have decided to leave Morocco permanently rather than expose their families to the risks of lawlessness in the future, when the French army will become less and less able to intervene.

7. It is impossible yet to estimate the consequences of these events in terms of actual damage to property, or on the outlook for future Franco-Moroccan co-operation in general and for developing agriculture in particular, both of which are far more serious considerations than the immediate losses sustained. " Colons " cannot find buyers for their properties and are thinking out means of liquidating their assets at the minimum of loss. Owners of orange plantations—and these suffered little damage—are the more fortunately placed. In the past they made a practice of devoting a large proportion of their profits to improving and extending their properties. With the destruction of orange trees in Spain owing to last winter's frosts, they hope for high prices for their oranges for several seasons to come. They calculate that by spending next to nothing on maintenance and development and retaining all their profits for the next three years or so, the latter may go a long way towards realising the capital value of their estates, after which they can abandon them and live on the proceeds in France. The owners of farms growing cereals, however, cannot produce crops if their agricultural machinery has been destroyed, and the smaller farmer no longer has confidence in launching out again. The resulting unemployment among considerable sections of the rural population, many of whom may move to the towns, will be a gift to political agitators and the national economy is likely to suffer from farms falling into decay.

8. The change of Government was an internal affair which had long been awaited and became imperative on the Sultan's return from Tunis. The first Moroccan Government, both by its size and the conflict of personalities, had been ineffective and unwieldy. By reducing the number of Ministers to fifteen, by creating a super-Ministry to cover economic and financial matters and by eliminating the " Partie Démocratique de l'Indépendance " (through offering them only two Ministries of minor importance which they declined to accept), it is hoped that the Government will be a more efficient and homogeneous team. Si Bekkai chose " action and efficiency " as its watchword and the Government declared that it would give the national economy priority in its deliberations. It includes at present six Independents and eight Istiqlalists (list enclosed), with the Ministry of Religious Foundations (" Habous ") yet to be filled: the Ministry of Town Planning and Housing has been placed under the Minister for Public Works. The Sultan has

also created a Privy Council to which he has appointed Caid Lahcen Lyoussi (formerly Minister of the Interior and then Minister of State), Si Mokhtar Soussi (formerly Minister of " Habous ") and Si Mohammed ben Larbi el Alaoui (an " alem " of the Karawiyine University).

9. It was inevitable that the Sultan, after his set-back over the Algerian episode, should lose ground to the professional politicians. When he returned from exile a year ago, he saw the immediate need of breaking the power of the political parties whose militias were so much in evidence at his reception here and on all subsequent public occasions. The Istiqlal Party, after their bombastic Congress in December, launched their nation-wide campaign for recruiting new members; but they made the cardinal error of not providing for their representation on the Executive Committee, which consisted almost entirely of Arabs from the towns. This gave Caid Lahcen Lyoussi his opportunity of working during the summer among the largely Berber population of the mountain districts, who had seen no return from their contributions to party funds, and, after the Army of Liberation had been accounted for by its absorption into the Royal Armed Forces, His Majesty's authority probably reached its zenith at the time of his visit to Oujda in the last week of September. I have heard from a reliable source that by the middle of October he was hoping to reduce the representation of the Istiqlal Party in a reconstituted Government to four portfolios but, in the event, he was obliged to accept eight of them as Ministers, one of whom Si Omar ben Abdeljellil, Minister of Agriculture, belongs to the extremist wing of Si Allal el Fassi and Si Mehdi ben Barka. Against this, however, five of the key positions are held by moderates—the Presidency of the Council and the Ministries of the Interior, National Economy, Defence and Information—and His Majesty's grip on the situation has not yet shown any outward sign of weakening, although he is reported to be despondent and tired. It has doubtless helped him, moreover, very considerably that the Algerian problem should, temporarily at least, have been superseded by the events in Egypt.

10. Throughout this period it is noteworthy that the marked deterioration of official relations between Morocco and France should not have broken the friendly and important contacts between the French Embassy and the Moroccan Ministers. Despite their strong condemnation of the French army assuming control at Meknes, they soon came to realise that the carnage and destruction would have been on a far larger scale but for the timely French intervention and they were doubtless relieved that this heavy burden of responsibility should have been, partially at any rate, taken off their shoulders. The French Chargé d'Affaires informed me that the Minister of the Interior readily agreed to their suggestion for the appointment of Major Driss ben Omar, a capable officer in the Moroccan General Staff, to be Governor of Meknes and that units of the Moroccan army should be sent to the Rharb district, into which disorders and incendiarism had been spreading. He also expressed satisfaction that the visit of M. Basdevant, Director-General of the Ministry for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs, at the end of October should have given the opportunity for a friendly and constructive discussion of current problems to prepare the ground for " resuming the dialogue." In the communiqués published on this occasion it was only to be expected that the Moroccan Government should publicly reaffirm their resolute stand on the Algerian issue but the rest of their content was in no way discouraging.

11. The Franco-British intervention in the Israel–Egypt conflict elicited an immediate declaration by the Moroccan Government of their attitude, the full text of which was forwarded to you on the 2nd of November. Here again the forcefulness of their phraseology was the least that the public would expect but the final exhortation that " wisdom and reason " should prevail was a tame and not a militant ending. As I have explained above, the Sultan and his principal Ministers would gladly see Colonel Nasser disappear, though they would have preferred to see this happen directly he seized the Suez Canal instead of in a " colonialist war " in which we were associated with the French. Provided that nothing further should occur to inflame the local population, the French Chargé d'Affaires hopes, rather optimistically, that it may be possible to resume negotiations on the Franco-Moroccan Conventions in the latter half of this month, and throughout this crisis it is remarkable that there have been no marked signs of public indignation at our joint action despite the quantity of propaganda in the local press and radio broadcasts.

12. To sum up, as stated in my opening paragraph, this review of the events of the past fortnight in the context of Franco-Moroccan relations can offer no more than provisional conclusions, and the most serious long-term factor has been the undermining of the new-found confidence among the French, and particularly among the " colons," who had decided to remain in Morocco after the end of the Protectorate régime. Anti-French feeling, particularly in the cities, has increased very perceptibly and the Moroccan Government are rightly apprehensive that their incapacity to deal with the disorders at Meknes and in the countryside should discourage foreigners from risking their lives and fortunes in this newly independent country, so greatly in need of their confidence and material assistance. The Algerian problem, which has bedevilled relations between the two countries in all manner of ways, is temporarily less in evidence; and, if the arrest of the rebel leaders should hasten a solution of a kind which the Moroccan Government would be obliged to accept, albeit with apparent disapproval, their official relations with the French Government should progress along an easier path. If, in addition, the baneful influence of Egypt can be effectively diminished, the extremists here should lose much of their following, as they did on the deposition of King Farouk who had been built up as an idol of what an Arab monarch should be. Si Allal el Fassi and his like would doubtless adjust their policies to remain in the political limelight and he is already reported to be complaining that events abroad (as in Egypt) are preventing progress over the necessary task of internal reconstruction.

13. In all of this rapidly changing scene, however, the central figure is the Sultan, who despite his deposition and his recent humiliation over the Algerian leaders, continues to find his personal interests binding him with the West. After all his tribulations, it will be necessary for the French discreetly to restore his confidence and, while avoiding all appearance of making him their puppet, to contribute in any way they can to his personal prestige. So long as he can retain his influence there remains some hope for his country's stability and future: otherwise the outlook would be very different.

14. I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Washington, Madrid, Cairo and Tunis, to His Excellency the Governor and to the Staff Officer (Intelligence), Gibraltar, to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet, and the Board of Admiralty, to Her Majesty's Consuls-General in Tangier, Tetuan and Algiers, to Her Majesty's Consuls in Casablanca and Fez, to the Regional Information Office in Beirut, to the Head of the United Kingdom Delegation in New York and to the Political Officer, Middle East Forces, in Nicosia.

I have, &c.

H. W. A. FREESE-PENNEFATHER.

Enclosure

The Moroccan Government formed on October 27, 1956

The following Ministers have retained their previous offices:—

President of the Council
Embarek Bekkai (Independent).

Foreign Affairs
Ahmed Balafrej (Istiqlalist).

Justice
Abdelkrim Benjelloun (Istiqlalist).

Interior
Driss M'Hammedi (Istiqlalist).

Education, Youth and Sports
Mohammed el Fassi (Istiqlalist).

Public Works, Town Planning and Housing
Mohammed Douiri (Istiqlalist).

Health
Abdelmalek Faraj (Independent).

Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones
Dr. Benzaquen (Independent).

The following Ministers have changed their offices or are new:—

National Economy (covering Finance, Commerce, Industry and Mines)
Abderrahim Bouabid (Istiqlalist).

Agriculture
Omar ben Abdel Jellil (Istiqlalist).

Labour and Social Affairs
Abdallah Ibrahim (Istiqlalist).

National Defence
Mohammed Zeghari (Independent).

Information and Tourism
Ahmed Reda Guedira (Independent).

The following new Ministry has been created:—

Public Administration
Mohamed Rachid Mouline (Independent).

The following new Minister has not yet been appointed:—

Religious Foundations (" Habous ").

In the Ministry for National Economy the following have been appointed Under-Secretaries of State:—

Finance
Abdallah Chefchaouani.

Commerce and Industry
Ahmed Lyazidi.

JM 1016/149

No. 28

THE INAUGURAL MEETING OF THE MOROCCAN CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

Mr. Freese-Pennefather to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received November 18*)

(No. 111. Unclassified) *Rabat,*
Sir, *November 16, 1956.*

I have the honour to report that the inaugural meeting of the National Consultative Assembly was declared open by His Majesty the Sultan at a ceremony held in the Mamounia Palace in Rabat on the 12th of November.

2. It will be recalled that the Assembly, which purports to have many of the same functions as the " Conseil du Gouvernement " of Protectorate days, is a consultative body set up to advise the Sultan. Meeting in ordinary session twice yearly it will comment on the budget and on any political, economic or social problem which the Sultan may see fit to refer to it. The names of the Assembly's 76 members, chosen to represent all branches of national life according to proportions laid down in advance by " dahir ", were announced earlier last week. Among them are a number of well-known political figures including Si Mehdi Ben Barka, Si Mohammed Chazi and Si Boubeker Kadiri (all members of the Executive Committee of the Istiqlal Party), Si Mohammed Mekouar (also Istiqlal), Si Mohammed Fadel Moskit of the " Parti Démocrate d'Indépendance ", Si Mahjoub Ben Seddik, Secretary-General of the " Union Marocaine du Travail " (U.M.T.), his Assistant Si Taieb Ben Beuezza, and Si Mekki Naciri, President of the " Parti de l'Unité et d'Indépendance " from Tangier. There is also the controversial figure of Na Ainin, one of the four representatives of the " ulema ", who comes from the Sahara well to the south of the territorial boundaries of Morocco.

3. The ceremony began with the Sultan's arrival, well ahead of time, at the Mamounia Palace accompanied by his sons, Prince Moulay Hassan and Prince Moulay Abdallah, and a large suite. The hall, which was formerly the auditorium of the " Conservatoire de Musique ", had been suitably adapated for its new purposes. On the stage sat the Provisional Committee, consisting of the " doyen d'âge " and the four youngest members of the Assembly, and in the body of the hall were the other members with the Government and the Diplomatic Corps ranged on either side.

4. On entering His Majesty took his place at one side of the committee and then delivered his inaugural speech. He described his ultimate aim as the establishment in Morocco of a democracy within the framework of a constitutional monarchy, a system based on the rational traditions of the Imamate. Meanwhile the present Assembly, which was a step in the right direction, would enable members to express opinions and make recommendations and suggestions, in particular on the Government's work and on national policy. In time membership of the Assembly would be decided by elections, and the political education of the people would take place in the local assemblies which it was his intention to set up. He wished to build democracy from the bottom upwards—as was the policy of the French in Protectorate days.

5. The Sultan then declared the session open and left the Assembly to its work, still so much ahead of the official time-table that certain distinguished visitors, who were arriving punctilliously at the correct hour only managed to greet the Sultan on his way out.

6. For a short while the proceedings of the session were rendered inaudible by the fanfares of the Royal Guard and the noise of the crowd whose enthusiasm was aroused by the reappearance of the Sultan outside the building. Then the Assembly settled down to the lengthy business of the election of its officers. The members of the Government and most of the Diplomatic Corps left after the first election of the President of the Assembly for which office Si Mehdi Ben Barka was chosen by an overwhelming vote. The remainder of the session, which lasted for another 4 hours, was devoted to the election of the other officers—the Vice-Presidents, the Secretaries and the Assessors—and I enclose a list of the successful candidates who will hold office for the first year of the present Assembly's two-year life. All of

them were elected with substantial majorities (none had less than 54 votes) and the list reflects clearly the dominant position of the Istiqlal Party. Although they are directly represented by only 10 members in the Assembly, according to the proportion allowed for each of the political parties, the members representing other interests—particularly the U.M.T., the agriculturists and the professional groups—are in many cases party members.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors in Paris, Madrid, Washington and Tunis, to Her Majesty's Consuls-General in Tangier, Tetuan and Algiers, to his Excellency the Governor and to the Staff Officer (Intelligence), Gibraltar, and to Her Majesty's Consuls at Casablanca and Fez.

I have, &c.

H. W. A. FREESE-PENNEFATHER.

Enclosure

ELECTED OFFICERS OF THE NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

President:
Mehdi Ben Barka (Istiqlal).

Vice-Presidents:
Mahjoub Ben Seddik (U.M.T.).
Thami Nait Amar (Organisations culturelles).

Secretaries:
Dr. Mohammed Bennani (Istiqlal).
Hachmi Bennani (U.M.T.).

Assessors:
Mohammed Daoud (Alem).
El Haj Ahmed Madkouri (Agriculturist).
Ahmed ou El Haj (Commerce, Industry and Handicrafts).

CHAPTER III.—SPANISH MOROCCO

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

JM 1015/3 No. 29

EVOLUTION OF SPANISH VIEWS ON THE FUTURE OF MOROCCO

Sir Ivo Mallet to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received January 24*)

(No. 21. Confidential) *Madrid,*
Sir, *January 20, 1956.*

In my despatch No. 222 of December 13 I reported General Franco's statement on November 30 to United States press correspondents that the stages of independence in Morocco must not be rushed, and that it would be a serious mistake to transplant existing democratic systems to Morocco. This declaration caused not only ill-concealed satisfaction in circles hostile to Spain in France but also unfavourable repercussions in North Africa which are said to have alarmed the High Commissioner of the Spanish Zone, and considerable efforts have since been made to present Spanish policy in a less unattractive light. In the interview devoted to Moroccan problems given to the EFE news agency on December 16, the Caudillo indeed refrained from changing his tone but showed great indignation at the criticism of his attitude especially in the French press. He insisted that Spain had always been faithful to the treaties and to the Moroccan people, and that it was France which had followed irresponsible and selfish policies. Independence within interdependence was to him a contradiction in terms; Spain would not allow herself to be pushed out of her zone under the pretext of pseudo-independence, and could have no part in a dangerously precipitate and unscrupulous policy. (See my despatch No. 225 of December 17.)

2. In a statement on foreign policy to the newspaper *Ya* on January 1 (reported in my despatch No. 2 of January 5) the Minister for Foreign Affairs made the first gloss on the Caudillo's remarks and gave an assurance that Spain would not lag behind in the solution of Moroccan problems. He emphasised the Caudillo's thesis that independence and interdependence are mutually contradictory but spoke of " the preparatory stages of complete independence."

3. General Garcia Valiño then entered the field in a statement to the Madrid monarchist newspaper *ABC* on January 5. He maintained that there was no question of following any new road or of correcting any earlier plans. Spain had pursued the same objectives since 1951, the year when there were revealed the plans for co-sovereignty and assimilation on the part of the nation which had assumed with Spain responsibility for leading Morocco to the sovereignty and independence which she had enjoyed for centuries and which had been restricted solely with the object of introducing Western civilisation, internal peace and progress. The aims which Spain proposed to attain in the minimum necessary delay were to ensure that Morocco should see the realisation of her political desires and that the protecting Power should see its promises fulfilled. He went on to say that while, in his opinion, democratic régimes were difficult enough to achieve for nations which had not suffered the commotions to which Morocco had been exposed, it would be for the Moroccan Government, once independence had been obtained, to choose whatever political system they preferred. He repeated the view that " independence " and " interdependence " were mutually contradictory and maintained that a tripartite conference between Spain, France and Morocco was indispensable if the existing status of Morocco was to be changed and re-established on a firm basis. The High Commissioner then said that Spain was in a position to give any help in the cultural, economic and technical fields for which the Moroccan Government might ask and would supply it with generosity in order to help Morocco consolidate her independence. This independence, if it was sincerely desired, should be brought about by the Governments concerned with caution in order to ensure that it might be lasting: mistakes arising from over-precipitation should be avoided.

4. On January 9 the High Commissioner issued a communiqué stating that contacts had been held with the Khalifa to determine the political future of the Spanish Zone. This covered a declaration in which the Khalifa stated that conversations had been going on with the High Commissioner regarding the future of the zone and that the country was about to enter on a new era; Moroccans owed much to Spain and were confident that General Franco would continue the policy proclaimed on various occasions by his Government recognising the principle of independence and watching over the unity of the country and the sovereignty of the Sultan.

5. On the following day the High Commissioner received the French Resident-General near Larache and the communiqué issued after their meeting stated that " the High Commissioner informed the Resident-General of the intention of the Spanish Government to institute in its territory political reforms which will make possible the independence of the Moroccan Empire by parallel evolution, with respect of course for the legitimate rights of the Powers."

6. Finally on January 13 the Council of Ministers in Madrid issued a communiqué which is evidently the authoritative expression of the new policy. I enclose a translation. It is as obscure as most of the Caudillo's pronouncements. While continuing to maintain that there has been no change of attitude, it announces Spain's firm determination to defend the unity of the empire and the independence of Morocco, but makes it clear that for the present Spanish policy will seek to promote the " self-government of the Spanish Zone by its natural authorities."

7. This communiqué was warmly welcomed in a telegram from the Khalifa published on January 16, and two days later the National Reform Party also expressed its satisfaction. According to the confidential EFE Agency, Guenum, who, with Torres, recently resigned his ministerial post in Tetuan, said in Rabat on January 19, after seeing the Sultan, that the Spanish Government's statement was a preparatory step for the realisation of the independence and unity of Morocco. Apart, however, from undoing some of the harm caused by the Caudillo's ill-judged statement on November 30, the latest expressions of Spanish policy summarised above clearly show that the Spanish Government have recognised the impossibility, without very serious trouble, of refusing to admit the ideas of independence and unity for Morocco when once the French have accepted them in the Protectorate. This does not, however, mean that the Spaniards think it a good idea that Morocco should pass in a few months from a paternally protected feudalism to complete independence and parliamentary democracy. They do not consider it wise or practicable and I doubt whether they consider it necessary. They realise that in the face of French concessions they will have to leave their zone sooner or later, but they want to stay on as long as they can because Spanish Morocco is almost all that remains of their overseas territory, because it is useful as a recruiting and training ground for their army, because they do not consider its people ready for independence, because they are genuinely anxious about what may happen in Morocco and along the southern coast of the Straits if France and Spain pull out, and because they therefore hope, before they go, to find ways of retaining some influence in the country. Moreover, they are particularly unwilling to step out in order to let in French control or see Morocco assimilated in some way with France. They, therefore, hope that the French will recognise that Spain also has rights and interests in Morocco, will cease taking unilateral action which must affect the whole country without consultation or even warning to Spain, and will take them along step by step in the development of their policy. They hope no doubt that the statements, above reported, about independence, and their plans for working out a form of self-government in their zone, will satisfy Moorish and Arab opinion for the present, so that if the French refuse to co-operate or insist on going ahead too fast, they may be able to carry on for a bit in their own zone.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Paris, Washington, Tetuan, Tangier and Rabat.

I have, &c.

IVO MALLET.

P.S.—As a postscript I should add that the Madrid papers on January 21 published a reply by the Spanish High Commissioner to a question by the Istiqlal paper *El Alam* regarding the phases to be passed in order that Morocco might attain unity and independence. General Garcia Valiño is reported as replying " It is for the Spanish Government in co-operation with the French Government and then with the Moroccan Government to lay down the number of phases, their nature and duration. To ensure this I feel it to be indispensable to convene a tripartite conference, such as I have always been asking for, and I believe that only an international agreement reached at such a conference can lay down the phases through which Morocco might become an independent nation."

The General added that in his view other Powers should only be brought in when changes in the international régime of Tangier were examined.

Enclosure

Communiqué issued after the meeting of the Council of Ministers on January 13.

The Spanish Government examined the general situation in Morocco and agreed as follows:—

(1) To make public Spain's firm determination to continue to defend under the authority of the Sultan, the unity of the empire and the independence of Morocco.

(2) In agreement with the Khalifa and in collaboration with the Moroccan Government authorities to promote self-government of the Spanish Zone by its natural authorities.

(3) To continue to assist and co-operate with the Moroccan people in order to ensure that neither Communism nor any other subversive activities disturb peaceful development.

(4) To watch the evolution of the general situation in Morocco and activities in the neighbouring zone so that the wishes of the Moroccan people may be fulfilled without prejudice to the legitimate interests of Spain.

JM 1015/42 No. 30

THE HISPANO-MOROCCAN AGREEMENT—APRIL 7, 1956

Sir Ivo Mallet to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received April 16*)

(No. 69. Confidential) *Madrid,*
Sir, *April 12, 1956.*

In the early hours of the morning of April 7, 1956, an agreement was signed in Madrid putting an end to the Convention of November 27, 1912, and so terminating the Spanish occupation of Morocco. It was probably an accident that that day marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Algeciras.

2. By this agreement Spain has abandoned her zone of protection in Morocco and also the hopes she has cherished for the past thirty years of securing control over Tangier. In the light of Franco's expressed determination to restore the greatness of Spain, of the dominating role which Moroccan questions have played in Spanish political life for the last fifty years, and of the value Morocco has been as a recruiting and training ground for the Spanish army—and where Franco himself made his name—this event might be expected to have noteworthy repercussions in Spain.

3. Moreover this event was in some degree the consequence of the policy pursued by Spain herself between 1953 and 1955 when, as a result of jealousy and dislike of France for the treatment she had accorded to Franco Spain since the civil war, and in order to curry favour with the Arab States, the Spanish Government gave support to the opposition in Morocco and other Moslem countries to the policy adopted by the French Government. When France reversed that policy and recalled Mohammed V, the tide of Moroccan independence was flowing too strongly to be resisted by a weak French Government, who accordingly decided to cash in on the inevitable and at the same time spite the Spaniards by coming out as the champions of Moroccan independence. Spain found herself hoist with her own petard and Franco's first reaction at the end of last November was to try and stand out against a flood which was bound to sweep Spain from her zone and seemed likely to place that zone under French influence.

4. Franco's first instinct was thus to resist what he saw was likely to be a political disaster which might seriously affect his prestige at a time when this was threatened by discontent at home. He quickly found, however, that resistance by Spain alone would have been as futile as Canute's effort to stop the flood, and his advisers, notably the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the High Commissioner in Tetuan, seem to have emphasised that, as well as being futile, such a policy would wreck Spain's policy of friendship with the Arabs and seriously endanger United States sympathies.

5. Franco therefore in his turn performed a *volte-face* and let it be announced on January 13 (see my despatch No. 21) that Spain would recognise the independence and unity of Morocco. The question was how to dress this up in such a way as to avoid serious loss of prestige and at the same time ensure that an independent Morocco—only a few miles from the coast of Spain—did not fall into disorder or under Communist influence.

6. Franco sought first that Spain should be allowed to participate in the negotiations between the French and the Moors. When this failed and France made her agreement on March 2, he tried to persuade the Sultan to visit Madrid for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with Spain. This the Sultan was unwilling to do until he had been convinced that the Spanish Government was prepared to recognise the reality of the independence and unity of Morocco. On March 15 the Caudillo addressed a letter to the Sultan renewing the invitations which had already been conveyed to him in Paris and Rabat to visit Madrid for talks which should be the first step towards an agreement which " on the basis of independence and unity " would ensure the happy co-operation of the two countries. On April 1 it was announced that the Sultan had accepted this invitation and would arrive in Madrid on April 4. Two days later the Spanish press published an interview which Franco had given to the *New York Herald Tribune* in which

he announced that " there will be a peaceful agreement in North Africa which will involve the disappearance in due course of the Spanish zone of administration and the creation of a unified and independent Morocco under the Sultan Mohammed V." On April 4 the Spanish press announced that the Cabinet had discussed on the previous day the draft of a Spanish-Moorish declaration on the independence of the Sherifian Empire and on future relations between Spain and Morocco.

7. A few hours later the Sultan arrived at Madrid airport. He was accompanied by a numerous suite, including his two sons, the Prime Minister and, in spite of Spanish opposition, certain French advisers. The Sultan was met by General Franco and the entire Spanish Government. In addition there were present the Khalifa and the Spanish High Commissioner from Tetuan. In company with the Generalissimo, the Sultan drove through the streets of Madrid which had been decorated for the occasion. The shops had been closed to enable the inhabitants of Madrid to give the Sultan a suitable welcome. The Sultan remained in Madrid until the morning of April 7 when he left for the old Moorish capital of Granada where he spent a day before proceeding to Seville. On April 8 he visited Cordoba, returning to Seville before leaving for Tetuan in the morning on April 9.

8. The preliminary official discussions were started on the afternoon of the first day and at the same time the Sultan visited the Generalissimo who invested him with a collar of the so-called Imperial Order of the Yoke and Arrows. On the morning of April 5 Franco took the Sultan to Toledo and showed him the Alcazar and the infantry school. My French colleague told me that the Sultan found his welcome in Toledo much warmer than in Madrid and that he was impressed with what he saw of the training at the school. In the afternoon the conversations were formally opened at the Pardo Palace with an exchange of speeches, of which I enclose translations (Annexes 1 and 2). In the evening the Caudillo gave a banquet for the visitors at the former Royal Palace but no foreign Heads of Missions were invited except those of the Arab States. On April 6 the Sultan visited the Escorial and thereafter entertained the Caudillo to luncheon. Later, accompanied by Allal el Fassi, he attended a reception at the Egyptian Embassy, where he again met representatives of the Moslem countries including Pakistan and Turkey and in the afternoon gave a reception for his Spanish hosts. The French Ambassador was not allowed even to greet the Sultan on arrival nor to see him off. But he called on him with members of his staff at his residence and the Sultan took tea with M. de la Tournelle on the following day.

9. The Sultan had arrived with a draft agreement similar to that signed in Paris on March 2, and with the intention of securing the Spanish signature to it. The Spaniards wanted a document in which, in return for their recognition of the unity and independence of Morocco, they would be assured of a position or influence not less than that obtained by the French in their negotiations. They sought above all an agreement which would enable them to relinquish their zone without loss of face and would ensure that their control in north Morocco was not replaced by French influence. They therefore sought guarantees for equal influence in the new Moroccan army and for the status of the peseta, and particularly tried to postpone the fusion of the zones and removal of internal frontiers until it should be clear that the French were giving genuine independence to Morocco. The Sultan successfully resisted these pretensions and made it clear that he would abandon his tour in the south and stay in Madrid until the Spaniards gave way. In return therefore for a small concession regarding the Dahirs on which the Spanish representative in Rabat would be consulted, the Spaniards accepted the draft and, after an all-night session, the agreement was signed at 6 a.m. on the morning the Sultan was due to leave for Andalusia.

10. This agreement, of which I enclose a translation (Annex 3), follows closely the Franco-Moroccan agreement of March 2, but the preamble emphasises the friendly nature of the arrangement and refers to the friendly spirit which will inspire the guarantees to be given to Spaniards in Morocco. The word " interdependence " is replaced by the more tactful and perhaps less effective term " free co-operation." The agreement states that the Madrid Convention of November 27, 1912, can no longer govern Spanish-Moroccan relations and recognises the independence of Morocco. Further negotiations are to be held to

define the " free co-operation " of the two countries in the sphere of their common interests and to guarantee the rights of Spaniards and Moroccans established in each other's country. It will also have to be agreed how the powers exercised by the Spaniards are to be transferred to the Moorish authorities, and many financial questions including that of the future of the peseta remain to be worked out. So do the conditions for the withdrawal of the Spanish army after the period of transition. No time limit for this is given. On the other hand all formalities restricting the passage of persons from one zone to another are abolished forthwith.

11. Beneath the apparent cordiality of the visit, which the Spaniards emphasised for propaganda purposes, it seems that the Moorish delegation felt considerable distrust of the Spaniards. The latter, at any rate so far as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is concerned, are fully aware that, while the Moors criticise the French and the French policy of interdependence to the Spaniards, they must be equally critical of the Spaniards behind their backs. So far as the future is concerned the Ministry seems to be under no illusions that it will be possible to prevent the Moors playing off France against Spain, or to spread out the transition period so as to ensure the Spanish presence in Morocco for any length of time. In the complementary negotiations due to begin on May 7 the Spaniards intend, according to the Permanent Under-Secretary, to adapt their attitude to that of the French in the hope of securing as much as they do. The Marqués de Santa Cruz spoke to me rather critically of the Sultan and particularly of the Crown Prince, who had given the impression of being a wild young man, and officials in the Ministry seem to be aware of the dangers to which the surrender to the Moroccan claims may lead. There is also uncertainty as to how long the Sultan will survive. I am told that neither the Tangier question nor that of the Spanish places of sovereignty was raised during the talks here, but my French colleague says that Allal el Fassi made it clear to him that the Moors would not be prepared to keep silent about the presidios for more than a few months.

12. The Spanish press was clearly directed to do everything possible to present this agreement in the best possible light. It was emphasised that Spain has always stood for the independence of Morocco, indeed this independence had been recognised by treaties to which Spain is party. A protectorate implied the handing over of authority when once the protected people is ready for self-government. Spain's readiness to act up to her principles showed how, in distinction to certain other countries, she understood the feelings of people trying to reach full development through freedom and self-government. Spain had now got even with France and had circumvented the French attempt to put Spain in the wrong with the Moors, to prevent Spanish-Moorish conversations and to secure the whole of Morocco, including the Spanish zone, as a field for French influence. These boastings were accompanied by bitter and unfriendly articles on French policy. It was stated that Spain's agreement with the Sultan would ensure that Morocco is really free and not reduced to interdependence on France. This would make possible a real Spanish-Moorish friendship, based on centuries of co-existence, which will enable Spain to give Morocco technical assistance and to arrange with Morocco for the effective defence of this part of the North African coast. It might also make possible a new Mediterranean agreement such as is needed now that British and French hegemony in that sea are outdated.

13. I cannot tell how much these arguments will persuade foreign opinion to regard the Moroccan agreement as a success. I doubt whether Franco will deceive many of his own people. On the other hand most of them will have come to see that the loss of Morocco was inevitable, and many will be glad to see the end of a responsibility which has cost Spain much blood and treasure. Undoubtedly there must be some anxiety about the future of the Spanish places of sovereignty and what may happen if disorder breaks out in Morocco, but I think that the way the question has been handled will avoid any serious loss of prestige resulting for Franco's régime. Indeed from the point of view of his internal and international position it seems to me that Franco has probably taken the best line he could take—in the short run. Internally he has shown the Spanish people that if Morocco had to be abandoned it is better that it should be given up while there is hope of gaining some goodwill from the Moors. He has avoided the serious loss of prestige which would have to be faced if Spain had been ejected by force. Internationally this policy should render it less necessary (and therefore less easy) to whip up opinion against Gibraltar by way of diverting national discontent. At

the same time it avoids a breach with the Arabs and enables Spain to pose in Washington as a progressive State free from the blemish of colonialism and therefore the better able to help the United States by exerting a useful and anti-Communist influence on the Arabs. Moreover, the mere fact of Morocco's independence increases the danger to security in this part of the world and thereby is expected to increase Spain's value as an ally to the United States especially as both France and Britain can be shown to be in trouble through short-sighted policy in their overseas territories, and when neither seems wholly immune, as Spain is, from Moscow's wiles and smiles. In short, the loss of Morocco is being used by Franco to tighten the bonds of his friendship with the United States. Whether Spanish policy will be successful in the long run depends upon how secure a friendship Spain can build up with Morocco, how stable this new country will remain, and whether the Spanish support for the Arabs will come into conflict with the Spanish policy of opposing the spread of communism and with her defence interests in North Africa.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's representatives in Paris, Washington, Tetuan, Tangier, Rabat and to the Governor of Gibraltar.

I have, &c.

IVO MALLET.

ANNEX 1

SPEECH DELIVERED BY SIDI MOHAMMED V ON APRIL 5th, 1956

Praise be to God. Excellency:

The present happy moment constitutes an event of the greatest importance in the relations between our two countries. On our part we congratulate ourselves doubly because we have never ceased to hope that this meeting would take place, bearing in mind the great benefit which would result from it for both countries. We are thus grateful to you for the noble sentiments which prompted you to raise the question of this precious and historic opportunity. They are the same sentiments as were made manifest in the past in an unequivocal attitude which we still remember and for which we are grateful to you.

On making this visit, our ardent desire is that it should mark the opening of a new era in the relations between our two countries. We therefore insist on this occasion on the importance we accord to friendship and good neighbourliness with Spain. The new Morocco does not ignore the advantages which would result from co-operation with Spain, nor the benefits which both countries would obtain from an exchange of their interests. This is why we wish to enter into negotiations with you for the purpose of regulating this co-operation on a firm basis of respect for the sovereignty and independence of our two countries.

Our new relations will be built upon the most firm basis once the claims of the Moroccan nation with regard to its territorial unity, expressly guaranteed by international Treaties, are realised.

Nobody is unaware of the difficulties and problems, both of a material and of a psychological order, which resulted from the division of Morocco into different zones, nor the evil consequences brought about by that division in the political and economic life of the country.

We are convinced that Spain, who stood by Morocco in difficult moments, will meet this wish with her chivalry and magnanimity. At this historic meeting the Moroccan people anxiously await the removal of the frontiers and barriers demanded inside their country which constitute a symbol of an era which has gone for ever: the era of guardianship and protection.

Recognition of the territorial unity of Morocco within the framework of her independence is in no way incompatible with the interests of Spain and of Spanish residents in that country. We have decided to safeguard such interests and to offer those Spaniards residing in Morocco the necessary guarantees for the security of their persons, properties and freedoms moved by the desire to ensure a friendly neighbourliness which will not prejudice our national sovereignty.

Undoubtedly, the safest basis on which our future relations can be built is that of mutual trust between our two countries, a trust of which we have had much evidence in the past. In the first place, we cannot fail to consider the very old historic links nor the mutual inheritance of civilisation and culture of which our two nations are so proud and which constitute the determining factor in their mutual approach and community of spirit. This approach was made manifest on different occasions and is a guarantee of the benefits which would result from free co-operation between our two States.

The day is not far distant when nations that have become strong through co-operation and solidarity will be established on the shores of the Mediterranean. Their mutual consultation will lead, on the one hand, to a civilisation based on the harmonious balance between spiritual values and material forces and, on the other hand, to respect for traditions and the need for renovation.

Our duty is to act with faith and sincerity for the fulfilment of this noble ideal and peace.

ANNEX 2

SPEECH DELIVERED BY GENERALISSIMO FRANCO ON APRIL 5

Your Majesty:

I share your pleasure at this happy meeting which your visit has made possible. It has enabled the Spanish people to pay their homage of admiration and regard for all you represent in these moments and, by providing the occasion of personal friendship, will facilitate this negotiation for the purpose of recognising formally the independence of Morocco proclaimed by Your Majesty. It will undoubtedly create new horizons in the relations and in the co-operation between our two peoples to the mutual benefit of both countries.

This event marks the end of an era during which Spain maintained her traditional policy of respect for the international personality of Morocco, for, in the exercise of her protectorate, she was able to safeguard it from becoming adulterated or being placed at the service of aims different from those for which it was instituted.

When Spain, forty-four years ago, as a consequence of international agreements made by others behind her back, accepted the responsibility of re-establishing the authority of the Sultan and thereby peace, order and progress in the territories of Northern Morocco adjacent to our country and therefore entrusted to us, Spain did so to avoid another country replacing her, realising that the mission confided to her was temporary, as well as all the sacrifices it represented for the Spanish nation.

In consequence thereof, when after thirty years of uninterrupted peace the wishes of the Moroccan people are realised by the proclamation of their independence made by the Sultan, the Spanish nation gives all her goodwill and spirit of service to make this independence effective.

It was always a desire of the Moroccans to see the unity of what, in an unfortunate moment for them, the Powers had separated, and we should congratulate ourselves that this administrative division (the material division never existed) should have been a means, in a difficult moment for Morocco, for the Moroccan people and the Spanish nation to show their loyalty to the Sultan and their rejection of the breaking of the treaties and violation of the Moroccan rights. Thus we should not be loyal to the sentiments of brotherhood which we feel for the Moroccans if we did not renew on this occasion our wish to respect the unity of the Empire and to offer the means necessary to make this unity effective.

My Government trusts that the full and effective exercise of the sovereignty of the Sultan over his territory will provide the Moroccan people with a great opportunity again to be masters of their destinies. An independence without a true sovereignty of Morocco would not respond to the spirit of the treaties wherein the unity of the Empire and the sovereignty of Morocco are inseparable terms.

Flying over our country you will no doubt have observed that there is no appreciable difference between the characteristics of the territories of our two

nations. The flora and fauna of our geography are a continuation of those you have in your country. Providence even designed that the same seas should wash our coasts.

You will find the same analogy between our countrymen, who, as a result of their meetings and neighbourliness throughout history, preserve affinities which time has been unable to obliterate. Thus, our common valuation of things spiritual, our love and cult of bravery, the practice of chivalry and loyalty to the pledged word are characteristics which grace the individuals of both countries. This explains why, having lived during long stretches of my life with the Moroccan people, I should feel this love for your country, a love shared by all of us who have served in the honourable task of returning to your country the culture and civilisation which, in turn, in distant days, your ancestors brought to us, leaving in our country and our language such important monuments and memories.

Since Spain and Morocco are bound by the proximity of their territories and the close ties of friendship, by neighbourliness established throughout history, the common interests of our two countries should be defined by close co-operation which would not be possible unless they both enjoyed the same degree of freedom to perceive such co-operation and if the development of the institutions did not respond in the future to an indegenous inspiration, free from foreign interference.

For this reason the Spanish Government must give the Moroccan Government the necessary facilities and aid so that these two postulates of unity and sovereign freedom may be fully achieved. The Moroccan Empire having thus reached a decision for its future, leads us to foresee a time to come in which the emancipation of other Mediterranean peoples and their rise in the economic and cultural order will permit the countries established on the shores of our Latin sea to safeguard and defend for themselves and in harmony, the peace, the order and the freedom of their communications.

ANNEX 3

TEXT OF THE JOINT HISPANO-MOROCCAN STATEMENT OF APRIL 7

The Spanish Government and H.I.M. Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, in the desire to achieve a singularly friendly arrangement, based upon reciprocity, for the purpose of strengthening their relations of lasting friendship and of consolidating peace in the area in which their respective countries are situated, have agreed to make public the following declaration:

1. The Spanish Government and H.I.M., considering that the régime established in Morocco in 1912 does not correspond to present reality, declare that the Convention signed in Madrid on the 27th of November, 1912, can no longer govern Hispano-Moroccan relations.

2. In consequence, the Spanish Government recognises the independence of Morocco, proclaimed by H.I.M. the Sultan Mohammed V and his full sovereignty, with all the attributes of the same, including diplomacy and army; the Spanish Government reiterates its determination to respect the territorial unity of the Empire guaranteed by the International Treaties; and undertakes to adopt the necessary measures to make it effective. The Spanish Government undertakes also to render to H.I.M. the Sultan the help and support mutually considered necessary, especially with regard to external relations and defence.

3. The negotiations opened in Madrid between the Spanish Government and H.I.M. Mohammed V are designed to conclude new accords between both parties, sovereign and equal, with the object of defining their free co-operation in the sphere of their common interests. These agreements will also guarantee, within the aforesaid particularly friendly spirit, the freedoms and rights of Spaniards established in Morocco and of Moroccans established in Spain, in the private, economic, cultural and social orders, on the basis of reciprocity and respect for their respective sovereignties.

4. The Spanish Government and H.I.M. the Sultan agree that, until the aforementioned accords are put into force, the relations between Spain and Morocco will be governed by the additional protocol and the present declaration.

TEXT OF THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

1. The legislative Power is exercised by His Majesty in full sovereignty. The representative of Spain will be informed in Rabat of the drafts of the " dahirs " and decrees which affect the interests of Spaniards and may formulate observations concerning them.

2. The powers exercised until now by the Spanish authorities in Morocco will be transferred to the Moroccan Government in the manner established by mutual agreement. The guarantees affecting Spanish officials in Morocco will be maintained.

3. The Spanish Government will assist the Moroccan Government in the organisation of its own army. The present status of the Spanish army in Morocco will remain in force during the period of transition.

4. The present situation of the peseta will not be modified until the conclusion of a new agreement on the matter.

5. From the date of the present declaration all visas and all administrative formalities required hitherto for the circulation of persons from one zone to the other are hereby abolished.

6. The Spanish Government will continue to assume the protection abroad of Moroccans, natives of the Zone previously designed by the Convention of 1912 and resident abroad until the Government of H.I.M. the Sultan shall take over the said function.

April 7, 1956.

JM 1641/26 No. 31

BRITISH CAPITULATORY RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES IN THE FORMER SPANISH ZONE OF MOROCCO

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Mr. Freese-Pennefather (Rabat)

(No. 77. Confidential) *Foreign Office, September 25, 1956.*

Sir,

You have represented, and I agree, that our capitulatory rights and privileges in what was the Spanish Zone of Morocco are now anachronistic; and that to attempt to retain them in the new independent Morocco would not only be unsuccessful but would prejudice our relations with Morocco.

2. Nevertheless, I agree that it would be premature to enter into full-scale negotiations with the Moroccan Government for the permanent abolition of the existing capitulatory régime until the Moroccan Government have concluded their negotiations over jurisdictional matters with France and Spain. Furthermore, I doubt if the Moroccan Government are in a position themselves to undertake such negotiations at the present time.

3. I therefore share your Excellency's view that we should take immediate steps to divest ourselves of the extra-territorial jurisdiction which we at present enjoy, since this privilege is the one most likely to alienate Moroccan opinion and to provoke the accusation that we are attempting to hold on to out-moded concessions in an independent State. I accordingly accept your proposal that a temporary protocol should be concluded with the Moroccan Government, renouncing our jurisdictional rights for the duration of a transitional period, pending a more comprehensive agreement. This protocol will, I hope, be as short and as simple as possible; and anything not directly and immediately required for the purpose of suspending the exercise of our extra-territorial jurisdiction should be excluded from its terms. The first draft of the protocol is now under examination here; and I hope shortly to send you the text for presentation to the Moroccan Government.

4. I also agree that it is desirable that we should make our intentions on this matter publicly clear. I understand that you favour a declaration by Her Majesty's Government to the Moroccan Government proposing that a provisional protocol on the lines described above should be concluded between the two Governments. I enclose a text for communication by you to the Moroccan Minister for Foreign Affairs, on which I should be grateful for your early observations. You will see that, in accordance with your advice, the declaration also proposes that the British postal system in the former zone should close down, and that arrangements for this purpose should be included in the protocol.

5. There remains the question of informing the Spanish Government of our intentions; which is dealt with in my despatch No. 166 to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid. Since Her Majesty's Government no longer have capitulatory rights or privileges in the former French Zone of Morocco, the French Government are not so directly concerned. But you should keep your French colleague generally informed.

6. You should inform the Moroccan Minister for Foreign Affairs that I wish to release this declaration for publication in London at an early date, and suggest to him that there would be advantage in issuing it at the same time in Rabat. I should also like to publish his reply.

7. Please report by telegraph Mr. Balfrej's reactions, repeating your telegram to Paris and Madrid.

8. I have sent copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Madrid, Tunis and Washington, and to Her Majesty's Consuls-General at Tangier and Tetuan.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

Enclosure

Declaration

Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom agree with the expressed hope of the Moroccan Government that the capitulatory rights and privileges at present enjoyed by Her Majesty's Government in

the United Kingdom should be abolished at the earliest possible opportunity.

2. The Moroccan Government will no doubt recognise that it would be difficult for Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom formally to abolish their capitulatory rights until the outcome of the present negotiations on matters of jurisdiction between Morocco on the one hand and Spain and France on the other is known.

3. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, mindful of the long period which may elapse before these negotiations are completed, are however prepared to conclude a temporary protocol renouncing, for the duration of the transitional period pending a more comprehensive agreement, their jurisdictional rights and privileges in the former Spanish Zone.

4. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are furthermore prepared to agree to the closing down of the British Post Office at Tetuan and propose to the Moroccan Government that the necessary arrangements for this purpose (which would include provision being made for a short period of grace during which the Post Office would continue to function) be included in the proposed temporary protocol.

APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

JM 1012/3

No. 32

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN THE NORTHERN ZONE OF MOROCCO

Mr. Pyman to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received June 11*)

(No. 38. Confidential) *Tetuan,*
Sir, *June 1, 1956.*

With reference to my despatch No. 45 of the 26th of September, 1955, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a revised report on leading personalities in the Northern Zone of Morocco.

I have, &c.

L. F. L. PYMAN.

Index

MOROCCAN

1. His Highness the Khalifa, Shereef Mulai al Hasan.
2. Abrisha.
3. Afailal.
4. Al 'Arosi.
5. Al Haddad.
6. Al Hajj.
7. Al Haskuri.
8. Al Morir.
9. Ash-Ash.
10. Baeza.
11. Benabud, Dr. Ahmad.
12. Benabud, Mohammad.
13. Benabud, Mohammad ben Mohammad. Ben al Bashir: see No. 7.
14. Benani, AbdusSalam.
15. Benani, Dris. Ben al Baraka: see No. 4.
16. Benmaman.
17. Ben Musa.
18. Ben 'Omar.
19. Ben Salah.
20. Bennuna, Dris.
21. Bennuna, Mehdi.
22. Bennuna, Tayyib.
23. Daoud.
24. Erzini, AbdusSalam.
25. Erzini, Mohammad.
26. Fasi.
27. Gannun.
28. Khatib.
29. Lalla Fatma.
30. Luh.
31. Mellali.
32. Meslohi.
33. Mesmudi.
34. Mulai Ahmad.
35. Mulai Arafa.
36. Mulai Ismail.
37. Mulai al Mahdi.
38. Mulai Mohammad ben al Hasan.
39. Mulai Mohammad ben al Mahdi.
40. Qaddawi.
41. Raisuni, Khalid.
42. Raisuni, Bil Mekki.
43. Skirej.
44. Tanji.
45. Temsamani.
46. Tenana.
47. Torres.
48. Uchen.
49. Um Kultum.
50. Yaish.
51. Zariuh.

SPANISH

101. Achútegui.
102. Alvarez Claro.
103. Aracáma Gorosabel.
104. Aragoncillo Sevilla.
105. Bellod.
106. Benet.
107. Bermejo y Gomez.
108. Bermejo y Lopez.
109. Casquero Medina.
110. Cuevas Fernandez.
111. Delgado Fernandez.
112. Dominguez Fernandez.
113. Gallego Suarez Somonte.
114. Garcia-Cuencas.
115. Garcia-Figueras.
116. Garcia-Sañudo.
117. Garcia-Valiño y Marcén.
118. Gasset y Diez de Ulzurrun.
119. Gomendio Ochoa.
120. Gomez Arroyo.
121. Gotarredona.
122. Herrero Muñoz.
123. Limia Perez.
124. Llord O'Lawlor.
125. Lopez Lopez.
126. Lopez Tienda.
127. Manso.
128. Mendizabal.
129. Oliver Rubio.
130. Perez del Rio.
131. Rivas Gonzalez.
132. Rodriguez Ruiz.
133. Salazar.
134. Santamaría Quesada.
135. Sentchordi.
136. Serrano.
137. Torres Martinez.
138. Trujillo Machacón. Valiño: see Garcia-Valiño.

MOROCCAN

1. Shereef Mulai al Hasan ben Mulai al Mahdi ben Mulai Ismail

Sultan's Khalifa or Caliph.

Born 1909 of a negress slave or concubine, but of direct Shereefian, *i.e.*, Mohammedan, descent from

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the Prophet's daughter and grandson of a former Sultan of Morocco. Is the second son of the first Spanish-zone Khalifa, who died in 1923. Was selected by the Spanish Government as the best of a poor lot to succeed his father, appointed by the Sultan, Sidi Mohammed V, who is his younger, second cousin, and installed as Khalifa, 11th November, 1925. Has three sons (*q.v.*), born of concubines. Married, 1949, Princess Lalla Fatma, daughter of former Sultan Mulai "Abdul" Aziz, by whom he has a daughter (*q.v.*). Celebrated silver jubilee, 1950.

Mulai Hasan was brought up to be a puppet ruler and lacks initiative. His submissiveness to the Spanish authorities has earned him the contempt of the local nationalists. After the deposition of Mohammad V his principal concern was to avoid, as far as possible, giving offence either to the deposed Sultan or to ben Arafa and to avoid positive actions which might identify him personally with one faction or the other. On the restoration of Mohammad V Mulai Hasan hastened to declare his allegiance. With the abrogation of the Franco-Spanish Convention of 1912 the juridical status of the Khalifate is somewhat doubtful but Mulai Hasan has so far continued, presumably at the Sultan's request, to perform his customary religious and ceremonial functions.

2. Si Abdul Wahid Abrisha

Born about 1902, of good family, and brought up in the house of the late Si Abdul Qadar Erzini, the leading British-protected Moor in the zone (*q.v.*). Was made Khalifa's Hajib or Chamberlain in 1932. Lacks any real education, but is well-liked and suited to his almost purely social duties of organising the entertaining.

3. Si Mohammad ben Tuhami Afailal

Born about 1881, a native of Tetuan and son of one of the leading families. Educated at the Qaraween University at Fez, he is completely lacking in any modern ideas or culture. Vizir for Islamic Justice, 1933–54; appointed to the Khalifian Privy Council, 1954. A man of private means, he had when in office the reputation of not accepting bribes.

4. Mohammad ben Baraka al 'Arosi

Born in the Beni 'Aros tribeland about 1905. Learnt a little of the Koran as a child and a little Spanish as a youth frequenting the Spanish Control, which gave him the position of "interpreter." When Major Trujillo was removed from that Control and put in charge of the Makhzan Income Department in Tetuan, Baraka followed and took such good advantage of his position that he is to-day believed to be very rich, having used Makhzan money to buy land and sell it to the Makhzan for personal profit at prices officially fixed by himself. He has invested his wealth largely in land in Tangier. Rais al Isteenaf Makhzani or President of the Administrative Court of Appeal from 1950 until summer 1954, when he was dismissed at the instance of the Spanish High Commission because he continually stirred up trouble between the Khalifa, with whom he was on very good terms, and the Spanish Administration.

Has taken care to keep in with the nationalists by giving money to party funds, and was rewarded with marks of Allal el Fasi's favour during the Sultan's visit to Tetuan in April 1956.

5. Si Ahmad ben Abdul Karim al Haddad

Born about 1893, of a middle-class family, and began his ascent as tutor to the Khalifa. Of a mediocre education and culture, except in religious matters. Has no presence, no character and little intelligence, but is modest and courteous, as well as superficial in his dealings. Was clerk in the Grand Vizir's office under ben 'Azuz and, when the latter's successor, Ahmad al Ganmia, died in 1943, was placed in charge of the Grand Vizirate, itself a small, impotent office, maintained by the Protecting Power like the rest of the native Government or Makhzan, *pour la forme*. He was made Grand Vizir in 1950.

Thoroughly subservient to the Spanish High Commission, he has received his reward in a comfortable material life and the periodic award of small financial favours.

He was used by the High Commission to present the Tetuan Petition at the gathering of January 21, 1954, and subsequently to present it to the Caudillo in Madrid in February 1954.

With the disappearance in April 1956 of the Tetuan Makhzan, retired into private life.

6. Si AbdesSalam al Hajj

Born about 1909, son of Mohammad al Hajj, who was regent during the minority of the present Khalifa. Little education. Well-to-do. Member of the National Reform Party (amalgamated with the Istiqlal, March 1956), and a close personal friend of Torres (*q.v.*). One of the notables from the Northern Zone nominated to attend the inaugural parade of the Moroccan army at Rabat in May 1956.

7. Si Ahmed ben al Bashir al Haskuri

Born about 1909, of a negress connected with the Khalifa's mother, who brought him up with the Khalifa after his mother's death. Dismissed from the household for some scandal, he lived in penury until given a job in the Basha's office in 1933. In 1938 was appointed Khalifa's Rais ad-Diwan or Comptroller of the Household. Has used this position to amass, partly by corrupt and partly by legitimate means, considerable wealth, some of which he shares with his master. Of evil moral reputation, he is also disliked and distrusted by his compatriots outside the palace. Is a Spanish tool and has at various times received appropriate rewards.

8. Al Faqih Mohammad al Morir

Born about 1885, a native of Tetuan and son of a leading family. Studied Islamic law and religion at the Qaraween University, Fez, and became first an 'Adil or judicial notary and then, when Spanish administration began, a clerk. Rose to be Qadhi or Judge of Tetuan during the Rif War and was made President of the Islamic Court of Appeal in 1934.

A man of lively intelligence and, through study, of surprisingly many-sided culture, owner also of one of the best Arabic libraries in all Morocco. Al Morir is a difficult man and has an excessive pride which deprives him of popular sympathy. Although as submissive as the rest of the Makhzan to Spanish wishes, he has not accepted any of the High Commission's illicit financial favours and lives as he always has, modestly.

9. Si M'Hammad Ash-Ash

Born about 1907. Uneducated, but picked up enough Spanish to become an interpreter to a local Spanish Controller and then became friendly with the zone's secretary-general, Colonel Capaz, who in 1935 gave him charge of the administration of the Babus or Pious Foundations, a post which he held until 1938. He so used the opportunities of handling the funds to enrich himself that a scandal ensued and he had to resign, but he is now one of the wealthiest Moors of the zone.

10. Si Mohammad Bulaish Baeza

Born about 1907. Became active in the meat trade, somehow lifted himself out of the ruck and is now very rich. Hold's a lawyer's diploma given in Madrid in 1944 under shady circumstances. Owns and directs the bi-lingual daily *El Dia/An Nahar* and the leading Tetuan hotel and has a hand in most local big business. He has powerful friends on all sides, helping even the former High Commissioner, General Beigbeder.

Married to a Spanish woman who was notoriously anti-British during the war.

Since he can be relied on to take a pro-Spanish line he is produced by the Spaniards at Press Conventions and other suitable occasions as a prime example of Hispano-Moroccan brotherhood.

His paper is bitterly anti-French, because of his own convictions as well as, since August 1953, of the High Commission's instructions.

11. Dr. Ahmad Benabud

Born about 1915, third son of the late British-protected person, Si Hamed Benabud, a brother of No. 12. Studied for three years at the Tetuan Free Institute and was sent by his father in 1931 to the Nablus "An-Niyah" School in Palestine, where he matriculated. Went on, still at his father's expense, to study medicine in Cairo, where he qualified and, in 1951, completed his training with two years' practice at the Kasr El Aini Hospital. Studied at the Cincinnatti Hospital, United States, for a two-years' post-graduate course and has now returned to Tetuan and set up in practice.

Speaks very good English and is a likeable man. Has strong Nationalist sympathies. Is Tetuan correspondent of "The American Friends of the Middle East" and maintains close touch with the United States Legation in Tangier.

Is expected (June 1956) to receive a governmental appointment from the Moroccan Government.

12. Si Mohammad Benabud

Born about 1910, eldest son of the late British-protected person, Si Hamed Benabud. A successful and none too scrupulous merchant. Ambitious and keen on money. Was offered the post of Minister of Finance in the Makhzan in the reshuffle of December 1954, but refused it as he thought that at present he could make more money outside.

Since the restoration of Mohammad V has reinsured by contributing to Istiqlal party funds.

13. Si Mohammad ben Mohammad Benabud

Born in Mazagan about 1900. Attended only a Koranic school. Was a draper until 1946, when he was selected by a former Governor as President of the Tetuan Municipal Council, which post he held for the rest of the period of the Spanish Protectorate and still holds.

No relation to Nos. 11 and 12.

14. Si AbdusSalam Benani

Son of No. 15. Born in Fez about 1921. Educated at the Tetuan Free Institute, whence he went to Egypt in 1938 to study law. Returned qualified and practised in Tangier. Member of the Committee of the National Reform-Istiqlal Party in Tetuan.

15. Haj Dris Benani

Born in Fez about 1887 of a poor but distinguished family. Received a rudimentary education at the Qaraween University and has served all his adult life in Customs, of which he was appointed head in 1935, except for a brief spell in 1934 as Basha of Arzila. Speaks no foreign language but has always obeyed Spanish orders and has thus been enabled to live in comfort and idleness.

16. Benmaman, Jacob

Moroccan Jew, born in Tetuan 1900. Married, has no children. Honorary Portuguese Vice-Consul. Past-president of the Jewish community. Self-important.

17. Si Mohammad ben Abdul Qader ben Musa

Born about 1873, a native of Marrakesh, but lived long in Larache. Religiously educated and has no modern veneer. Is a close friend of the Khalifa, through whom he rose from obscurity to be Vizir for Habus or Pious Foundations in 1937.

Relinquished this post in December 1954 and was appointed to the Khalifa's Privy Council.

Ben Musa is one of the leading poets of his place and day and a subtle writer of the old school. Of a mottled mousey appearance he also is reputed to have done himself well, speculating with the capital of the innumerable religious legacies which have been made by the pious for all sorts of beneficent objects in addition to the feeding of the needy.

18. Dr. Ahmed ben 'Omar

Born about 1915. Studied in Melilla whence he went as a scholarship student to Madrid, where he obtained a medical degree in 1940. On his return to Morocco as a fully qualified doctor he had the same experience as Skirej (*q.v.*) with whom he now shares consulting rooms. Specialises in consumptive diseases and is highly regarded by his fellow countrymen.

19. Al Yazid ben Tayyib ben Salah

Born about 1892 in Beni Erzin of a leading Ghomari family. Studied at the Qaraween University of Fez. After serving under Abdul Karim and helping him to force the disorderly Spanish retreat of 1921 to Sheshawen, he was bribed by the Spaniards to rise against the Rifian leader and eventually rewarded, first with the Qaidship of the tribes and in 1932 with the Bashaship of Sheshawen. He was promoted to be Governor (Basha) of Tetuan in 1951.

Ben Salah is the best-read and most cultivated of the zone's tribal leaders. His well-filled library is said to contain unpublished Andalusian manuscripts of considerable value. His business acumen is also great and he enriches himself by the various means which his office affords. Was one of the Moorish Commission which took the Tetuan Petition to the Caudillo in Madrid in February 1954.

20. Si Dris Bennuna

Born about 1925. Brother of No. 21 and No. 22. Educated at the Tetuan Free Institute and went to Madrid with a scholarship to study in the Catholic Institute of Arts and Industries, reputedly the best engineering course in Spain. Finished brilliantly in 1948, but on his return to Morocco was palmed off with the small Elementary Technical Institute where he is still principal and doing good work training Moroccans as electricians, mechanics and so on. In 1953 was offered by the British Council facilities for advanced study in the United Kingdom, but was not allowed by the Spanish authorities to accept the offer; he was, however, allowed to go to the United States for a short course. Has strong nationalist sympathies and is a member of the National Reform-Istiqlal Party. Since the declaration of Moroccan independence has been helping his brother (21) to set up Moroccan trade unions under Istiqlal auspices.

21. Si Mehdi ben Haj AbdusSalam Bennuna

Born about 1916, second brother of No. 22. After an education in Palestine returned to Tetuan but went off again to Egypt, where he became the editor of a Cairo newspaper, *Az-Zaman*. On his return home went into business but, as a keen nationalist, preferred politics and was sent in 1947 by the National Reform Party to New York to establish contact with United States public opinion on the Moroccan problem. He lectured widely and wrote articles, and became known to the United Nations Organisation. Returned to Tangier shortly before Torres (*q.v.*) and with him was forbidden re-entry to the Spanish Zone and lived an exile's life until able to return, under the Valiño régime, in 1952. Was able to make good money, however, with the North American Construction Company in French Morocco until forced by the French to leave.

Since May 1954 editor of the National Reform Party organ, *Al Umma*. Appointed Tetuan sub-agent (under Madrid) of the United Press. Shares in the commercial profits of his brother Tayyib (*q.v.*) and devotes some of the money to the nationalist cause.

Began the clandestine organisation of Moroccan trade unions in December 1955 and brought his activities into the open when Moroccan independence and unification were declared. Organised the first May Day labour rally at Tetuan on May 1, 1956.

Speaks English well, French and Spanish. An intelligent and plausible man who is well liked by his fellow countrymen both within the National Reform Party and outside it. Tubercular.

22. Si Tayyib ben Haj AbdusSalam Bennuna

Born about 1909 of a large and respected Tetuan family. After elementary Koranic studies, was sent by his father to "An-Nayah" school at Nablus in Palestine and thence to the American College at Istanbul, but on his father's death in 1934 had to leave his studies uncompleted.

For long served as unpaid teacher in the Free Institute and on the death of the first secretary-general of the National Reform Party succeeded him and has devoted his time and talents, which are above the average, to the Nationalist cause, plus a little business. In 1937 he accompanied Torres (*q.v.*) to Cairo, but not in 1947, remaining behind to lead the party, of which in 1938 he had been appointed secretary-general, and prepare a triumphant reception on his leader's return. Suffered with him, as a result, exile in Tangier, from which he returned in 1952. While in Tangier, visited the French Zone and was instrumental in securing agreement between the Istiqlal and his party.

With his brothers owns a general store in Tetuan for the supplying of which the Spanish authorities give him import licences; has become rich by selling goods on hire purchase at usurious rates of interest.

In December 1953 was arrested by the Spanish authorities for writing letters to people outside the zone allegedly defamatory to the High Commissioner and the Khalifa, detained without trial for some three months, then sentenced to ten years' banishment and almost immediately pardoned.

After the Tetuan riots early in March 1956 showed a high degree of responsibility in calming down the population and has since consistently used his influence to discourage violence.

23. Si Mohammad Daoud

Born about 1901. Studied at the Qaraween University of Fez, where he completed learning the Koran by heart. Early showed Nationalist leanings and in 1925 helped found the first modern free school in Morocco. In 1923 he founded the periodical, *As-Salaam, The Peace*, and shortly afterwards the purely Moorish printing company, "Al Mahdiya." In 1934 he prepared the first Moroccan calendar, which was prohibited under the Spanish Republican régime. Has visited all the Arab countries of the Middle East and met many leading men but has never actually joined a political party.

Was given the directorship of the Middle East and met many leading men but has never actually joined a political party.

Was given the directorship of Moorish education in 1942 but made no mark except in leaving it when, in 1947, he issued a manifesto, exposing the Spanish administration's conduct of native education. This was published by the National Reform Party, the leader of which had been his pupil.

Since giving up his official post has engaged in historical writing and lecturing. Strongly nationalist in sentiment.

24. Si AbdusSalam Erzini

Born about 1884, of a leading and highly respected Tetuan family with distant origins in the Ghomara mountain tribe of Beni Erzin.

Inherited the status of a British-protected person from his father, Si Abdul Qader, to whom it was granted for hospitality and help to the Royal Navy when, before 1913, its ships used to anchor in Tetuan bay to take on water and supplies. His principal interest is the safeguarding of the family properties in all three zones of Morocco. Is reputed by his compatriots to be mean but is otherwise of good reputation. Unmarried.

25. Haj Mohammad Erzini

Born about 1895, only brother of AbdusSalam, than whom he is more popular as he is more open-handed. Has considerable nationalist sympathies. His only son, AbdulQader, is studying agriculture in England.

26. Si Mohammad ben Haj AbdusSalam el Fasi

Born about 1914. Learned the Koran by heart. Educated first at the Tetuan "Ahliya" School, then at the Nablus "An-Nayah" School in Palestine and finally at Robert College, Istanbul, where he studied engineering and completed his studies with a good record.

On his return to Morocco he was employed for a short time only by the Public Works Department as overseer but forced out by his Spanish competitors. Succeeded Torres (*q.v.*) as director of the Free Institute, teaching mathematics, chemistry and physics. In 1946 was sent by the Khalifa to Cairo as a member of a Cultural Commission and there spoke so openly against the Spanish Zone régime that he was forbidden re-entry.

Speaks very good English with an American accent, as well as Spanish. An active man with Western ideas.

Member of the National Reform-Istiqlal Party.

27. Si Abdullah Abdessamad Gannun

Born at Fez about 1907. Has lived mostly in Tangier, but was for a time a professor of the Qaraween University at Fez. Has written much on literary and theological subjects. Knows Spanish and French well.

A personal friend of Mohammad V. After the latter's deposition he associated himself with his cause and moved to Tetuan where he was appointed Director of the Mulay Hasan Cultural Institute. Appointed Minister of Justice in the Makhzan, December 1954. Resigned January 1956 as he was not prepared to collaborate with the Spanish authorities in their schemes for the reorganisation of the Makhzan.

28. Si Mohammad el Khatib

Born about 1915. Educated at the Tetuan Free Institute and went with a scholarship to Egypt, where he entered the Cairo School of Applied Engineering. On his return was taken up by the Department of Education and Culture and put in charge of the physics and mathematics classes at the Moroccan Institute of Secondary Education in Tetuan. Is also on the Board of Examiners. A moderate nationalist.

29. Lalla Fatma, Princess

Khalifa's wife. Born about 1921, in Tangier, to the former Sultan Mulai "Abdul" Aziz in his retirement there.

Married on the 5th June, 1949, to the Khalifa, she gave birth to a daughter in March 1950.

She is the Khalifa's first and so far only wife and was brought up in Tangier completely emancipated from the normal bonds of Islam on women. She has, however, had to adapt herself to this hareem life of a Moorish princess. Speaks French and English well. Owns property in Tangier.

30. El Arbi el Luh

Born about 1905 in the Rif. His brother was a Caid under Abdul Karim. Studied in the theological institute at Tunis. Entered the service of the Makhzan in 1930, rising to the post of Chief Secretary to the Grand Vizir. Appointed Minister of Pious Foundations, December 1954. Has a reputation among his fellow countrymen for energy and honesty.

31. Si Mohammad ben el Haj Mustafa el Mellali

Born in the Kholot about 1882. Entered Sultan Mulai Hafidh's service when young and Spanish service in 1911. Is quite uneducated and very autocratic. Appointed Basha of Alcazarquivir in 1933. November 1954 appointed Representative (Naib) of the Grand Vizir for the Western Region of the Spanish Zone. A corrupt, rapacious and oppressive governor.

32. Ahmad ben Mohammad ben Allal Meslohi

Born in the Ghomara about 1895. Succeeded his father, under appointment from the then rebel, Raisuni, as Qaid of the Telata of Beni Ahmad. Joined the Spaniards soon after his territory was overrun by the Rifs in 1925 and was renamed Qaid after Abdul Karim's defeat. Forcibly recruited Moorish tribesmen for Franco's crusade and in 1941 was awarded the campaign medal with special "Vanguard" insignia. Introduced in his tribeland in 1946 a repressive and lucrative system of forcible land purchase which drove numbers of tribesmen to the capital, but their grievances went unredressed. Appointed Basha or Governor of Chauen, 1950.

A thoroughly unpopular governor but one well supported by the Spanish Administration.

33. Hasan ben Ahmad Mesmudi

Born about 1925 of Moroccan parents living in Egypt. Came to Tetuan in 1946. Since 1947 has been editor of *Al Maarifa*, the organ, appearing intermittently, of the Shura (Democratic) Party.

34. Shereef Mulai Ahmad ben al Mahdi

Khalifa's younger brother.

Born about 1915 of a concubine. Little seen, of no political importance. Has a reputation for lechery. April 1955, married Lalla Hasania bent Mulay Laarbi ben Abdulhadi al Alawi.

35. Shereef Mulai 'Arafa

Born about 1920. Eldest son of Mulay ben 'Arafa, who became Sultan in August 1953. Married the Khalifa's sister in 1948. Lived in Tetuan until December 1953, when, because of his awkward position in the dynastic question, he moved to Rabat. Summer 1955 moved to Tangier.

36. Shereef Mulai Ismail ben al Hasan

Khalifa's third son. Born about 1934.

37. Shereef Mulai al Madhi ben al Hasan

Khalifa's eldest son.

Born about 1929 of a concubine. Educated from 1937 until 1941 in Egypt, then in Spain, where in 1951 he graduated in law at Madrid University. The most educated and presentable member of the Khalifian family, but to the point of knowing more Spanish than Arabic and having Spanish friends, many of them female, in preference to Moorish. Is classed by his former associates as stupid and lazy. Knows a little English. Is studying engineering.

Was used by his father as a confidential messenger to and from the Sultan during the Madrid negotiations in April 1956.

38. Shereef Mulai Mohammad ben al Hasan

Khalifa's second son.

Born about 1931, of a concubine. Insignificant.

39. Shereef Mulai Mohammad ben al Mahdi

Khalifa's elder brother.

Known as El Gordo, "Fat One." Married to a Spaniard. Born about 1907 of a slave or concubine. Head of his brother's so-called Privy Council, which hardly ever meets and was created in 1948 by the last High Commissioner as a check to the National Reform Party. Is also honorary colonel of the Khalifian Mehalla or Guard, whose uniform he invariably wears. Swarthy. Very short and fat but powerful. Well practised in turning his rank to financial account.

40. Si Mohammad ben Omar Qaddawi

Born about 1891 in the Rif, where he grew up virtually unschooled except in the repetitive reading of the Koran and then passed on this smattering of the first two R's to others in the Koranic schools of the Rural Rif. When the mountains were occupied by Spain he sided with the Spaniards and was rewarded with the Qaidship of several tribes consecutively and, when General Varela introduced his Makhzan "reforms" in 1948, was selected as about the only presentable Rifi to put at the head of the so-called Ministry of Agriculture and Production, which office he held until the amalgamation of the northern and southern zones in April 1956.

41. Mulai Mohammad Khalid ben Ahmad Raisuni

Born about 1901, son of the notorious bandit Shereef Raisuli or Raisuni, from whom he inherits lust for power and a ruthless cruelty. The best educated and the most absolute of the Hispanophil Moorish governors. Made Basha of Larache in 1934. Since his appointment he has amassed enormous wealth, including houses, land and cattle, partly by confiscation, imprisonments and floggings, on occasions to death: *i.e.*, by uncontrolled abuse of power; also the use of various favours, such as import and export permits given by the Spanish administration. Popular resentment at his cruelty and avarice broke out in an attack on him in April 1956, in the course of which his house was sacked, a number of his retainers and friends slaughtered and he himself had to flee. Is now thought to be in Spain.

Is part-owner, amongst other things, of the Tangier bull-ring. He consorts with and is said to be married to a Spanish officer's widow.

42. Mohammad bil Mekki Raisuni
Born about 1880, a native of Tetuan and son of a distinguished and popular branch of the famous (when not infamous) Raisuni family. Although he lacks education and culture, he is pleasant in his dealings and plainly modest, qualities which, with his proved honesty, have won him popular esteem. Was named director of Makhzan properties, equivalent to our Crown Lands, by the Khalifa's father in 1922 and promoted Vizir for Finance and Crown Lands when General Varela " reformed " the Makhzan in 1948. Held office until the amalgamation of the zones in April 1956.

Bil Mekki Raisuni also controls the large assets and revenues of the Historic Raisuni Zawis or Pilgrims' Guest Rest House at Tazerut in the Beni Aros mountains, where his bloodthirsty and notorious relative the brigand Shereef once lived and held his prisoners, like Mr. Walter B. Harris, to ransom; and by way of contrast Bil Mekki is a model of honour and rectitude.

43. Dr. Mohammad Skirej
Born about 1914. Educated locally, then entered the Faculty of Medicine at Granada University, where he qualified, visiting Egypt meanwhile. Returned to Tetuan and set up in private practice. Immediately on return seems to have met with some difficulties on the Spanish side. Is now Assistant Head of the Children's Section of the Civil Hospital.

44. Si Mohammad Tanji
Born at Tetuan about 1904. Educated at the Qaraween University at Fez and Al Azhar in Cairo. Is a professor of theology, writes much on religious subjects and preaches in the mosques. A prominent member of the National Reform Party. In 1936 and again in 1937, when Torres was in charge of the Department of Pious Foundations, Tanji was his chief assistant, resigning when he did on each occasion.

Tanji became very popular as a result of his active opposition to the Spanish Administration in Morocco in 1948, when he was imprisoned and heavily fined. Was appointed Deputy Leader of the party in 1954. Appointed secretary-general to the Ministry of Social Affairs in the Spanish zone, January 1955.

Resigned March 1956, after the issue of the Franco-Moroccan declaration of Moroccan independence.

45. AbdusSalam ben Ahmad Temsamani
Born in the Rif about 1902. For many years right-hand man of Mekki al Nasiri, leader of the Moroccan Unity Party. In 1952 gave up his connection with Nasiri and returned to Tetuan from Tangier. Appointed Secretary-General in the Grand Viziriate May 1955.

Since the Hispano-Moroccan declaration of April 1956 has acted as an informal intermediary between the Moroccan authorities in Rabat on the one hand and the Khalifa and the Spanish administration on the other.

46. Mohammad Tenana
Born about 1895. Expert in Moslem law; notary public. A Nationalist since 1930 and a member of the committee of the National Reform Party since its foundation in 1937. Generally respected.

47. Si AbdulKhaliq Torres
Born in 1905 of a leading Andalusian-Arab family and grandson of one of the Sultan's best-known Ministers for Foreign Affairs, who represented Morocco at the Algeciras Conference. Learned the Koran when young and studied theology and Arabic at the Fez Qaraween University, and later the history and legislation of Morocco, which he is said to have mastered. Speaks excellent Spanish and learnt French during a two-year stay in Paris. In 1932 toured Europe, including England. On his return, founded the Moroccan Students' Association and has ever since been closely identified with the cause of Moorish education. Founded the Free Institute in 1935, the first secondary school in Morocco.

Founded the National Reform Party in 1936 and has been its leader ever since. In 1937 represented Morocco at the Pan-Islamic Conference in Cairo, where his speech made a considerable impression. After an outspoken speech in Tetuan in 1946 criticising General Varela's native policy and a special audience of the Sultan in Tangier, Torres again went to Cairo where he saw much of Abdul-Karim al Khatabi. As a result, his return to Tetuan was forbidden and a small riot followed, but he had to remain in exile in Tangier until invited to return in 1952 by General Valiño. In January 1955 was appointed Minister of the newly-created Ministry of Social Affairs.

Torres is able but venal and ambitious. During the war he took Germany money without doing anything much to earn it.

On his return to Tetuan in 1952 he followed a policy of co-operation with the Spanish High Commission which at times severely strained the loyalty of a section of the National Reform Party; his acceptance of office under the Spaniards further accentuated this strain and lost him some of his prestige with the general public, which took it as evidence that he was concerned chiefly with his own personal advancement. But despite all this he remained the unchallenged leader of the National Reform Party and the focus of the aspirations of the Nationalists of the Spanish Zone. He considerably enhanced his prestige in January 1956 by resigning his portfolio and declining to countenance Spanish plans to reorganise the Makhzan on separatist lines. In March 1956 he arranged the fusion of the National Reform Party with the Istiqlal Party, becoming a member of the Istiqlal Executive Committee.

48. Caid Omar Uchen
Born about 1875. Since 1947 Representative (Naib) of the Grand Vizir in the eastern region of the Spanish zone. Corrupt, unpopular and of poor education; it is widely remembered against him that he helped the Spaniards against AbdulKarim.

49. Um Kultum, Princess
Born to the Khalifa and Princess Lalla Fatma on March 24, 1950.

50. Si Mohammad Luali ben Dris ben Yaish
Born about 1896, a native of Larache, of a family that has long served in Sultanic households. Khalifa's Qaid al Meshwar or Master of Ceremonies from about 1930 until 1955. His two brothers also serve the Khalifa. Quite uneducated, but has picked up fluent Spanish and a Spanish wife. Is, nevertheless, bringing up his children as strict Moslems. Has a kindly nature which makes him popular, a rarity among Masters of the Audience Chamber. Not much in Spanish favour, however, probably because he once supported the Frente Popular, yet well protected by the Khalifa, with whom he shares many of his pickings, business and other.

51. Si Mohammad ben Hammu Zariuh
Born at Khadia, near Villa Nador, in the eastern region of Spanish Morocco in 1912, approximately. Studied Islamic law and theology at the Azhar University in Cairo.

He lived mostly at Villa Nador but in April 1952 founded in Tetuan, under Spanish auspices, the " Maghrib Al Hor " (" Free Morocco ") political party.

Has a certain following in the Kert region and in the Spanish " plan " represents the Kert in the Makhzan. Is poorly regarded by the National Reform Party.

Appointed Minister of Education and Culture in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, January 1955. Resigned March 1956 when he saw that to continue in office in the Spanish-controlled Makhzan would cause him to be regarded as a traitor. In March 1956 amalgamated his party with the Shura (Democratic) Party.

Spanish

101. Achutegui, Agustin
Director of the Moroccan State Bank. Delegate for Finance 1952–January 1954. Intelligent. Staunch Catholic. Lives quietly with his wife and two children.

102. Alvarez Claro, Rafael
Born in Malaga about 1892. Was foreman in the docks. Later set up an insurance and shipping agency in Melilla and laid the foundations of his fortune as an army contractor during the Rif War. He subsequently rendered similar valuable services to the Franco Party during the uprising. He suffered many ups and downs, but was finally elected Mayor of Melilla in 1940.

As mayor he is reliably reputed to have used his position to foster his own private interests. He also embarked on a lavish programme of public building, much of which has been criticised as wasteful.

In 1952 was appointed Acting Head of the Department of Economics, Industry and Commerce of the Spanish Zone by his friend Garcia-Valiño; promoted Head of the Department in February 1955. President of the Hispano-Moroccan Press Association from 1954.

Thanks to his friendship with the High Commissioner and his power to grant or withhold import, export and foreign exchange licences, he is one of the most powerful men in the zone and is not neglecting the resulting opportunities to enrich himself. Has a forceful character and an outwardly genial manner; his size testifies to his love of good living. Married; several children.

After the Hispano-Moroccan declaration of Moroccan independence entered into confidential private negotiations with certain nationalists with a view to securing a privileged position for himself and his friends in the new Morocco.

103. Aracama Gorosabel, Lieutenant-Colonel Juan
Doctor. Physician to the High Commission and to H.I.H. the Khalifa, with whom his wife is very friendly. Is director of the Military Hospital. Is well-off, having business interests and appreciable property. Is said to be pro-masonic and to have been protected during the Spanish Civil War by the Khalifa. Professionally he is quick to reject responsibility by calling in other doctors. Socially he is easy to get on with, also clever at worming his way into remunerative official posts.

He is married for the second time and has six children.

104. Aragoncillo Sevilla, Cipriano
Born in Malaga 1906. Married. The outstanding Spanish lawyer in Spanish North Africa: honorary legal adviser to this Consulate-General. Engages in business, in which he is associated with Alvarez Claro (*q.v.*), as well as in the law; has become very prosperous and is sometimes too busy to attend properly to all the legal work which he undertakes.

105. Bellod, Antonio
Born 1898. Lawyer by profession is one of Tetuan Court's judges. A widower. Lives a retired life, but is agreeable company.

106. Benet, Rafael
Catalan by origin. Born about 1905. The leading merchant industrialist of Tetuan, owning a paper mill, exporting various commodities and holding a number of import agencies including the profitable Mercedes-Benz agency. A self-made man, industrious, tough and capable, who is now one of the richest men in the zone, in close relations with Alvarez Claro (*q.v.*). A friend of the High Commissioner with whom he goes shooting. Strongly pro-Nazi during the war, as was his wife.

107. Bermejo y Gomez, José Maria
January 1954 appointed Delegate-General in the Spanish High Commission (for earlier career see Madrid Personalities). Has not made any great mark on the administration and does not conceal his desire to return to diplomatic employment; on first arriving in Tetuan found it irksome that the colonels and majors on the High Commissioner's personal staff had so much more real power than he did, but is now apparently reconciled to the position.

Is good company and, for foreign representatives, a refreshing change from the average local official. Unpopular with other Spaniards here, by whom he is regarded as dry, aloof, and (because he has launched something of an anti-noise campaign) eccentric.

108. Bermejo y Lopez, José, Colonel
Born about 1900. Promoted Delegate for Education and Culture, February 1954, from his previous post of Deputy Head of the Department of Native Affairs. At an earlier stage in his career was Governor of Sidi Ifni. A quiet man with an agreeable manner. American wife.

109. Casquero Medina, José Maria
Married; has children; born about 1910. Staff Major. Formerly Head of the Protectorate Secretariat, May 1956, Political Secretary to the High Commissioner. Intelligent and agreeable. Gets on very well with the present High Commissioner who uses him as a means of contact with the Moors when he wishes to by-pass the Native Affairs Department.

110. Cuevas, Fernandez
Brigadier-General.
Commands the Lukus (Western) Command. Reputed a good soldier and agreeable company.

111. Delgado Fernandez, Manuel
Born about 1895. Appointed Delegate for Public Works, 1954. Widower with a daughter in Tetuan married to Pi Cuchi, Technical Secretary of the Department of Economics. Personal friend of the High Commissioner. An honest but not very effective administrator.

112. Dominguez Fernandez, Salvador
Born about 1905, a widower. Secretary in the " Delegación General " and official in the Administrative Corps. Staunch Falangist of the old brigade (*camisas viejas*).

113. Gallego Suarez Somonte, Manuel
Born about 1896, married; has children. Air Force General. Holds position of General-in-Chief of the Air Force in Morocco. Has an unpleasant character and grossly ill-treats the personnel under him. Lives in a villa taken in the name of the Air Force and has spent a lot of public money in repairing it. He has it staffed with Air Force personnel as cooks, messengers, boot-blacks, guards, &c., and is reputed to make a lot of money using Air Force planes to fly contraband into Spain. A great frequenter of the clubs and cinemas. Is very full of his own importance and claims that, as senior general in the zone after the High Commissioner, he should take precedence over the Delegate-General.

114. Garcia Cuencas, Tomás
Born about 1896. Retired colonel, now head of the Veterinary Service. Has lived in Morocco for many years. Was attached to the Spanish Consulate-General in Tangier during his military career. Has a French wife. Sociable.

115. Garcia-Figueras, Tomás
Born about 1890. Widower. Starting life as an artillery officer has made his career in Morocco which he has studied deeply. Is a prolific writer on Moroccan questions. Held a number of administrative posts, including those of Delegate successively for Economics and Education, before being appointed Delegate for Native Affairs in 1952. This is one of the key posts in the administration since the Delegate for Native Affairs controls both the police and the District Administrative Officers (Interventores), who are the backbone of the Spanish administration; he has brought to this task an unusual capacity for sustained hard work (he reaches his office at 8 every morning) and a firm determination to keep all effective power in the zone in Spanish hands. For this latter reason he is detested by the Nationalists.

A Falangist and friend of Serrano Suñer in his pro-Nazi days, he is believed to stand well with Franco.

116. Garcia-Sañudo y Giraldo, Manuel
Born about 1904. Newspaperman. Married and has children. Time-server. Claims to be a friend of the English and indeed often supplies the Consulate-General with news and views, sometimes of some value. Amateur poet. Politically "Requeté."

117. Garcia-Valiño y Marcen, Lieutenant-General Rafael
In March 1951 appointed Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco, Governor-General of the State Territories and Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Morocco. For his earlier career, military reputation and reputed ambitions in Metropolitan Spain see Madrid Personalities.

Until the situation altered radically with the Hispano-Moroccan Declaration of April 1956 the main task of any Spanish High Commissioner was to keep order and to maintain the authority of the Spanish Government and this task Garcia-Valiño efficiently fulfilled. He has also shown himself to be a careful and methodical administrator.

His conception of his role involves much self-glorification and he has surrounded himself with an apparatus of pomp and ceremony and an aura of inaccessibility and infallibility. He has also developed a manner, which, with its frigid solemnity, has done much to make him unpopular with his fellow-countrymen in Morocco; his reputation for using his position to make money is a further cause of unpopularity, not least with those who envy him the opportunities for enrichment denied to themselves. In general it can be said that among Spaniards here he is feared but not liked, except perhaps by some State functionaries for whom he has obtained much-needed improvements in pay. A further cause of criticism among Spaniards, especially in Ceuta and Melilla, is that he is alleged to pay too much attention to the Moors and to neglect the interests of the Spanish business communities.

Certainly Garcia-Valiño has built himself up as the Champion of Hispano-Moroccan "brotherhood." The first significant manifestation of this trend occurred in 1952 when he permitted Torres (*q.v.*) to return from exile and to revive the National Reform Party which had been suppressed by Varela in 1948. The experiment was not at first very successful, but the situation was radically transformed by the French deposition of Mohammad V in August 1953; thus provided with a cause which united Spain and the Nationalists. Garcia-Valiño had for over two years a clear field in which to proclaim the doctrine of brotherhood and the advantages to Moroccans of Spanish friendship, supplementing his words with various deeds, *e.g.*, granting asylum to fugitives from the French Zone and permitting Tetuan press and radio to be used for pro-Nationalist and anti-French propaganda. As a further gesture to Nationalist sentiment he reshuffled the Makhzan in 1954 and in January 1955 brought Torres into it at the head of the newly-created Ministry of Social Affairs. But he did not give the Makhzan any increased authority and made it clear in his public statements that his policy was to advance slowly.

The resignations of Torres and Gannun in January 1956 brought his experiment in collaboration with the local nationalists to an end. Thereafter Garcia-Valiño concentrated on securing his own position *vis-à-vis* the Sultan; he was rewarded by a formal acknowledgment of his services during Mohammed V's visit to Tetuan in April 1956 and subsequently by the special reception accorded him by the Sultan at Rabat when he attended the inaugural parade of the Moroccan army in May 1956, to which he contributed a detachment of Moroccan troops from the northern zone.

As far as British interests are concerned, he has shown himself amenable to argument; and when he has given decisions favourable to us he has carried them out faithfully.

In his private life he is a devoted family man (he has seven children). His recreation is shooting, of which he is extremely fond.

118. Gasset y Diez de Ulzurrun, Eduardo, Conde de Peñarrubias
Appointed Head of the Diplomatic Cabinet May 1955, on transfer from Zürich. Has the rank of Counsellor. His wife is of the Garvey sherry family

He is affable in manner and plainly anxious to keep relations with foreign representatives as cordial as possible.

119. Gomendio Ochoa, José Eugenio
Manages the Lukus Company which produces and exports large quantities of oranges from its properties near Larache. Reputed to be a good organiser. Pro-Nazi during the war, now sends his children to school in England.

120. Gomez Arroyo, Francisco
Born in Granada about 1892. Retired army general. Doctor. Director of the zone's Civil Health Services. Not particularly well qualified for the post which he holds as recompense for his excellent military record. Staunch Catholic; was very strict in his soldiering days.

121. Gotarredona, Ramon, Brigadier-General
Appointed Chief of Staff of the Army of Morocco, August 1955. Reputed in army circles to have a bad temper.

122. Herrero Muñoz, Luis
Born about 1910. Captain in the Air Force Medical Services. Also has a private practice. Married to the daughter of a former artillery officer, commanding in Seville in July 1936 who was executed by Queipo de Llano for refusing to take part in the uprising. Herrero himself is very Catholic and a Fascist (*camisa vieja*). Dr. Herrero is at present studying English, but he used to deride others who were doing so before the end of the last world war. Although he now shows himself very friendly, he was not so formerly when friends were needed. He is said to have no scruples about using his political and official influence to better his position even at the expense of his friends and companions. Nevertheless he is pleasant and entertaining company. His wife is the local tennis champion.

123. Limia Perez, Adolfo
Born about 1897; married; has children. Head of the Spanish Zone Customs. Is an exceptionally hard-working and honest man and a staunch supporter of the administration's interests, who does not admit "recommendations" concerning official matters "sub-judice" (seizures of contraband, &c.). Has always done his utmost to satisfy our consular requests. Reliable and friendly. A monarchist.

124. Llord O'Lawlor, Manuel
Widower with children. Was at one time Head of the Makhzan Properties, where, it seems, he took bribes. Now Municipal Judge. Anglophobe.

125. Lopez Lopez, José
Born about 1892. One of the zone's administrative officials. Has lived for some thirty-five years in Tetuan. Holds the minor position of archivist to the Finance Department, but having been friendly with most of the now senior officers at various stages in their Moroccan careers is on good terms with them all and ranks as something of a local celebrity. Vice-president of the Hispano-Moroccan Press Association.

126. Lopez Tienda, Joaquin, Brigadier-General
November 1954 appointed to command the Jebala command. A courteous and agreeable man with artistic tastes; fond of cards.

127. Manso, Gumersindo, Brigadier-General
Sub-Inspector of the Khalifian Forces. Born about 1892, married with one son. Of good personal and professional reputation.

Since April 1956 has come to the fore as a link between the Spanish High Commissioner on one side and the Khalifa and the Moroccan leaders on the other.

128. Mendizabal, Eduardo
Born about 1920. 1954, promoted from Assistant Public Prosecutor to Public Prosecutor. Is efficient but has not succumbed to the callousness which might easily afflict one exercising the functions he does.

129. Oliver Rubio, Luis
Major-General. Born about 1900. General Commanding the 9th Army Corps with headquarters at Ceuta. Well liked. Not too strict, does not like fuss, especially religious ceremonies and processions. Married. Three daughters. Is learning English. Will be promoted to lieutenant-general about June–July when he will be leaving his post. He and his wife were most helpful and friendly when a British destroyer squadron visited Ceuta in February 1956.

130. Perez del Rio, Eduardo
Born about 1890. Married. 1952, appointed President of the Hispano-Moroccan Courts, the highest judicial post in the zone. Reputed a good judge who keeps strict order in his court. An agreeable, though garrulous, man. President of the Tetuan "Amigos de la Musica."

131. Rivas Gonzalez, Felix
Born about 1908 in Palencia. Married and has children. Industrial engineer; director of Electras Marroquies and president of the Chamber of Commerce. Staunch Catholic and active in Church affairs. Anglophobe. In touch with United States interests in Tangier.

132. Rodriguez Ruiz, Arturo
Head of Protocol to the High Commissioner since February 1954. His rank of Minister Plenipotentiary is rendered ridiculous by the insignificance of his functions. An agreeable nonentity. Bachelor.

133. Salazar, Francisco
Judge of the Tetuan "Audiencia." Staunch Catholic, pleasant character. Lives a retired life. Showed himself in the 1945–46 Fereres and Amar cases (British subject and protected person illegally imprisoned and maltreated) too subservient to administrative pressure to be a good judge.

134. Santamaria Quesada, Ramiro
Born in Melilla in 1925. Married. Newspaperman and special correspondent for several organs in Spain and Morocco. Falangist (*camisa vieja*). Fought in the Civil War and was in the Blue Division. 1951–52, employed by the Spanish Military Information Services. 1954, started, with the support of the High Commission, a weekly paper, *Aquí Marruecos*, which specialised in violent anti-French propaganda, varied by occasional attacks on the British. The paper ceased publication in summer 1955 apparently because Santamaria thought he did not make enough money out of it. He is a frequent contributor to the Tetuan daily papers, his articles being almost invariably informed by violent anti-French or anti-British prejudice.

135. Sentchordi, Eduardo
Born about 1910. After a successful career in the Finance Department was appointed Delegate for Finance in February 1954. In addition was appointed in February 1956 to the post of Administrator-General of the State Territories of Ceuta and Melilla, created to provide for the application of the newly-passed legislation intended to promote the economic welfare of these places. An efficient but not very forceful bureaucrat, liked by his subordinates. Reserved but sociable. He and his wife both take an active part in Church (Catholic) activities.

136. Serrano, Rafael Alvarez, Major-General
November 1954, appointed Commanding General of Melilla and the Eastern Region of the Spanish Zone.

Has a reputation for courtesy and punctilious attendance at Mass.

137. Torres Martinez, Rafael
Born 1902. Married. Has seven children. Lieutenant-colonel, aide-de-camp to the High Commissioner. Affable, and when off duty frequents the Casino Español with a circle of friends. His children are friends of those of the High Commissioner.

138. Trujillo Machacon, Francisco
Of the Corps of District Administrative Officers. Spanish co-President of the mixed Hispano-Moroccan Municipality of Tetuan.

CHAPTER IV.—TANGIER (INTERNATIONAL ZONE)

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

JM 1013/3 No. 33

QUARTERLY REPORT, OCTOBER–DECEMBER 1955

Mr. Scott to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received January 9*)

(No. 2. Confidential) *Tangier,*
Sir, *January 5, 1956.*

I have the honour to transmit herewith my political report for the quarter ended the 31st of December, 1955.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch and the enclosure to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Madrid and Cairo, to His Excellency the Governor of Gibraltar, to Her Majesty's Consuls-General at Rabat, Tetuan, Algiers and Tunis, to Her Majesty's Consul at Casablanca, to the Staff Officer (Intelligence), Gibraltar and to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station.

I have, &c.

E. J. F. SCOTT.

Enclosure

POLITICAL REPORT FOR TANGIER, QUARTER ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1955

General

With the return to the throne of Morocco of Mohamed Ben Youssef, the past quarter was neatly divided between the last six weeks of one era in Moroccan history and the first six weeks of another. It seems hard now to realise that, as the quarter began, speculation was devoted to the possibility of the abdication of Ben Arafa, to the remote possibility of recognition by the French Government of Ben Youssef, to gleams of hope that the period of repression might be coming to an end and to the thought that the Moroccan Nationalists, so long regarded with the indifference due to their mysterious unimportance, might be coming into their own.

2. As far as Tangier itself was concerned, the quarter had opened with the arrival on October 1 of Ben Arafa, who had left Rabat without, it appeared, having taken steps showing any immediate intention to abdicate; rather the contrary. The anxiety that his arrival in Tangier had caused was soon seen to be without foundation. At no time during the past quarter has any attention been paid to him in any unpleasant fashion. He has been left to interest himself in the reconstruction of the house in which he will presumably end his days. The Moroccans of Tangier were little interested in the past; they were impatient like all their compatriots for an end to the ambiguities of the situation.

3. When the news of the recognition by the French Government of Mohamed Ben Youssef was followed by that of his impending return to his capital, excitement mounted steadily in Tangier and was accompanied by renewed anxiety on the part of those responsible for the maintenance of public order. When it became known that the Sultan's return and the Fête du Trône a few days later were to be accompanied, not by any organised manifestations, but only by genuine expressions of public rejoicings throughout the town, the authorities gave up planning and hoped for the best. Experience in the month of August had shown that the police were ill-trained to deal with large crowds, even if those crowds were partly organised. Disorganised crowds were evidently beyond their capacity. The five-day period of rejoicing that covered the return of the Sultan, the Fête du Trône, and the passage through Tangier of M. Balafrej and other leaders of the Istiqlal Party, saw cheerful crowds in all the streets but gave rise to no incident of any

kind whatever. It was perhaps typical of the Tangerine authorities that as soon as this was over they shook their heads in horror at the thought that the militants of the Nationalist parties, who had ensured the absence of incident, should have shown themselves to have been so well organised.

4. After the first enthusiasm had passed, responsible opinion interested itself in the future not only of Morocco, but of Tangier as a possibly semi-independent area. Articles appeared in the Press giving the pros and cons, as seen by various categories of Tangerines, of a retention or of the disappearance of the Statute. It was also noticeable that the leaders of the three principal Moroccan political parties (MM. Balafrej, Ouazzani and Naciri) had established themselves or intended to do so, in permanent residence in Tangier. This suggested that they continued to regard Tangier as a safer place from which to direct their parties.

5. On the 28th of November the business world of Tangier was depressed to find that a dock strike concerning the Moroccan labour, which alone handles goods arriving at the port, contrasted unhappily with the rejoicing of the previous weeks. This strike, despite the incompetent handling of it by the Administration, was brought to a satisfactory end 10 days later. But meanwhile it had been appreciated that the end of an era brought with it many uncertainties, and that the money so eeasily won by the business man in past years might henceforth have to be shared more liberally with the underpaid Moroccan element in the trades of the town. Although by the end of the quarter there had been no other strike that in the least resembled in importance that of the dockers, there had none the less been pressure, sometimes effective, for wages of many workers to be increased; and towards the end of the quarter the almost daily creation of new trade unions indicated still more plainly that the European business men would have to change their attitude.

Committee of Control

6. In the course of its meetings during the quarter, the Committee of Control as usual discussed various forms of incorrect expenditure on the part of the Administration. The running battle between the Administrator and the Contrôleur Spécial des Dépenses (who is directly responsible to the Committee) came to a point of truce. At the end of the quarter it was again necessary for the Committee to vote a *douzième provisoire* for the first month of 1956.

7. The return of the Sultan to Morocco led to discussions about the measures to be taken to maintain public order on that day, and during the days that followed. These discussions were singularly pointless, and led, as usual, to a reaffirmation of the responsibility of the Administrator himself for maintaining public order, though without giving him, on this occasion, any advice to help him in that task. The Spanish representative took advantage of the occasion to make a declaration in an amusingly "I told you so" manner, expressing the gratification of the Spanish Government that their two years of loyalty to the cause of Mohamed Ben Youssef should be crowned by his return to his capital. It was agreed in the Committee that a number of expulsions pronounced in the past two years, affecting Moroccan Nationalists, should be cancelled.

8. At the time of the dock strike members of the Committee were busily engaged in conversations aimed at bringing the strike to an end. These might in fact have had some effect had not the strikers themselves, with the encouragement of the Istiqlal leaders, decided after 10 days of striking, to settle for a wage greatly below that first claimed.

9. On the 27th of November Her Majesty's Consul-General, who had been taken ill at the beginning of that month, embarked for the United Kingdom on leave before taking up his next appointment in Paris. At the end of December the retiring President of the Committee of Control, the Italian Minister, went on leave and his place in the chair was taken by the President for 1956, the Dutch Minister.

Administration

10. The Administrator did nothing during the past quarter to improve his already very low reputation with almost everyone of consequence in Tangier. He was perhaps fortunate that the quarter provided him with opportunities for expressing his interest in social welfare, as he seemed to have few others.

11. At the time of the strike he was anxious to combine an improvement in the wages of the strikers with an over-urgent removal of perishables from ships and barges: for this purpose he wished to use the General Police as dock-workers. The British representative in the Committee of Control took the lead in securing a delay in this ill-advised employment for the police, which proved sufficient for the strike to be ended before the moment for such use arrived. There was astonishingly little liaison between the Administrator and the President of the Commission du Port who was kept, until the last minute, in complete ignorance of the fact that effective negotiations for bringing the strike to an end were taking place.

12. The Administrator embarked on the preparatory stages of social legislation concerning a minimum wage and trade union rights, but at the end of the quarter this was still in embryo form. He was successful, however, in forcing through a somewhat unwilling Assembly a measure providing approximately £30,000 for the relief of employment by public works during the winter months.

13. It became known in mid-November that M. Vermeil, Assistant Administrator for Moroccan Affairs, was to be appointed Chef de Région in Rabat. The Committee of Control formally asked the French Minister to delay M. Vermeil's removal until the end of the year if possible, and as the quarter closed he was still in Tangier, while the name of his successor was being unofficially mentioned in the Press.

Legislative Assembly

14. The Budget was presented to the Assembly by the Administration in early November, and duly studied in Commission. On December 20 the Assembly began a Christmas holiday lasting until January 9, and on the same day the Committee of Control approved an Ordinance (modified on December 27) for a *douzième provisoire* for the month of January. The Committee also expressed the opinion that it was unseemly that the Assembly, legally required to pass the Budget before the end of the year, should instead go off on holiday.

15. Mr. A. H. Selley, one of the three British representatives in the Legislative Assembly, was voted by that body into the Presidency of the Council of the Water Monopoly mentioned in paragraph 19 of the previous report.

Naval Visit

16. A most successful naval visit was paid between November 24 and 28 by H.M.S. *Theseus*, wearing the flag of Rear Admiral H. W. Biggs, Flag Officer Training Squadron, and H.M.S. *Ocean*.

Visits

17. Shortly after the Sultan's return Abdelmejid Mahmoud, the Iraqi Minister, passed through Tangier on his way to Rabat. Sheikh Ahmed Hassan Bakouri, Egyptian Minister for Religious Foundations, also passed twice through Tangier. Both were entertained by the Nationalists and were greeted on arrival by fairly large crowds.

Press

18. The *Dépêche Marocaine* maintained its policy of reporting Moroccan affairs in as innocuous a fashion as possible; it was the Spanish *España* which carried news of events in the French Zone at far greater length. The Nationalist papers, whose entry into Tangier had been forbidden, were once again allowed to appear on sale in Tangier at the end of the quarter.

JM 1011/1 No. 34

TANGIER: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1955

Mr. Scott to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received January 9*)

British Consulate-General,
Tangier,
January 5, 1956.

(No. 3. Confidential)

Sir,

It was implicit in Mr. Muntz's despatch No. 3 of the 4th of January, 1955, as in the annual reviews for many years before, that the present régime in Tangier would long continue, with slight modifications at every five-year period of reforms. During the first half of 1955 this same attitude legitimately prevailed. The emphasis in the workings of the Committee of Control and the other bodies that run the Tangier Zone was as usual on the effects of Franco-Spanish relations at all points. During the second half of 1955, however, the dramatic recognition by the French Government of Mohamed Ben Youssef as being once again Sultan of Morocco led to a complete change in this attitude. The disharmony that had for so many months existed owing to French support of Ben Arafa and Spanish support of Mohamed Ben Youssef gave place to a brief period of comparative harmony, during which the Spaniards were able to pat themselves on the back, flattering themselves that Hispano-Moorish friendship must continue on an even firmer footing; while the French, a little hesitantly, looked forward to days in which the Franco-Moorish hostility of the past two years would come to an end in a spirit which, at least in the minds of some, would be one of co-operation. But if the French and the Spanish appeared for a short while to be pulling in the same direction, it was not for long. The declarations of General Franco regarding Morocco rapidly broke the confidence (if indeed it had existed in any great degree) of the Moroccans in an easy or automatic transformation in the Spanish Zone. Meanwhile, though many responsible Moroccans continued to be greatly perturbed by the possibility that the French might not prove sincere in establishing an independent, though inter-dependent, Morocco, they had also understood the indispensable need for French help in running the country, in the almost complete absence of Moroccan cadres. Thus within a very few weeks the position of the Spaniards was greatly weakened, and that of the French greatly strengthened.

2. If it was still relevant, as it seems likely for a considerable time to remain, to think in terms of Franco-Spanish relationships in most matters affecting the problems of Morocco as a whole and Tangier in particular, by far the greatest change that 1955 has seen here is that the hitherto neglected Moroccan Nationalists became more important than their European governors. Whereas in early 1955 one could reasonably look to the Tangier Statute, in its present shape, running through to reform in 1958, by the end of the year it was widely thought that not merely the Statute but the whole status of Tangier must inevitably be revised if not in 1956, then whenever the negotiations between the French and Moroccan Governments came to an end. In the minds of all forward-looking people the Statute, with the New Year of 1956, entered into its last months. Indeed it seems highly probable that the Committee of Control must also come to an end at some time within the next two years, since its virtually sovereign power in Tangier is in no way compatible with a restoration of Moroccan sovereign control of the Tangier area. It is against this background that one must review the events in Tangier of the past year.

3. During 1955 the presidency of the Committee of Control was held by the Italian Minister, whose unfailing concern to discover conciliatory formulae, if on the whole successful, often caused amusement amongst the other members of the committee. He was at pains at all times to avoid taking any initiative, and appeared to regard his role as being that of caretaker rather than head of an active Government. Throughout the year the committee was chiefly engaged in discussion of money matters of every kind, very often with a degree of detail which was scarcely compatible with its proper role. The committee did none the less make genuine efforts to drop the practice of the past whereby decisions affecting the finances of the zone were taken by ordinance of the committee rather than by law from the Legislative Assembly. There was therefore a continuing trend away from

the authoritarian attitudes established chiefly by the Spanish and French representatives in 1952 and 1953; and this change was unquestionably for the good. But with the arrival in March of the new administrator, a Belgian diplomat, the difficulties of the committee were reopened. He rapidly showed himself to be interested in little other than social problems, and on most questions to be only too ready to ignore laws, règlements or any other controlling documents. The more irresponsibly he acted, the more inevitable it became that the Committee of Control, itself responsible for his nomination, should take up in a more serious frame of mind the tasks that he mishandled. When, therefore, in the autumn, questions of public order arose as a result of changing French policy with regard to Mohamed Ben Youssef, the Committee of Control found itself in the unenviable position of in fact bearing responsibility for the maintenance of public order though this responsibility, as the committee itself had somewhat hypocritically to stress, rightly belonged to the administrator himself. The committee was consequently able to prevent some of the more unfortunate errors of the administrator. This preoccupation with questions of public order occupied the greater part of the time of the committee's meetings towards the end of the year, and it seems probable that it will continue to do so as long as the committee continues to exist.

4. The Mendoub, whose reputation reached its nadir in 1954, was in no way able to recover it during the past year. But if he could not recover his reputation, he was able, by following the example of many others and climbing on the band-waggon at the right moment, to recover from the evident fears for his own safety, which he had showed until the Sultan's return. He was maintained in his office; but it is impossible to believe that he can look forward to many more months there. He was able to make no contribution of authority in dealing with the Nationalists and the constant questions of public order which political changes caused. Indeed, the last months of 1955 showed only too plainly that if the administrative machine established by the Tangier Statute was capable of running the town and its surrounding area in peaceful times, it was quite incapable of coping with the strains put upon it when the Moroccans themselves began to acquire a feeling of authority. The demonstrations that took place in August clearly showed that the police were not capable of controlling large crowds of Moroccans, even though these were on the whole well-disposed. It is to be feared that this incapacity may have serious consequences if for any reason the Moroccan majority of the population, whether from anti-European motives or from disunity between the Moroccan political parties themselves, should demonstrate with any violence. As the year closed it was evident that neither the Mendoub nor the Administrator were capable of exercising any practical authority at all; and the Committee of Control, if in the event it stepped into the breach in 1955, is far from being qualified to supervise the maintenance of public order in the future. The peaceful demonstrations that accompanied the return of the Sultan to Rabat were the occasion for the appearance on the streets of arm-band-wearing militants of the political parties. At a time when the proper authorities virtually abdicated their power to control the crowds, it was these militants who assumed authority, and voluntarily shared it with the police. In the past few weeks they have continued their training, and if the police do not show some unexpected ability to handle unusual situations, then the peace of the town is likely to depend to an increasing extent on these militants, and on the sense of responsibility shown by those who control them. There is no doubt that these political leaders have on the whole been at pains to avoid violence of any kind on the part of their supporters during the past months. To this is due the fact that Tangier fortunately has seen only four deaths for political reasons during the past year (and those at the hands of a semi-lunatic) and this encourages one to hope that the coming year may also pass with negligible violence. Further encouragement is to be derived from the fact that the leaders of the three leading political parties have all chosen to reside permanently in Tangier rather than in Rabat.

5. The past year has therefore been the last during which this zone knew the peaceful passage of days under the firmly-established régime that has served for over thirty years. Although the future status of Tangier seems likely to include a number of international features, it does not seem likely that the sovereign power for so long in fact exercised by Europeans, within a fiction of the unity of the Cherifian Empire, can be maintained for many more months. Nor can one pretend that the European population of Tangier has itself shown any enthusiasm for the

present system during recent times. The economic freedom of the zone is cherished and is widely admitted to be the basis on which its prosperity has rested. But there has been increasing impatience with the autocratic and wasteful ways of the Committee of Control and of the Administration, and with the ineffective role played by the Legislative Assembly. Articles in the press about a change in the status of Tangier contributed by all types of Tangerines have been evenly divided between the merits of maintaining or of drastically altering that status. But if it is now clear that the end of a thirty-year-old system is in sight, it is hardly in a review of 1955 that one would seek to delve into the future.

6. I have the honour to enclose herewith a summary of the year's events in chronological order.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to his Excellency the Governor of Gibraltar, and to the Staff Officer (Intelligence), Gibraltar.

I have, &c.

E. J. F. SCOTT.

Enclosure

January

12 Press announced that Moroccan legal reforms established in French Zone were to be extended to Tangier. As a result of discussion in Committee of Control, this proposal was dropped.
18 Italian Minister returned from leave and took up presidency of the Committee of Control for the year.
20 Candidature of M. van de Kerchove for post of Administrator was notified.
24 Ordinance passed for a *douzième* for February.
25 Nomination of Mr. Richardson as " Chef de la Sûreté " was accepted.
26 M. van de Kerchove's appointment was agreed by Committee of Control.
31 *Bulletin Official* carried text of new *Règlement Intérieur* for Legislative Assembly.

February

7 M. Stéphane Halot took up appointment as Belgian Consul-General.
12 Vaccination made compulsory in the zone owing to small-pox epidemics elsewhere: no cases were reported in Tangier.
24 Committee of Control passed the budget.

March

17 M. van de Kerchove arrived.
24 Newspaper *Aquí Marruecos* temporarily suppressed under new law.
30 The day, first in the year on which trouble was anticipated, passed off peacefully.

April

5–7 Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet, flying his flag in H.M.S. *Glasgow* (accompanied by H.M.S. *Surprise*) visited Tangier.
20 Administrator, in his first speech to Assembly, struck a note of interest in social welfare, which he was to pursue.

May

7–9 Air rally held at which four aeroplanes from the United Kingdom were present.
23 Police precautions taken for Aid-es-Seghir. No disturbances.
Moorish shops regularly shut on Fridays for political reasons.

June

1 Mr. Julius Holmes took up appointment as United States Minister.
Señor del Castillo completed ten years as Spanish Consul-General.
17 Mr. Bridge took up appointment as " Secrétaire Greffier " at the courts.

June

20 Three members of Shura Party arrested for disseminating pamphlets.
25 Tangier Industrial Fair opened.
30 Inauguration of new building for Legislative Assembly.

July

20 Moorish shops shut in sympathy with demonstrations in Casablanca.
23 Legislative Assembly meeting had to be adjourned as a result of uproar over Water and Electricity Concession.
Some Moorish shops set on fire for failing to shut.
30 Shops shut for two days for Aik-el-Kebir.

August

1 Moor ran amok and stabbed four people to death including a British subject.
20–21 On anniversary of Sultan's deposition, demonstrations in streets. Several casualties, none fatal; no damage to property.

September

9 Committee of Control asked for French and Spanish reinforcements for Special Police.
11 French reinforcements arrive for Special Police: Spanish reinforcements stayed at the border.
12 Slight demonstrations.

October

1 Ben Arafa arrived from Rabat.
10 Mogoga canal opened.
12 Titan crane ready and handed over to the Société du Port.
29 Ben Arafa sent letter of abdication to French President.
30 Demonstration in Tangier.

November

8 The Mendoub saw the Sultan in Paris.
Budget presented in Legislative Assembly.
Ouazzani (P.D.I.) and Laghzaoni, both of whose passports were withdrawn in 1952, allowed back to Tangier.
14 Ouazzani arrived.
Tazi, Moroccan judge at the Juridiction Internationale, had two conversations with Ben Youssef in Paris.
18 Fête du Trône. Crowds in all parts of the town for five days without incidents.
21 Istiqlal leaders, Balafrez, Lyazidi, Bouhabid and Abdel Jallil enthusiastically welcomed to Tangier.
22 Torres (Reform) met Istiqlal leaders.
Vermeil, Assistant Administrator for Moroccan Affairs, appointed " Chef de Region," Rabat.
24–28 H.M.S. *Theseus*, wearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Biggs, F.O.T.S., and H.M.S. *Ocean* visited Tangier.
28 Dock workers went on strike for more pay.
P.U.I. delegation, including Mokhtar Ahardan, saw the Sultan.

December

1 Istiqlal Party delegation left Tangier for congress in Rabat.
3 Tangier delegation including the Mendoub, the President of the Rabbinical Tribunal and Jo Hassan saw Si Bekkai.
9 Harbour strike ended with offer of more pay.
13 Minor disturbance in market leading to suppression of Brigade Economique.
27 Committee of Control voted *douzième provisoire* for January.

JM 1013/4 No. 35

QUARTERLY POLITICAL REPORT—JANUARY–MARCH 1956

Mr. Scott to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received April 16*)

(No. 33. Confidential) *Tangier, April 12, 1956.*

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith my political report for the quarter ended the 31st of March, 1955.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch and the enclosure to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Madrid, Washington and Cairo, to His Excellency the Governor of Gibraltar, to Her Majesty's Consuls-General at Rabat, Tetuan, Algiers and Tunis, to Her Majesty's Consul at Casablanca, to the Staff Officer (Intelligence), Gibraltar and to the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Station.

I have, &c.

C. J. F. SCOTT.

Enclosure

POLITICAL REPORT FOR TANGIER, QUARTER ENDED MARCH 31, 1956

General

As the past quarter came to an end, the integration of the former French and Spanish Zones under the Moroccan Government was already in sight, and the future of Tangier itself became the next obvious question requiring solution. Three months ago some people thought, with some reason, that that question, though already being discussed, lay in the distant future when the background of its solution, namely, the bringing together of the rest of Morocco, had become established. At the end of the quarter, the background was, if not clear, then at least sufficiently clarified for more solid efforts to be made in establishing the future place of Tangier in Morocco. The pace of events in the country as a whole no longer left room for doubt that the question of Tangier must arise in the very near future.

2. Hopes and fears of every kind were having a marked effect on the life of the town. Much gold had already left the security of past Tangier for Switzerland. Worried speculation was rife, and strikes or threats to strike had had an upsetting effect on the business life of the town. About 40 trade unions had been set up since mid-November 1955 and this led to a steady and successful pressure for increases in wages. As a result the employers formed a branch of the Conféderation Générale du Patronat au Maroc, to protect their interests. It was but little consolation that, in various party meetings held in Tangier, assurances for a safe economic future of the town had been given by the party leaders. If consolation existed at all, it lay in the fact that both nationally and individually the Moroccans were thought unlikely to want to destroy a system that brought foreign currency into the country and enabled private funds to get out, and in the fact that there had again been no violence shown in all the demonstrations that had taken place.

Committee of Control

3. Much of the time of the Committee of Control was as usual devoted to money matters; and, after two more *douzièmes* for February and March, the Committee was able to pass the Budget for 1956 on March 27. It was balanced at figures of Frs.2,177,249,000 for revenue and Frs.2,147,430,000 for expenditure.

4. Apart from money and a number of lesser questions, the Committee spent many hours discussing public order, strikes, the police, and, last but not least, the follies of the Administrator. It was agreed that both the numbers and the pay of the police needed to be increased so that the effectiveness of the force might be a little improved. An increase in numbers was duly approved by the Committee,

but an increase in pay for the lower ranks, though considered necessary, was agreed to be a subject more properly dealt with by the Administrator and the Assembly.

5. On January 15, Mr. R. G. A. Meade arrived to take up his appointment as Her Majesty's Consul-General. Count Cippico arrived on February 28 to replace Count Macchi di Cellere as Italian Consul-General.

Administration

6. The Administrator, who became more unpredictable and more embarrassing in his actions than ever, not only showed no sign of giving up his appointment in view of the lack of confidence in him both in the Committee of Control and Legislative Assembly, but on the contrary, by his persistent discrimination in favour of everything Moroccan suggested that he had hopes of keeping his job for a long time. He was again able to secure from the Assembly a grant, this time of Frs.40 million, for the relief of unemployment by minor public works, although he admitted that his methods only increased local unemployment by causing an influx from the neighbouring zone. A unanimous decision of the foreign representatives to press for the Administrator's recall by the Belgian Government was defeated by the defection of Spain, who subsequently chose to see it as a French manoeuvre, whereas the prime movers were the Dutch, American and British representatives, and by French doubts and hesitations. M. Spaak was not very helpful but sent the Administrator a gentle remonstrance which elicited a self-satisfied reply. The present position is very unsatisfactory as M. de Kerchove hardly concerns himself with the European interests in Tangier and his actions are all conditioned by his desire to secure some sort of position in the Moroccan Tangier of the future.

7. M. Edmond Vermeil left Tangier on appointment as Chef de Région, Rabat, and his replacement in the post of Assistant Administrator for Moroccan Affairs, M. Barbey, arrived on February 15.

Legislative Assembly

8. The Assembly, after a New Year holiday, started work on January 19, and devoted most of its time and attention to prolonged study, in Commission, of the Budget for 1956. This delay was not caused by unusual features in this Budget, but by general distrust of the Administrator. It was eventually approved with few modifications from the draft. There was a petulant Spanish explosion (repeated in the Committee of Control) over the amount of money to be given to the Oeuvre Anti-Tuberculeuse which, to Spanish regret, does not come under the control of the Spanish Assistant Administrator for Hygiene. This Budget though supposed to pass through the Assembly in mid-December, was not passed until March 21, after a two-day debate, so that *douzièmes* were necessary for the first three months of the year.

9. The Assembly also passed inter-connected legislation establishing a minimum wage of Ptas.34 (about 5s. 8d.) a day for unskilled labour, and the institution of workers' cards intended to ensure that unskilled jobs in road-making, &c., should go to Tangerine rather than immigrant labour.

Naval Visit

10. Amongst the customary operational visits, a most agreeable one was paid between February 2–6 by H.M.S. *Glasgow*, wearing the flag of Vice-Admiral Onslow, Flag Officer Flotillas, accompanied by H.M.S. *Reward* and R.F.A. *Tidereach*.

Press

11. The local Spanish newspaper *España* continued to provide the fullest news on Moroccan subjects, while the French *Dépêche Marocaine* made a point of avoiding anything remotely controversial. A new eight-page Arabic weekly *Tanjah* appeared on March 8 in Tangier sponsored by an uninfluential group of Moroccans who claimed to deplore the attitudes of the political parties.

JM 1013/6 No. 36

QUARTERLY POLITICAL REPORT—APRIL–JUNE 1956

(From Her Majesty's Consul-General, Tangier)

General

The June quarter saw the first, and sudden, moves towards the integration of the Tangier Zone into the independent Moroccan State, through an engineered intervention in the affairs of the Administration, in actual anticipation of the signing of the diplomatic convention with France on May 19. By the end of the quarter a radical revision of the Tangier Statute by means of a Protocol had been prepared. Nationalist ferment found expression in "symbolic" strikes, accompanied by extravagant trade-union demands. A more definite though unobtrusive act of "Moroccanisation" was the inauguration of a Regional Court for Moroccan causes.

2. Speculation on the future of Tangier was of course lively, the more so as definite indications were few. At his meeting with the Committee of Control on May 1 (see below) the Foreign Minister, Mr. Balafrej, had said that the Sultan had no wish to disrupt present conditions in Tangier, and he realised that the abolition of free currency would produce grave unemployment. This is in line with, and only slightly more explicit than, pronouncements made by the Prime Minister and other Moroccan personalities during the past few weeks. These various declarations may have contributed to the comparative calm—indicative of resignation rather than optimism—with which the foreign communities of Tangier have faced these fast-moving events: they do not know that Mr. Balafrej has since told the Committee of Control that he does not consider Press declarations to be binding. Nevertheless, I gather that most of the locally held capital has been transferred (often illegally as far as francs are concerned) to Switzerland. The British community at least have shown no panic: they hope for a continuance of economic freedom and for the efficient maintenance of public order and security. They are convinced that, for some time to come at least, Tangier cannot pay its way if it does not keep its freedom of exchange, and that this freedom is equally in the interests of the new Moroccan State. I suspect that several Moroccan leaders consider this will also be in their best private interests.

Legislative Assembly

3. On April 30 a Moroccan delegate, Si Benani, proposed the surrender to the Moroccan Government of all the Assembly's powers which were not purely municipal, as well as the opening of immediate negotiations for the abrogation of the Tangier Statute; on the rejection of this motion the Moroccan delegates walked out and the Assembly passed into suspended animation. It had not resumed its meetings by the end of the quarter.

Committee of Control

4. Si Benani's action released the floods. His motion is now known to have been concerted beforehand with his near relative the Foreign Minister, Mr. Balafrej, who found time from his new and pressing duties to visit Tangier the very next day. He told the Committee that his meeting with them was "part of the establishment of diplomatic relations with foreign powers", and demanded that the Legislative Assembly should henceforth limit itself to purely zonal matters. In a Note to him of May 16 the Committee agreed to this and stated that their Governments were prepared to negotiate on a modification of the régime.

5. The question of the premature revision or entire abrogation of the Statute was thus, by what amounted to a *fait accompli*, thrown wide open. Subsequent discussions have been reported in detail by letter and telegram during the past months. They reached the stage where a draft protocol on the interim status and administration of Tangier had been agreed among the Control Governments and their representatives on the Committee. (Note. The protocol with certain modifications was in fact initialled in Rabat on July 5 and came into force on July 10.) Present indications are that a conference of the Powers concerned will meet in the autumn, probably at Fedala, between Casablanca and Rabat.

6. Mr. Julius Holmes, the United States Minister, who had been a tower of strength to the Committee, left Tangier on June 16 on transfer to Washington as Adviser to Mr. Dulles for NATO affairs. He was succeeded on the Committee by his Counsellor, Mr. Vaughan Ferguson, who becomes United States Consul-General at Tangier, though without the rank of Minister. Although a reliable, amiable and painstaking colleague, his knowledge of French is indifferent and I fear the "Voice of America" will be muted, at any rate at Committee of Control meetings.

Administration

7. The Administration Staff Union published on April 26 claims for better working conditions, which were prefaced by a statement condemning the Administration and all (or most of) its works. This was followed next day by a communiqué of the local Union Marocaine de Travail in a similar sense, which called on the Sherifian Government to intervene.

8. Fifty-eight prisoners broke out of the Malabata prison during April. About half were recaptured by nightfall but the event gave further proof of the ineffectiveness of the thoroughly demoralised police force.

Judicial

9. On June 4 the Minister of Justice, Mr. Benjellun, was present at the formal inauguration of the Regional Court at Tangier. This Court, which replaces the former Court of the Mendoub, brings Moroccan justice in Tangier into line with the judicial system of the Southern Zone. Mr. Benjellun on this occasion declared to the Press that the International Jurisdiction (Mixed Court) of Tangier —"A Moroccan Court with an international staff"—should continue in being as at present "pending a final solution".

10. On June 15 the Special Tribunal of the State Bank of Morocco, composed of three magistrates and two assessors drawn from the Consular Corps of Tangier, met under the presidency of the Italian Minister. The other two magistrates were British and Dutch; the assessors Belgian and Portuguese. The cause was a comparatively trivial and simple claim for overtime and seniority by a retired employee of the Bank: indeed it is only worth mention in this report as a survival of a rapidly vanishing age, for unless one party exercises its right to appeal to the Federal Court at Lausanne this may well be the last time the Court will function.

Visitors

11. The Foreign Minister, Mr. Balafrej, visited Tangier on May 1 and again on June 1, to discuss the future of the régime (see above).

12. Allal al-Fassi, the fiery and intransigent leader of the nationalist (Istiqlal) party, visited Tangier from June 17–19 and held an open-air meeting the next day. In an open-air speech on June 18 he confirmed his intention of settling in Tangier. He demanded the "integration" into Morocco not only of Tangier but also of the Sahara, Tinduf, Twat, Kenarza and the whole of Mauretania. His party, he said, had sworn not to end their struggle until Algeria, Tunisia and the Fezzan were freed.

Economic

13. Labour troubles during the quarter had a political rather than economic background. The two most important strikes, those of the employees of the Administration and of the Banks, both limited to a 48-hour stoppage of work, were symptomatic of the Union Marocaine du Travail's impatience for the integration of Tangier into Morocco. Although several of the aims of the U.M.T.-affiliated Unions are so nationalist as to be ultimately anti-European, it is said that many of the recent adherents to these Unions are Spaniards, probably even where there are rival Spanish Unions. Reinsurance is their motive.

14. Business men are in general pessimistic about the future and are not placing much faith in the promises of Moroccan political leaders. Imports into Tangier have been swollen by heavy purchase of bulk foodstuffs and the cheaper textiles, which are finding their way, legally or otherwise, into the other Zones. One or two banks of medium importance have closed their offices here and several others are considering doing so.

JM 1013/8 No. 37

QUARTERLY POLITICAL REPORT, JULY–SEPTEMBER, 1956

Mr. Meade to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received October 16*)

(No. 88. Confidential) *Tangier,*
Sir, *October 8, 1956.*

I have the honour to transmit herewith my political report for the quarter ended the 30th of September, 1956, for the preparation of which I am indebted to Mr. Consul Grant and Mr. Vice-Consul Carlisle.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Madrid, Washington, The Hague, Brussels, Rome, Lisbon, Moscow, Stockholm, Cairo, Rabat and Tunis, to His Excellency the Governor of Gibraltar, to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean station, to Her Majesty's Consuls-General at Tetuan and Algiers, to Her Majesty's Consul at Casablanca and to the Staff Officer (Intelligence), Gibraltar.

I have, &c.

GEOFFREY MEADE.

Enclosure

POLITICAL REPORT FOR TANGIER, QUARTER ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1956

General

The overshadowing event of the quarter was the coming into force of the Protocol of July 5 which created an interim régime for Tangier pending the integration of the Zone into the Moroccan Empire by international agreement. The uncertainty which followed aroused alarm in financial circles; which was largely allayed, though not for nearly two months, by Moroccan declarations that Tangier would be given a special financial status similar to its old one. Moroccanisation of the Administration has not been conspicuous; nevertheless, European officials of all grades are acutely conscious that their future is uncertain. The Legislative Assembly, now little more than a municipal council, held a session, possibly its last, on August 1. Tangier has indeed become in name and almost in fact a province of the Sherifian Empire and the Governorship was given to a distinguished man of letters as a reward for loyalty to the throne.

Committee of Control

2. The members of the Committee went to Rabat on July 5, and after all-day discussions with the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of State for National Defence, initialled the Protocol establishing an interim régime for Tangier. The provisions of this instrument were put into force at once; but the Imperial Dahir approving it, though dated July 7, was published only on September 21.

3. Throughout the quarter the Committee have been mainly concerned in preparing for the Tangier conference and in establishing a common front. The discussions throughout have been considerably harmonious. The legalistic attitude of Sweden has not made their situation easier; and the Soviet request for an invitation has been given more (and less accurate) publicity than was at all necessary.

Legislative Assembly

4. Article IV of the Rabat Protocol allowed the Assembly to hold three more meetings to dispose of arrears of business. In fact only one meeting has so far been held, on August 1. There was some fear that it might turn out to be a marathon session; but in the event 26 laws (now called " decisions ") were passed within an hour. All related to the raising of credits. The new Governor of Tangier presided, and in his speech he said that he was glad that his office fell on him at a moment when the Assembly no longer [*sic*] held powers incompatible with national sovereignty and unity. At the time of writing a second and final meeting is expected.

Administration

5. The new Governor (Amel) of the Province of Tangier, Si Abdellah Guenoun, arrived at one hour's notice on July 9, accompanied by the Minister of the Interior (but not by the Foreign Minister). He was installed in office the next day, in circumstances of some confusion. The proceedings suppressed any remembrance of the international character of the Zone, and the keynote was struck when Moroccan boy scouts hauled down from the Assembly building roof the flags of the eight Control Powers whose representatives were attending the ceremony within. The ex-Administrator was pointedly ignored; and the ex-Mendoub had already retired to an honourable shelf near the throne. The Governor henceforth united in himself the functions of both.

6. Si Abdullah has so far proved himself painstaking and honest, if not a dynamic or an experienced administrator. His most conspicuous acts have been to close drink shops situated in Moslem quarters (which at first aroused some apprehension among those who live on the tourist trade); and to decree that all signs, notices and placards in foreign languages should be accompanied by, and subordinated to, their Arabic versions. This last provoked a *démenti* from the Ministry of the Interior, in the form of a circular to Governors—which was not published in the Tangier Press. The order was not rescinded; but it is being allowed quietly to lapse.

7. The numerous European officials of the International Administration are not unreasonably anxious about their future. A scheme that appeals to the Moroccan Government, who would have to foot the bill, must be neither complicated nor costly; and it may well be that the Moroccans will, at the beginning, try to keep on quite a number of European officials and offer compensation only to those they do not. If this happens, those officials who are offered new contracts and refuse them are likely to fare badly. Nevertheless established officials of long standing are generously provided for under existing Tangier statutes and the cost of these provisions, it is felt, should be met by the Administration of the Zone before its liquidation. British officials of all classes number only 22, of whom only one is classified as temporary (*i.e.*, unestablished) but he has been employed for over 30 years.

Future of Tangier

8. Mr. Balafrej came to Tangier for three days on August 31. He received the presidents of the various Chambers of Commerce and made a declaration aimed at soothing the nervousness of foreign financial interests. He hoped that Tangier would become a centre for international conferences as well as a tourist resort; and confirmed that its special financial status would have the guarantee of an international convention. This statement did much to calm the near-panic that existed, and was followed by what the Press described as an " euphorie générale ".

9. A week later the palace issued a communiqué confirming that Tangier would be given a special financial and economic status: and that the conference which would produce the international convention would be opened by the Sultan on October 8. This was further confirmed by the Prime Minister, Si Bekkai, on September 13; and once again by Mr. Balafrej in an article in *Istiqlal*, the party weekly, on September 28 when, however, he concluded by a warning (mostly for home consumption) that no action prejudicial to Moroccan sovereignty would be tolerated.

Economic

10. At its session on August 1 the Legislative Assembly placed additional consumption taxes on numerous commodities, notably certain luxury goods, alcohol and petroleum products. The purpose was to meet the wage claims of the Administration employees. A general rise in prices—even of commodities not additionally taxed—is generally attributed to this action; but contributing factors are no doubt also a rise in wages and a depreciation of the peseta. Prices are expected to go on rising considerably in the next few months.

11. The Tangier Fair was opened on June 30. British motor engineering products were well displayed; but the organiser complained that in general local business gave him very poor support. The fair saw almost the last public appearance of the Mendoub, who opened it and, although a nervous man, forced himself to accept a free ride in a small helicopter.

Labour

12. The incidence of strikes showed that the principles of orthodox trade unionism are no nearer to being understood. " Symbolic " strikes with political motives have become a local feature: one, for one hour, was organised on July 5 in sympathy with the Algerian rebels, and another, in sympathy with the Egyptian attitude over the Canal, on August 15. In this second strike, nominally for one hour but lasting several, cars were stopped and main streets blocked by pickets, and a European policeman who intervened was only saved from ill treatment and possible lynching by the timely arrival of Dr. Benjelloun, the local Istiqlal leader, who explained that striking was one thing and rowdyism another. Of the purely labour strikes the most important was one of dockers (who had already received large concessions not long before) on July 11–12: all labour in the port ceased and the Algeciras and Gibraltar ferries could not even come alongside overnight.

13. The Minister of Labour, Mr. Butalib, on August 14 gave the leaders of the Spanish trade union (O.S.T.) an assurance that they were free to work on the same terms as the Union Marocaine de Travail.

Miscellaneous

14. On September 20, following mass arrests of French citizens in the Southern Zone, there was an enquiry into the activities of the " Présence Française " organisation in Tangier. It was reported that no trace was found.

15. A detachment of the Moroccan army, said to be some 250 strong, arrived (contrary to Article 3 of the Statute) on July 28 and camped in the bullring: where it still is.

16. Her Majesty's Treasury's case against one Chiocchi for the illicit minting of gold sovereigns was heard by the International Tribunal on September 29. Judgment is to be given after a fortnight. The Treasury was personally represented by Mr. R. J. B. Anderson, Assistant Treasury Solicitor.

17. Various kidnappings, mostly of members of the P.D.I. by Istiqlal partisans, aroused general alarm and resentment. They were denounced by Si Bekkai in his statement of September 13.

Visitors

18. Mr. Darrell Bates, Colonial Secretary, Gibraltar, visited Tangier on July 14–15; and Rear-Admiral Foster Brown, Flag Officer, Gibraltar, with Mrs. Foster Brown on July 16–17.

19. Mr. Richard Dimbleby and a team from the BBC spent three days in Tangier from September 11. They recorded film interviews with local authorities and members of the British community for the television programme " Panorama " in connexion with the forthcoming conference.

20. Mr. Balafrej made a private visit at the end of July, before that of August 31–September 3 already referred to. Allal el-Fassi spent odd nights here with his family during August and September but made no public pronouncement. Other Moroccan visitors were Dr. Faraj, Minister of Health (August 17); Dr. Laraki, Head of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry, and Mr. Ben Abduljalil of the Ministry of the Interior (August 23–24); Mr. Thami Wazzani, Minister for Industrial Production (August 28); Messrs. Sussi, Minister for Habus (religious properties), and Ibrahim, Minister of Information (August 30); Mr. Abdulkhalaq Torres, Ambassador to Spain, on the occasion of a farewell to the former Spanish High Commissioner-General Garcia Valino (September 8); Mr. Butalib, Minister of Labour (September 15); and Prince Mulay Idris, the Sultan's brother (September 11–15).

21. On September 14 the Turkish steamer *Tarsus* made a brief visit with 12 Turkish journalists on a Mediterranean cruise. She came from Casablanca and left for Las Palmas the same evening.

APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

JM 1902/1 No. 38

TANGIER: HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS

Mr. Meade to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received August 7*)

(No. 65. Confidential) *British Consulate-General, Tangier, July 30, 1956.*

Sir,

I have the honour to send you my report for 1956 on the Heads of Missions at Tangier.

I have, &c.

R. G. A. MEADE.

Enclosure

(Passages marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports)

Belgium

M. Stéphane Halot (arrived February 1955), Consul-General with the personal rank of Minister.

*Born in 1897, served in the forces 1914–18, and entered the Belgian Diplomatic Service in 1920. Has served at Prague, Berlin, Paris, Ankara and New Delhi, where he was appointed Ambassador in 1951. After a nervous breakdown there he became Head of the Protocol Department in Brussels in 1954. (Written in 1955.)

He is a pleasant colleague, but is not interested or energetic. His position has been made difficult by the unbalanced behaviour of the Belgian Administrator, whom, however, he has never sought to defend. He speaks excellent English.

France

Le Baron Robert Barbara de la Belloterie de Boisesson (arrived in December 1954), Consul-General with the personal rank of Minister.

*Born in 1905, he served in Warsaw, Paris, the Far East and Rome. He was appointed Délégué in Tunis in 1951 and promoted Minister in 1953. While in Tunis he suffered some heart trouble and consequently prefers a quiet and abstemious life (written in 1955), but this does not prevent him from entertaining on a considerable scale.

*Married with several small children. He and his wife, both of whom could be described as charming, speak some English. Though he is not a dominating character, he is a very pleasant and reliable colleague. (Written in 1955.)

Italy

Il Conte Tristram Alvise Cippico (arrived February 1956), Minister in charge of Italian Consulate-General.

Born in Rome in 1904, he went to school in England (Clifton), graduated in law at Rome in 1927, and studied at London University 1932–34, while *en poste* in London. Entered the Diplomatic Service in 1927 and served at Berlin, London, Seville, Cluj and Kaunas before becoming a First Secretary in his Ministry in 1941. Joined the army as interpreter, captured in North Africa and spent several years as prisoner of war in Australia and speaks with appreciation of good treatment received there. Counsellor at Nanking in 1947; Minister 1951, and Vice-Chief of Protocol at the Chigi until late 1955.

A bachelor, of great though rather melancholy charm, he is as a diplomatist cultured, correct, intelligent and painstaking, though somewhat inclined to stick on legalistic points. His hobby is photography; he carries out his social duties conscientiously but with reluctance, admitting to a preference for tea over cocktails. He is proud of his Scottish ancestry (through his mother) and his command of English is perfect.

Netherlands

Dr. H. H. Dingemans (arrived April 1954), Consul-General with the personal rank of Minister.

*Born in 1907, he is a Middle Eastern expert and an Arabic scholar. After holding appointments in Jedda and Djakarta, he was, in 1950, appointed Head of the African and Middle Eastern Section of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1953 he went as Ambassador Extraordinary to the Coronation of King Feisal II. (Written in 1954.)

Dr. Dingemans, who is President of the Committee of Control for 1956, has had a very difficult task, which he has carried out reasonably well in spite of his imperfect knowledge of French, occasional lapses in tact, and moods of obstinacy which can be quite mulish. But his English is good and I have found him anxious to co-operate very closely with me as evidenced by the fact that when seeking advice he usually consults me in the first place.

*Like his wife, he is of a retiring disposition. (Written in 1954.)

Portugal

Senhor Manuel de Cunha Pimental Homem de Mello (arrived August 1952), Consul-General with the personal rank of Minister.

*A man of about 51, Senhor Homem de Mello was last employed in the economic side of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lisbon. He has served in Hamburg and Berlin. Sent down partly to support the Portuguese Administrator, Senhor Archer, of whom he is a distant relative, he was at first rather noisy and bellicose. He is still noisy, but found it difficult to support all the Administrator's actions. Though not brilliant, he has proved himself reasonably impartial and courageous enough to stand up for his principles from time to time. (Written in 1953.) He has been very friendly and helpful to us.

*He is married and has children. He speaks no English. When not buttonholing his colleagues, he is socially as loudly talkative as his wife is quiet. (Written in 1955.)

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Spain

Señor Don Cristóbal del Castillo (arrived September 1945), Consul-General, promoted to personal rank of Ambassador in 1953.

*Señor del Castillo joined the Spanish Diplomatic Service in 1917. He was Minister-Counsellor in Paris before the war and Minister in Athens before serving here as Consul-General from 1942–44, when he was appointed Assistant Under-Secretary in Madrid. After the Paris Conference in 1945 he was reappointed Consul-General in Tangier. During the war he is said to have given the impression of being anti-British, but on his return to Tangier in 1945 he frequently spoke of the need for co-operation between Spain and the United Kingdom and the United States. Recently, though aggressive for Spanish claims, he has been very friendly. There is no doubt that he feels Spain has a right to a predominant voice in the affairs of the International Zone, and that, put in its worst light, she has expiated her sins of illegal occupation by an over-long sentence. His ambition is to see Spain restored as nearly as possible to her pre-war position in this Zone before he retires. (Written in 1952.) *He had, I believe, great influence in Madrid as far as Morocco is concerned; but recently it has seemed that this is by no means as great as it was. (Written in 1955.)

*He suffered from bad health for several years, and in 1952 was obliged to attend to business in his home and sometimes in bed. He was absent for medical treatment for four months in the winter of 1952–53. His long experience of Morocco (thirty years on and off), his rather Jesuitical interpretation of a country gentleman's codes, and his undoubtedly very acute intelligence, make him a colleague to be treated with care, however pleasant and friendly he may be. (Written in 1952.) *He detests social affairs and only attends (briefly) those functions at which he will be seen by large numbers of his compatriots. (Written in 1955.)

*His wife, who is a delightful little party from Bilbao, speaks English. They have one son who studied for a year or more in England (written in 1952) and is now in the Ministry of Commerce in Madrid. (Written in 1955.)

Señor del Castillo, whose health has greatly improved following an operation for hernia, has been one of the leaders of the Spanish delegations for negotiation with the Moroccan Government: for this reason he ceased from March to June to take any active part at meetings of the Committee of Control, where his place has been taken by his assistant, Señor Don Miguel María de Lojendio e Irure.

Don Miguel, who arrived in January 1953 as Counsellor, was promoted to Minister in April 1956. He speaks fluent English, having served in London; has a pleasant personality and makes a point of being punctual. A bachelor, he is entertained much and entertains little, if at all. He is very intelligent and has been a useful member of the Committee of Control; although I have doubts as to his sincerity or discretion.

At the end of June Señor del Castillo resumed his place on the Committee of Control and, possibly owing to his greatly improved health, he has been a much more co-operative and amiable colleague than heretofore.

United States

Charles Vaughan Ferguson Jr. arrived in 1955 as Counsellor and Consul-General and was appointed Consul-General and head of the post without the rank of Minister on the regretted departure of Mr. Julius Holmes in June 1956.

Mr. Ferguson was born in 1915 and is a graduate of Harvard. He became a Foreign Service Officer in 1940 and has served at Winnipeg, Tehran, Bucharest and Dakar. He dealt with Persian affairs in the State Department from 1949 to 1952.

He is a bachelor, quiet, intelligent and not lacking in humour. He is handicapped by his indifferent French and by not having much personality, which is especially noticeable in the successor to Julius Holmes, who by his wide experience, intelligence and consummate tact and incidentally his special diplomatic position dominated the Committee of Control. It is also unfortunate that Mr. Ferguson carries much less weight than Mr. Holmes with the State Department. I have, however, found him a friendly and reliable colleague and receptive of the arguments which I have had occasion to put to him either on my own initiative or at the request of my colleagues. But I fear that the "Voice of America" will be muted at meetings of the Committee of Control.

APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

JM 1012/7 No. 39

TANGIER: LEADING PERSONALITIES

Mr. Meade to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received December 28, 1956*)

(No. 102. Confidential) *Tangier,*
Sir, *December 8, 1956.*

I have the honour to send you my annual report on leading personalities at Tangier for the year 1956.

I have, &c.

GEOFFREY MEADE.

Enclosure

Leading Personalities in Tangier

INDEX

Europeans

1. Andreu.
2. Apostoli.
3. los Arcos.
4. Bird.
5. Buiskool.
6. Chérif.
7. Crawshaw.
8. Crichton-Stuart.
9. Doolittle.
10. González (Torresoto).
11. Jardim.
12. Jorro.
13. Lemass.
14. Marchegiano.
15. Ménégaux.
16. Regil.
17. Sedillo.
18. Selley.
19. Villarejo.
20. Wauters.
21. Wilbers.

Jews

22. Abensur, Aaron.
23. Abensur, Moses.
24. Abensur, Joseph.
25. Bendrao.
26. Hassan.
27. Pinto.
28. Salama.

Moslems

29. Akalay.
30. Barrada.
31. Benani, Abdessalam.
32. Benani, Mohamed ben Makki.
33. Benjelloun.
34. Erkaina.
35. Fassi.
36. Filali.
37. Guenoun.
38. Menebhi.
39. Nasiri.
40. Suda.

Obituary

Diaz Merry.

EUROPEANS

1. Andreu, José Abelló

Managing director of the Banco Inmobiliario. Was a Republican, but is quite well thought of at the Spanish Consulate-General, where he uses every possible means to secure his rehabilitation and permission to return to Spain.

Runs the gambling at the Spanish State-owned Gandori Club (gambling is officially illegal in Tangier owing to the Spanish veto).

2. Apostoli, Giovanni

Italian judge, appointed in succession to Fernando Malmusi, when the latter was recalled on account of his Fascist tendencies in 1945. Apostoli is not a brilliant jurist nor an outstanding personality, but he appears to enjoy a fair reputation for honesty if not for morals. He is a bachelor.

3. Arcos y Elio, José Luis los

Appointed Assistant Administrator for Health and Labour, August 1953. Born 1913. Served in Spanish diplomatic service at Casablanca, Tetuan, Fez, Damascus. Married. Speaks English, French, Arabic. He is regarded by the Spaniards as something of an expert on Arab affairs. His wife is considerably more intelligent than the usual Spanish woman.

4. Bird, William

Was American Vice-President of the Legislative Assembly. Journalist and printer. Runs a small press and is co-director and acting editor of the *Tangier Gazette*, in which he writes stupid, tactless and inaccurate editorials. A chronic grumbler with democracy on the brain. Married.

5. Buiskool, J. A. E.

Appointed Netherlands judge on International Court, Tangier, in 1953. Member of the Magistrature of the Netherlands Union. 1947 President of the Court in Surinam. Speaks good English and is scrupulously correct in legal affairs.

6. Chérif, Mohamed el Hachemi

Born March 25, 1912. Has been barrister at the Mixed Tribunal since 1942 or earlier. Belongs to an Algerian family and is thus a French subject. Very clever and entirely unscrupulous. Is said to be married to a Frenchwoman whom he defended in 1942, when she was sentenced to a year's imprisonment for murdering her husband. Has been reported both as a Nationalist and as a Communist sympathiser, but is in fact probably 100 per cent. self-interested. Was appointed one of the French representatives on the Legislative Assembly, in which he has since been prominent. Since the declaration of independence has displayed incredible energy in scrambling on to the Moroccan bandwagon. Assisted the Moroccan delegation as legal adviser and made himself conspicuous by his specious argumentation and his aggressive manner.

He is said to be *persona gratissima* both with the Sultan and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and to be their chief adviser on Tangier affairs. It seems

possible that he hopes with the help of the Sultan to play an important part in any negotiations which might take place in the future covering Algeria.

7. Crawshaw, Harold Godfrey, O.B.E.

Aged 52. Appointed Assistant Administrator for Finance, August 1953. Member of the Scottish Institute of Chartered Accountants. 1928–39 worked as a chartered accountant. Chief Accountant, Allied Commission, Italy, with the rank of colonel. 1943–53 Director of Finance and then Secretary-General, Inter-Allied Reparation Agency, Brussels. Married. No children.

8. Crichton-Stuart, Lord Rhidian

Appointed to the Legislative Assembly as one of the three British members in 1953. Born 1917, fifth son of the fourth Marquis of Bute. Educated Ampleforth and Magdalen, Cambridge. Black Watch 1938, transferred Royal Artillery 1939 and to Reserve as captain 1948. Married 1939 daughter of Netherlands Minister, Tangier. Two sons, one daughter. Has property and business in Tangier.

9. Doolittle, Hooker Austin

United States Consul in Tangier for several years before the war. Was appointed consul-general, Tunis, in 1940 and subsequently served in Egypt and Pakistan and on a mission for the United Nations in Indonesia. Retired from the Foreign Service in 1951 and returned to Tangier where he has settled down. Is one of the American members of the Legislative Assembly. Doolittle has a good knowledge of Morocco and a forceful personality which sometimes brings him into conflict with the United States Legation. He is pro-Nationalist, and inclined to be indiscreet in his friendships, but this is largely due to his avowed dislike of convention and protocol. Married to a White Russian.

10. González Gordon, Pedro (Marqués de Torresoto)

Spaniard, born about 1886. Head of the sherry firm of González Byass. Very wealthy. Very pro-British, speaks English perfectly, related to the Gilbey family. Monarchist and anti-Falange. Has a large family.

11. Jardim, Achiano Vera

Appointed Portuguese judge on International Court, Tangier, 1953. Born 1911. Educated at Coimbra University. Joined Portuguese magistrature 1937. Became a judge 1946. Since 1949 has been assistant to the Attorney-General at Lisbon. Is scrupulously correct in legal affairs.

12. Jorro y Andreu, José

Spanish vice-president of the Legislative Assembly, and president of the Spanish Chamber of Commerce. Representative in Morocco of Juan March. Has large business interests in Tangier and owns a considerable amount of property.

13. Lemass, Edwin

British judge in the Mixed Tribunal. Appointed 1st November, 1949.

Born 1890. Called to the Bar in Dublin 1912. Served in the army from 1914–18. From 1920–49 was employed in the Egyptian judicial service where he became a judge of the Mixed Court in 1932. He is good-natured and easy going, but his lapses from tact in handling his fellow judges and the lawyers have caused embarrassment on several occasions. Married.

14. Marchegiano, Giuseppe

Appointed Assistant Administrator for Judicial Affairs following the reforms of 1953. Was judicial adviser to the Italian Consulate-General. Is not a man of strong character and is entirely dominated by an energetic and ambitious wife whose political loyalties are of the most ephemeral nature but are none the less vehement whilst they last.

15. Menegaux, Pierre

Appointed French judge on International Court. Born 1904. Fought for the Free French. 1945, Director of Personnel at Ministry of Justice. 1951, served on Court of Appeal and later as counsellor in the Court of Cassation, Paris. Intelligent and reliable judge. Speaks English.

16. Regil, Eugenio Mora

Appointed Spanish judge on International Court at Tangier 1953. Born 1901. Has held appointments as judge at Larache and Tetuan.

17. Sedillo, Juan A. A.

Appointed American judge on International Court at Tangier 1953. Born in New Mexico 1902. Member of Bars of New Mexico and Supreme Court, United States. Practised in United States and Denmark. Served with the United States forces in Europe in Judge Advocate-General Corps. Served as Associate Justice of Court of Appeals in Germany 1948–51 and as Legal Adviser to State Department 1951–53. Married. One child.

18. Selley, Alan

Appointed to the Legislative Assembly as one of the three British members in October 1949. Manager of the Bank of British West Africa, Lloyd's agent and *Times* correspondent.

19. Villarejo de los Campos, Francesco

Spaniard, born about 1900. Procureur of the Mixed Court. Has a British wife of Gibraltar origin and is believed to be not unfriendly.

20. Wauters, Alfred

Born 1912. Belgian judge of the Mixed Court appointed to replace M. de Foy. Worked with Belgian Government in United Kingdom from 1943. Was Premier Substitut du Procureur du Roi up to date of his appointment to Tangier. Married an English wife. Is pleasant and useful, but not a forceful character.

21. Wilbers, François

Appointed Director of General Police in 1953. Was one of the Belgians appointed to the International Police in 1945 with the rank of commissaire. He was in charge of the Sûreté from 1945–53 and enjoyed the reputation of being a conscientious and honest officer. He is pro-British, but does not get on too well with his Spanish colleagues.

JEWS

22. Abensur, Aaron, O.B.E.

British subject, born 1887. Owns, with his brother Moses (Maurice), the local banking-house of Moses Pariente, established in 1844, with which this consulate-general and the former British Legation have banked for at least sixty years. Father naturalised in 1896 by special Act of Parliament on account of the family's long services to the Crown. Of undoubted loyalty, he is always ready to help Her Majesty's Consulate-General and is a very sound and reliable banker. British Vice-President of the Legislative Assembly. Awarded the O.B.E. in 1953.

23. Abensur, Maurice Moses

Born 1896. Younger brother of No. 22 and partner in the firm of Moses Pariente. Served in Navy in First World War. Spent the war years with his family in the United States and as a result his wife and sons at any rate have become somewhat Americanised.

24. Abensur, Joseph

Son of No. 23. Is a most efficient and likeable young man who has recently done much good work for the British charities funds. Bids fair to become a valuable member of the British community.

25. Bendrao Ruah, Isaac

Spanish national, born Tangier, 26th December, 1900. Said to be richest man in Tangier, very friendly with the more influential section of the Spanish colony.

26. Hassan, Joseph

Portuguese subject, born 1888. Very rich. Head of the Hassan family, who own the Salvador Hassan Bank. Bank's Tetuan agency acted as Franco's bankers in the civil war, other banks in the Spanish Zone being either foreign and non-interventionist or else controlled by Republican Madrid. Portuguese representative on the Legislative Assembly. His nephew, Salvador, was educated at Cambridge and acts as his uncle's substitute in the Legislative Assembly.

27. Pinto, Jaques M.

Partner in the firm of Toledano Pinto, who are among the largest produce importers in Tangier. Wife is British and daughter is married to Joseph Abensur (No. 24 above). Shrewd business man. An American protégé, he and his wife are popular with all sections of the community and contribute extensively to all charitable organisations.

28. Salama Benatar, Isaac

Spanish national, very popular with the Spanish. Born 1901. He and his younger brother, Samuel, are partners in the firm of Jacob J. Salama, with branches in Tangier and the former Spanish Zone.

The Salama family is one of the richest though not most highly regarded Jewish families in Tangier.

MOSLEMS

29. Si Muhammad Akalay

Born September 24, 1907, of a Tangier family. Appointed Directeur de Cabinet to the new Governor of Tangier (see No. 37) in July 1956 and has been heard to describe himself as the "Vice-Governor." After holding various minor administrative posts he became Mayor of Tangier during the Spanish occupation of 1940–45, when he held a Spanish passport. Later appointed an assessor in the Mixed Courts. Speaks French, Spanish and some English. Very friendly.

30. Si Abdelkader ben Omar Barrada

One of the richest merchants in Tangier. Native of Fez. Was blacklisted during the war, but always kept up friendly relations with the French Consulate by whom he appeared to be treated with considerable respect, in spite of the fact that he had acquired Spanish nationality. He has now fallen into disfavour with the French having become a Nationalist and the representative in Tangier of the Democratic Party of Independence.

31. Si Abdessalam Benani

Born about 1920. Licencié of the Law Faculty of Cairo University. Judge of Tangier Regional Court, June 4, 1956. Appointed President of Tetuan Regional Court, December 1956.

32. Haj Mohamed ben Makki Benani

Born 1902. Director of Banque Moghreb, in which the bulk of the Istiqlal funds are deposited. He is himself a prominent member of the Istiqlal Party and very wealthy and influential. Was one of the Moorish members of the Legislative Assembly from 1945 onwards. Proposed on April 30, 1956, the motion for the incorporation of Tangier into Morocco which led to the protocol of July 5, 1956. Related by marriage to M. Balafrej, the present Minister for Foreign Affairs.

33. Dr. Abdellatif ben Hachem Benjelloun

Appointed Moroccan Ambassador to Bonn in November 1956.

Born Casablanca 1917 of a Fez family, and educated there at the Ecole des Fils des Notables and the Lycée Lyauty. Studied medicine at Montpellier and Paris, finishing in 1950. From 1945, when he founded a Moroccan students' association in Paris, he was active in propaganda among politicians of both extremes for the Moroccan case; and during the war he is said to have had contacts with anti-Nazi Germans. In 1950 he presided at a congress of "Jeunesses Nord-Africaines" at Tunis.

In 1953, being unwelcome in the French Zone, he settled in Tangier, where he has been the leading member of the Istiqlal committee in party circles. He also ran a clinic for indigent Moors, financed from party funds. He is said to have been prominent in the "Army of Liberation" and was in close touch with nationalists in Tetuan, being the right-hand man in Tangier of Allal el Fassi.

He is intelligent, well educated, friendly and talkative. His wife is Swiss and speaks German, but is of a retiring disposition.

34. Si Ahmed Erkaina

Born about 1907. Owns large bakery. Probably most intelligent and outspoken of six Moorish members of Legislative Assembly. Appointed Nadir del Habus on the death of his brother, Mohamed.

35. Si allal el Fassi

Born about 1906.

Leader of the (French Zone) Independence Party (Hizb el Istiqlal). An educated man who, like most of his fellow Nationalists, has so far shown more gift for speaking and writing than for political organisation, el Fassi, who had been living quietly in Tangier directing his paper, *Al Ala'am*, came into prominence with his party in 1951 in connection with the crisis in the relations between the Sultan and the authorities of the French Protectorate, when, Nationalist reactions in the French Zone having been repressed, the initiative passed to the leaders in Tangier. Joined with the leaders of the Reform, Democratic Independence and Moroccan Unity parties to form a National Front in April 1951. Returned to Morocco from exile in Cairo in 1956 and settled in Tangier. He continues to lead the Istiqlal Party and to make fiery speeches all over the country.

36. Si Abdelaziz Filali

A doctor of law of the University of Grenoble and a member of the minority P.D.I. (Democratic Independence Party). Formerly President of Casablanca Regional Court. Aged about 40. Installed as President of the Tangier Regional Court on its inauguration, June 4, 1956. His court has so far

enjoyed a good reputation and his wife appears in public. He is expected to be appointed the first Moroccan President of the International Courts.

37. Si Abdullah Abdessamad Guenoun

Governor of the Province of Tangier, installed July 10, 1956.

Born at Fez, September 26, 1908, of a distinguished learned family, and educated at the Great Mosque of Tangier. A poet, historian and theologian, he taught in a Franco-Arab school until 1936, when he founded a "free" school (*i.e.*, one not officially controlled). Excluded from the French Zone from 1935 to 1946, he became the first director of the Institute of Islamic Studies at Tangier and head of the Mulay Hasan Institute at Tetuan. Refused to sign the act of allegiance to Mulay ben Arafa in August 1953 and went to Tetuan, where he was made Minister of Justice in the Khalifian Government in January 1955; a post he felt acutely to be nothing more than a sinecure. He resigned after a year and returned to Tangier.

A personal friend of the Sultan and brother-in-law of Mekki Nasiri (No. 39), he has held aloof from politics while always maintaining Nationalist sympathies. He is widely respected for his modesty and integrity; and his lack of administrative experience does not seem to perturb him in his new post. He understands a little French and speaks a little Spanish; he always requires an interpreter near at hand and uses only Arabic for official business.

38. Si Abderrahman Menebhi

Son of the late Sir Mehdi-el-Menebhi, G.C.M.G., and brother-in-law of the late Pasha of Marrakesh, El Glaoui. Enjoys a certain prestige as the son of his father, but not very reliable or of strong character. Though not an active Nationalist, he has allowed them the use of his house as a meeting place. As a result he was summoned before the Mixed Court in June 1951, with other Nationalists, and questioned on the score of alleged illegal political activities. He was one of the very few Tangier Moroccan notables who refused to sign the act of allegiance to the new Sultan in August 1953.

39. Si Mohammed al-Mekki Nasiri

Born about 1907, formerly resident in Tetuan. Founder and leader of Moroccan Unity Party, editor of party's newspapers (*Al-Wahdah al-Maghribia*, suppressed by Spanish authorities, Tetuan; *La Voix du Maroc*, in 1947 by Committee of Control, Tangier). Founder and director of Moulay al-Mahdi Institute, Tetuan, with branch in Tangier. Studied in Cairo 1927–31 and revisited Egypt 1937–38 (where he still has good contacts) to found Beit-al-Maghrib. Has the reputation of being more venal than the other Nationalist leaders. In 1950 he started a new paper, *Minbar al Sha'ab*, which was subsidised by the French authorities, and tried to start a new political party in the French Zone to work for Franco-Moroccan co-operation. In this he was unsuccessful, and at the time of the dispute between the Sultan and the Resident-General, he burned his boats with the French and returned to Tangier, where he joined the other Nationalist leaders in forming the National Front. He went to the United States in 1952. Speaks French and Spanish and seems friendly and reasonable.

40. Si Ahmed ben Suda

Representative in Tangier of the Democratic Independence Party, and signed the National Front pact in April 1951 on behalf of his leader, Mohammed Hassan el Wazzani. Went to Egypt with the latter in August 1951. Is a Nationalist of many years' standing. Was in Paris 1954–55 engaged in unofficial negotiations with the French. Was a member of the Democratic Independence Party delegation interviewed by the French Government representatives at Aix-les-Bains on August 23, 1955.

CHAPTER V.—TUNISIA

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

JF 1013/1 No. 40

POLITICAL REVIEW FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDING JANUARY 25, 1956

Mr. Williams to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received January 31*)

(No. 14. Confidential) *Tunis,*
Sir, *January 25, 1956.*

I have the honour to send you herewith my Review of Political Events in Tunisia for the three months ending the 25th of January, 1956.

2. Copies of this despatch are being sent to Her Majesty's Ambassador, Paris, Her Majesty's Ambassador, Tripoli and Benghazi, Her Majesty's Consuls-General at Algiers, Tetuan, Tangier and Rabat, the United Kingdom Delegation, New York and to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

I have, &c.

A. M. WILLIAMS.

Enclosure

POLITICAL REVIEW OF EVENTS IN TUNISIA FOR THE PERIOD NOVEMBER 1, 1955 TO JANUARY 25, 1956

The Tunisian and French Governments continued their work of applying the Franco-Tunisian Conventions. The Nationalist movement split into the Neo Destour Political Bureau and the Salah ben Youssef faction. The districts close to the Algerian frontier became once more insecure owing to fellaga activity. The economic situation showed no improvement.

Tunisian Home Rule and the Franco-Tunisian Conventions

2. The hand-over of power from the French to the Tunisian authorities continued without major incident. The local government formerly exercised by the French *Contróleurs Civils* was assumed by the Caids. On January 8 the Government obtained the agreement of the Bey to a general transfer and re-posting of almost the whole Caidal service, with the object of strengthening the administration and of staffing the main posts with their own men.

3. The Tunisian responsibility for public order was extended to part of the Southern Territories where a scheme for the transfer over two years of the Maghzen troops was adopted.

4. Agreements were made with the French concerning the introduction of the Customs Union, which in the main applied the French customs tariff to foreign goods entering Tunisia. An agreement was made with regard to the control of foreign exchange which ensured that Tunisia would comply with the rules of the Franc Zone. The French agreed to favour the building up of a Tunisian merchant marine in return for reciprocal rights in the Franco-Tunisian and coastal trades. The Convention governing telecommunications was put into effect and a Tunisian appointed to control Arabic programmes on Radio Tunis. A joint defence committee was set up. The Council of Arbitration of three French and three Tunisian members was agreed on; M. van Kleffens of the Netherlands was appointed as the seventh member of the committee.

The Tunisian Government

5. The Tunisian Government continued to co-operate well with the French authorities. The Ministry was however divided by the Bourguiba-Salah ben Youssef quarrel and it moved very slowly. It was not until the turn of the year that it began to show some results and it was therefore generally criticised for its inertia. The decree of December 8 giving the Tunisian Courts power to deal with political crimes and the substitution of import and production taxes for the transaction tax were unpopular. The decree of December 8 was later amended to allow civil servants to join trade unions while the section imposing penalties on journalists was repealed. The decree of January 6 which laid down the method of election for the Constituent Assembly which is to meet on April 8 (single direct vote for a constituency list of candidates) was regarded as favouring the Neo Destour in spite of the Government defence that the method ensured the election of representatives of a policy rather than individuals with local influence.

The Neo Destour

6. The Neo Destour held a party congress at Sfax from November 15 to 19. The congress was attended by delegations from Egypt, Libya, India and Iraq as well as by numerous foreign journalists who remarked on the high standard of the organisation of the meeting. The Egyptian delegate incurred the displeasure of the party for his too obvious support of Salah ben Youssef. Bourguiba was re-elected President of the party and the Political Bureau was confirmed in office with some changes. The congress agreed to the expulsion of Salah ben Youssef, the former Secretary-General, and voted in favour of the Franco-Tunisian Conventions. The congress looked forward to the creation of a Tunisian army and to the entry of Tunisia into international organisations. The economic resolution was strongly tinged with the views of the U.G.T.T. A meeting of the National Council of the party at the end of January confirmed the Sfax decisions and heard progress reports from the Neo Destour Ministers. The Council passed a resolution urging the early transfer of responsibility to the Tunisians and the formation of an army. It also urged an early settlement of the Algerian problem.

7. Bourguiba toured the country speaking in defence of the Conventions. His meetings were often the occasion of skirmishes with followers of Salah ben Youssef and there were casualties including several killed and many injured.

8. The Neo Destour continued to be the main influence in the Tunisian Government and probably held a majority in the country. The party's reliance on U.G.T.T. support caused the landowners, including some members of the Beylical family, and rich merchants to swing towards Salah ben Youssef.

Salah ben Youssef

9. Salah ben Youssef increased his opposition to Bourguiba and the Political Bureau of the Neo Destour and spoke continually against the Franco-Tunisian Conventions which he castigated as a betrayal of the country's interests. He refused the Political Bureau's invitation to explain his point of view to the party congress in Sfax and he continued to regard himself as the Secretary-General of the party. His attempt to hold a party congress of his own in January in Tunis was vetoed by the Government.

10. Attempts were made by the Egyptians and by the Libyans to heal the breach between Bourguiba and Salah ben Youssef. As the delegations which came to Tunisia seemed to expect that most of the concessions should be made by Bourguiba it is perhaps not surprising that they were unsuccessful.

11. Salah ben Youssef claimed to have the support of 747 cells throughout the country. His supporters, apart from the rich land-owning classes and the Moslem traditionalists of the Old Destour, appeared to be mainly amongst the rougher elements and the unemployed. The Political Bureau of the Neo Destour attempted, so far unsuccessfully, to force Salah ben Youssef to stop calling his movement the Secretariat-General of the Neo Destour.

Public Order

12. The quarrel between Bourguiba and Salah ben Youssef led to many incidents between their followers. The frontier areas were once more insecure owing to the incursion of fellaga from Algeria and to the recrudescence of local

banditry. On two occasions camel convoys of arms destined for Algeria were discovered and seized near the Libyan frontier.

The Food and Agriculture Organisation

13. Tunisia became a full member of the F.A.O. at the Rome meeting in November. The Tunisian Government marked its displeasure at the United Kingdom's vote against the suspension of the rules necessary to allow Tunisia to become a full member by boycotting the visit to Bizerta of the Flag Officer Commanding Flotillas, Mediterranean in H.M.S. *Forth*.

Votes for Women

14. During December the feminists in Tunisia started a movement demanding votes for women. The movement was opposed by members of the women's section of the Neo Destour, as well as by Bourguiba and the Arab Press, on the ground that the first steps should be social and educational improvement amongst the women and that the suffragette organisation was unnecessary because there was already a Neo Destour women's organisation.

Labour

15. The U.G.T.T. and the other unions were active and there were numerous token strikes. The U.G.T.T. carried on their campaign to force Tunisian employers to give union rates and conditions and called out amongst others the workmen on the Prime Minister's estates.

Press

16. After his return to Tunisia, Salah ben Youssef was able to obtain the support of all the Arabic daily newspapers and he is reported to have approached one of the French-language papers also. To counter this Bourguiba and the Political Bureau published *El Amal* in Arabic and *L'Action* in French. The Tunisian Government on December 6 banned *Al Balagh* for three months for incitement to violence. The paper was re-published in January as *Al Balagh al Jaddid*.

JF 1013/4 No. 41

POLITICAL REVIEW—JANUARY 26–APRIL 30, 1956

Mr. Pell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received May 7*)

(No. 37. Confidential) *Tunis,*
Sir, *May 3, 1956.*

I have the honour to send you herewith my Review of Political Events in Tunisia for the period January 26 to April 30, 1956.

2. Copies of this despatch are being sent to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Washington, Tripoli and Benghazi, Her Majesty's Consuls-General at Algiers, Tetuan, Tangier and Rabat, the United Kingdom Delegation, New York and to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

I have, &c.

P. C. PELL.

Enclosure

POLITICAL REVIEW OF EVENTS IN TUNISIA FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 26 TO APRIL 30, 1956

Franco-Tunisian Relations

These have consisted of constant pressure from the Tunisian side for their complete independence and of resistance from the French in their reluctance to allow control of the country to pass from their hands.

2. Early in February M. Bourguiba consulted in Paris with the French Government concerning a modification of the Franco-Tunisian Conventions which were signed on June 3, 1955. As a result further negotiations commenced in Paris on February 26. These were conducted, on the Tunisian side, by M. Tahar ben Ammar, President of the Council, M. Mongi Slim, Minister of the Interior and M. Bahi Ladgham, the Secretary-General of the Neo Destour Party, who was given the rank of Minister of State and Vice-President of the Council for that purpose. The negotiations opened in a friendly atmosphere but by the end of the first week in March it was clear that agreement was not going to be easy owing to the reluctance of the French to commit themselves to the drafting of a Protocol on the Tunisian claims for defence, diplomacy and the abrogation of the Treaty of Bardo of 1881. On March 17 the negotiations virtually broke down over the question of defence responsibilities, but at the last moment M. Bourguiba stepped in and it was announced next day that agreement had been reached. A Protocol of Agreement was signed on March 20 by M. Pineau and M. Tahar ben Ammar in which France solemnly recognised the independence of Tunisia; agreed that the Treaty of Bardo could no longer govern Franco-Tunisian relations; agreed that those provisions of the Conventions of June 3, 1955, which were in contradiction with the new independent status of Tunisia should be amended or repealed; and agreed that Tunisia should exercise her responsibilities in matters of foreign affairs, security and defence and in the setting up of a Tunisian national army. Provision was made for the subsequent definition or completion of the practical details of Franco-Tunisian interdependence. At the same time the French Government issued a communiqué stating that in accordance with French constitutional rules the Government intended to submit for ratification by Parliament the agreements to be concluded in conformity with the provisions of the Protocol of Agreement.

3. After the signing of the Protocol the Tunisian Government received messages of congratulation from 18 countries, nine of which expressly recognised their independence.

4. It was also announced that negotiations would be resumed on April 16 for the purpose of completing the necessary instruments, but in view of the election of a new Tunisian Government about that time they were postponed and by the end of the period under review they had not yet taken place.

5. However, the so-called *"petites négociations"* on the question of the transfer to the Tunisian Government of responsibility for security and public order commenced in Paris on April 6. The Tunisians gained their point and on April 19 police powers were assumed by the Tunisian Minister of the Interior. The head of French security, M. Francès, left at once for France and M. Bourguiba took the opportunity at the ceremony of the handing over to issue a warning to the French members of the police that no disloyalty would be tolerated.

6. During the period under review the popularity of M. Roger Seydoux, the French High Commissioner, among Tunisians gradually waned owing to various incidents and statements of his to which the Tunisian-controlled Press took exception. The appointment of M. Bourguiba as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence on April 14 placed M. Seydoux in an awkward position *vis-à-vis* his own tenure of the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs and it was not until April 21 that the Acting Consul-General was informed verbally by M. Lemoine, *Chef du Cabinet* of the French High Commissioner, that M. Seydoux was no longer the holder of that post. As far as is known, however, no public announcement to this effect has been made.

Anglo-Tunisian Relations

7. Her Majesty's Government decided, immediately after the signing of the Protocol of March 20, that a message of congratulation upon the independence of Tunisia to His Highness the Bey would be premature, but that the Acting British Consul-General could pay courtesy calls of congratulation on His Highness and on the French High Commissioner. He called upon M. Seydoux, but the latter demurred at his request to be allowed to call on the Bey, saying that consular protocol was still in force, but that he would be pleased to pass on a message.

8. Upon instructions from Her Majesty's Government a suitable message of congratulation was given by the Acting Consul-General to M. Gillet, *Ministre Délégué* at the French High Commission, on April 13 and he agreed to deliver it, accompanied by a French translation, to the Bey on the following day. The French translation, which of necessity had to avoid a direct recognition of the independence of Tunisia, proved to be somewhat difficult and M. Gillet consulted the Quai d'Orsay concerning it. It was not therefore until the evening of April 16 that the message was delivered. Unfortunately M. Bourguiba had assumed the post of Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs two days previously and he did not feel that he could accept a message from Her Majesty's Government through the intermediary of the French High Commissioner, who was by then no longer Minister of Foreign Affairs. The message was therefore returned and was delivered by the Acting Consul-General personally to M. Bourguiba on the afternoon of April 24. The text in French was published by the Tunisian Government in the local Press on April 26, but by the end of the month no acknowledgment had been received from His Highness the Bey.

9. On the morning of April 24 M. Bourguiba convened the heads of career consular posts in Tunis and informed them that the time had now come for their status to be changed to conform with the independence of Tunisia and requested them to inform their respective Governments that the Tunisian Government wished for diplomatic relations.

10. Talks then ensued between Her Majesty's Government and the French Government as to the establishment of a British diplomatic Mission in Tunisia, but by April 30 no agreement had been reached.

Tunisian Government

11. M. Tahar ben Ammar's Government continued in office, more or less as a caretaker Government and under constant fire for its slowness and inefficiency, until the elections of March 25, which resulted in an overwhelming victory for the National Front consisting mainly of the Neo Destour Party and the labour unions. All except one of the members of M. Tahar ben Ammar's Government stood for election and were successful. M. Bourguiba, who made a triumphant return to Tunis on March 22, was of course a successful candidate. 98 deputies were elected and the opening ceremony of the first Tunisian National Constituent Assembly, presided over by the Bey, took place on April 8 in the Throne Room of the old Beylical Palace at Le Bardo.

12. M. Bourguiba was elected President of the Assembly but on April 15 he turned over the presidency to M. Djellouli Farès in order to devote himself to his new posts of Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence. At the same time he appointed his new Government.

13. The National Assembly is now engaged upon the task of writing a Constitution. The accession of M. Bourguiba to power was the subject of favourable comment in the United Kingdom Press and the London correspondent of a Tunis newspaper made a friendly reference to the attitude of Her Majesty's Government.

Salah ben Youssef

14. At the end of January the discovery of supplies of arms among the supporters of Salah ben Youssef, the arch opponent of M. Bourguiba, led to a large number of arrests all over the country. Salah ben Youssef himself disappeared and a week later announced his arrival in Tripoli, where he has since lived with occasional visits to Cairo. His flight is alleged to have been connived at by M. Bourguiba, who astutely realised that by arresting him or having him assassinated he would have become a public hero or a martyr. Although discredited and his party broken up, Salah ben Youssef continued his anti-governmental activities from Tripoli, whence he directed a terrorist campaign which continued until the middle of April, when it decreased sharply. It is said that he had given orders, after the signing of the Protocol of March 20, to cease operations. He nevertheless continues his campaign against the present Government through the medium of the Press.

Public Order

15. The whole of the period under review has seen an almost daily occurrence of terrorist activity in one form or another. During February many bombs were either thrown or deposited, apparently almost at random, at various private houses and apartments in Tunis or the suburbs. Bomb attacks ceased at the end of February but the number of terrorist attacks, varying from large bands of 100 rebels attacking a whole village to isolated instances of attacks by two or three men on outlying farms, increased considerably in March. Most of these activities were to the west in the direction of the Algerian border, but in the south a favourite activity was the cutting down of telegraph poles and the stealing of large quantities of wire.

16. On March 8 two French farmers, brothers, living about 60 miles south-west of Tunis, were brutally assassinated by terrorists. This murder caused the greatest excitement in Tunis and the funeral of the brothers in the capital the following day was attended by a crowd estimated at from 10,000 to 15,000 Frenchmen. After the funeral a body of several hundred of them marched into Tunis and, without the slightest intervention from the French police, spent the next two hours sacking the premises of the American Consulate-General, the United States Information Service and the offices of *Le Petit Matin* and of *Tunis Soir* where the official organ of the Neo Destour Party, *El Amal*, is printed. After the damage was done the police arrived with tear gas and dispersed the demonstrators.

17. At the end of April bandit activities were still continuing sporadically but on nothing like the previous scale.

Labour

18. The labour unions are well represented in the new Government. The Ministries of Agriculture, Public Works, Posts and Telegraphs and Education are all occupied by members of the Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (U.G.T.T.) and that of Commerce and Industry is held by a member of the Union Tunisienne de l'Artisanant et du Commerce (U.T.A.C.). It may be expected therefore that a number of decrees will be promulgated in the interests of the Tunisian workers.

Tunisia and International Organisations

19. Towards the end of April Tunisia requested full membership of the World Health Organisation. This will be considered at the next World Health Assembly at Geneva on May 8. It is also understood that she has asked for membership of several Specialised Agencies.

JN 1051/2

No. 42

INTERVIEW WITH M. BOURGUIBA

Mr. Malcolm to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received July 16*)

(No. 58. Confidential)

Tunis,
July 10, 1956.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that I arrived at Tunis on the 27th of June. After a long delay due to a massive reshuffle of posts two days earlier I was greeted on board the ship first by M. X. Hajeri, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and later by General Bahri, Director of Protocol, both for His Highness the Bey and for the Tunisian Government. Both officials were full of apologies for their lateness and for the lack of other ceremonial that had been planned, and they both accompanied my family and myself to our official residence at La Marsa, 11 miles away.

2. It had been agreed by your Department that I could await the return of M. Bourguiba, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, from the negotiations in Paris before seeking audience of the Bey in order to present my Letters of Credence. This was M. Bourguiba's special desire; and when he found that his return would be delayed he sent me a message saying that it was still his hope that I would wait for him as he wished to make a special thing of the occasion. I decided to wait.

3. M. Bourguiba returned to Tunis on July 8 and received me the following afternoon, having sent his own car, with the Director of Protocol and a police-escort, to fetch me. Mr. Pell, in paragraph 7 of his despatch No. 36 of the 26th of April, gave a good picture of M. Bourguiba's appearance and vivid manner and I would only add that I was struck by some Mussolinian aspects of his head. When I had handed over the copy of my Letters of Credence I was able to tell him at once that the Queen had given her *agrément* to the appointment of M. Taieb Slim as Tunisian Ambassador in London. This obviously caused equal satisfaction and relief.

4. The Prime Minister then made me a considerable speech in praise of the United Kingdom's record as a colonial power in giving freedom to other countries. It was, he said, the 1922 Declaration on Egypt (" Voici votre pays! Prenez-le! ") which had first opened his eyes, as a young agitator, to the fact that a great Power, a *very* great Power then, could be generous and yield to demonstrations of the popular will without the massive shedding of blood. Then followed Iraq (what was Iraq? " une province turque ") and then, above all, India. Tomorrow, the Gold Coast and Nigeria. It had all been immensely encouraging to him.

5. There was a good deal more in this vein (all obliquely aimed at the French, of course) and at one point he said the warm messages of congratulation which he had received from Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government on the occasion of Tunisian independence had been a great help to him in his dealings with the French. In all this flood he did not forget to mention his friends in London, Mr. Neville Barbour, Mr. Kingsley Martin and—he groped —Mr. Fenner Brockway, M.P., also the *News Chronicle* and the *Manchester Guardian*. Nor, however, did he forget to mention his recent pique with Her Majesty's Government over the election of Tunis to the Food and Agriculture Organisation—though he quickly added, with a smile, that this was entirely overlaid by his pleasure in welcoming an Ambassador from Her Britannic Majesty.

6. I thanked the Prime Minister for his friendly reception of me and for the generous things he had said about my country, and took my leave. In conversation afterwards the Secretary-General, who had been present at the interview, assured me that the Prime Minister meant every word of what he had said in praise of the United Kingdom. I am not quite sure of that; but I am quite sure he meant it while he was saying it.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I have, &c.

A. C. E. MALCOLM.

JN 10317/4 No. 43

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON JULY 17, 1956

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Sir Gladwyn Jebb

(No. 541. Confidential) *Foreign Office, July 17, 1956.*

Sir,

The French Ambassador called on me to-day, on instructions from his Government, to explain the views of the French Government on the breakdown in the negotiations between the French and Tunisian Governments for a mutual defence agreement. He said that similar representations were being made to the United States, German and Canadian Governments and probably in other friendly capitals as well.

2. M. Chauvel said that the Tunisian Government and M. Bourguiba personally were conducting a lively campaign for the complete evacuation of French forces from Tunisia. M. Bourguiba had said that, while they did not reject in principle the idea of common defence arrangements with France, the Tunisian Government could not accept the permanent stationing of foreign troops on Tunisian soil in time of peace.

3. The French Government were prepared, within the framework of a negotiation for the common defence of the two countries, to study how the presence of French forces could best be reconciled with Tunisian sovereignty, and the limitations which might have to be placed on the activities of French troops. But there could be no question of French troops leaving Tunisia. For the moment, therefore, the situation was that the Tunisian Government had broken off negotiations on defence and the promise which M. Bourguiba had given on the 15th of June that a treaty of friendship and alliance would speedily be concluded remained unfulfilled. So long as no agreement had been reached French troops would stay where they were.

4. The Ambassador said that the policy of the French Government was governed by three considerations: their first care must be to ensure the necessary protection of Algeria. Tunisia was the best route for the smuggling of arms into Algeria from the Middle East, and without the presence of French troops might become an area of refuge and escape for rebel bands from the Aures mountains and the area of Constantine.

5. In the second place, the French Government considered that the importance of the problem lay far beyond French internal politics or Franco-Tunisian relations; it was of vital interest to the whole of the free world, and in particular to the Atlantic community. Tunisia occupied a vital strategic position, and Bizerta was one of the principal bases of the French Navy. In time of war it would be of the greatest importance; much military construction had been undertaken there, in which SHAPE had taken a particular interest. Tunisia was also important to the radar network of the fighter defence of NATO. Finally, were Tunisia to leave the Western camp and fall into the hands of a possible enemy, the British and American bases in Libya would be compromised and their military value much reduced. The neutralisation of Tunisia would thus open a breach in the whole Western defence system in the Mediterranean.

6. In the third place, the Tunisian demands were also of great importance from the viewpoint of the general Western situation. If the French Government were agreed to evacuate Tunisia, the French armed forces could hardly remain long in Morocco and both the new independent countries would thus be left without any Western armed forces to guarantee their integrity. There would thus be an even greater risk of disorders arising in Tunisia and Morocco; this danger already existed due to their sudden achievement of independence, the lack of experience of most of the local leaders and the inflated ambitions of certain extremist movements. There was a risk that the efforts of the present nationalist leaders, who in general were showing courage and realism, might be brought to nought by a sudden wave of fanaticism.

7. Moreover, the experience of the past few months has shown that the USSR was always ready to exploit the neutralist tendencies of under-developed countries and profit by the sense of frustration under which those countries were labouring. For the French to abandon Morocco and Tunisia, and allow a political and military vacuum to be created in an area of vital importance to the West, could only encourage the Russians to multiply their offers in the hope of installing themselves in the area in advance of a possible American penetration. If this took place it could only lead to a repetition of the events which have lately taken place in Egypt and to an extension of the neutralist *bloc* up to the shores of the Atlantic.

8. The Ambassador said that for all these reasons the French Government held that it was its duty to keep forces in Morocco and Tunisia. Even if in a few months' time an improvement in the Algerian situation permitted the withdrawal of troops from that country, French troops would have to remain in Morocco and Tunisia. If the Algerian situation could be cleared up it might be possible to reach enduring agreements with Moroccans and Tunisians which would provide for the occupation by the French forces of specific areas. But for the moment it was essential in the interest of all parties that no doubt should exist whatever about the French determination to maintain for an indefinite period armed forces in all parts of North Africa.

9. I did not comment on this statement of the French case, but I asked the Ambassador whether his Government was asking for our help with the Tunisians. He said that this was not the case, but that they hoped that, if the Tunisian Government approached us, we should use appropriate language to them. I undertook to consider this.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors in Washington, Cairo, Tunis and Rabat and to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Algiers.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

JN 10317/6 No. 44

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE FRANCO-TUNISIAN "INTERDEPENDENCE" NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. Malcolm to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received July 30*)

(No. 64. Confidential) *Tunis, July 21, 1956.*

Sir,

The Franco-Tunisian negotiations in Paris have been interrupted by the Tunisians. Whether they have been suspended or broken off, time alone will show. The prospect of an early resumption is not bright: but the outlook is not tragic either.

2. The negotiations began on the 26th of June. Their object was to produce the treaty of "interdependence" foreseen in the agreement of the 20th of March by which France conceded independence to Tunisia. The new treaty would comprise not only such revisions of the Conventions of June 3, 1955, as were made necessary by the transition from full internal autonomy to full international independence and such others as might be agreed to be desirable, but also a treaty of alliance by which France would receive the right to keep forces in Tunisia and, notably, at Bizerta, while Tunisia would obtain much greater military security than her own forces could ever hope to provide.

3. Already before the negotiations began, however, the two Governments spoiled their chances by publicly taking up extreme and literally irreconcilable positions on this question of defence. M. Bourguiba, the Tunisian Prime Minister, declared that the French must evacuate Tunisia—at least by stages *pari passu* with the growth in the capacity of the Tunisian armed forces to assure internal order and defend the frontiers. (In an interview with a journalist he went further and said he would not conclude a treaty of alliance until the Algerian question was settled.) The French Government, on the other hand, declared that French forces must remain indefinitely in Tunisia for three purposes: (*a*) in order to discharge France's obligations towards the defence of Western Europe; (*b*) in order to ensure the lives and property of Frenchmen in Tunisia; (*c*) in order to cover Algeria.

4. The brief course of the negotiations was further disturbed by two minor incidents of which each party made in turn a stick to beat the other publicly. First Radio-Tunis criticised French policy in Algeria in terms that led the French Embassy to protest in language which the Tunisian Government treated as too strong to be acceptable; and then the French Security Services on the Libyan frontier handled the departing Libyan Ambassador in a manner whihc the Tunisian Government angrily used to demonstrate how little independence France had really conceded.

5. When these two incidents had apparently been got out of the way, two more appeared. The French *Conseil de la République* voted that the credits destined for Tunisia (and which are vital to the Tunisian economy) should be used in the first place to compensate French settlers; and then M. Pineau, the French Foreign Minister, repeated before Parliament the requirements of France as regards the retention of French forces in Tunisia, citing again the three points quoted in paragraph 3 above.

6. Next day, July 13, the Tunisian delegation in Paris issued the following communiqué:—

> "A working-session was due to take place this Friday afternoon at 5 p.m.
>
> "After an interview between M. Alain Savary and M. Ladgham, the Tunisian Vice-Premier, said that in view of the unfriendly position taken up by the *Conseil de la République* and of the statement made by M. Pineau, Minister for Foreign Affairs, before the National Assembly, the Tunisian Delegation thought it ought not to pursue the negotiations in the present atmosphere."

7. M. Bourguiba, who had returned to Tunis some days earlier, stayed away from the French military parade on July 14, but he and his Ministers decided after all to attend the French Ambassador's reception later in the day. That night, however, in his weekly broadcast, he took up an attitude of defiance. It was not, he said, the "refusal of a loan" by the *Conseil de la République* which had, as some people thought, done the damage. The "Senate" did not have the last word on the matter and Tunisia could seek loans from other quarters. It was M. Pineau's speech which had caused the break.

8. The Prime Minister then attacked M. Pineau's three points in turn (the text of his broadcast is enclosed(1)) and concluded by saying that he refused to negotiate so long as the other party persisted in seeking to maintain its occupation of part of the national territory. "We are not afraid of fighting and we shall fight if it proves necessary. We broke off the struggle the day our rights were recognised. But if our French partners give us the impression that our independence will remain incomplete we shall resume the struggle in order to complete the recovery of our sovereignty. I am convinced that the whole Tunisian people, regardless of political leanings, will be behind its Government and will struggle effectively to make a reality of Tunisian independence."

"Once our independence is achieved, we can co-operate freely with France in the interest of both parties. We shall be the first to ask for that co-operation."

9. This, then, is the state of the public record, and on the face of it one would say there was a deadlock. But people here tell me that there have been such deadlocks before and that after a time things start moving again, because the doors are never really slammed. The French Ambassador, indeed, has already had a long and friendly interview with M. Bourguiba, at the end of which he told the journalists that there had never been any question of "une reprise de la lutte." The situation, however, was "delicate." On the Tunisian side it is to be noted that M. Masmoudi, one of the chief Tunisian delegates, has been retained in Paris, while the Prime Minister's newspaper summarises its reports of press reactions in Paris under the headline "Conciliation is still possible, so they write in Paris."

10. Meanwhile I have not yet found anyone who prophesies renewed disorders in Tunisia. European farmers and employers may, however, have more trouble than recently with their workers. The French Embassy say that the Tunisian authorities are conducting a war of pinpricks against their troops, whereby every little incident even of the most normal kind is exploited to the utmost. But they say they will sit tight. Meanwhile, of course, the administrative situation is chaotic for, by and large, the Tunisians are quite unready to take over functions which the French are only too ready to give up.

11. I do not propose to make opportunities of discussing the official deadlock with Tunisians because I do not wish to give them free opportunities for using me as a channel for appeals to Her Majesty's Government. But I shall no doubt hear opinions during the courtesy-visits which I am beginning to pay to the Tunisian Ministers.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Rabat and Tripoli and to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Algiers.

I have, &c.

A. C. E. MALCOLM.

(1) Not printed.

JN 1015/2 No. 45

THE TUNISIAN CONSTITUTION—FIRST CHAPTER

Mr. Malcolm to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received August 13*)

(No. 69. Confidential) *Tunis,*
Sir, *July 31, 1956.*

In his despatch No. 30 of the 9th of April Mr. Pell reported the opening of the first Tunisian Constituent Assembly on the 8th of April and the election of M. Habib Bourguiba as its President. On the 13th of April, however, M. Bourguiba resigned this office in order to become Prime Minister and was succeeded as President by M. Ahmed ben Salah, the 30-year-old Secretary-General of the *Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens*. The same day, the Constituent Assembly approved without much reported debate the first Chapter of the draft Constitution submitted by the Government. The text is enclosed.

2. You will notice that although Tunisia contains important non-Arab and non-Moslem minorities, Article I proclaims its religion to be Islam and its language Arabic. Article III guarantees liberty of conscience and the free exercise of religion " subject to law " and one must hope that some later chapter will limit the powers of the Legislature in these respects. Nevertheless it is certainly the present Government's intention that Tunisia shall be an " état laïc ". The aim is that of the late Atatürk but it is proposed to reach that goal by persuasion and not by decree.

3. Article II attributes sovereignty to the people, not to the Bey and thus lends further colour to the view that the days of monarchy are numbered. I have been told moreover that other Articles, not yet debated, refer to " the Head of the State " instead of to the Bey and that this is intended to facilitate transition one day to a Republic.

4. On July 17, after some three months of unpublicised work in Committee, the Assembly debated the enclosed draft of the Preamble. Reports of the debate are scanty and it does not seem that any decision was taken that day. One member complained that the draft was vague; but the President told him that the Articles to follow were the place to seek precision. The Vice-Premier proposed that " rejecting war and preaching peace " be replaced by " condemning aggression ". The Prime Minister modestly proposed that the references to the Néo-Destour and to himself be omitted, remarking that " We are not here to write history but to lay the foundations of the Constitution ". Another Minister suggested that " respect for the law " be added to " liberty of the individual and of association " as a basic principle. The Minister of Justice asked that the judiciary be not described as " unified " lest confusion result: but a Deputy retorted that there was no longer any place for a " foreign jurisdiction ". Another Deputy ridiculed the reference to capital being used " for the benefit of the people ", as though, he said, capitalists were philanthropically minded. The Prime Minister thought it would be enough to talk of " creating a prosperous economy and social justice " without specifying the means to be used, and the President then proposed that this phrase be further amended to read: " Create a prosperous economy in social justice ". Several Deputies wanted to suppress the words: " hoarding and speculation ". Another regretted the absence of any mention of " property "—though it was not clear from the report whether he wished to abolish property or preserve it.

5. The Prime Minister eventually stopped what was evidently a rather untidy debate by remarking that the Constitution ought really to have been drafted before the Preamble since the latter should summarise the leading principles of the former. Privately, I am told that this is what will now happen. The Preamble will be left till last.

6. The sitting then appears to have been adjourned and the date of the next meeting is not known. As it stands, the draft Preamble seems to preach rather the ideas of the liberal Nineteenth Century than those of the *dirigiste* Twentieth, although the latter, and the notion of the welfare State, are strongly present too

and are, I suspect, likely to be well-entrenched in the main body of the text. It is noteworthy again that there is no allusion to the fact that Tunisia to-day is a Monarchy. I am assured that this is no accident.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Paris, Rabat, Algiers and Tripoli.

I have, &c.

A. C. E. MALCOLM.

Enclosure

TUNISIAN CONSTITUTION

CHAPTER I

Article I

Tunisia is a free, independent and Sovereign State. Its religion is Islam and its language is Arabic.

Article II

Sovereignty resides in the Tunisian people which shall exercise is in the manner prescribed in the present Constitution.

Article III

The State guarantees liberty of conscience and ensures protection for the exercise of religion subject to law.

(*adopted April 13, 1956*).

PREAMBLE

" In the name of God, the Clement, the Merciful.

We representatives of the Tunisian People, conscious of our responsibility before God and before men, sitting by the will of the nation, itself respectful of Humanity, as the National Constituent Assembly, believing in Dignity, Justice and Liberty, rejecting war and preaching peace according to the precepts of Islam and the principles of the Charter of Nations (*sic*):

Take note of the victory of the People over colonialist despotism, of the achievement of its liberty and independence thanks to the sacrifice of its martyrs of sacred memory and to the struggle of the nation grouped under the leadership of the Néo-Destour and of its chief, Habib Bourguiba, symbol of national unity;

Proclaim and resolve to:

Create a *régime* based on the principles of respect for the human being, liberty of the individual and of association, equality of all citizens in rights and duties.

Establish a true democracy which shall guarantee national unity and the full development of patriotic enthusiasm, and shall be based on a stable political organisation resting upon popular representation holding full legislative powers; a strong executive power; an independent and unified judiciary ruled solely by law, by reason and by conscience.

Create a flourishing economy by means of increased production freed from every shackle, industrialise the country and use capital for the benefit of the People.

Put an end to the present tyrannical *régime* by abolishing hoarding and speculation.

Establish an equitable social structure, guaranteeing every citizen's right to work, to social security, to education and to the wealth of the country.

We representatives of the free and Sovereign Tunisian People, believing in the unity of the Maghreb (*i.e.*, Moslem North Africa) write by the Grace of God and of Divine wisdom these principles as a preamble to the National Constitution ".

JN 1022/4 No. 46

SUPPORT FOR THE FRENCH POSITION IN TUNISIA

Mr. Malcolm to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received August 13*)

(No. 72. Confidential) *Tunis,*
Sir, *August 5, 1956.*

In paragraph 1 of his very interesting despatch No. 250 of the 13th of July Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris was good enough to suggest that you might wish to have my comments, among others, on his arguments " for our definitely indicating that we are on the French side in North Africa generally rather than on the Arab ".

2. I should indeed like to contribute what little I can to the discussion of this matter: but it will be very little, and my contribution must start with a string of excuses—for which in turn I apologise. I set foot for the first time in Africa and in the Moslem world six weeks ago, and at a time when the delicate state of the Franco-Tunisian negotiations in Paris has made me very wary of engaging in any serious discussion of Tunisia's future position with anybody. My comments are therefore highly tentative and I only offer them now because, if I did not, I should have to wait six months at least. Besides, the outcome of the crisis over the Suez Canal is capable of changing the general position of Western-Arab relations very greatly in the next few weeks.

3. Instinct and temperament alike incline me towards Sir Gladwyn Jebb's thesis: and in the light of such slight discussion as I was able to have with your Department before coming here, my initial tactic has been to try and persuade Tunisian Ministers to regard me as friendly and honest, while doing and saying nothing that could lead anyone to think that Her Majesty's Government might let themselves be played here against the French.

4. This path has so far proved less rocky than I had been prepared for, in as much as I find French officials less resentful of the Tunisians and the Tunisians more basically Francophile than I had thought likely. The Algerian situation weighs heavily upon both, of course: but both are, I think, very conscious of the need for an early treaty of Franco-Tunisian interdependence that will assure both Tunisia's economic needs and her retention in the Western strategic camp. Algeria apart, moreover, I fancy the Tunisian Goverment is well aware of the strength of France's case for holding on to Bizerta and its immediate hinterland. It was not, one may think, for nothing that in his interview with *The Times* correspondent in March M. Bourguiba said that if he had to choose between the Arab League and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation he would choose NATO. I doubt if he will have to choose. He will join the Arab League pretty certainly before very long, though without enthusiasm; and I suspect he sees in some form of association with NATO a device which will enable Tunisia, as a sovereign act, to permit France to remain at Bizerta, not for French purposes alone but as caretaker for something larger. In this belief I hope that serious study may be given to Sir Gladwyn Jebb's suggestion for a Western Mediterranean Pact.

5. In speaking of the Francophile, occidental and indeed anti-Russian tendencies which I have noted in Tunisian Ministers, I do not overlook of course the powerful contrary pull of Arab blood and the Moslem faith. This pull, reinforced by physical contiguity, is what enables the Algerian situation to oppress the atmosphere here. The eastward pull seems to me less strong. Libya appears to exert none at all; and I am told that Cairo, as such, enjoys much less prestige that Damascus. The pull of Nasser's Egypt is nonetheless real and will grow *pari passu* with Nasser's success, much as Hitler's grew in Austria before the Anschluss. It is, they tell me, a grudging admiration that M. Bourguiba grants to Nasser and he has no desire to become an Egyptian satellite. Nor do I have the impression that he is any longer in real danger from Salah ben Youssef and his clique.

6. This pull and counter-pull has naturally created a school of thought (if that be the word) that favours the notion of Tunisia as—to use the local catch-phrase—a " link between East and West " with its corollary of cheap military neutrality and of getting bribes from both parties. How strong this tendency is, I cannot judge: in a weak, oft-conquered and mongrel people such as this it has natural attractions. But I would guess that (i) so long as M. Bourguiba is in power and (ii) provided the

French succeed in pacifying Algeria with firmmness and political skill before too long, even that degree of " success " which Nasser is bound to retain over the Suez Canal will not increase the pan-Arab nationalist strain on M. Bourguiba to the point of wrecking Tunisia's settlement with France and the formal attachment to the West which this implies.

7. Time, however, is very much a factor. These are, moreover, risky assumptions and if one or more is not fulfilled I should, in my present state of superficial knowledge, be surprised if Tunisia did not slide via neutralism towards Egypt and perhaps worse. (I deliberately abstain from speculating on what Tunisia's relations might be with a North Africa from which France had withdrawn. I cannot yet formulate even a guess.)

8. It is true that this prognostication leaves out of account Tunisia's massive economic dependence on France which is, of itself, a strong bulwark against such a movement. Yet, as Sir Gladwyn Jebb has pointed out, France may not always be willing to subsidise a Tunisia whose ultimate allegiance to the Western world must, I think, always be in some doubt. Sir Gladwyn Jebb has suggested American help (including under that head the International Bank) and, as you know, Dr. Jamali recently induced M. Bourguiba to consider, at least, joining the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact. In present circumstances I do not think American help, if skilfully managed, would be at all uncongenial to Tunisians whatever the French might think of it. Far more dangerous to French and Americans alike would be the situation if Russian backing should enable real financial help to be offered by Egypt. But of that, I trust, there is as little likelihood as there is of financial help from the Her Majesty's Government.

9. My first hesitant impressions of Tunisia's position to-day leave me thinking, therefore, that we should certainly, as a minimum, do nothing to weaken France's position in Tunisia. The lack of local reaction to such verbal support as Her Majesty's Government and Sir Gladwyn Jebb have recently given to France's efforts in Algeria lead me on to think that further mild doses at intervals would not destroy the goodwill we seem to enjoy here. But—and this is really the one comment I have to make—we must, in the Western interest, bear in mind the many factors that may cause France to fail in the Maghreb as a whole. If that happens we shall need all the influence we can exert over Tunisian minds as, no doubt, over Moroccan and Algerian. We must therefore, I think, keep something back from our expressions of sympathy for France, and invest that reserve, so to speak, in a fund of Tunisian sympathy for ourselves. The interest can still be gently used to bet on France so long as France is still in the race.

10. There is little or nothing we can do in the economic field to help Tunisia save by buying even more iron ore, phosphates and esparto grass; and even so the Bank of France controls most of the resultant sterling. In the military field we can obviously do nothing save at French invitation. We are thus left, for the present, with the fields of information and cultural work. Here there are certainly possibilities, increased by the undoubted desire of many young Tunisians to escape, be it only a little, from the " bain de culture française " in which, to their immense advantage, they have spent most of a century. All this I am studying to the best of my ability and shall make my proposals this autumn. For the present I will only say that things seem to be moving fast—in what direction I cannot feel sure—in the Moslem world to which Tunisia still very much belongs; and that if our stock of goodwill is to be increased by cultural and information work in time to be of use when it may be needed, it will cost money and work must be begun with the next financial year.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Paris, Washington, Moscow, Bonn, Rome, Rabat, Cairo and Madrid, and to the United Kingdom Delegations at Paris and New York.

I have, &c.

A. C. E. MALCOLM.

JN 1013/1 No. 47

POLITICAL REVIEW—MAY 1 TO JULY 31, 1956

Mr. Malcolm to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received August 13*)

(No. 75. Confidential) *Tunis,*
Sir, *August 5, 1956.*

I have the honour to transmit herewith my Review of Political Events in Tunisia for the period May 1 to July 31, 1956. I am much indebted to Mr. First Secretary Pell for the draft.

2. Copies of this despatch are being sent to Her Majesty's Representatives at Paris, Washington, Tripoli, Benghazi, Algiers, Tetuan, Tangier and Rabat, to the United Kingdom Delegation, New York, and to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

I have, &c.

A. C. E. MALCOLM.

Enclosure

POLITICAL REVIEW OF EVENTS IN TUNISIA FOR THE PERIOD MAY 1 TO JULY 31, 1956

Franco-Tunisian Relations

The Franco-Tunisian negotiations concerning the independence of Tunisia which had not been renewed by the end of April were re-started in Paris on June 26. Their object was to produce a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, but from the outset agreement was made almost impossible by the extreme positions taken up publicly by both sides in connexion with the question of defence. M. Bourguiba, the Tunisian Prime Minister, took the view that French forces must leave Tunisia, though not necessarily at once, whereas the French Government declared that their forces must remain indefinitely. Negotiations were therefore broken off by the Tunisian delegation on July 13. Private discussions then followed between the French Ambassador and M. Bourguiba and an early resumption of negotiations was generally expected. But they had not been resumed at the end of the period under review.

2. Apart from the above dispute relations between the French and Tunisian Governments have on the whole been friendly. There have been no incidents arising out of the difference of opinion and the only changes to be noticed are the renaming of certain streets which formerly bore French names and the alteration in the status of the French High Commissioner, who has become an Ambassador Extraordinary and Envoy Exceptional, with a privileged position at the head of the Diplomatic Corps. After the conversion of M. Roger Seydoux into a French Ambassador on June 21 the French authorities in Tunis itself ceased to act as intermediary between foreign representatives and the Tunisian Government. They did however act for a time in matters of customs facilities and nationality questions. Responsibility for customs affairs has now passed to the Tunisian Government, but the French still have a hand in the issue of passports and visas.

Anglo-Tunisian Relations

3. By agreement with the French Government no recognition of the independence of Tunisia by Her Majesty's Government could be made until such time as the French Government could see their way clear and it was not until May 10 that Her Majesty's Government were able to make an announcement. A note delivered that day by the Acting Consul-General to the Tunisian Minister for Foreign Affairs, transmitting the text of the announcement and stating that Her Majesty's Government were prepared to establish diplomatic relations with the Tunisian Government as soon as the detailed negotiations about foreign affairs contemplated in the Protocol signed at Paris on March 20, 1956, had been completed,

was rejected by the Tunisian Government on the grounds that it was not considered to be consonant with the recognition of the independent sovereign status of Tunisia. The Minister for Foreign Affairs suggested an alternative wording, but it was decided to await the outcome of the Franco-Tunisian talks in Paris. The latter dragged on, however, and there was a possibility of their breaking down altogether. As this might have put Her Majesty's Government in a difficult position, seeing their declared support of the French Government, with the new Tunisian Government which they had just recognised, it was decided to await the result of the debate in the French Assembly on North Africa at the end of May, in the hope that the situation would by then have clarified itself.

4. No solution had been reached early in June and in view of an announcement by the United States Government that the United States Consulate-General had been raised forthwith to the status of an Embassy, and of the action of the Tunisian Minister for Foreign Affairs in according *agréments* for the Egyptian and Libyan Ambassadors, Her Majesty's Government felt that they could no longer put off their own announcement. They proposed to make it on June 9, but owing to a strong protest by the French Government, who wished them to wait until the Tunisian Government had concluded an arrangement with France implementing the Protocol of March 20, 1956, action was again postponed. The Acting Consul-General then made an unofficial approach to the Tunisian Government on June 13, stating that Her Majesty's Government were anxious to appoint an Ambassador but that their traditional friendship with France precluded them from doing so until the Tunisian Government came to an agreement with the French Government; and expressing the hope that this would soon come about. On June 14 the Tunisian Government, in response to the friendly approach made to them, informed the Acting Consul-General confidentially that it was only the refusal of the French Government to take a realistic view of the situation which was holding up an agreement between the two parties and the opening up of a way to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. The following day, however, a Franco-Tunisian diplomatic convention was signed in Paris and the French Government immediately withdrew their objections to the appointment of foreign Ambassadors to Tunisia. On June 16 a note was delivered to the Tunisian Government expressing the desire of Her Majesty's Government to enter into diplomatic relations immediately and to appoint the Acting Consul-General *Chargé d'Affaires ad interim*. At the same time an oral request was made for *agrément* for Mr. A. C. E. Malcolm as Her Majesty's Ambassador and Consul-General. The Tunisian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed at once to the establishment of diplomatic relations and to the appointment of Mr. Malcolm, who arrived on June 27 to take up his duties.

Tunisian Government

5. The Tunisian Government have been busy setting their house in order and consolidating their position in the political field. M. Habib Bourguiba, the Tunisian President of the Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence, remains very much the strong man of the country. The Ministers appointed on April 15 have all retained their portfolios and as far as can be seen there is little internal strife within the Government itself. They have taken strong measures to terminate the activities of so-called rebels and terrorist gangsters and by the middle of June a number of the chief terrorists, evidently impressed by the public hanging of two of their *confrères*, made their submission to the Government and by the end of the period under review these activities had practically ceased.

Tunisian Foreign Relations

6. The establishment of diplomatic relations by Her Majesty's Government on June 16 was followed by similar declarations by other European Powers and by the end of July the Italian, Turkish and Spanish Governments had announced the raising of their respective Consulates-General to the status of Embassies. In the case of Spain the Consul-General was appointed Ambassador and the Italian and Turkish Consuls-General became *Chargés d'Affaires*. The United States Government had announced a similar intention about two weeks earlier and the Consul-General became *Chargé d'Affaires*. The first Ambassador to present his credentials was naturally the French. He was followed the next day by the new Libyan Ambassador and by Her Majesty's Ambassador on July 10, after a delay due to the absence of M. Bourguiba in Paris.

7. Many other countries have recognised the independence of Tunisia and some of them have stated that they will open diplomatic relations as soon as possible.

8. The Tunisian Government have started making their own appointments and Ambassadors have been chosen for the United Kingdom, United States, Egypt, Morocco and Libya.

9. On July 26 the Security Council, on the motion of the French delegation, approved Tunisia's application for membership of the United Nations.

Salah ben Youssef

10. The situation regarding Salah ben Youssef, who is in exile and has used every opportunity to bedevil the new Tunisian Government, is now becoming rather uncertain. The recognition of Tunisian independence and the appointment of foreign Ambassadors has stolen a good deal of his thunder and he has now confined himself to demanding the complete removal of French troops from Tunisian soil. He has nevertheless appointed himself Generalissimo of the Tunisian Army of Liberation, which of course does not exist. Whether because of the removal of the main bone of contention between the two men, or because Salah ben Youssef feels that he is losing a lot of ground by remaining in exile when important events are taking place at home, it is now rumoured that he and M. Bourguiba are about to be reconciled.

Labour

11. Labour is continuing, with the aid of its four representatives in the Tunisian Government, to consolidate its already strong position in the country. There have, however, been no startling events during the period under review and the various labour unions may therefore be awaiting a more prosperous and favourable opportunity before presenting demands.

His Highness The Bey

12. With the rise to power of M. Habib Bourguiba has come a corresponding decline in the power of the Bey, who now tends more and more to become a constitutional Ruler. In addition his Civil List has been cut to 105 million francs, a measure which has had the effect of reducing sharply the extravagant incomes of the Husseinite Princes and Princesses. The privileges and immunity of the Beylical family have also been taken from them. One of the first results of this was the sensational arrest and subsequent imprisonment, in a blaze of publicity, of two Princes, Salah Bey and Ridha Bey, on a charge of operating a traffic in drugs.

Tunisian Armed Forces

13. Pressure from extremist elements led the Tunisian Government to ask for the establishment of their own Army. It was with great reluctance that the French Government, which will anyway have to pay, gave way in the matter and early in June M. Bourguiba held a parade of 1,500 Tunisian troops in the city. There were token detachments of infantry, artillery, anti-aircraft units, tanks and native cavalry. There were no naval forces. The Tunisian Government now use the existence of their microscopic forces to claim that French forces will very shortly be superfluous for purposes of public order and defence alike.

JN 1904/3 No. 48

FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO TUNIS

Mr. Malcolm to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received September 26*)

(No. 90. Confidential) *Tunis,*
Sir, *September 11, 1956.*

I have the honour to report that the Tunisian Government have agreed to the appointment of Comte Pierre de Leusse, now French Ambassador at Warsaw, to be Ambassador at Tunis in the place of M. Roger Seydoux, who is appointed Director-General of Cultural and Technical Affairs at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2. The transfer of M. Seydoux to this new post has been publicly predicted for several months past, coupled (quite correctly) with the name of M. León Marchal as his successor at Tunis. M. Marchal has, however, fallen seriously ill and M. de Leusse has now been selected in his place.

3. The name of the new French Ambassador has been received without enthusiasm or complaint, though with some emphasis on his professional training as a diplomatist by contrast with the political or military background of most of his predecessors.

4. This is not the place to examine in detail the achievements of M. Seydoux: but they have been remarkable. In the short space of two years he has been successively *Ministre-Délégué* (*i.e.*, political second-in-command) under a military Resident-General, then High Commissioner himself and finally Ambassador. He has thus spanned the rapid transition of Tunisia from the full-scale Protectorate via internal autonomy to full independence. In each stage he has had to tackle the most difficult political and administrative problems while balanced on a knife-edge between French and Tunisian nationalism—each of them prone to have recourse to violence—and exposed at the same time to recurrent gusts from Algeria and to all the different winds that blow from Paris. All this he has survived, and with credit. To his successor he leaves a situation which, unless anything goes very seriously wrong, should not be impossibly hard to manage by almost normal diplomatic methods.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I have, &c.

A. C. E. MALCOLM.

JN 10317/13 No. 49

THE PRESENT STATE OF FRANCO-TUNISIAN RELATIONS AND THE POLICY OF M. BOURGUIBA'S GOVERNMENT

Mr. Malcolm to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received October 23*)

(No. 98. Confidential) *Tunis,*
Sir, *October 15, 1956.*

The arrival of a new French Ambassador, the return of M. Bourguiba from his holiday, the impending visit of the Sultan of Morocco and "la rentrée" generally—all these furnish an occasion for attempting a review of the present state of Franco-Tunisian relations. The subject cannot, however, be treated in isolation. Both parties are acutely sensitive to what is going on elsewhere—especially in the Arab world. Every step that either of them takes, every responsible speech that is made on either side, is calculated in the light of the outlook for Algeria, for Nasser's Egypt and for M. Mollet's Government—and in this last connection it must be remembered (certainly no French Ambassador dare overlook it) that M. Bourguiba knows with great exactness how to utilise the political forces at play in France itself. The negotiations in progress between France and Tunisia are thus being conducted (by both parties, no doubt) as much in the Palais Bourbon as at the Quai d'Orsay.

2. If the rise and fortunes of Nasser's Egypt are becoming a major factor for both parties, it is, of course, the problem of Algeria that makes this possible. For M. Bourguiba this problem creates a complex of hopes and fears that may perhaps be represented as follows:—

(i) He hopes as an Arab, a Moslem and a nationalist, that Algeria will get independence; for until she does so he knows he cannot bring Franco-Tunisian relations on to the new basis of steady and intimate collaboration that he needs and desires; and until that new stability is achieved he knows that the Tunisian economy, which is by nature very weak, cannot do otherwise than remain in a most harmful state of stagnation.

(ii) He knows very well that Algeria is not a nation with a history but a modern French creation with little power of independent life; and he fears, as a francophile, impregnated through and through with French and occidental culture, that if Algeria got beyond French control the vacuum there would be beyond the power of Tunisia or Morocco to fill, but is most likely to be filled by Egypt and Russia in combination. In that event the Maghreb will be split, Morocco isolated in the West and Tunisia isolated with Libya (of which I think he has no opinion) in the East. In such circumstances, he may reason that if Tunisia is not to succumb she might actually have to seek a new form of French protection. These circumstances must therefore not be allowed to arise.

3. Faced with such dangers to Tunisian independence, unable to make more than minor progress with France while they persist, M. Bourguiba's active imagination has been turning more and more to the possibility of helping to end the Algerian conflict—this "sorte de guerre inexpiable" (as he called it in a recent press interview) "qui, si elle se prolonge, risque d'entraîner l'Afrique du Nord toute entière dans des convulsions révolutionnaires." I am sure he means what he says. "The existing régimes at Tunis and Rabat," he went on, "can only maintain themselves if the fighting stops." Later he said: "J'ai du mal à empêcher mes compatriotes de manifester de façon plus active leur sympathie aux combattants" and added that he might feel obliged to vote against France on this issue at the United Nations. In other words he sees himself in danger of being swept away by Arab nationalism that will take its cue from Egypt and turn its back on France and all that she still has to offer.

4. For these reasons M. Bourguiba has spent a good part of his holiday trying to persuade French politicians that they must let him and the Sultan of Morocco (in that order) help them with Algeria. "Je suis persuadé que le prestige dont je bénéficie dans le Maghreb me permettrait de me faire écouter." The pre-condition that he poses is, however, that France shall "at once recognise formally, explicitly, not the immediate independence of Algeria but

Algeria's inherent right to independence"—and all the better if, as M. Bourguiba expressly hopes, that declaration is endorsed ("cautionnée") by Tunisia and Morocco.

5. What effect his offer has had in France I do not know and cannot judge: but I am sure his intentions, while doubtless complex, are honourable in respect of France. His aim, as far as she is concerned, is undoubtedly to save French influence for the future in North Africa. Whether the French Government believe French influence is in such danger as he makes out, and whether, if they do, they share his opinion that they cannot afford to neglect his offer—these are quite different matters.

6. That M. Bourguiba is sincere is, I think, proved by his going on to place Algerian independence in the framework of a new relationship between France and North Africa as a whole. "Relations could be created," he said, "which have perhaps no parallel in the world. No more than the Tunisians and the Moroccans do the Algerians wish to consider France as an enemy. It is to her that they still look, to her civilisation, to her way of life. They know that they still need her."

7. If we accept, and I do not presume to say that we should do so, the view that the French must soon, in one form or another, concede a wide measure of internal autonomy—if not full juridical independence—to Algeria or at least to most of it, and that such autonomy, once conceded, will, after a short interval, have to be converted under pressure into juridical independence, then it seems to me fair to argue, as M. Bourguiba clearly would, that France's essential interests (economic and strategic) will be better safeguarded if Tunisia and Morocco are allowed to participate in the process, use their influence with the Algerians on the side of moderation, keep the spiritual allegiance of Moslem Algeria turned towards France, and eventually construct a triune independent Arab Maghreb in special relations with France. This, at any rate, is pretty clearly the scheme that will be urged upon the Sultan when he visits Tunisia next week; and although the Secretary-General assured me the other day that it was not the Tunisians' idea to try and force a solution upon France but to use quiet good offices, the expectancy aroused by the Sultan's visit (in Tunisia at any rate) is such that I shall be surprised if a joint public appeal to France and to the Algerian nationalists does not result.

8. In this fluid and complex setting Franco-Tunisian relations seem to me to be going as well as can be expected. The patriotic attitudinising that caused a rupture in July has been kept to a minimum. Polemical communiqués have been rare. Negotiation has proceeded in camera and only results have been announced. Concurrently there has, of course, been a series of military incidents of no great importance in themselves and the Tunisians have not failed to make use of them. But they have not overdone it and they have had their reward. The Minister of Finance has brought back an investment "loan" of 16·5 milliard francs; agreements have been reached on the handing over of "Radio Tunis," of the Gendarmerie, the frontier-control service ("D.S.T.") and on the conversion of the twenty-odd ex-"Contrôleurs Civils" into eight more or less genuine Consular offices. The French have agreed to start negotiations in November on the gradual transfer of full juridical competence to the Tunisians, and negotiations are going on somewhere as regards Tunisia's desire for greater freedom on commercial agreements and for her own note-issuing bank.

9. These are solid achievements for "Bourguibisme"—the policy of negotiating and of doing things by stages—and I have not yet heard how the French have safeguarded (if they have) the reality of their control on the Algerian frontier. But, as I indicated above, these are essentially minor matters. The major problems have been wisely set aside, and the time for tackling them is not yet in sight. But they are there, they are major problems and they cannot wait for ever—the presence of the French army, the status and control of Bizerta, and finally the Treaty of Alliance and Interdependence. All these are held up, not, I think, as the French sometimes assert, by bad faith on the part of M. Bourguiba, but by Algeria.

10. Franco-Tunisian relations are, I repeat, not at all bad. But there are difficulties enough. The long-stagnant economic situation is pressing the French business community very hard. There are half a million unemployed and the power of the *Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens* (U.G.T.T.) is such that the dismissal of redundant workmen or farm hands is a risky operation. Out in the country, French farmers face, in addition to a less than mediocre harvest, the certainty

of rising taxes and falling profits, and a disaffected peasantry that only waits for them to be forced to sell up and leave. After a calm of several months a French farmer has just been most brutally murdered by men —possibly Algerians—demanding a large sum of money. Considering that French investment created what little wealth this country boasts, these are hard conditions, mitigated at the moment, solely by good prospects for the olive crop. On the industrial side, the Government is well aware of the need for massive new investment. In more than one speech this summer the Prime Minister has given assurances that the Government has no intention of nationalising and that the interests of employers and employees are complementary. More recently, in connection with the impending negotiations for the elimination of the French courts, the Vice-Premier has reminded the public that they have responsibilities in respect of the foreigners who live here. None the less the secretary-general of the U.G.T.T. is on record as calling for nationalisation of large foreign concerns (unashamedly citing Nasser's example) and this has made its mark on some who might otherwise have taken the risk of investing even now. No one appears to have a clear idea of what may emerge—or when—from negotiations on Tunisia's freedom to make her own commercial agreements. Still less has there appeared any explanation of what may result from Tunisia's claim to her own note-issuing bank. Both these uncertainties must naturally be contributing their quota to the "attentisme" that reigns in the business world. It is basically a crisis of confidence.

11. Meanwhile "Tunisification" proceeds apace. French officials are fast being replaced by Tunisians of indifferent calibre (there are probably only 30,000 really literate Tunisians in the whole country) and Frenchmen are leaving at such a rate that the chief removals firm has never been so busy. Mostly the emigrants are officials born in France, who have been guaranteed integration into the French civil service. Their villas here are up for sale (not for rent) but nobody is buying at the prices asked. With these officials are leaving perceptible numbers of technicians and artisans, no less discouraged by the prospects of discrimination against them here than attracted by the many vacancies available in France. Italian residents of Tunisia are going too—not to Italy so much as to France—and some of the less illiterate Maltese as well.

12. The situation of those 15,000 French officials who are still in Tunisian service has been getting steadily more difficult owing to the conflict of loyalties involved and the small discriminations to which their Tunisian masters subject them—sometimes in breach of the Convention of 1955. They, too, could, of course, leave Tunisia and be assured of further service in France. But they do not want to leave, for Tunisia is where the bulk of them were born. At the moment of writing a serious strike of these Frenchmen is in progress and is likely to spread. The president of their uñion, M. Giovanni, has gone off to France to press their complaints upon the French Government and summon it to give them the protection it has promised. Seen off by a thousand French officials, he made a long speech full of the most violent complaints against both Governments.

13. It was not surprising therefore that the new French Ambassador should, in his very first speech, have laid special emphasis on his readiness to defend French interests and to help his countrymen adjust themselves to the new conditions. It is a most difficult adjustment at the best of times, as Englishmen well know by now, and these are not the best. Speaking on the radio on October 12, M. Bourguiba exhorted the strikers to submit their demands and complaints to their Ministers in the proper manner, adding that a "reconversion" of the French Colony in Tunisia was very necessary. Tunisia, he said, needed French teachers, doctors and technicians but could very well dispense with the services of minor officials of doubtful utility who made trouble.

14. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Washington, Rabat, Tripoli and Benghazi and to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Algiers.

I have, &c.

A. C. E. MALCOLM.

JM 1941/23 No. 50

STATE VISIT OF THE SULTAN OF MOROCCO TO TUNISIA

Mr. Malcolm to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received November 6*)

(No. 105. Confidential) *Tunis,*
Sir, *October 26, 1956.*

I have the honour to report that at 3.15 p.m. on the 22nd of October His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco arrived at Tunis on a six-day State visit, accompanied by his heir, Prince Moulay Hassan, his Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and a considerable train. They had travelled in a "Super Constellation" of the Moroccan air-line, with a French crew. His Sherifian Majesty was greeted at El Aouina airport by His Highness the Bey, his heir the "Bey du Camp", the whole Tunisian Cabinet, the Diplomatic Corps and a large crowd of notables, including many Moroccans resident in Tunisia. After the usual ceremonial, the two sovereigns drove into Tunis in open cars at the head of a procession of some thirty-five vehicles. Having toured the city slowly amid cheering crowds kept in perfect order by the Tunisian police, the procession drove out again to the palace called "Dar es-Saada" at La Marsa which had been especially renovated in order to serve as the Sultan's residence during his stay. His Majesty arrived there about 6 o'clock. Hardly had he entered the house when news was received of an event elsewhere that by midnight had caused the whole programme to be cancelled. By noon two days later, the Sultan and the whole of his suite had left Tunisia. The visit, and the event which suddenly brought it to an end are so closely connected that they must be dealt with in a single narrative.

2. For obvious reasons, the Sultan's visit had been eagerly awaited. This was the first state visit to be received by Tunisia since she became independent and the visitor was the head of the sister-State of Morocco, a monarch, moreover, of the Sherifian blood and a fellow-sufferer in the cause of liberty. More even than that, the Sultan was an important confederate in the cause of Algerian freedom; and the political purpose of the visit was, ostensibly at least, to devise, if possible, a common policy that would not only be conducive to ending the Algerian war on satisfactory terms before it got out of hand but to constructing thereafter some kind of triune North African group that would be in specially intimate relations with France to the mutual benefit of France and of the Arab Maghreb alike.

3. Great preparations had therefore been made by the Tunisian Government. At a cost reputed to be £200,000, the "Dar es-Saada" had been entirely reconstructed and refurnished, its derelict park re-landscaped and replanted, new approach-roads laid out, new gateways built and much of the more visible parts of La Marsa village re-whitewashed. One third of the 12-mile road from Tunis had been newly-lined with palms. Illuminations had been devised and installed at the approaches to the Bey's palace at Carthage and to the Prime Minister's residence at Sainte-Monique, where great entertainments were planned. The city was beflagged, the statue of Jules Ferry on the main avenue of Tunis was removed on the ingenious pretext that it had been asked for by his natal village in France, its site levelled and its place taken by a temporary pseudo-Islamic triumphal arch bearing the portraits of the Bey, the Sultan, and M. Bourguiba. The Avenue Gambetta was to be renamed Avenue Mohammed V in the Sultan's presence. The programme included a visit to the Holy City of Kairouan where His Sherifian Majesty would take part in the traditional Friday rites. The whole of this, the result of months of planning and several weeks of actual work carried on night and day, was scrapped within nine hours of the Sultan's arrival.

4. The reason is well known to you. Algeria was to have been represented at the conference by five of the principal leaders of the Algerian revolt, headed by its military director, Ben Bella. These men, who had been publicly received by the Sultan in Morocco, were to have travelled to Tunis in his own aircraft as his guests and, in his own eyes, under his personal protection. Shortly before the Sultan left Rabat it was found that there would not be room for them in his aircraft. The reason is alleged, perhaps by French sources, to be that the Sultan made a late decision to take with him some of his women-folk. The Sultan therefore chartered an aircraft of a Moroccan air-line to bring the five rebel

Algerians, with twenty-seven journalists, to Tunis. This aircraft was to fly by way of Majorca and Sardinia so as to avoid Algeria. The crew, however, was French. The aircraft took off from Rabat about half past eleven, refuelled at Palma and was on its way to Cagliari at about five o'clock when (according to the Moroccan sources which gave the first news here) the pilot radioed Rabat that he was being summoned by a French fighter to land at Algiers. He asked for instructions and was told to return to Palma. An ominous silence then ensued for several hours. The worst fears were confirmed when it became known in Tunis about half-past nine that the aircraft had landed at Algiers and that the five rebel leaders were under arrest.

5. Already before the fate of the aircraft was definitely known, the Tunisian Government had taken steps to communicate its indignation and alarm to various foreign representatives here. M. Bourguiba sent for the French, American and Spanish Ambassadors, and the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called on me after dinner at my house. M. Hajeri told me, on instructions, the first part of the tale recounted in the previous paragraph and then said the Tunisian Government greatly feared that an act of gross treachery had been committed which, if confirmed, would " set the whole of North Africa ablaze ". When I asked what the charge of treachery was founded on, he said that there had been a " gentlemen's agreement " with the French that the five Algerians would be allowed to proceed unmolested to Tunis for the conference, provided they kept away from Algeria. I pressed him to tell me who had made this agreement with whom, and when. He replied that it had been made orally by M. Bourguiba himself in Paris recently, with the French Prime Minister and M. Alain Savary, Minister for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs. Its breach, he said, was a grave stain on French honour and would have incalculable consequences. The Sultan, he added, was in a great rage. His Majesty felt himself personally responsible, the Algerians being his guests and under his protection, and was swearing he would return to Rabat next day unless the Algerians reached Tunis safely that night. The Tunisian Government asked me to inform you of their feelings and their fears. M. Hajeri was clearly exhausted and in great distress at the calamitous turn events had taken. I therefore confined myself to saying I thought, with great respect, that the Sultan would be very ill-advised to take any such decison until it was known just what had happened and I earnestly hoped for the same reason that no dramatic communiqué would be issued that night. I would of course report what he had asked me to; but as there was no question of Her Majesty's Government doing anything about it (to which he agreed) I should wait until I had seen the morning's newspapers. Surely, I argued, it would be better to be sure that the worst, from their standpoint, had really happened before they acted on that assumption and wrecked the situation themselves. The Secretary-General seemed to share my view. An hour after M. Hajeri had left me, the French Embassy telephoned to say, on the Ambassador's instructions, that the aircraft had landed at Algiers, that M. Mollet and M. Alain Savary, to whom the Ambassador had been telephoning, disclaimed all knowledge of the affair and that the Cabinet was meeting at that moment, to consider it.

6. The morning's papers confirmed the landing and the arrest. They contained an angry Tunisian communiqué but no French statement. I rang the Ambassador and ascertained that none had been made so far as he knew. The Cabinet was meeting again. But the fat was plainly in the fire; and the Press said the Tunisian Ambassador had been instructed to call on you. I therefore sent off my telegram No. 130 and went in uniform to " Dar es-Saada " (no longer, alas, the " House of Peace ") where the Diplomatic Corps was due at ten o'clock to pay its respects to the Sultan. Arriving there, I found packed bags in the front hall and a few colleagues being told in hushed tones that the Sultan had been in conference until 6 a.m., had cancelled our reception and all other engagements and was returning at once to Rabat. There would be no luncheon with the Bey and no dinner with M. Bourguiba. Once outside, my American colleague told me the only reason why the Sultan was still there at all was that he flatly refused to fly back with a French crew but that he, the Ambassador, had not yet been able to find him a large American aircraft. (Eventually it was the Italian Ambassador who succeeded, though Alitalia requested him to get a cheque for 9,000 dollars before the Sultan embarked. This, however, he did not attempt.) I then despatched my telegram No. 134.

7. The 23rd of October was spent in continuous conference between the Tunisians and Moroccans. A joint note of protest, appealing for reconsideration,

was handed to the French Ambassador. It was not, however, published until the Prime Minister read it to the Constituent Assembly on the 25th of October. A translation is enclosed. Throughout the day there was a general strike all over Tunisia and some minor disturbances took place in Tunis and elsewhere. The Tunisian armed forces, however, were out in strength and seem to have dealt with the rioters most creditably everywhere. French troops left barracks and waited out of sight but did not intervene.

8. The following day the shops reopened and, while the Sultan was paying private visits of homage to the tombs of Moncef Bey and Ferhat Hached and, I believe, unobtrusively re-baptising the Avenue Gambetta, I called on the French Ambassador. This interview was reported in my telegram No. 135. M. de Leusse was very weary and was apprehensive about the safety of the 180,000 French civilians in Tunisia. He told me he had sent for reinforcements from Algeria, that these were arriving but would be kept out of sight. He said M. Bourguiba had been pretty wild in talk at first but was so clearly trying to keep things calm, and rightly so, for his own régime would be in danger very soon if things got rough. The Ambassador thought the next few days would be crucial and did not think it impossible that Morocco and Tunisia would declare war on France. In his private opinion, the arrest had been a " monumental error ". I told him of your interview with the Tunisian Ambassador the previous day (having just received your telegram No. 174) letting him see that Her Majesty's Government at least showed no inclination to add to France's troubles.

9. At 11.45 a.m., the Sultan and his party (less his Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, who had flown to Paris) left Tunis. They were seen off by the Bey and his Ministers, and by the Egyptian, Libyan and Italian Ambassadors. After His Majesty's departure a joint communiqué was issued on the results of the conference. A translation is enclosed. Thus ended, abruptly and in an atmosphere of calamity, strife, and impending bloodshed, the state visit of the Sultan of Morocco to Tunisia.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and Rabat and to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Algiers.

I have, &c.

A. C. E. MALCOLM.

Enclosure No. 1

(Translation)

JOINT TUNISIAN-MOROCCAN NOTE DELIVERED TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR AT TUNIS: OCTOBER 23, 1956

The Moroccan and Tunisian Governments, whose representatives are meeting at Tunis, have reviewed the situation which results from the interception, by the French authorities in Algeria, of the aircraft carrying the prominent Algerians whom the two Governments had invited with a view to examining with them what means might contribute to a peaceful solution of the present conflict in Algeria.

The two Governments protest most energetically against this act of force which constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. They point out especially the brutality of the kidnapping of which the said prominent persons were made the victims in contempt of the law of nations.

The two Governments consider the French authorities' stroke as an act of hostility directed against the sovereignty of the two countries and as an attempt to thwart their efforts for the restoration of peace in North Africa and thus to jeopardise the harmonious development of relations between France and the countries of North Africa.

The two Governments consider it their duty to draw the attention of the French Government to the extreme gravity of the situation created by the act of the French authorities in Algeria and to the disastrous consequences which would inevitably follow for the relations of Morocco and Tunisia with France if these acts were endorsed by the French Government.

The two Governments will, furthermore, hold the French Government responsible for the fate of the prominent Algerians now under arrest.

The two Governments appeal to the wisdom of the French Government, to take, as a matter of urgency, the steps which are necessary in order to restore the atmosphere of calm which is indispensable to the solution of the grave conflict that has arisen and to do so in the interest of all the countries concerned.

Enclosure No. 2

(Translation)

JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED BY THE MOROCCAN AND TUNISIAN GOVERNMENTS AFTER THE SULTAN OF MOROCCO HAD LEFT TUNIS ON OCTOBER 24, 1956

The representatives of the Tunisian and Moroccan Governments, meeting at " Dar es-Saada ", have examined the problems which concern the two countries and in particular the distressing situation which prevails in their brother-country of Algeria, have proclaimed the identity of their views on the Algerian problem and their entire solidarity with the Algerian people as regards the attainment of its freedom, on account of the spiritual, cultural and historical bonds and of the common destinies which link the countries of the Maghreb.

Furthermore, the two Governments have agreed to co-ordinate their actions in all fields that lend themselves to co-operation between Morocco and Tunisia and to remain in permanent contact in order to agree upon all measures that may serve the interests of the brother-countries of the Maghreb pending the signature of the " Treaty of Co-operation and Alliance " which the two Governments have resolved to conclude.

Tunis,
18 Rabia 1376—24 October, 1956.

JN 1015/3 No. 51

POLITICAL REVIEW FOR THE PERIOD AUGUST 1–OCTOBER 31, 1956

Mr. Malcolm to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received November 5*)

(No. 109. Confidential) *Tunis,*
Sir, *October 31, 1956.*

I have the honour to transmit herewith my review of political events in Tunisia for the period August 1 to October 31, 1956.

2. Copies of this despatch are being sent to Her Majesty's Representatives at Paris, Washington, Tripoli, Benghazi, Algiers, Tetuan, Tangier and Rabat and to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

I have, &c.
A. C. E. MALCOLM.

Enclosure

POLITICAL REVIEW OF EVENTS IN TUNISIA FOR THE PERIOD AUGUST 1–OCTOBER 31, 1956

Franco-Tunisian Relations

Confidence was very badly shaken by events late in October, but relations had previously been really rather good. With the tacit agreement to put aside the difficult questions of defence, Bizerta, &c., negotiations were quietly resumed in Paris on August 1 and were steadily pursued, with ups and downs, throughout the summer. They resulted first in an agreement to the transfer of Radio Tunis to Tunisian hands by March 31, 1957, followed by French agreement to lend Tunisia 16·5 milliard francs for capital investment (against 13·5 in 1955). It was also agreed to reduce the 20-odd French " Consulates " to eight genuine ones, to hand over the gendarmerie and the control of frontiers to Tunisian control in October, and to start, early in November, negotiations for the gradual elimination of separate French tribunals for Frenchmen and nationals of excapitulatory powers.

2. The harmony of these discussions was marred from time to time by military incidents of varying gravity, all of which stemmed from the Algerian war and from the fact that French forces based in Tunisia were engaged in it while Algerian bands constantly sought aid and shelter in Tunisia. Only late in October did serious trouble break out. What set it off was the action of the French in arresting, by a neat trick, five of the top Algerian rebel leaders who were on their way to take part with the Sultan of Morocco and M. Bourguiba in a conference at Tunis ostensibly concerned with ways and means of acceptably ending the war in Algeria. The shock and anger felt in Tunisia were so intense that the French at once moved forces back from Algeria to protect if necessary the lives of their nationals. The Tunisian Government reacted violently and widespread minor clashes resulted. By the end of the month a dozen or so had been killed on either side but the trouble seemed to have spent its first anger, and both sides were warily feeling their way towards a new *modus vivendi* as regards the French forces.

Anglo-Tunisian Relations

3. No question arose and even the Suez Canal crisis produced no animosity to speak of. M. Taieb Slim, whose *agrément* as Tunisian Ambassador in London had been signified early in July, at last took up his post late in September.

Tunisian Government

4. So far as could be seen, the Cabinet continued to work harmoniously under M. Bourguiba's forceful leadership and were almost too active in drafting and promulgating reforms. The chief of these affected the judiciary which was thoroughly reorganised. By consent of the Moslem and Jewish religious leaders

(obtained by some pretty high pressure) the law on personal status was reformed and codified and brought under the general control of the civil courts. Among other reforms, polygamy was abolished—not without arousing a good deal of grumbling among the older and more Islamic sections of the people who, if they personally found one wife enough, saw no reason why what the Prophet had allowed should be forbidden by M. Bourguiba.

5. The economic situation continued to stagnate, largely on account of *attentisme* on the part of the French business element in whose hands so much of the country's productive power lies. Unemployment remained high. The Government balanced its budget on paper by heroic measures—among them violent cuts in the pay of all civil servants. This produced much discontent and was a contributory cause of the crisis that rent the Trades Unions late in the period under review. But the Neo-Destour swept the board in August by-elections and its grip on the country remained very strong.

6. Tunisification proceeded apace, to the growing alarm of Frenchmen, many of whom continued to sell up and leave. A strike of 15,000 French civil servants greeted the new French Ambassador on his arrival but did not last long.

Tunisian Foreign Relations

7. On September 24 M. Roger Seydoux left to take up his appointment as Director-General of Cultural and Technical Affairs at the Quai d'Orsay. On October 6 he was succeeded by Comte Pierre de Leusse who, however, had lost his temper and his job by October 25 over the arrest of the Algerians. On October 29 M. Seydoux returned on a temporary " special mission " with the task of restoring confidence.

8. Credentials were presented by Ambassadors from Morocco, Egypt, Western Germany, Italy and the United States; and the Greek Consulate declared itself to be a Legation. A mission from Canada spent a week enquiring into the utility of establishing diplomatic relations and possibly a Legation under a resident *Chargé d'Affaires*.

9. On October 22 the Sultan of Morocco with a large suite arrived on a six-day State Visit but returned to Rabat on October 24 in consequence of the crisis recorded under " Franco-Tunisian Relations " above. Great sums had been spent on getting ready to receive him.

10. The Suez Canal crisis found the Tunisian populace solidly on Nasser's side, their Government however a good deal less so in view of Nasser's frequent hostile criticism of M. Bourguiba and his policies. The support that M. Bourguiba gave to Egyptian policy was therefore tardy, verbal and minimal. He had bigger fish to fry with the French. Nor on the last day of October was the Tunisian Government doing more than express anxiety at the reported Anglo-French descent on the Canal Zone.

11. The Tunis Trade Fair in October was noteworthy for a massive crop of national pavilions erected by the Communist satellite Governments (including China though not the USSR) and accompanied by profuse advertising in the Press. Diplomatic relations with the Soviet *bloc* continued, however, to be conducted through the Ambassadors in Paris.

Labour

12. On August 5 the able and ambitious Ahmed ben Salah called in a speech for nationalisation of foreign enterprises *a la* Nasser but was quickly slapped down by M. Bourguiba who attached much more importance to stemming the flight of capital and attracting fresh foreign investment. On the whole, however, the U.G.T.T. gave the Government such steady support that when the time came for its annual conference in September, M. ben Salah found his re-election quite strongly opposed by the malcontents, led by the Sfaxian Habib Achour. With help from M. Bourguiba, who broke his holiday for the purpose, and by his own brilliant oratory and management, ben Salah achieved a handsome victory only to see the whole group of the Sfax unions break away a month later and found the new " Union des Travailleurs Tunisiens ". Small unions elsewhere seceded to the U.T.T. but no landslide had developed or was predicted by the end of October.

13. The I.C.F.T.U. will hold its annual conference at Tunis in July 1957.

His Highness the Bey

14. His Highness continued to receive Ambassadors with grave old-world courtesy but was not otherwise heard of. If rumour is correct in predicting that Tunisia will become a republic either on his death or on the promulgation of the new Constitution (whichever is the earlier) His Highness certainly seems to be putting up no fight for his throne. Nor were any of the senior Princes—least of all his heir.

Tunisian Armed Forces

15. The Army slowly took shape—wholly French in all essentials. Staff officers were dispatched to courses in France and cadets to St. Cyr. Next to nothing was seen or heard of any Air Force or Navy, and no report has come to hand about the Army's showing in the skirmishes with the French at the end of October. Universal military service appears to be intended.

General

16. Much of M. Bourguiba's holiday in France seems to have been spent in trying to persuade French politicians that France had, for her own good, better let him and the Sultan of Morocco use their good offices for ending the Algerian war before it got out of hand, engulfed the whole of North Africa and very likely swept away the present régimes at Tunis and Rabat and with them the last North African friends of France and French influence. It seems unlikely that M. Bourguiba got much encouragement in responsible French circles. His fears, however, are believed to be not only genuinely felt but not devoid of foundation as regards the power of his régime to resist a wave of really fanatical Moslem nationalism fanned by Egypt.